Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic

Edited by

S.T. ROSELAAR

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Processes of Integration and Identity Formation in the Roman Republic

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INTRODUCTION: INTEGRATION AND IDENTITY IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

Saskia T. Roselaar*

1. *Introduction*

This volume is the result of a conference held at the University of Manchester in July 2010, which focused on issues related to integration and identity in the Roman Republic.[1] The reader may perhaps wonder whether there is a need for yet another volume on identity in the ancient world, a subject which has been the subject of much recent scholarship. However, we feel that this volume adds essential new insights to the existing literature and shows that there are many areas that need further investigation. Firstly, the Roman Republic has not received as much attention as other periods in antiquity. Secondly, debates on integration and identity are often very general: they focus on general processes of integration and identity formation, looking for rules and models that can be applied over a wide area and through various periods in time. However, they do not always take sufficiently into account the myriad local variations that occurred throughout the Roman Republic and the motivations of the individuals experiencing and participating in these processes. Although general models can certainly be helpful to explain such processes, local situations should form the starting point of any enquiry into integration and identity formation. The studies in this volume try to go beyond the arguments of definition and applicability that have so often bogged down recent scholarship. By taking local situations and individuals as their starting point, they attempt to shed new light on these recent debates.

Throughout this volume it will be emphasized that the integration of Italy under Roman rule was a complex process, which showed many local

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[1] Some papers and posters presented at the conference are not published in this volume. They are: G.J. Bradley, 'The social and ethnic mobility of the elite in central Italy from the archaic to the mid-Republican period'; T.J. Cornell, 'The Romanization debate'; A. Coşkun, 'Citizenship in the context of law, culture, politics, and society: the construction of Romanness in Cicero's *Archiana*'; J. Ferriss-Hill, 'An ancient understanding of cognate relationships? Varro's treatment of Latin-Sabellic pairs in the *De Lingua Latina*'; E. Isayev, 'What and where was Rome after the Social War?', and M. Termeer, 'The Latin colonies of central Italy in the Middle Republic: cultural communities between local and Roman'.

and regional variations. The contributors to this volume hope that it will give at least an introduction to these complex issues and that the topics discussed here will lead to further fruitful research into other aspects of the fascinating processes of integration and identity formation in Republican Italy.

2. *The Study of Integration Processes: 'Points of Contact'*

A modern definition of integration states that it is 'the intermixing of people who were previously segregated', specifically 'the bringing into equal membership of a common society those groups or persons previously discriminated against on racial or cultural grounds'.[2] While the Italian peoples did not form one coherent subordinate group, the Roman state did become the dominant political unit during the Republic. This had far-reaching consequences for the Italians, but also for the Romans themselves. These changes are most clearly visible in the culture and language of the Italian peoples: by the end of the first century BC, Italy shared many elements of culture which had not been present everywhere in earlier periods, for example theatres, baths, roads, and regular town layouts. However, local variations, of course, still existed, as will be emphasized throughout this volume. Furthermore, the Latin language was now in general use throughout Italy; most other languages had already been dropped from daily use. Only Etruscan and Greek still remained in use in small pockets of Italy.[3]

Early studies of the integration of the Italian peoples into the Roman political framework assumed that there was one 'Roman' culture, which, in itself, was superior to that of the 'uncivilized' Italians, and that therefore its attractions were obvious to the Italians. The adoption of this 'Roman' culture, and of the Latin language by the Italian peoples, was, therefore, an inevitable consequence of Roman military conquest.[4] This static view has long been rejected. It is now clear that the processes of integration that took place between the Romans and their subjects were extremely complicated. Furthermore, it is clear that Italians were active agents, who

[2] Oxford Dictionaries Online: http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0415100#m_en_gb0415100; Oxford English Dictionary: http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/97356?redirectedFrom=integration

[3] Penney (2009).

[4] Haverfield (1905).

created their own cultural identity, rather than passive recipients of Roman culture.[5] Many areas of Italy already shared elements of Hellenic culture, such as temples and theatres, and Rome was not the driving force in the spread of this culture, which instead centred on the towns of Campania and Italian rural sanctuaries.[6]

Even the political dominance of the Roman state was expressed in various ways: some Italian people received Roman citizenship, others the *civitas sine suffragio*, while yet others, the majority of the Italians, remained independent allies, who had to obey Roman rule by paying tribute and serving in the Roman army.[7] Political dominance, furthermore, is not sufficient to explain integration in other senses. In order to understand why eventually all Italians shared a largely common culture and language, we must look at other types of interaction. Such wide-ranging cultural changes as occurred in Republican Italy can only occur in situations of long-lasting, close contact in a variety of contexts. A serious lacuna in our current knowledge of these changes—as well as one of the reasons for the debate about the term Romanization—is that most studies of Italy under the Republic focus on cultural, religious, and linguistic change. They describe the consequences of increased contact with Rome, namely the adoption of 'Roman' material culture and Latin language, and describe material artefacts which illustrate these changes. These changes are often simply attributed to 'increased contacts' between Romans and Italians.[8] However, it is by no means clear how exactly these 'contacts' led to cultural change. Furthermore, the types of interaction that occurred between Romans and Italians varied from place to place, and according to social class, gender, age, profession, et cetera. Therefore, the causes of cultural change are not yet explained in a satisfactory way. There is, therefore, a significant lacuna in our knowledge of the integration processes in the Republic: we know that the peoples of Italy were united in one political unit and that eventually culture and language became more uniform throughout Italy, but we do not know how these developments were related. To simply

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5 Keay & Terrenato (2001); Le Roux (2004); Revell (2009).

6 See the articles collected in Zanker (ed.) (1976).

7 Göhler (1939); Sherwin-White (1973); Galsterer (1976); Hantos (1983). For the Latins, see most recently Coşkun (2009).

8 E.g. Torelli (1995); for linguistic change see Adams (2003). Many studies on individual Italian cities follow the same pattern; some recent examples include Celuzza (2002); Cambi (2004); Dall'Aglio & Di Cocco (2004). Of course there is nothing wrong with such studies in themselves, but they do not always offer sufficient explanation as to why cultural change occurred.

ascribe change to 'increased contacts' is to miss a crucial step in the process of integration.

What we need to study, therefore, is which interactions exactly took place between Romans and Italian peoples, and between various Italian peoples. Only if we know where different peoples met each other in daily life can we understand how 'increased contacts' led to cultural and linguistic change. An essential requirement for a clearer understanding of integration in the Republic is therefore to focus on the actual 'points of contact' that existed between Romans and Italians. This book therefore focuses on the interactions that took place between these groups, the way these interactions led to integration, and how this led to greater cultural unity within the peninsula.

Political dominance led to a variety of contexts for interaction between Romans and Italians: first among these were Roman administration—for those Italians who had received (partial) Roman citizenship—participation in the army, and economic contacts. Gradually these led to other forms of contact between Romans and Italians, for example patronage and marriage links, direct involvement in Roman politics (depending on the political status of the Italian communities) and contacts with Rome or with colonies founded by the Romans. Recent works have focused on some of these contexts for interaction,[9] but not all of them have received equal attention.

This book explores interaction in a variety of contexts:

a) *Settlement*

To establish points of contact between Romans and Italians, we must first find out where these groups lived. The colonies founded by the Romans throughout Italy are usually assumed to have played a large role in the 'Romanization' of Italy. Until recently, it was often assumed that Italians were expelled from their lands and that colonies were created according to a standard model, which exerted a strong influence upon the surrounding Italian population.[10] The impact of this traditional model of Roman colonization has been so large that it is only very recently that scholars have started to question it. Bispham, for example, expresses reservations concerning the traditional model, especially for the mid-Republican period

[9] E.g. Jehne & Pfeilschifter (2006); Bispham (2007); Roth & Keller (2007).
[10] Gargola (1995); Torelli (1999).

(338–*c.* 200 BC).[11] Colonies established by the Romans in this period seem to have had little influence on the surrounding territory. Many elements that constitute a community, such as town walls, public buildings, roads, farms, and land measurement grids, seem to have been created not at the time of the colonies' foundation, but only after 200 BC. It is possible, therefore, that many colonies in the preceding period were not the well-organized towns postulated by traditional scholarship.

Moreover, the physical elimination and expulsion of defeated groups seems, in fact, to have been very uncommon. In many colonies local culture did not disappear, continuing to flourish long after the foundation of the colony.[12] If local inhabitants were not, as a rule, removed from the land on which they lived, then interaction between Romans and Italians may have been very common in and around most colonies.[13] A more detailed reconstruction of the colonial landscape is therefore in order. In this volume Edward Bispham studies the colony of Antium as a case study for the role of local inhabitants in colonies. He argues that the identity of the town was slow to reflect integration into the Roman state; it shows evidence for the presence of people from various ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

Colonies, however, were only one possible location for interaction between Romans and Italians; these groups also came into contact through viritane settlements created by the Roman state, as well as by informal migration, which was not regulated at all. Furthermore, Roman *ager publicus* could be used freely by Roman citizens and by Italians.[14] Elizabeth Robinson explores the allied town of Larinum, its contacts with other locations in Italy, and the identity formation that occurred among its elite. It is clear the local identity of this town was not only dependent on contact with Romans, who may have migrated to this area, but that many networks existed between Italian towns and other areas in and outside of Italy.

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[11] Bispham (2006).

[12] Pelgrom (2008); Stek (2009).

[13] The level of incorporation of Italian peoples in colonies varied considerably from colony to colony, however; in some colonies there is hardly any evidence for Italian presence, whereas in others, such as Paestum and Brundisium, the Italian elite continued to play a crucial role. See Roselaar (2011).

[14] Roselaar (2010).

b) *Army*

The role of the Italians in the Roman army has since long been a subject of study, with many suggesting that the army functioned as a 'melting pot' for Romans and Italians.[15] Others, however, have suggested that the integrative mechanisms of the army were limited: because the Italians each served in their own units under their own commanders.[16] However, this issue has recently come under renewed scrutiny. The focus now lies mostly on the exact duties of the allies and the functioning of its individual units, which were probably less static than is often assumed in reconstructions of the Roman army.[17]

In this volume Nathan Rosenstein investigates the layout of army camps and the daily life of soldiers in order to see where Roman and Italian recruits may have interacted. He suggests that there were myriad possibilities for interaction between soldiers of different backgrounds. Thus, he sheds more light on how exactly the experience of service in the Roman army would have impacted on an Italian soldier. However, the army did not only serve as a location for integration between Romans and their Italians allies; in fact, military contacts had always been an important instrument to create contacts between different peoples. Patrick Kent suggests that Rome's strategy to control its allies with mutual defence treaties was not unique, but that this had been an essential element of warfare during the early Republic; many peoples made such treaties with each other, and continued to do so in the face of Roman aggression. Thus, the army was essential for integration between Italian groups as well.

c) *Politics and Administration*

As we have seen, the Roman state could deal with defeated Italians in a variety of ways: some received full citizenship, while others were granted *civitas sine suffragio* or remained allied. Because of the many local differences, a veritable patchwork of groups with different forms of citizenship was created. Those with full or partial Roman citizenship would have interacted with the Roman state in a different way than those who were its allies. Communities which possessed full Roman citizenship were subject to Roman law and their inhabitants were allowed to vote in Rome;

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15 E.g. Ilari (1974).
16 Keppie (1984, 23).
17 Pfeilschifter (2007).

however, they also had their own magistrates to carry out local administration. Communities with the *civitas sine suffragio* were administered by *praefecti* who were sent out from Rome—although the exact responsibilities of these men are not well known—and for day-to-day business they also had their own magistrates.

The different forms of political integration led to varying levels of integration: some Italians now came to Rome to vote (although not many who had citizenship may have made the effort), while others only experienced the powers of the *praefecti*. Allied communities also experienced administrative integration through the influence of the Roman *dilectus* and census procedures; there was, furthermore, occasional direct intervention by the Roman state, as in the Bacchanalia affair.[18] In this volume Osvaldo Sacchi explores the governmental structure of the town of Capua, which had received the *civitas sine suffragio* in the fourth century BC. Although this status was taken away in 211, and the town became governed directly by Roman prefects, there were still local magistrates who played a role in the town's cultural identity.

d) *Economy*

Contacts between Romans and Italians occurred for various economic reasons. For example, trade provided an important opportunity for Italians, to meet both the Romans, as well as other Italian groups. Trade is often a first point of contact between different peoples and participation in the economy of a politically dominant group may lead to integration in a cultural sense.[19]

Important, in this respect, is the question of where Romans and Italians met for trade purposes. All kinds of markets existed. Some shops and markets were permanent, especially those in larger towns such as colonies, and could have attracted both Romans and Italians, especially if the latter lived in colonies or travelled there for trade. Other markets (*nundinae*) were held weekly in specific towns, on a relatively small scale, and catered for a few villages. Others occurred less frequently, were larger, and had a larger area of attraction.[20] Some of these trade relations are highlighted

[18] For the census see Northwood (2008); for the Bacchanalia affair see Pailler (1988); De Cazanove (2000).

[19] Curtin (1984); Simon (1989).

[20] De Ligt (1993); Frayn (1993).

by Daniel Hoyer in his paper on Samnium's economic contacts before and after the Roman conquest; Samnium was by no means a poor and backward region, but had many trade contacts with other areas in an outside of Italy. During the Roman conquest of Italy and the Mediterranean, local people may also have come to Roman army camps to trade. This aspect of trade is explored by Toni Ñaco del Hoyo and Jordi Principal, who focus on trade in the wake of the Roman armies in Spain; it becomes clear that a lively trade was carried out between locals and Romans, and that this led to cultural change among the local population.

In dealings with non-Italian peoples, Italians may have benefited from their association with Romans, because they were considered by other peoples to be protected by Rome's power. This may have given Italians more business opportunities than they had before the Roman conquest. It is also clear that Italians and Romans on Delos presented themselves as a homogeneous group and were perceived as such by those with whom they traded. This was important for the creation of a 'Roman' identity among the Italians, who perceived that they were treated as equals to the Romans when outside of Italy, but were not granted the same rights as Romans within Italy.[21] This may have contributed to their eventual demand for full Roman citizenship. Saskia Roselaar explores in this volume how Italians benefited from their association with Rome and how this contributed to their integration within the Roman state; the Roman state, from an early date, took the interests of its allies to heart, but this did not lead to their political inclusion.

e) *Social Networks*

Roman and Italian elites maintained close social contacts. These may have been initiated for various purposes, such as guest-friendship (*hospitium*) and trade, and eventually developed into closer relationships, which included intermarriage between Roman and Italian elites.[22] Kathryn Lomas explores the reasons for the emergence and maintainence of these contacts in the late Republic, the geographical area and social range they covered, and their role in the integration of Roman and Italian elites.

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21 Gabba (1954); Bleicken (1990).

22 See e.g. Capogrossi Colognesi (1994); Patterson (2006).

3. *Roman and Italian Concepts of Identity*

All these different kinds of contacts may have changed the way that Romans and Italians thought about themselves, in other words in their concept of their identity. Identity in this context must be considered as the ideas which the involved parties had about their place in the world and their relationship with others. Such ideas can be reflected in material culture, religion, and language; for the Romans we have a considerable body of literature on this subject as well.[23]

There are few direct sources written from an Italian point of view, but it is clear that their political incorporation into the Roman state led to changes in their own identity, and in the material artefacts and the language through which they expressed this. Roman Roth, in this volume, studies connections that existed between various regions in the early Republic. He argues that regions have tended to be defined in ethnic terms (e.g. Daunians, Lucanians etc.), which are based on often shaky notions of the cultures of pre-Roman Italy. However, the mid-fourth century saw a realignment of the regions of Italy along axes of cultural connectivity, which cut across such perceived ethnic boundaries.

Many Italians were aware of the benefits that could accrue from association with Roman rule, not least the new economic opportunities that resulted from being part of the growing Roman Mediterranean empire. However, this did not mean that they were now consistently trying to represent themselves as Romans, rather than as members of their respective Italian groups. Moreover, the willingness of Italians to present themselves as 'Roman' varied according to time and circumstance. It is crucial to remember that the identity that someone chooses to adopt varies according to circumstance: someone may be at the same time a son, a father, a husband, a middle-aged man, a Lucanian-born Roman citizen, a local town councillor, and the guest friend of a Roman, and consider himself "all, some, or none of these at any given moment".[24] Our man may have presented himself differently to his own family than to a Roman magistrate; sometimes he may have preferred to call himself a Roman, for example when dealing with Roman courts of law or trying to pursue a career in Rome, while at other times he may have expressed pride in

[23] For the relationship between material culture and identity see Antonaccio (2010).
[24] To borrow a parallel from Huskinson (2000, 10).

his Italian heritage, for example when celebrating a local town festival.[25] Language usage may be a good example for such behaviour. As David Langslow argues here, the shift from Italian languages to Latin did not progress in a uniform fashion. An Italian could choose to employ different languages in different situations, according to the identity he wanted to be associated with at that moment.

Furthermore, how he saw himself at any given moment may be different from how he was seen by others at the same time; say, by his Roman host, who was descended from ten generations of Roman nobility.[26] Romans were not always eager to accept Italians as equals, either in a political and legal or in an ideological sense. However, when it suited their purpose, the Romans were quick to assert a shared identity with Italians. In this volume, Federico Russo explores how the Romans constructed a shared Italian identity, with the Mamertines in this case, in order to justify their intervention in the First Punic War. Roman writers, especially those with a non-Roman background, also emphasized the importance of Italy for Roman history and identity. Eleanor Jefferson takes Cato's *Origines* as an example; in this work, the author shows great awareness of the local history of Italy, and acknowledges the importance of Italians in the formation of the city of Rome and the expansion of its power. Thus, the work can be constructed as an early example of Romano-Italian cultural negotiation.

It is clear that in the late second century Italy was very different from two centuries before and that the changes that had occurred were mostly due to the increasingly important role of Rome in the lives of most Italians. On the other hand, the Italians now also played an indispensable role in the Roman state and they were aware that this was the case. However, it must be remembered that the Italian peoples did not always see eye to eye. There were tensions within and between communities, based on local rivalries, status differences, and the varying impact of Roman authority. John Patterson explores how all these tensions led to the fact that the Italians were hardly ever, before the Social War, able to formulate an overall policy which could have formed an alternative to Roman rule.[27]

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[25] Farney (2007).

[26] Dench (1995).

[27] Even just before and during the Social War, not all Italians were unified; some did not join the rebellion, or only at a late stage. *Cf.* debate about the aims of the Italians in the Social War: Mouritsen (1998) maintains that they aimed for independence from Rome, while Keaveney (1987, ch. 2.2) argues that the Italians could at first have aimed for citizenship, but when this was not forthcoming, decided to try for independence.

Notwithstanding the Italians' essential role in creating and maintaining Roman hegemony, Rome was still reluctant to share the Roman citizenship with them. Clearly, in the late second century the majority of Roman politicians did not consider it worthwhile to grant the Italians Roman citizenship. It is not clear why; it may be that prejudice existed which would make it undesirable to equate Italians with Romans, but practical and strategic considerations may also have played a role.

On the eve of the Social War, Roman leniency could have prevented a bloody conflict which cost many lives. However, the Romans chose the hard line: they first passed the *Lex Licinia Mucia* to expel Italians from Rome, and a few years later chose war rather than a grant of citizenship. In this volume Fiona Tweedie explains how the relations between Romans and Italians had changed in the last decades of the second century BC, so that when the *Lex Licinia Mucia* was passed in 95, it caused an outrage among the Italians. Compared to earlier, similar laws, the uproar now was much larger than before, showing that, for many Italians, citizenship had become more important than previously. Clearly, the acceptance of Roman citizenship in this period was not considered incompatible with maintaining one's identity as member of an Italian group. Even in the 90s BC the Social War could have been prevented, but Rome deliberately chose not do to so. Apparently, even a war now seemed preferable to sharing citizenship with the Italians. Seth Kendall investigates why this was the case; what would have been the social, political, economic, and military costs for Rome if it had granted enfranchisement and why did these costs seem too high for the Romans?

Although after the Social War all Italians received Roman citizenship, this does not mean that all cultural differences between them had disappeared. On the contrary, the political unification of Italy after the Social War, combined with the administrative reorganization during the municipalization of the former allied territory,[28] seems to have been the trigger that started these processes, rather than a culmination point. The Italian languages only disappeared in the first century BC and only in the Augustan era does a uniform Italian culture become visible.[29] An Italian aspiring to be fully accepted in Roman society thus had to walk a fine line between showing his allegiance to cultural behaviour acceptable in Rome, and adhering to his identity as an Italian from a local community.

28 See Bispham (2007).
29 Wallace-Hadrill (2008).

The Italians most likely to aspire to acceptance in Rome were the local elites from the Italian towns, but they could not completely give up their local identity, since this would cause resentment at home. Furthermore, local identities remained important in the Italian communities after the Social War, and towns now employed Latin language and *koine* culture to express their own identity.[30] Religion was one way in which these identities were formulated. Elisabeth Buchet investigates how the town of Tibur 'reinvented' itself after the oracles of the local goddess Albunea were transferred to Rome by Sulla: Tibur now became known for the oracles of Hercules, which, although of recent date, were argued to have been present in the town since its foundation. A similar process seems to have been at work in Etruscan Perusia, which is explored by Skylar Neil; many networks created bonds between the inhabitants of this town and other communities, not only the Romans, but many other groups as well. Although the town gradually adopted Latin, it still maintained local cultural elements, such as Etruscan names; these were clearly important for the inhabitants of the town, who wanted to show their connection to their past, and for the self-representation of the town as a whole.

The unification of Italy and the conquest of a Mediterranean empire had equally strong effects on Rome itself, where deep cultural transformations are visible in the last centuries BC. One of the areas in which the Italian influence on Rome made itself felt was religion. Roman religion was remarkably open to influences from other cultures and could quite easily accept new gods into its pantheon. Rianne Hermans explores the goddess Juno, who was venerated in a variety of guises. Some of her incarnations were local Italian variations, e.g. Juno Regina of Veii and Juno Sospita of Lavinium. Through constant retelling and reinvention, the 'Italian' origins of these goddesses were remembered by the Romans. Clearly the Italian background of Juno was important for Roman identity.

Because there was no strict separation between the gods venerated by the Romans and the Italians, it is difficult to pinpoint changes which occurred under the influence of increased Roman dominance. A peculiar case of religious 'Romanization' was the goddess Feronia, as explored by Massimiliano Di Fazio. She was, by origin, a non-Roman deity, but became incorporated into the Roman pantheon at an early date. Her cult then appeared in many colonies settled by the Romans throughout Italy, seemingly as a result of Roman conquest; however, if non-Romans also

30 Laurence (1998); Revell (2009).

participated in colonization, this apparent contradiction may seem less marked.

4. *Integration and Romanization*

At the end of the Introduction we cannot avoid saying just a few words on the heated issue of 'Romanization'. This term has been used so often, with so many different meanings, that many scholars have despaired of its usefulness and have proposed to abandon the term altogether;[31] or they have looked for alternative models of cultural change, such as 'creolization'[32] or 'cultural bricolage'.[33] At the moment the debate on the use of the term 'Romanization' rages on, and any agreement between scholars seems elusive.

However, I suggest that the confusion surrounding this term results, in a great part, from the fact that many of the actual processes we are talking about are still so badly known. Most scholars would agree that the military conquest of Italy by the Romans resulted in a myriad of changes throughout the peninsula; some see no problem in continuing to use the term Romanization to describe this process.[34] It is also unmistakably the case that, as Rome united the Italian peninsula under its rule, a cultural *koine* gradually spread throughout Italy. This culture was broadly based on Greek culture, so that it might be more proper to speak of 'Hellenization' rather than Romanization; furthermore, the nature and speed of these changes differed according to region and location, so that a uniform 'Roman' culture did not appear. In many cases this Greek influence was not spread from Rome, but directly from Greece to the various regions of Italy. For example, the monumental theatres and sanctuaries that appeared in many Italian towns in the second century are not paralleled by buildings in Rome itself.[35]

However, the money to pay for such Greek-style buildings was gained in overseas trade; this had enjoyed an enormous increase after Rome's conquest of the East, which opened up new trade routes in which Italians participated to an unprecedented level. Furthermore, many public buildings

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[31] E.g. Mattingly (2002).
[32] Webster (2001).
[33] Terrenato (1998).
[34] E.g. Wallace-Hadrill (2008).
[35] See the articles collected in Zanker (ed.) (1976).

depended on Roman technological inventions, such as the use of concrete and *opus incertum*. But, even though these buildings followed Greek cultural models and depended on Roman imperialism for their finance, they were still expressions of local identity. As Wallace-Hadrill states, they were "investment[s] in local religiosity and local pride which [were] in no way diminished by the existence of stylistic evocations of the east, or dependence on participation in Roman imperialism and constructional technique".[36] Thus, the interaction between Roman conquest, Hellenic culture and local Italian identity is much more complex than is often assumed. To maintain a local identity, Italians had to be conversant with the different symbolic meanings ascribed to the various aspects of culture, so that they could make an informed choice about the identity they wished to project.

I would argue, then, that 'Romanization' is still a useful term, when applied to the political, legal, and administrative status of the Italian communities, as well as possibilities for economic exchange that were opened up by Roman imperialism. By no means, however, did Romanization lead to a loss of local identity; on the contrary, Italians exploited the new possibilities to express their identities for their own purposes. To really understand the processes of integration and identity transformation, as well as cultural and linguistic change in Republican Italy, it would be more fruitful to study the actual interactions between Romans and Italians, rather than continue the current debate on the meaning and usefulness of the term Romanization.

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[36] Wallace-Hadrill (2008, 106–43, quote p. 115).

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REGIONALISM: TOWARDS A NEW PERSPECTIVE OF CULTURAL CHANGE IN CENTRAL ITALY, *C.* 350–100 BC

Roman Roth*

1. *Introduction: What is 'Regionalism'?*

In the context of recent scholarship, it may appear odd, at first, to present a regional perspective to cultural change in Italy during the 'Hellenistic Period' as in any way innovative. In fact, during the past decade or so historians and archaeologists have produced a number of works on the subject—usually to the extent of rendering the distinction between the two disciplines increasingly fuzzy—in which they have explicitly approached the complex of 'Romanization' from a decentralising angle.[1] At the core of this have stood attempts to move beyond the 'dominant account' supposedly provided by Roman (literary) sources and thus do justice to the amount of cultural diversity that evidently existed across the Italian peninsula, and which is overwhelmingly documented by archaeological and, to a lesser extent, epigraphic materials.[2] This has often and, in many cases, rightly been heralded as a departure from 'orthodox' views based on Romano-centric perspectives.[3]

Yet, it is important to bear in mind that the new wave of regional approaches ultimately draws on long-standing traditions of research into the so-called pre- and non-Roman cultures of the peninsula, amongst which those of the Etruscans, Western Greeks, and Samnites may be singled out as particularly prominent.[4] This debt is not least reflected by

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[1] For an overview, see the contributions to Bradley, Isayev & Riva (2007), especially the introduction by Isayev; *cf.* Roth (2007). Other important examples include Dench (1995; 2005); Bradley (2000); Williams (2001); Isayev (2007a).

[2] E.g. Terrenato (1998); contributors to Keay & Terrenato (2001). Note that these approaches are explicitly archaeological and not (or only in a limited way) guilty of the methodological shortcomings that are evident in some of the works cited in the previous footnote; nor can they—on the whole—be accused of neglecting the important contributions of previous works by Italian and other non-Anglophone authors.

[3] Mattingly (1997) still makes one of the most powerful cases for looking into such 'non-dominant', even discrepant accounts.

[4] It suffices to refer the reader to the numerous journals here, amongst which I choose to single out *Studi Etruschi*, *AION*, *Atti e Memorie della Società della Magna Grecia*, and *Dialoghi d'Archeologia*, in addition to the periodicals of the foreign academies at Rome.

the way in which much recent work still takes as its point of departure a view of the ancient regions of Italy, which goes back to ancient categories as, for instance, the Augustan *regiones* and, on a smaller scale, towns and their territories (*agri*). In this context, especial credit must be given to the important *Forma Italiae* series, as part of which many extensive surveys of ancient Italian towns and their territories have been published over the years, as well as, of course, to the great number of intensive field surveys that have at least traditionally tended to define their subject areas in terms of such territorial notions.

The important contributions of all these works notwithstanding, I propose an alternative avenue towards a better understanding of ancient Italian regionalism in this paper. Without simplistically lumping together such diverse approaches, let alone impertinently dismissing their validity in each case, they share the *petitio principii* that the regions of ancient Italy can be defined, in however 'fuzzy' a fashion this may be done, and these regions thus form the starting points of those investigations. Against this, I suggest that defining the Italian regions should, in the first place, be the end of a regionalist approach;[5] and that those definitions need to go beyond geographical, political, and ethnic parameters, all three of which have dominated and still dominate historical and archaeological approaches to the subject.

My endeavour evidently draws on, first, several of the suggestions made by Horden and Purcell in *The Corrupting Sea* a decade ago. In particular, their two interrelated notions of (micro-) ecologies and connectivity—as against rather more inflexible parameters such as urbanism, geography and the economy—inform the approach to regionalism, which I merely intend to sketch out in this paper. This is not to say that Horden and Purcell's work has failed to make an impact in ancient Mediterranean studies up this point: far from it. And yet, however much their suggestions have been invoked in the context of regional studies of ancient Italy, this has not gone beyond adding a nuance to avowedly progressive—and, frequently, post-colonialist—approaches. Despite their many merits, in their majority these approaches still build on relatively straightforward

In addition, it is worth mentioning the papers collected by Ridgway & Ridgway (1979), which for the first time provided the Anglophone readership with a comprehensive and, in some ways, innovative overview of the subject, without selling short the contribution of continental scholarship.

[5] This is in agreement with Horden & Purcell's (2000, 102–3) statement that "there is the difficulty of defining the regions within which centrality is to be measured. Such definition should be the goal of enquiry, not its starting point".

definitions of the Italian regions, rather than as this very definition as a goal *per se*.[6]

Second, the approach which I am proposing here is only feasible as a result of survey and, to a lesser extent, excavation projects in central Italy, which have increasingly begun to add resolution to regional settlement patterns (in the widest sense), which go beyond the more traditional town-and-hinterland approach. Pivotal in this regard has been the work conducted under the umbrella of the Tiber Valley Project which, in conjunction with other fora such as the *Suburbium* congresses, has been producing an ever increasing amount of evidence for complex patterns of spatial and chronological variability within even a (supposedly) well defined geographical and historical region.[7] More work in this and other parts of Italy is currently underway, in the form of both new fieldwork and projects involving the re-study of previously excavated and collected evidence.

Third, the last few years have produced a number of approaches which have begun to question some long-held notions from a primarily historiographical and epigraphic angle. Much of this work has been conducted under the banner of 'identity studies': this has been particularly helpful in deconstructing certain ideas concerning ancient Italian ethnicity.[8] In addition, other studies which might be more appropriately described as socio-economic and political in their outlook have begun to unravel the institutional structures of Roman Italy. Thus, they demonstrate considerable variations in the ways in which, for example, supposedly homogenous 'models' such as those of urban constitutions or the distribution and ownership of land manifested themselves across the peninsula over time.[9]

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6 While not all of the papers collected in Bradley, Isayev & Riva (2007) fall into this category, Isayev (2007b) explicitly cites *The Corrupting Sea* as a source of inspiration for her own post-colonial approach, especially insofar as their critique of the concepts of urbanism and centrality are concerned (cf. Horden & Purcell (2000, ch. 4). Yet I remain to be convinced that her notion of 'regions without boundaries' can provide the substance to a methodologically and heuristically sound study of regionalism as a historical phenomenon; see also Isayev (2007a).

7 E.g. Carandini & Cambi (eds.) (2002); Patterson, Di Giuseppe & Witcher (2004); Coarelli & Patterson (2008); Jolivet et al. (eds.) (2009).

8 This is evident in the prolific number of edited volumes on this subject, e.g. Berry & Laurence (1993); Bradley, Isayev & Riva (2007); Keay & Terrenato (2001); Prag & Merryweather (2003); Roth & Keller (2007); Terrenato & Van Dommelen (2007); *cf.* the insightful critique by Pitts (2007).

9 Bispham (2007) is important in this regard. I agree, on the whole, with the views expressed by Morley (2008), Rathbone (2008), and Roselaar (2008), which demonstrate the

Drawing on these interrelated yet, more often than not, insufficiently integrated archaeological and historical debates, I outline here an alternative, regionalist approach to the study of central Italy from *c.* 350–100 BC. The premise of my proposal is simple: recent work has (rightly) done much to question the validity of Romano-centric approaches to this period, even if this has sometimes led it to neglect the important contribution which much of such 'traditional' scholarship has made to regional studies. In fact, by substantially drawing on that contribution, those new approaches have often fallen short of providing a fresh angle on how regional perspectives could provide us with a better understanding of the changes of the period, not merely at a regionally (i.e. in most cases, geographically and ethnically) defined level, but also within the wider framework of a cultural history of Italy.[10] By contrast, I suggest that the historical evidence available for the period points to the emergence of a new regional dynamic across the peninsula.[11] The aim of the proposed study will be to chart these dynamics, with the ultimate aim of explaining them historically. As the following discussion outlines, this endeavour can be successful only if the respective contribution of 'archaeological' and 'textual' sources is properly assessed, with the aim of arriving at a methodologically sound perspective of the available historical evidence in its entirety; and, second, if this evidence can be geared to an interpretative framework, without relativizing and, ultimately, subjecting it to a self-serving exercise.

2. *Sources and Source Criticism*

In this section, I focus on the evidence available to a regionalist approach to the cultural history of Italy during the period under discussion. As noted above, this necessarily has to involve both material and textual sources. Although several recent works (mainly by Anglophone writers) avowedly cross the disciplinary boundaries (and, with little justification, claim this as an innovation within the study of ancient Italy), by and large

value and limitations of textual sources for these issues and thus point the way to a more integrated approach to our historical evidence as a whole.

[10] I exempt Wallace-Hadrill's innovative approach to the relationship between centre and periphery under the heading of Rome's Cultural Revolution (2008, esp. chapter 2) from my criticism here, even though I do not, on the whole, agree with his methodology, selection of regional case-studies, and the linguistic paradigm informing his model of cultural change.

[11] Witcher's (2008) observations in this regard, with a particular focus on the vexed issue of demography, are more than apposite.

this procedure still too often takes the form of subjecting archaeological evidence to methodological and interpretative frameworks that are essentially text-driven.

On the other side of the spectrum, archaeologists also tend to accept tacitly the primacy of written evidence. In the archaeological practice, this finds its main expression in what can only be described as a circular approach to the dating of material culture (pottery in particular). Therefore, certain ceramic shapes are more often than not dated following a chronology of 'key events' (such as the foundation of a colony or warfare); when found in new excavations or (as is especially pertinent in the case of central Italy) field surveys, these types are subsequently used to date the sites in question. At the level of culture-historical interpretation, this procedure is evidently questionable: for why should human interaction with material (which includes visual) culture inevitably be defined by experiences of specific events, especially if it is entirely unclear how the agents in question may or may not have affected by such experiences? The perversity of this way of reasoning is epitomised by what one might refer to as its negative variety, namely those (in our case, frequent) instances in which the lack of information concerning *histoire événementielle* has led scholars to postulate that certain practices ceased or were interrupted (such as colonization after 167 BC), or even that we are dealing with periods of wholesale decline.[12] As far as our period is concerned, the latter is most acutely demonstrated by what has been dubbed the third-century 'dark age' but what, in fact, reveals nothing other than a slavish reliance on the historiographical framework (see further below).[13]

This means that, when writing about the cultural history of Italy, we need to reconsider our conventional frameworks of periodization (as has been done for other, 'more problematic' periods such as Late Antiquity).[14] As with the definition of the regions, this cannot be done in an aprioristic manner, but has to be an objective of such an investigation. In fact, periodization forms an integral part of the proposed regionalist approach, which necessarily involves re-thinking the way in which we conceive of how time is experienced in different context, different media, and, above

[12] Especially the early publications of the excavations at Cosa document this clearly. Pina Polo's (2006) cautionary remarks concerning the chronology of Republican colonization are helpful in this respect.

[13] For the *oscurità* of this period see, for instance, Musti (2005, 351). The time of the Pyrrhic War provides a particular case in point, see Roth (2010), with further references.

[14] For a recent overview, see Marcone (2008).

all, by different groups of agents. This is not to advocate what some might perceive as a 'soft' approach to 'hard' historical evidence. On the contrary, the easy way out is embodied by the orthodox procedure: that is, to subject material evidence to textual frameworks and thus to postulate an inversely proportional relationship between the quantity and quality of the historiographical information (i.e. 'hard' evidence) on the one hand, and the fuzziness of our historical understanding on the other. I suggest that any study of the period in question needs to take into account that, in many if not the majority of cases, we are almost faced with a 'prehistoric' situation, of which the third century between the late 290s and 220s would provide a prime, yet by no means isolated example. This is particularly relevant to the case of regional studies, for obvious reasons: the types of activity that are of primary interest here (such as subsistence, regional politics, architecture, trade, to name but a few) were not of much interest to ancient authors and their readerships; when they were, the reliability of the information furnished is difficult to ascertain, as in the case of Cato's *De Agricultura* or his fragmentary *Origines*. In those cases in which we do possess substantial corpora of epigraphic evidence—Etruscan burial being a prime example—its value tends to be limited to very specific contexts and may, overall, be compromised by the problems associated with translating such texts.[15]

The aim of this has not been to dismiss textual and, more specifically, historiographical evidence. On the contrary, my objective is to initiate a more fundamental debate among those interested the history of ancient Italy, which may to some extent be comparable to what has been happening to the study of the Archaic Greek World over the last three decades or so.[16] The solution cannot merely be to revert to a Braudelian paradigm of *long durée, conjonctures*, and *histoire événementielle*. While this may be helpful in distinguishing between the contributions of different historical sources in a basic sense, the situation in the case at hand is more complex. Leaving aside the longest of the three historical perspectives, one of the intriguing qualities of the textual and material evidence available for our period is that they can refer to both very specific events and to medium-term trends. Particularly in so far as textual (and, more specifically, historiographical) sources are concerned, one of the great challenges may lie in

[15] Izzet's (2007a) introductory chapter offers a salutary reminder of this, even though she is primarily concerned with an earlier period; see also Izzet (2007b).

[16] See now the important study of Hall (2007), with further references.

debating whether a reported event should be regarded as an exceptional case or the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Even more problematic are historical trends which scholars infer from the sources' silence (*cf.* what was said with regard to the third century above) or, in the opposite scenario, arrive at by overestimating the immediate impact of a specific, textually documented event.

We can clearly discern both of these methodological pitfalls in the important case of trade in central Italy during the third and the early second centuries BC. As is well known, the central Italian economy is usually supposed to have experienced something of a boom following Rome's victory in the Hannibalic War. In particular, a rapid increase in the production and export of Campanian wine has often been postulated on the basis of ceramic evidence: Greco-Italic amphorae and the Campana A fine wares which presumably accompanied them. However, recent studies have been able to establish significantly earlier dates for these (and other) ceramics, which clearly suggests that that the third century was less dark than has often been assumed and that, conversely, the impact of Rome's victory in the Hannibalic War as a catalyst for economic development has been overestimated.[17] Conversely, the low-density distribution of wine amphora from the fourth and the third centuries in Rome and the *suburbium* should not tempt us to assume that Romans had no access to wine during this period. Recent archaeological investigations have confirmed the considerable extent of vine cultivation in the *suburbium*—to produce wine that was presumably consumed locally and thus distributed using other clay or perishable containers.[18] In addition, it has been suggested that significant quantities of wine may also have been shipped down the Tiber on rafts, using containers that either did not survive or are not readily recognised as such.[19]

The methodological shortcomings of standard approaches to linking historiographical and material evidence are, admittedly, especially glaring in this case, owing both to an increase in the archaeological data available and to advances in the analysis of the evidence. However, this, too, is typical rather than exceptional for the period under study, which has for a long time been archaeologically underrepresented when compared to, say, the preceding Archaic or subsequent early Imperial phases. In addition, the

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17 E.g. Ferrandes (2007); Olcese (2008), both with further references; Vandermersch (2001).

18 Volpe (2008).

19 A point raised by Coarelli in response to Volpe (2008).

example is instructive, since it also illustrates how the issues of periodization and regionalism may often turn out to be intimately connected. On the one hand, it now seems tempting to suggest that Campania or, as I would prefer to argue, certain parts of it, may have undergone specific processes of regional transformation, which were the product of particular (micro-) ecological circumstances.

However, they cannot simply be linked directly with any of the seemingly obvious supra-regional or, even, 'global' 'movers' which scholars are prone to evoke at the expense of—and this must be stressed—*increasingly* available historical resolution. In this case, then, the distribution of amphorae and other ceramics may indeed be the tip of the iceberg, the latter being more representative of complex patterns of (micro-) regional transformations in Campania and beyond,[20] than of the arrival of Roman hegemony conceived in whatever terms. On the other hand, the ecological dynamics of the very 'centre' turn out to be rather more complex than may usually be imagined in this case if the surviving archaeological evidence indeed reflects the state of local wine production correctly. If this is the case (and there is little evidence to the contrary), the cultivation of vines was concentrated in the eastern part of the *suburbium*, while there is no real reason to assume that wine consumption was significantly lower elsewhere in the city and its surroundings. This invites us to think more carefully about the intra-regional movements of goods, making use of riverine shipping as well as, inevitably, overland transport, the latter remaining a subject which many studies of the ancient world tend to neglect; and, one hastens to add, something which must have been of great significance to the 'non-economic', yet equally significant aspects of social interaction.[21]

Although the example of wine production, distribution and consumption is only one of many that could be cited here, it merits being singled out in the context of a programmatic paper because it highlights the potential of the plethora of sources available and yet to come. 'Yet to come' since ongoing fieldwork, methodological advances and, last but not least, the increasing availability of archaeological data can only improve

[20] As, to cite another example, in northern coastal Etruria/southern coastal Liguria, a case that has largely escaped the notice of non-Italian historians; see Gambogi & Palladino (1999); Roth (forthcoming).

[21] In raising these points, I am again indebted to the views expressed by Horden & Purcell (2000, ch. 5), whilst insisting throughout that they need to be applied to specific historical examples using appropriate methodologies.

the degree of resolution to which these sources can be historically analysed. In the next section, I discuss the heuristic angle which I propose for the study of the regional history of central Italy, whilst also emphasising the importance of embedding the interpretative task in a sophisticated, methodological approach to the evidence.

3. *Settlement and Connectivity*

In the preceding section I suggested that regionalism should be approached with a view to two interconnected themes: first, the concept 'cultural history' needs to be properly defined. At present, it appears to provide a conveniently fuzzy terminology allowing for the integrated study of both textual and material evidence. However, in their great majority these 'culture-historical' approaches still tend to be text-led and reluctant to engage with the very different historical perspectives afforded by material and written culture. Only once this methodological debate is under way (especially now that new archaeological evidence for regional patterns and to ever improving degrees of geographical and chronological resolution increasingly becomes available) will it be possible to tackle the second theme, periodization.

As I argued above, the study of regionalism properly conceived cannot exclusively be geographical in its focus, with the chronological framework being provided by one or a small number of text-based narratives. This, as I argue in this section, constitutes a major dilemma in the field as it stands. For, while the importance of de-centralised, non-dominant takes on the history of ancient Italy has been widely acknowledged, it is also sufficiently clear that serious inroads into this type of study cannot be made unless the methodological issue at their heart is taken seriously; and—which is even more important—wide-ranging perspectives like those outlined by Horden and Purcell can be taken beyond the interesting heuristic avenues which they offer, to form part of a meaningful exercise in writing regional history. Otherwise, the latter is condemned to remain at the level of lip-service, constituting broadly valid statements that, however, do little other than merely relativizing (and thus not adding much of an alternative to) ancient historical narratives as they stand. In this section, I suggest that two of the central areas discussed by Horden and Purcell provide such heuristic avenues for a new approach to regionalism: these are, first, urbanism/centrality and its discontents or, more broadly speaking, settlement and, secondly, connectivity. While arguing that these two

areas of investigation provide suitable headings under which to approach the available evidence, I emphasise throughout that this can lead to constructive results and genuinely new insights only if we find appropriate ways of accessing and analysing this evidence.

Talking about settlement in this context provides a salutary example. As cogently argued in *The Corrupting Sea*, there is little reason to assign privilege to urban lifestyles (i.e. towns and cities) in any analysis of Mediterranean history—which, at least in a limited fashion, is borne out by the authors' four case studies. Yet, despite all attention duly paid by subsequent writers to what I interpret and agree with as a qualitative statement, this has, on the whole, not led to traditional *categories* being questioned. Rather than to an acknowledgment of the anachronism inherent in the settlement hierarchies imposed by modern students of ancient Italy, new perspectives such as that offered by Horden and Purcell have largely led to post-colonial rhetoric, ultimately boiling down to the assertion that other forms of settlement may have been just as sophisticated, albeit in other, yet undefined ways. This is, in itself, a perfectly valid insight. Yet, to anyone even vaguely familiar with non-Mediterranean scenarios, it also amounts to rather little and, moreover, defeats the point of the postcolonial argument, historically speaking. If we want to be serious about exploring the question of settlement typology (if typologies are what we must adhere to, which I somewhat doubt), how can it possibly be helpful (especially from professedly post-colonial points-of-view) to continue referring to urban, or even centralised settlement (as we are used to conceiving of it) as the yardstick for measuring all developed forms of human occupation of the landscape?[22]

Once again, the text-led narrative revealingly dominates the discourse. Here I would like to cite the example of a nucleated settlement such as Capena, now some 30 km outside Rome. It is widely accepted that this occupied area measuring about nine hectares constituted a town which, according to the historiographical tradition, became part of Rome's sphere of influence following the defeat and siege of the city of Veii in 396 BC.[23] Without going into any of the difficulties associated with using Livy as a source for the early history of the region, it still remains astonishing to see how Capena (and, for that matter, broadly comparable cases such

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[22] Unfortunately, Isayev (2007a) falls into this trap when discussing (non-) urban settlements in the central Apennines; by contrast, the perspective offered by Herring (2007) in the same volume sets out an interesting alternative to the traditional categories.

[23] Liv. 5.23.3.

as Nepet and Sutrium) are conveniently referred to as documenting the precocious nature of urbanism in this part of central Italy, in the absence of any relevant archaeological documentation other than tombs.[24] This is not to deny the fact that there *is* evidence for such inherently urban characteristics, such as monumental architecture and, more to the point, considerable concentrations of ceramic fine-wares on the surface of these sites. Yet, none of these indicators (sparse as they are) provides us with any indication as to how these and other, comparable settlements worked—and why, more to the point, we should simply accept that we are dealing here with *urban* settlements conceived of in an idealising fashion and, ultimately, to be contrasted with the supposedly non-urban nuclei of the south and elsewhere.

In short: rather than hiding behind phraseologies of alternative existences, we must radically redefine the playing field: alternatives to what? How, for example, can it be tenable to adopt the same *urbs-cum-agro* perspective for settlements as close to each other, yet as different in size and, I hasten to add, ecologies (see below) as e.g. Veii, Capena, and Falerii (let alone Rome, but, for once, this has widely been accepted as *the* exception)? And how can we postulate that these were different *in a certain way* (i.e. urbanised vs. non-urbanised) from other nucleated settlements in and outside central Italy (even if the latter may just have been as sophisticated, according to an avowedly post-colonial perspective building on the same anachronistic fallacies)? To counter this, I contend that the study of regionalism must move away from relativist statements based on categories that were (conveniently) established as part of a different paradigm to which one might have chosen to react. In the same vein, I submit that subscribing to an unorthodox yet, if properly applied (see below), useful premise such as Horden and Purcell's renunciation of urbanism, can come to fruition only if we are prepared to move away conceptually from our engrained, static, attractive, yet ultimately fallacious ideal of what it meant to live in a certain place at a certain time.

A certain place *at a certain time*: this connexion of geography and chronology too often goes unnoticed in studies of ancient Italy in general and in particularly in recent, avowedly regional approaches. In short: many 'alternative' accounts provide the reader with a scenario of virtual

[24] For the ongoing excavations at Capena, see Roth & Roth-Murray (2008; 2009). For the problems associated with using the funerary record as evidence for settlement, see Roth (forthcoming); *cf.* also the sophisticated approach to Etruscan urbanism proposed by Riva (2010).

timelessness (i.e. unthreatened and, to a considerable extent, good-because-original ways of life) preceding the time of the Roman conquest (and, it goes without saying, the rapid decline of those time-honoured traditions). Even in cases such as that of (some of) the Etruscan cities, in which more contemporary evidence is available than is, for example, in central southern Italy, the conventional view is one of a lengthy prosperous 'Etruscan' phase (despite supposed setbacks such as that of the Battle of Cumae 474 BC—yet another indication of unjustified text-ledness), which was rather abruptly brought to an end by the Roman conquest. For the subsequent period, the historiographical framework provided by Livy and a handful of other fragmentary sources usually becomes the principal guideline for the study of regional history.

It is not difficult to identify some fundamental problems inherent in this chronological and, by necessity, interpretative framing of the regional history of central Italy. First of all, it is based on a limited amount of source material, limited in the sense of both the historical processes with which it is concerned, and of the scarcity or even absence of such evidence for considerable chunks of the period with which I am concerned here. The sources can hardly be faulted for the former: rather, it is some of their modern interpreters who are to be criticised for stretching the evidential value of this material beyond the implausible, especially when it comes to the matching (i.e. mutually 'proving') of written and archaeological sources.[25] The second problem, that of the exiguousness or even lack of historiographical evidence for certain periods, is lamentable, yet there is precious little that can be done about it. However, this does not mean that we should be in the dark concerning the chronology of these periods. On the contrary, we must consider seriously questioning the existing framework, even and especially for those periods that are relatively well documented in the historiographical record—as opposed to the usual practice of creating a convenient yet heuristically and methodologically weak patchwork of whatever information might be provided by the available evidence. For, even if we had access to Livy's work in its entirety, the information thus provided would not form a suitable basis on which to build a chronological framework for the study of regional history.

Much of what I have just said may appear self-evident or, at least, going over ground covered in the preceding section. Yet the muddling of

[25] The issues raised by Cornell (1995) and, from a contrasting perspective, Forsythe (2005) illustrate these methodological problems in relation to early Roman history.

information derived from incongruous evidence constitutes a major stumbling block when trying to re-define the parameters of writing regional history. The relevant example of settlement typologies was cited earlier and should briefly be reiterated here. Thus, I question the extent to which our sources' definitions of certain forms of human occupation can be used as a meaningful basis for our understanding of these places of cultural interaction across time. Even if we acknowledge the existence of different constitutional set-ups—which is really possibly only for the period after the Social War—this only relates to one aspect of settlement and one, at that, which was not necessarily among the most central criteria by which the majority of ancient Italians would have defined their existence.[26] A second aspect of typology relates to this, which pertains especially to the regional history of our period: colonization. The issue of chronological mixing-and-matching is particularly problematic in this case, as noted earlier. In addition, it is time to question the very assertion that (different types of) colonies should *a priori* constitute a distinct category of regional history. Rather, we should, in the first place, approach them within a wider context of human mobility, as has been done in the case of other instances of ancient colonization.[27]

'Human mobility' leads me to another central element of the ecological approach to Mediterranean history, proposed by the authors of *The Corrupting Sea*: connectivity. As in the case of urbanism/centrality and its discontents, this concept has been much cited in subsequent literature, especially in the area of landscape archaeology. The example of wine production, distribution and consumption, which I discussed earlier, illustrates very well the heuristic usefulness of connectivity: by moving away from focusing primarily on large-scale maritime trade and widening our perspective to include other, more limited yet ultimately related activities, we begin to get a concrete grasp of how connectivity works across regional space and time. In addition, connectivity allows us to avoid isolating an anachronistic sphere of economic history, and broaden our perspective to one that comprises, amongst other things, the types of interactions involved in the production, distribution, and consumption of foodstuffs and material culture. As in the area of settlement, this step of linking

[26] See Bispham (2007).

[27] This equally applies to the instances of so-called 'internal colonization'—as in fourth-century Etruria (Colonna 1985)—and to the conquest and settlement of the Greek cities on the Campanian coast by Apennine populations during the fourth and fifth centuries. For mobility and Greek colonization, see Osborne (1998).

overarching theory with the evidence is crucial, and has hardly been realised yet: wide-ranging concepts such as (non-) urbanism and connectivity are ultimately useful to the regional historian only if the available evidence is subjected to analytical methodologies that provide a middle range (a somewhat unfashionable term these days) between the level of ideas and that of the evidence, both material and textual.[28] Otherwise, we are left with merely paying lip-service to lofty and, indeed, intangible concepts or, worse, with forcing them onto data-sets that were established on the basis of rather different or even opposing heuristic standpoints. In the next and final section of this paper, I shall sketch how the study of central Italian regionalism, which is proposed here, seeks to find a positive solution to this dilemma.

4. *Finding the Regions: An Outlook*

In the previous section, I singled out to of the broad areas, settlement and connectivity, and suggested that they form suitable headings for structuring a study of the regional history in Italy. As noted before, one of the most problematic issues concerning *The Corrupting Sea*, as well as the ways in which it has made its impact on the historical debate, is the invitation it provides to the related fallacies of relativism and sweeping statements. Conversely, I contend that to declare the subject of urbanism (and the way in which it has been used as a quintessential ingredient of Mediterranean cultures) as problematic and potentially unhelpful should not invite us to play fast and loose with our data, deconstructing what we encounter whilst failing to come up with new angles from which the area of settlement could usefully be approached. In analogy, it is not enough merely to assert that alternatives to large-scale trade, such as cabotage, existed. Rather, by approaching our evidence through suitable methodologies, we need to look very hard for such patterns, and should not be surprised if they do not quite correspond to the picture produced by cross-cultural or probabilistic modelling.[29]

However, once these methodological ground-rules have been established, 'settlement' (as opposed to the narrower concept of urbanism/centralism) and 'connectivity' indeed provide two suitably broad yet con-

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[28] See Roth (2007b, ch. 3), with a particular focus on linking material-culture theory to the study of central Italian pottery.

[29] As in the case of northern coastal Etruria (see above).

crete categories through which to approach a culture-historical perspective of regionalism. The chosen time period of *c.* 350 to 100 BC deliberately ignores the historiographical 'key-dates' that are conventionally chosen by most historians. In addition to minimising historiographical prejudice, the chosen period also cuts across the closely related chronological timeframe that is usually adopted by archaeologists, such as 'Late Classical' and 'early to late Hellenistic'. A quarter of a millennium would, furthermore, appear to constitute a time span that allows for sufficient resolution as far as both the material and the written evidence are concerned, and, in this case, covers periods that are relatively well documented and such that—like the third-century 'dark age'—are notoriously underrepresented in the historiographical record.

a) *Settlement*

Few issues have been more contentious in historical debates concerning Italy during our period than that of settlement patterns. Owing to the popularity of survey archaeology, this has largely focused on questions relating to their increase and, conversely, decline, both in terms of the overall numbers of individual sites and, increasingly, the types of sites that tended to survive and disappear respectively.[30] When it comes to excavated settlements, it is fair to state that the overwhelming number of examples fits into the category of medium to large sites which are difficult to define in terms of ancient nomenclature and modern takes on it, the heuristic difficulties surrounding the once convenient terminology of the 'villa' being a prime case in point.[31] However, as noted in an increasing amount of literature—much of it emanating from regional projects, such as the Tiber Valley Project and the *Suburbium* conferences—the study of nucleated settlements has more and more come into the limelight, through approaches involving both excavation and geophysical technology, or a combination of the two.[32] It has, furthermore, been noted that indirect evidence for such settlements, for the most part consisting of burial sites, needs to be introduced to the discussion on a more sophisticated footing than may have been the case in the past. Finally, the period from *c.* 350

[30] E.g. Patterson, Di Giuseppe & Witcher (2004); Witcher (2008); *cf.* Rathbone (2008) and now Launaro (2011) for a sophisticated approach which—though not without its own shortcomings—provides some useful insights into the regionally diverse nature of settlement and population structures across Italy during the late Republic and early Empire.

[31] *Cf.* Terrenato (2001a); Rathbone (2008).

[32] E.g. Keay, Millett & Strutt (2005); *cf.* Roth (forthcoming).

to 100 BC also witnessed various forms of colonization or, rather, mobility: ranging from the conventionally recognised (yet perhaps to easily generalised) instances of Latin and citizen colonies, to the case of Etruria's 'internal colonization' (as in the Tuscia) and, in fact, the waves of pressure exerted by the populations of the south-central Apennines onto the coastal settlements of Campania.

While it might be possible to treat such forms of settlement typologically, especially if one is dealing with a relatively short period and rather limited geographical area, the diversity of those changes may at first sight be overwhelming and, indeed, invite relativist statements. Yet a systematic survey of the sources available to document the dynamics involved promises to lead to a structurally more satisfying account. Here, the fallacies involved in using sherd-counts as evidence for increasing and contracting settlement patterns in survey archaeology can be applied to a broader scale of historical research.[33] To put it bluntly, text- and material-culture-focused historians alike tend to take quantitative and qualitative patterns observable for one or a small number of types of cultural practices, ranging from fine-ware consumption to tomb painting and the foundation of colonies, to have far wider implications for our understanding of the history of settlement on the whole than may be justified. As I argue elsewhere, this is especially pronounced in the cases of the distribution of black-gloss wares and (especially, but not exclusively, Etruscan) burial practices,[34] yet it also holds true for subjects that are primarily studied through written evidence, with the destruction of settlements and the resettlement of entire populations providing an important and, of recent, increasingly controversial case in point.

The best way to avoid relying on an overly impressionistic reading of a limited amount of data would seem to access a greater pool of evidence, allowing us to gain a wider perspective of cultural change and variability across time and space. For these purposes, 'settlement' will be defined in a broad sense, going beyond the study of specific forms of occupation to include not only practices such as burial and cult, but also issues affecting the location of settlement, which may be driven by factors ranging from subsistence patterns to phenomenological considerations. However, my analysis will not reserve special treatment for preconceived categories of

[33] See Millett (2001); Rathbone (2008); Witcher (2005; 2008; forthcoming).

[34] Roth (2007a; forthcoming). I should admit that some of my tenets in Roth (2007a) are in need of revision, although I still consider my overall contention—that pottery and non-elite material should be used as a source for cultural history—as valid.

settlements, such as colonies or *villae*, nor will it be structured by regions as they are conventionally defined. To take only one, albeit a prominent example: the burial practices observable across a 'region' such as Etruria during our period of investigation should become far more enlightening as a source for cultural history within the context of central Italy as a whole, if they are seen against the underlying background of (a) contemporary burial practices elsewhere and (b) other aspects of settlement across Etruria and beyond.

b) *Connectivity*

By analogy, the study of the cultural networks of ancient Italy should also be put on a broader footing. As indicated earlier, enquiries into this area have too often been confined to economic analyses that, in turn, tend to be set within a literary framework. By looking at the example of the Campanian economy, I have already suggested in outline how the production, movement, and consumption of goods could be approached more fruitfully in an inclusive way that duly takes into account the historical resolution offered by the different types of evidence at our disposal. In addition, the mobility of populations should also be integrated into such an enquiry: as in the case of settlement, colonization would provide an important case in point here, as would the related issue of the viability and navigability of landscapes, rivers and seascapes. Once again, *The Corrupting Sea* has done much to open up the debate to new perspectives. Here, I am particularly thinking of the subjects of coastal cabotage and inland transport by road.[35] However, as with settlement, it is equally important in these cases to apply such newly gained perspectives to specific instances, following a suitable methodological approach to the sources, and, above all, with a view to exploring how regionalism operated across a large area like central Italy over two-and-a-half centuries.

As in the study of regionalism from the perspective of settlement, the proposed approach to connectivity will be based on a methodology that is sensitive to the different contributions of our sources to such an historical enquiry. It is no longer enough simply to provide distribution maps of supposedly well-defined types of material culture as a way of proving the existence of this or that network. In addition to carefully reconsidering

[35] See note 21. The most recent treatment of ancient Italian roads pays too little attention to their importance within the context of overall mobility, especially insofar as minor routes are concerned.

how we define those very types, we need to push the boundaries further in debating the ways in which and the reasons why such networks came into existence and changed over time.[36] Ultimately, this will link back into the argument concerning the transformation of settlements, where, as I suggested above, we need to integrate more widely a fuller range of sources, and thus move away from assigning privilege to a narrow spectrum of signpost evidence, since this tends to give us a clear-cut yet ultimately misleading impression of cultural history in action.

5. *Conclusion*

To conclude, I suggest that writing a cultural history of regionalism in ancient central Italy entails as much a heuristic as a methodological leap of faith. If anything, as I hope to have shown within the very limited scope of this paper, the methodological aspect of such a project even promises to be the more laborious and controversial of the two, unless it is to be another exercise in dressing the emperor in new clothes. It is time to stop being stunned by the perplexing cultural diversity of ancient Italy and, in this way, resorting to parochialism. On the contrary, we must begin to explore those differences from an integrated, regionalist perspective, and thus to subject them to the kind of historically valid enquiry which they clearly merit.

[36] Archaeometry may be expected to make a major contribution to this, as it has for other parts of the Mediterranean, see Olcese (2008).

THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR AND THE CONCEPT OF ITALIA

Federico Russo*

1. *Introduction*

The beginning of the first Punic War was the centre of a historiographic debate already in ancient times, mainly in relation to the legitimacy of the Roman intervention in Messina. Here, the Mamertines, who were under siege by the Syracusans, had split into two factions: one pro-Roman and the other pro-Punic.[1]

> Some of them appealed to the Carthaginians, proposing to put themselves and the citadel into their hands, while others sent an embassy to Rome, offering to surrender the city and begging for assistance as a kindred people (καὶ δεόμενοι βοηθήσειν σφίσιν αὐτους ὁμοφύλοις ὑπάρχουσιν). The Romans were long at a loss, the succour demanded being so obviously unjustifiable. For they had just inflicted on their own fellow-citizens the highest penalty for their treachery to the people of Rhegium, and now to try to help the Mamertines, who had been guilty of like offence not only at Messene but at Rhegium also, was a piece of injustice very difficult to excuse. But fully aware as they were of this, they yet saw that the Carthaginians had not only reduced Libya to subjection, but a great part of Spain besides, and that they were also in possession of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian Seas. They were therefore in great apprehension lest, if they also became masters of Sicily, they would be most troublesome and dangerous neighbours, hemming them in on all sides and threatening every part of Italy. That they would soon be supreme in Sicily, if the Mamertines were not helped, was evident; for once Messene had fallen into their hands, they would shortly subdue Syracuse also, as they were absolute lords of almost all the rest of Sicily.[2]

In the end they decided to send help to the Mamertines. However, the Romans were aware of being in an awkward position; they therefore tried to justify their intervention as an example of a *bellum iustum*.[3]

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[1] Sensi (1974); Lazenby (1996, 5–7).

[2] Plb. 1.10.3–11.3. See Zon. 8.8: "The Mamertines, who had once conducted a colony from Campania to Messana, were now being besieged by Hiero, and they called upon the Romans as a nation of kindred blood."

[3] On this concept and its connection with the outbreak of the Punic war, see Marino (1996).

2. *The Greek Concept of* Syngeneia

Among all the ancient evidence relative to Roman motivations, Polybius' is particularly significant. According to him, the Mamertines claimed that the Romans were a 'kindred people'. Since this was an important pretext under which the Romans agreed to help the Mamertines, it is quite logical to think that the pretext of *homophylia* that the Romans put forth not only had to have a meaning in the Roman context, but it also had to be widely accepted and shared. The problem, at this point, is to understand exactly what this Roman-Mamertine *homophylia* consisted of. Furthermore, if, as some scholars maintain, it is true that the Mamertines decided to ask the Romans for help only after having driven the Carthaginians away, the idea of *homophylia* may have had, perhaps, above all, a particular anti-Punic value.

As far as Polybius' passage is concerned, in the modern critique there has often been a reference to 'kinship'.[4] *Homophylia* mainly had an ethnic value attributed to it, suggesting that the connotations of this word are the same as those of the word *syngeneia.*[5] This creates the assumption that at the outbreak of the Punic conflict the Romans maintained (or accepted) the idea of ethnic kinship with the Mamertines. It has been suggested that this is probably the reason why they decided to intervene; in support of this hypothesis, reference is made to the case of Segesta, whose *cognatio* with Rome, according to Cicero,[6] was claimed by the Romans during the Second Punic War. According to some scholars, the supposed *cognatio* with the Mamertines would have its roots in the Trojan myth, through the figure of Capys, Aeneas' companion and founder of Capua.[7]

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[4] See in particular Pinzone (1983, 106–8).

[5] Battistoni (2009); for the Mamertines' case, p. 87.

[6] Cic. *Verr.* 5.83. See Giardina (1997, 23–4); Chirassi Colombo (2006, 218–20).

[7] Pinzone (1983, 99–101). According to Pinzone (1983, 107), the Roman-Mamertine *homophylia* should have an ethnic value, since it should indicate a precise *cognatio* between the Romans and the Mamertines, based on the myth of the Trojan origins of Capua, the metropolis of the Campanians (the Mamertines were Campanians according to Plb. 1.7.2; 8.1; Dion. Hal. 20.4.8; Strabo 6.2.3; Cassius Dio fr. 40.8). Rhomos, Aeneas' son, is said to have founded the city, giving it the name of Capys, forefather of Aeneas (Dion. Hal. 1.73.3). See Pinzone (1983, 95); Perret (1942, 309–11); Heurgon (1942, 143–5). According to Pinzone, the Mamertines were *cognati* of the Romans since they were Campanians, and the Campanians' metropolis was Capua, *urbs cognata* of Rome. For this reason they were *homophyloi* of the Romans.

The idea of *syngeneia* (Latin *cognatio*) has a very important value in ancient diplomatic relationships.[8] This concept, when first documented, was mainly regarded as the fundamental basis of Hellenism: all Greeks were related, and shared the same language; therefore they were to be considered distinct from other peoples, i.e. barbarians; it was soon adopted as a political category and a diplomatic tool in international relations between different Greek cities. In order to strengthen some alliances or pacts, the Greeks relied on the theme of their common origin, very often expressed through the encoding of a shared myth of descent (for instance, from the same hero) and the claim of belonging to the same lineage. The application of such a concept was therefore used to highlight, and give meaning to, closeness between two different cities or populations that, for whatever reason, needed to reinforce their ties in front of others. The motif of *syngeneia* was therefore an important diplomatic tool, essential for the Greeks to account for and make acceptable alliances with non-Greek populations (or at least those perceived as such), which, because they were barbarian according to Greek political and cultural ideology, were normally to be kept at a distance. This fictitious belonging to the same *ethne* enabled them easily to overcome such distance.

However, we cannot avoid noticing the terminological difference, and therefore perhaps substantial difference, between the two cases. Can we really accept that the semantic sphere covered by *homophylia* coincides with the one so typical of *syngeneia*? Research on the occurrence of the terms *homophylia* and *syngeneia* and their derivatives shows that there is a clear difference between the two terms. This is above all evident in cases when they are used together: the simultaneous use of such terms suggests that a precise semantic difference existed between them, even if not always accurately definable. We have a confirmation of the clear distinction between the two terms for instance in Demosthenes: "Furthermore, the people of Athens regard the people of Thebes as in no way alien either in race or in nationality (οὔτε τῇ συγγενείᾳ οὔτε τῷ ὁμοφύλῳ)." [9] Because of the structure of the speech, the two terms must cover different meanings: the idea of blood ties, which is stronger than belonging to the same ethnic reality, is expressed through the concept of *syngeneia*.

Leading in the same direction is a passage by Plutarch:

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8 For the problem of the kinship concept in the Greek world and its political value, see Musti (1963); Curty (1985, 224–6; 1994a; 1994b, 193–7; 1999); Will (1995); Hall (1997, 36–8); Jones (1999, 66–80); Piccirilli (2001). Recently, Russo (2007, 55–7); Battistoni (2009; 2010).

9 Dem. *Cor.* 186.

> Aristides declared that they were utterly wrong; they had contended emulously with the Tegeans, but a little while back, for the occupation of the left wing and plumed themselves on being preferred before those rivals; but now, when the Lacedaemonians of their own accord vacated the right wing for them, and after a fashion proffered them the leadership among the Hellenes, they neither welcomed the reputation thus to be won, nor counted it gain that their contention would thus be, not with men of the same tribe and kindred, but rather with Barbarians and natural enemies.[10]

The Athenians were lucky to fight against foreigners who were their natural enemies, instead of fighting against other Greeks. Since the use of two terms with the same meaning would have been redundant and illogical, there must have existed a certain distinction of meaning between ὁμοφύλους καὶ συγγενεῖς, just as there exists a parallel one with βαρβάρους καί φὺσει πολεμίους, which are certainly not synonymous. The structure of the text leads us to believe that the arrangement of the terms was not by chance, but rather increasingly intense; being of the same race does not mean having the same blood, just as being a foreigner, or even a barbarian, does not necessarily mean being enemies. Thus the term *homophylos* would indicate a less close connection than a *syngeneia* relationship.

Cassius Dio confirms the difference in meaning and the distance between *syngeneia* and *homophylia*. In his account of the battle of Pharsalos, the two armies are told to be ashamed of "belonging to the same race (*homophylia*) and to the same kinship (*syngeneia*)".[11] At 41.57.3 the meaning of being *homophyloi* is clarified: "Sharers of the same tent, of the same table, of the same libations". Later the concept of *homophylia* represents a precise level in a sort of range of attributes linking different persons of the same people (in this case the Romans): to be of the same race (*homophyloi*), to be part of the same citizen body (*politai*), and to be linked by kinship (*syngeneis*).[12] These examples show clearly that the idea of *homophylia* never had, at any stage of the ancient tradition, the same semantic value as the concept of *syngeneia*; sometime the terms were complementary, but never synonyms.[13]

Having recognized the difference between the concept of blood relationship and *homophylia*, what does it mean exactly being *homophylos*

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[10] Plu. *Arist.* 16.2–3: πρὸς ὁμοφύλους καὶ συγγενεῖς, ἀλλὰ βαρβάρους καί φὺσει πολεμίους ἀγονίσασθαι.

[11] Cassius Dio 41.53.2.

[12] Cassius Dio 44.32.5.

[13] See below for Cassius Dio's passage in the context of the First Punic War.

to someone else?[14] From the cited examples it seems possible to deduce that *homophylia* is a condition common to a homogeneous group, which did not share this characteristic, nor others associated to it, with anyone considered barbarous, or, more generally, an outsider and different.[15] We must remember that according to Herodotus, since *homophylia* united all Greeks, it was the essential and binding component of τὸ Ἑλληνικόν and of Greek identity.[16] We can also clearly note that this term essentially means "of the same race", even in Polybius' use. For instance, an Acarnanian ambassador calls the Macedonians and Achaeans *homophyloi* of the Spartans, in contraposition to the Romans, who are defined as *allophyloi*.[17]

Nevertheless, not only was it difficult in ancient times to attribute a specific meaning to this term, and to identify those populations who had the right to be included in the Greek *homophylia*, according to immutable and particular parameters, it is difficult even today after having analyzed the sources. Like Polybius, Isocrates makes Philip a descendent of the Greeks to flatter him, resorting to the concept of *homophylia*, even if antithetical to the Macedonian population.[18] Demosthenes, on the other hand, presents Philip as *allophylos anthropos* with respect to the Greeks, over whom he cannot expect to govern.[19] The example of the Macedonians is paradigmatic of the ancient (as well as modern) difficulty, not only in giving a precise and univocal meaning to this term, but also in defining the specific parameters according which two peoples could be considered *homophyloi*.

While the lack of *homophylia* between the Macedonians and the Greeks could be appreciated by at least some ancient authors, it is particularly surprising to find also inside the *Hellenikon* some cases of rejection of *homophylia*. For instance, according to Isocrates, the Spartans are *syngeneis* of the Athenians and of all the other Greeks.[20] However, according to Thucydides, the Spartans considered the Athenians to be *allophyloi*.[21] Similarly, the Peloponnesians and their allies are presented as not

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14 Also according to the analysis of Loraux (1987), being *homophyloi* does not imply being *syngenoi* in absence of precise and further indications.

15 Cassius Dio 41.6.2.

16 Hdt. 8.144. In general on this problem, see Malkin (2001); Konstan (2001).

17 Plb. 9.37.7.

18 Isocr. *Philip* 106–8.

19 Dem. *Cor.* 185.

20 Isocr. *Paneg.* 174; *Panath.* 94, 164, 207.

21 Thuc. 1.102.3.

homophyloi.[22] Hermocrates highlights the mutual connection between all the Siceliotes, in contrast with the Athenians, who were *allophyloi*.[23] The needs of each situation could determine the specific value to give to the concept of *homophylia*; however, this obviously does not refute that this term had a precise meaning.

It has been supposed that the *homophylia* indicated a specific and non-automatic link inside a wider context, as, for instance, a portion of a citizen body which enjoyed precise rights or prerogatives. So, *homophylia* would have indicated neither a generic community of a specific race (for which the Greeks would have adopted the more specific idea of *homoethnia*), nor a situation of *syngeneia*, but something different.[24]

Let us consider two passages of Aristotle and Plato. Regarding cultivation of land, Aristotle states: "Those who are to cultivate the soil should best of all, if the ideal system is to be stated, be slaves, not drawn from people all of one tribe nor of a spirited character."[25] He suggests that slaves should not all be of the same origin or of the same race. Plato has the same idea; if a master wished to increase the docility of his slaves, they should not be from the same country nor, if possible, should they speak the same language.[26] This is to avoid what happened to the Spartans, whose Helot servants were *homophyloi*. The comparison between these two passages reveals two more characteristics of *homophylos*: belonging to a people of the same town and speaking the same language.

This leads us back to what Polybius said about Hannibal's army. He defines Hannibal's soldiers as *allophyloi*,[27] and praises Hannibal because his soldiers never rebelled against him, even though they were so mixed:

> No one can withhold admiration for Hannibal's generalship, courage, and power in the field.... He never broke up his forces and dismissed them from the field, but holding them together under his personal command, like a good ship's captain, kept such a large army free from sedition towards him or among themselves, and this although his regiments were not only of different nationalities but of different races (καίπερ οὐχ οἷον ὁμοεθνέσιν ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁμοφύλοις χρησάμενος στρατοπέδοις). For he had with him Africans,

[22] Thuc. 1.141.6.

[23] Thuc. 4.64.4, The Athenians consider themselves *allophyloi* as to the Doric colonists of Sicily (Thuc. 6.23.2); this corresponds to the lack of *homophylia* between Athenians and Spartans.

[24] Oliver (1970).

[25] Arist. *Pol.* 1330a.26.

[26] Plato *Laws* 6.777b–d.

[27] Plb. 3.61.5.

> Spaniards, Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, and Greeks, peoples who neither in their laws, customs, or language, nor in any other respect had anything naturally in common.[28]

So, according to Polybius, to be *allophyloi* means to have nothing in common, from laws to languages. Thus, we can identify what characteristics *homophylia* was made up of: speaking the same language, and having the same laws, religion, and *mores*. So, not only was this concept coherent with ethnic facts (being of the same race, or literally from the same tribe), but also, more marginally, with 'cultural' ones.

To gain a clearer picture of the semantic value of the term *homophylia* it is necessary, finally, to determine the relationship between this concept and the one of *homoethnia*, since there are several examples of contemporary use of these two terms.[29] As stated above, Polybius praises Hannibal because in all of his sixteen years of battle in Italy, his soldiers never rebelled against him, even if they are neither *homoethnoi* nor *homophyloi*. This same use of both the concepts emerges also in a passage of Appian:

> By the law of war, nay, by the practice of robbery, they took from Italians who had committed no offence, who had done no wrong, their land and houses, tombs and temples, which we were not accustomed to take away even from foreign enemies, but merely to impose on them a tenth of their produce by way of tax. They divided among you the property of your own

[28] Plb. 11.19.1–4. See also 23.13.1: "An admirable feature in Hannibal's character, and the strongest proof of his having been a born ruler of men, and having possessed statesmanlike qualities of an unusual kind, is that, though he was for seventeen years engaged in actual warfare, and though he had to make his way through numerous barbaric tribes, and to employ innumerable men of different nationalities (πλεῖστα τ᾽ ἔθνη καὶ βάρβαρα δειξελθὼν καὶ πλεῖστοις ἀνδράσιν ἀλλοφυλοις καὶ ἑτερογλώττοις χρησάμενος συνεργοῖς.)." Polybius' characterization of Hannibal recalls Livy's description of the Carthaginian soldiers. See for instance Liv. 28.12.2–4, where the author describes the Hannibalic army with these words: *Ex conluvione omnium gentium, quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis, alius habitus, alia vestis, alia arma, alii ritus, alia sacra, alii prope dii essent, ita quodam uno vinculo copulaverit eos ut nulla nec inter ipsos nec adversus ducem seditio exstiterit*; see Liv. 23.5.11: *Poenus hostis, ne Africae quidem indigena, ab ultimis terrarum oris, freto Oceani Herculisque columnis, expertem omnis iuris et condicionis et linguae prope humanae militem trahit*. The closeness between Polybius and Livy is clearly indicated in these Livian passages, where the Hannibalic army is defined *alienigena*, a Latin calque of the Greek *allophylos*). The prophecy of the *carmina Marciana* (Liv. 29.10.4–5, 205 BC) demonstrates the homogeneity of the anti-Hannibalic propaganda in that period: *Quandoque hostis alienigena terrae Italiae bellum intulisset eum pelli Italia vincique posse si mater Idaea a Pessinunte advecta esset*. For this particular aspect of the anti-Hannibalic propaganda see Russo (2005; 2009).

[29] Pol. 11.19.3–4; ὁμοεθνής usually means "belonging to the same people". See Aristotle *Rhet*. 1384a; *Econ*. 1344b; *Eth. Nic*. 1155a; Diod. Sic. 11.78.5; 12.11.3; 29.2; 88.6; 13.27.6; 14.114.1; 15.39.2; 82.2; 16.23.4; 17.100.4; Strabo 7.1.3; Hdt. 1.91.5; Plb. 2.7.6; 11.19.1; 30.6.7; App. *BC* 2.77; 80; 141; *Hann*. 5.30; *Pun*. 7.47.

> people, the very men who sent you with Caesar to the Gallic war, and who offered up their prayers at your festival of victory. They colonized you in that way collectively, under your standards and in your military organization, so that you could neither enjoy peace nor be free from fear of those whom you displaced. . . . And this, ye gods, they called colonization, which was crowned by the lamentations of a kindred people (ὁμοεθνεῖς) and the expulsion of innocent men from their homes.[30]

On the basis of these passages it seems that the *homophylia* indicated something different from the belonging to the same race (for which there was the *homoethnia*). Probably, the difference between *homoethnia* and *homophylia* is connected to the semantic relationship between *ethnos* and *phyle*: the latter indicates something included in the former and more specific than the former. To sum up, the generic semantic value is the most significant aspect of the *homophylia* concept, which seems to indicate not a precise ethnic relationship, but the sharing of cultural or legal facts, as, for instance, belonging to the same citizen body.

3. *Polybius and the Mamertines*

Let us now return to Polybius' statement about the Mamertines. If *homophylos* indicates kinship in the sense of *syngeneia*, then the Mamertines would be relatives of the Romans, just as Segesta would be connected to the Romans by Trojan *cognatio*. But, since ancient tradition was well aware of the clear distinction between the two concepts, it is impossible to think of an example of *cognatio* in this case. Polybius also informs us of the Senate's perplexities in accepting the Mamertines' requests. These perplexities were due to the Mamertines' despicable behaviour in Rhegium and other Greek cities of southern Italy. Since Rome was on good terms with some of these cities, it could certainly not be too explicitly or exclusively associated with the Mamertines.

So far we have recognized the clear distinction between *syngeneia* and *homophylia*; seeing that Roman-Mamertine *homophylia* should not be thought of as a relationship of *syngeneia*, we might wonder whether behind this special relationship between the Romans and Mamertines there are hidden motivations, which might be different from explicit ties of kinship. This *homophylia* could be considered as a sort of translation in Greek terms of Capua and Rome sharing the same rights. In fact, we

[30] App. *BC* 2.141.

know that the Campanians were given the *civitas sine suffragio* in 338 BC. [31] It could be that the Mamertines, who emphasized their Campanian origin, theoretically believed that they had those same rights, and this is where the declaration of *homophylia* may derive from. More particularly, Polybius' persistence regarding the relationship between the Mamertines (Campanians) from Messana and the Campanians from Rhegium (whom he constantly calls Romans, perhaps because of the *civitas sine suffragio*) could be the ultimate reason as to why the Mamertines could feel *homophyloi* of the Romans.

Either way, the relationship with Rome which the Mamertines claimed would have been based only on this legal status. Rome's behaviour towards Capua, the native state of the Mamertines, at the time of Hannibal's invasion, is enlightening. It was stripped of its *civitas sine suffragio*, and this could be considered a formal renunciation of Rome's blood relationship with Capua. When Capua left its alliance with Rome in favour of Hannibal, Decius Magius from Capua opposed the presence of a Carthaginian garrison in the city; he even suggested killing them to make up for the wrongdoings by his fellow citizens towards the Romans, whom he defined as *vetustissimi socii consanguineique*, but his appeal went unheard.[32]

However, the defeated Capuans were willing to use the concept again when it suited them in their appeal against the punishment that Rome had given them:

> They could not deny that they deserved punishment, and there were no tyrants on whom they could throw the blame, but they considered that they had paid an adequate penalty after so many of their senators had been carried off by poison, and so many had died under the axe. Some of their nobles, they said, were still living, who had not been driven by the consciousness of guilt into doing away with themselves, nor had the victor in his wrath condemned them to death. These men begged that they and their families might be set at liberty, and some portion of their goods restored to them. They were for the most part Roman citizens, connected with Roman families by intermarriage.[33]

This argument failed to sway the Senate, in contrast to the appeal of the Mamertines at the start of the First Punic War. However, in this passage there is mention of secondary relationships of kinship, i.e. marriage, that is,

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[31] Liv. 8.14.10; 23.5.9. See Sherwin-White (1973, 40–53); Frederiksen (1984, 221–32); Elwyn (1993, 268); Pinzone (1983, 92).

[32] Liv. 23.7.

[33] Liv. 26.33.1–4.

not blood relationships. Whatever the reasons that the Capuans declared kinship with the Romans (perhaps even a mythical claim, with reference to the well-known myth of Capys), the fact remains that such motivations were used by the Campanians for obtaining benevolence from the Romans. This surely means that, whether mythical or real, reasons did exist which made it possible for the Capuans to call themselves *cognati* of the Romans. But from the evidence, it would seem that Rome did not make use of such arguments and, above all, that such reasons were not accepted by Rome. The Romans never even accepted that other Italian populations could declare themselves their blood relations. As a consequence, since the Mamertine request for aid was based on the concept of *homophylia*, and since this request was accepted by the Romans, it is necessary to find the meaning of this *homophylia* outside mythical *cognationes* and marriages between the two cities.

At this point we can ask ourselves, what, from the Romans' point of view, Roman-Mamertine *homophylia* consisted of, while excluding the possibility that it had any justification in the Trojan myth or that it implied a relationship of *syngeneia* with the Capuans.[34] As we have seen, using the theme of *cognatio* between the Capuans and Romans, as the Capuans did, did not lead to the desired result, nor to pity from the Romans. This shows that the Romans did not always accept local requests. Instead, in the case of the First Punic War, it is necessary to look for a meaning that can be attributed to the Roman-Mamertine *homophylia* that would also be approved by Rome.

Polybius gives the most explicit reasons for supporting the Romans' decision: he states that if Messina had been taken by the Carthaginians, it would have become a sort of natural bridge for the Carthaginians' expansion and dominance in Italy.[35] This would also have made Sicily into a Punic dominion. Cassius Dio states that Carthage's expansionist capabilities represented a threat to Rome and all of Italy.[36] He continues by explaining that the causes or, better yet, the excuses for the war were the Carthaginian intervention in Tarentum and Rome's friendship with Hiero. These were only excuses, because both Rome and Carthage believed that their salvation depended on the destruction of the city that was their

34 And excluding a simple legal value based on the *civitas sine suffragio*, for the reasons seen above. On the mutual relationships between Italian communities in Italians' perspective and then on the concept of internal identity, see Dench (1995); Patterson in this volume.

35 Plb. 1.10.1–8.

36 Dio fr. 43.1–4; Zonaras 8.8–13.

enemy. It is important to underline the mention of Italy and the threat the Carthaginians represented to it. Even though the differences between Polybius (attributed to Fabius Pictor) and Cassius Dio have been pointed out, they do, in any case, share the fear of a Carthaginian assault on Italy and not only on Rome; this suggests further close ties between Rome and the rest of Italy.

Not only did Rome choose to help the Mamertines to avoid Carthaginian dominance from spreading in Italy (according to Polybius' supposition), but also because (according to Cassius Dio's version) the Mamertine *genos* was originally from Italy; the *chiliarchos* C. Claudius assured he would help the Mamertines διὰ τὸ γένος αὐτῶν τῆς Ἰταλίας ὄν.[37] Not only do these passages imply the importance of Italy as a concept at the beginning of the First Punic War,[38] but the concept of Italia was also used in connection with Sicily, well before this region was reduced to a province, juridically and administratively different from the concept of Italy itself. Thus, as the evidence of Polybius and Cassius Dio suggests, the common belonging to the 'concept' of Italia could be a reason for the Roman-Mamertine *homophylia*.

4. *The* Ludi Saeculares *of 249 BC*

The same concept of Italy seems to be connected to the celebration of the *Ludi saeculares* in 249 BC as well. The *Ludi saeculares* present problems in many respects.[39] We know neither the exact date they were established, nor the public or private character of the initial events, nor even the two (or possibly, three, if we consider that there were at least two identifiable interventions regarding regulations on the dates of the games) occasions of their celebration, before the Augustan age.[40]

We can, however, say that the games were certainly celebrated in 146 BC and in 249 BC, and also most probably in 348.[41] In particular, we can

37 Val. Max. 2.7.4. See also the above-mentioned passage of Zon 8.8.

38 For the juridical value of *Italia* concept and its progressive superimposition to the geographical aspect of the term, see Catalano (1978, 528–30). For the *terra Italia* theme, see Mazzarino (1966); Catalano (1961–2). For a different interpretation of Valerius Maximus' passage see Crawford (1990, 103–5). See also Brizzi (1986); Valvo (1997, 10–19); Prag (2006, 736–7).

39 See Coarelli (1993). For the literary and epigraphic sources, see Pighi (1941). See also Taylor (1934); Gagé (1955); Poe (1984); Brind'Amour (1986); Russo (2008).

40 For the chronological aspect of the problem, see Freyburger (1993); Pavis D'Escurac (1993).

41 The edition of 348 (346 in the Augustan revision) was documented by Censorinus (*Die nat.* 17.11), Zosimos 2.4.1, and in a problematic fragment of Festus (440 L). About the *Ludi* of this year, see Diehl (1933); Taylor (1934).

rely on the coherent and consistent literary sources regarding the date 249 BC. More than the date, we are interested in the problem raised by the oracle that ancient tradition connects with the celebration of the *Ludi saeculares* and which we find in Phlegon of Tralles and Zosimus. The hymn sung at this occasion recorded a Sibylline oracle, which described the rites to be held during the festival. If these were to be followed, then "your laws will be observed not Latium alone, but your control shall extend to all of Italy (πᾶσα χθὼν Ἰταλὴ καὶ πᾶσα Λατίνων)".[42] The oracle was probably not codified during the Augustan age, because it would not have been coherent with the atmosphere of the time, but earlier, since, in this verse, mention is made of the control that Rome has, and will continue to have, if it abides by what is said by the oracle about the 'Latin land' and the 'Italian land'. I argue that such an expression pre-dates the Social War,[43] because after the war it would have been considered insulting to use these words to describe the relationship with the former allies. In any case, this expression obviously recalls third-century concepts, for instance *terra Italia*. Therefore, I believe that it is in this period that we must look for the origin of reference to Italy and in particular Rome's dominion over Italy, while only the mention of the Latins should refer to the 348 edition.

A scholium by Ps.-Acron. provides us with some further information on the edition of 249 BC.

> *Verrius Flaccus refert carmen saeculare et sacrificium inter annos centum et decem Diti et Proserpinae constitutum bello Punico primo ex responso decemvirorum, cum iussi essent libros Sibillinos inspicere ob prodigium, quod eo bello accidit. Nam pars murorum urbis fulmine icta ruit. Atque ita responderunt: bellum adversus Kartaginenses prospere geri posse, si Diti et Proserpinae triduo, id est tribus diebus et tribus noctibus, ludi fuissent celebrati et carmen cantatum inter sacrificia. Hoc* [*autem*] *accidit consulibus P. Claudio Pulchro L. Iunio Pullo.*[44]

It appears that during the First Punic War, the Romans celebrated some kind of *Ludi*, in order ask to the gods to intervene, on the Romans' behalf, in the war against the Carthaginians. As far as the origin of the *Ludi* is concerned, originally known as *Ludi Terentini*, scholars believe that they began within the *gens* Valeria, also responsible for creating the myth of the origin of the games. Later, in 249 BC, their function changed and

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42 Zosimus 2.5–7. See Phlegon *Macr.* 37.5.2–4 (= *FGH* 257 F 37 V). For Phlegon see Breglia Pulci Doria (1983).

43 Mommsen (1889a) was the first to propose a dating earlier than the first century BC. See also Russo (2008).

44 Ps.-Acron 5.8 (Keller I 471).

they became *saeculares*, losing their private aspect.[45] On the basis of the meaning attributed to the 249 BC celebrations by ancient sources, we can assume that the formula with which the oracle of Sybil ends, was formulated at that time. Where once the Romans had to 'be content' with assuring themselves dominion over the Latins at the games of 349, in the middle of the following century a different kind of prayer was imposed: an explicit mention of Italy had to be made in it, since this was the new horizon of the Roman domain.

If we hypothesise that this formula was part of the 249 BC innovations, we can clearly see that Verrius Flaccus' testimony about the games of this year bears a very important fact: the *Ludi* were celebrated during the First Punic War. However, this indication is not only a chronological specification. It suggests the reason for which the *Ludi* were celebrated: if the Romans wanted to defeat the Carthaginians, the *Ludi saeculares* would have to be celebrated.

Is a reference to the concept of Italy in a ceremony whose aim was to help Rome against the Carthaginians plausible and credible? In virtue of what we have observed about the exploitation of the concept of Italy at the time of the First Punic War, I believe the answer must be affirmative. Faced with an enemy who constantly threatened Sicily and could also be a danger for Italy, it is more than natural that Rome should also make reference to Italy in a public ceremony, just as had happened in the past when it had been necessary to assure dominion only over the Latins.

As illustrated by the sources, 249 BC was an unlucky year for Rome. There were severe losses in the battles of that year with the Carthaginians, all of which occurred in Sicily. In a context of great difficulty, Rome decided to appoint a dictator, A. Atilius Calatinus. He was the only dictator who led an army outside Italy, in contrast with one of the prerogatives associated with this position.[46] The bad results of the war in Sicily clearly determined a departure from the rules that regulated dictatorial power.

I suggest that the special powers attributed to the dictator in 249 BC reflect the same concept of 'Italy' that appeared at the beginning of

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45 Taylor (1934).

46 Livy *Per.* 19: *A. Atilius Calatinus primus dictator extra Italiam exercitum duxit.* According to Cassius Dio 36.34.2: "If you require any such official, you may, without either transgressing the laws or forming plans in disregard of the common welfare, elect Pompey himself or anyone else as dictator—on condition that he shall not hold office longer than the appointed time nor outside of Italy. For surely you are not unaware that this second limitation, too, was scrupulously observed by our forefathers, and no instance can be found of a dictator chosen for another country, except one who was sent to Sicily and who, moreover, accomplished nothing."

the First Punic War. The stress with which the sources highlight how Calatinus was the first dictator with powers applying also beyond Italy could be instructive. During the First Punic War, when a wider meaning of the concept of Italy was supported by the Romans in function of anti-Carthaginian terms, up to and sometimes including Sicily, it is quite plausible that a dictator who concerned himself with disasters that took place in Sicily was a possibility. That a dictator's power did not normally include areas out of Italy proper is clearly indicated by Cassius Dio. This may suggests that either the norm that Sicily was outside the concept of Italy had not yet been fixed, or because it had been possible to 'get around' this norm. A 'broader' concept of Italy is constantly visible in the first war with Carthage. In this sense I think it is also useful to explain the concluding verse in the oracle by Phlegon and Zosimus.

During a period of danger that also included the cruel behaviour of a consul, bad omens, and a plague, celebration of the *Ludi saeculares* seems completely plausible. We must remember the connection between these and the safeguard of Rome's dominion over an area that it risked losing and that could be considered, at least at this level of the tradition, in some way connected to Italy (possibly thanks to presence of an Italian people, the Mamertines). The progress of the Carthaginian dominion not only put Sicily in danger, but Italy as well.

What might these *Ludi* be that were celebrated at the time (or just before) A. Atilius Calatinus was appointed? I think the *Ludi* that Livy mentions should be identified as the *Ludi saeculares* mentioned by Censorinus, with some indication that the source was Valerius Antias.[47] Bearing in mind the importance of the concept of *Italia* in the wider context of A. Atilius Calatinus' dictatorship and of the oracle, I believe they are to be identified with the *Ludi saeculares* which were held in 249 BC: that is, the 'new series', strongly modified in the ritual, and probably enriched with referral to Italy.

Both the nomination of a dictator with powers that the successive sources register as extraordinary and the attention to the new sphere of dominion for Rome which was Italy, expressed in the *carmen* of the *Ludi saeculares* of that year, celebrated to find a solution for the forthcoming catastrophe, are aspects of the same attention manifested by Rome for the concept of 'Italy', in contraposition to the Carthaginians, well before Hannibal's arrival on the soil of *Italia*.

[47] Censor. *Die Nat.* 17.10.

5. *Conclusion*

We find here a confirmation of how the concept of Italy was used by Rome to give sense to the intervention in favour of the Mamertines. If we compare evidence concerning the onset of the First Punic War to evidence coeval with Hannibal's campaign, we find significant similarities that allow us to understand what the connection between Rome and the Mamertines probably consisted of.

Rome reverted to the concept of *allophylia* to consolidate the Italian front against Hannibal. This concept was applied to the Punic troops and Hannibal's extraneousness with respect to Italy. As the Romans believed, this extraneousness impeded the Carthaginians from nourishing any sort of ambition to dominate the peninsula. Hannibal's army was stigmatized because it was composed of people of different races; they did not speak the same language, did not have the same gods, were not of the same religion, and had different customs. It is significant that during Hannibal's period the concept of *allophylia* still applied to Italy, but this time in a different way. Just as Italy was the horizon of reference for Roman-Mamertine *homophylia*, the same could be said for Hannibal's *allophylia.* The fundamental message of the anti-Hannibalic propaganda was that Hannibal could not boast any rights over Italy. For him it was a foreign land. Nor could his army be compared to the Roman army, which also included allied and Roman forces, united by the fact of belonging to Italy. The fact that in both cases the concept of Italy serves to push away, even if ideologically, an enemy considered a foreigner and an outsider, shows us the particular ethno-cultural importance of Roman-Mamertine *homophylia*.

Even before the concept of *terra Italia* became fixed, both in administrative and sacred terms, the image of Italy as something specifically relevant to the Romans and other Italian populations supported the Roman intervention against Carthage. Thanks to this particular interpretation of the bond between Mamertines and Romans, it was considered a *bellum iustum*.[48] Research up to now has confirmed the ideological importance of the concept of Italy in Rome's diplomatic relations in the first half of the third century, and perhaps even in the late fourth century, if we wish to accept, as I do, the historicity of the treaty of Philinos between Rome

[48] See Marino (1996, 365–72).

and Carthage.[49] In any case, I think it is now important to investigate the concept of Italy applied to Sicily. Before Sicily became a province, written sources seem to confirm a broad vision of the concept of Italy. It also included Sicily, confirming what we have proposed about the concept of *Italia* as basis of the *homophylia* between Romans and Mamertines.[50]

[49] Among the sustainers of the historical reality of Philinos' treaty see: Mommsen (1859, 320–5); Mazzarino (1966, 53–5); Scardigli (1991, 130–62); Palmer (1997, 16–17). *Contra*, Albert (1978, 205–9); Badian (1980, 159–69); Hoyos (1985). See recently Serrati (2006, 120–9); Russo (2010; 2012). On the role of Philinos as source for Polybius see Ambaglio (2005).

[50] Of course not all of Sicily was included in this embryonic idea of Italy, but only that part occupied by the Mamertines, because of their Italian origin. Therefore, it is not accidental that later (for instance during the Social War) Sicily was not part of Italy anymore, since the Italian-Mamertine 'aspect' of the island had value only in a specific historical context, the clash with the Carthaginians. On the idea of Italia in the first century BC and its 'Apennine' aspect, see Dench (1995) and Pobjoy (2000).

IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND BOUNDARIES: HELLENISTIC PERUGIA

Skylar Neil*

1. *Introduction*

Essential to the debates of contact and integration in this volume is a study of frontier zones and other hotbeds of interaction. How is identity negotiated and expressed differently depending on proximity to these points of contact? With respect to the Roman Republic and the incorporation of Italy under the aegis of Rome, what were the effects of Roman expansionism in areas without direct intervention of the Romans? Perugia, located on the periphery of Etruria on the boundary between the Etruscans and the Umbrians, presents an interesting case study as to these effects on a border community, which were manifested in the construction and expression of boundaries. The maintenance of boundaries both inscribed on the landscape and generated through repeated cultural interaction is dependent on the political and social dynamics of the groups involved. During times of socio-political unrest, the expression of these boundaries become critical, as each group acts to protect their own interests and maintain its identity; on the contrary, during periods of relative stability, these boundaries may become more permeable.

This paper will explore the way in which the act of boundary maintenance may reflect 'an identity in crisis'. In the case of Perugia during the fourth to first centuries BC, the increase of political pressure from Rome resulted in an increase in the importance of boundary maintenance. The construction of the Perugian city walls coincided not only with the threat of Gallic invasion, but also with an increase in settlements in the Perugian hinterland, as attested by the funerary evidence.[1] In this case, the walls may serve a symbolic purpose of materialising civic identity in addition to their practical defensive use. Likewise the evidence for the increased usage of *tular*, or boundary, stones to delimit property in this region attests to a period of political uncertainty, in which the maintenance of one's assets becomes a higher priority. This is corroborated by evidence

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1 Bruschetti (2002a, 77).

for the worship in the region of the god Selvans (Roman *Silvanus*) whose duties included, among others, the maintenance of boundaries.

2. *Boundaries*

A boundary, in the basic sense of the word, represents a definition of the limits of space, whether that space is abstract or physical. The boundary exists not as the interstitial area between two entities; rather, it is the boundary itself that defines each entity. It can be described as indeterminate or 'fuzzy', but should not be qualified with respect to size; the sole property of the boundary is permeability. Boundaries exist between entities of varying forms, both ideological and physical: individuals, descent groups, socioeconomic classes, ethnic groups, public, private and ritual space, cities, regions, and nation states. A boundary is not fixed, but is constantly being negotiated and reinforced through social agreement and practice. The way in which people observe these boundaries, either physically or through recursive practice, can indicate the relationship between these entities and how permeable the boundary was between them.[2]

For the archaeologist, the physical signifiers of these boundary agreements ('inscribed boundaries') are of primary importance in determining the nature of otherwise ephemeral social relationships. The ideational boundary defines what is being bounded, and the inscribed boundary signifies it. The issues concerning the connection between artefacts and social relationships comprise the primary challenge in interpreting the material record. As with any other facet of identity, a study of ethnicity must be properly contextualised and overly simplistic interpretations must be avoided. It is counterproductive to maintain a bird's-eye view of ethnicity, such that no pattern is recognisable. On a local level, however, especially within the context of daily life and Bourdieu's *habitus*, patterns of ethnic recognition and interaction can be discerned through the interrelationships of artefacts and the minutiae of spatial patterning. Indeed, archaeology is uniquely suited to the study of ethnicity in the past, since the differences in social practice mentioned above, and therefore the differences in the materialisation of that practice serve as the locus for emphasising ethnic distinctions.[3]

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[2] See Barth (1969) for a theoretical predecessor to this study.

[3] For more on methodological approaches to the interpretation of ethnicity within the archaeological record, see especially Emberling (1997); Hodder (1982); Jones (1997); Lucy (2005).

The expression of ethnicity in the material record is contingent on the historical and political context in which it exists: the more an ethnic group comes in contact with another, the more likely ethnic identities will be expressed in their interactions. By adapting a diachronic contextual framework for the study of ethnicity, archaeologists can pick up on shifts in the expression of ethnicity through changes in material signifiers over time. These shifts may include greater or lesser institutionalisation of expressions of difference, or changes in the way certain material aspects are used as signifiers. Depending on the demands of one's socio-political and socio-economic network, some aspects of an identity may be emphasised while others are downplayed, a dynamic that can be gleaned through the study of material signifiers. An examination of the contexts in which ethnic identities are constructed, expressed and transformed will offer new insights into group relationships and the shape of a socio-political network at any given time.

Within the physical landscape, a boundary exists not as physical entity, but as a social agreement amongst the people interacting with the boundary and moving between the bounded areas. These ideational boundaries can then be represented in the landscape physically, as inscribed boundaries, through either the construction of visible monuments, or the association of the ideational boundary with an existing landmark, such as a river or mountain range. As the dynamics of an inhabited landscape change over the course of time, so too do the ideational boundaries, not only with respect to the physical location of the boundaries, but also in the varying permeability of a given boundary. In this case, the permeability of a boundary can be measured both in the physical sense—for example, the difference in difficulty between crossing a mountain range versus passing through a city gate—and in the ideological sense, e.g. the amount of material exchange between two areas or the representation of foreign names within a specific settlement.

Likewise, the visibility of a boundary within the landscape can be misleading as to its permeability or significance; for example, a boundary that is highly permeable and receives high traffic between its bounded areas may be represented by a visible landmark simply because there are no other visible indications that a boundary exists; in this case, the boundary serves more as an ideological delineation rather than a physical one. In contrast, a more remote boundary that does not receive a lot of traffic may not be as visibly represented because the amount of individuals interacting with the boundary is very low. In the case of physical boundaries, again, the boundaries delimit the territory, and the inscribed boundaries signify where one has entered or left it.

This last point is particularly salient to a discussion of ancient boundaries and landscapes. As with modern international boundaries, the cultural and ethnic identity of those living within a bounded area and across a boundary has a significant impact on the expression of a boundary and its permeability. Likewise, the importance of a boundary, especially in terms of the resources, territory, and peoples delimited by it, also affects the way in which a boundary is maintained. The material representation of relationships across the boundary, in terms of the flow of people and goods, is especially relevant to the study of ancient boundaries in archaeology. Understanding the dynamics across these boundaries will add a new dimension to the study of ancient border areas, and further clarify questions of social, economic, cultural, political, and ethnic relationships in the past. Like the cultural landscape, ethnicity can often transcend political boundaries and has specific criteria for inclusion and group membership. In areas in which multiple ethnic groups and state infrastructures are present, multilocality often occurs. Human actors in an environment will ascribe multiple meanings to various features, depending on experience and facility.

3. *Ethnicity in Ancient Etruria*

What makes the Etruscans particularly suited for enquiries on boundaries and ethnicity are both their rapid rate of urbanisation and highly developed social systems, and their central role within the economic network of the Mediterranean. Moreover, the Etruscan language was the only known non-Indo European language spoken within peninsular Italy and, without serving as an indication of ethnicity per se, would have marked the Etruscans as ‘different’ compared to other Italian peoples. During the Orientalising and Archaic periods, the Etruscan centres flourished, developing rapidly and consolidating their territories at an impressive rate. For the seventh century, this urbanisation process is largely evident in the public display of Orientalising material culture in elite tombs, indicating social authority and power over resources, especially foreign goods. This funerary ideology varied greatly from that of the preceding period and indicates not only the consolidation of power in the hands of elites, but indeed the construction of new forms of political authority.[4] Moreover, the

[4] Riva (2010, 37–8).

construction of civic sanctuaries, in which this type of material culture was deposited and displayed publicly, indicates the participation of non-elites in the deposition of votive material at these sites as a form of 'integration rites'.[5] Despite the socio-economic differentiation, these rituals of public participation emphasised feelings of social collectivity and cohesion. It is during the Orientalising period that a civic identity begins to emerge through the practice of these inclusive rituals. Although these processes of urban formation can be indicative of a centralised authority, Riva rightly warns that it is not synonymous with the existence of a state.[6]

By the end of the Archaic period, the process of urbanisation was mature, with clear delineations of space for public use, as well the construction of other public resources (i.e. public water collection points).[7] Beginning in the seventh century, but especially during the sixth and fifth centuries, the construction of city walls physically defined what was Urban and what was Not. As the city walls were visible from long distances, they acted as a potent symbol of civic identity and cohesion. The liminal zones between city and countryside were likewise observed and ritualised through the construction of sanctuaries;[8] indeed, Colonna notes that ritual sites are accounted for in areas along the civic boundaries or even near the gates at Tarquinia, Cerveteri, Veii, Vulci, Arezzo, and Perugia.[9] Necropoleis could also represent the ritualization of civic boundaries, especially considering the liminality of death itself, as well as the structured layout of the necropoleis into 'streets'.[10] Likewise, the construction during the Orientalising period of tumuli in conspicuous areas in the hinterland signified the political authority of the elites over the civic landscape. Later these tumuli were the focal points of communal worship on the periphery of communities.

4. *Perugia and its Hinterland from the Eighth to Third Centuries* BC

Perugia represents an interesting deviation from other major Etruscan cities, in that its urban development was largely retarded until much later than most Etruscan urban sites. Moreover, Perugia remained untouched

5 Riva (2010, 137).
6 Riva (2010, 21).
7 Izzet (2007, 181).
8 De Polignac (1995); Riva & Stoddart (1996); Zifferero (1995).
9 Colonna (1985, 68).
10 Riva & Stoddart (1996, 94).

until the war between Octavian and Antony, having been spared the physical consequences suffered by many other Etruscan cities at the hands of either Rome or her enemies. As a site located on the frontier of Etruria, Perugia was not subject to direct political and military pressure from an expanding Roman Republic, as was the case with Veii and Volsinii. Although Perugia was located in a strategic position along the Tiber River and at the boundary between Etruria and Umbria, its location was relatively remote and its hinterland thickly wooded and hilly.[11] Because of the lack of direct intervention by Rome into the socio-political system of the city, Perugia provides an interesting case study into the maintenance of a distinctive group identity and how that identity evolved over time when exposed to various social, political and economic circumstances.

The ancient site of Perugia straddles the Colle Landone and the Colle del Sole hills at a dominant position controlling the Upper Tiber Valley; it represents an intermediary between Etruria and Umbria, moderating and facilitating economic and cultural activity within the region. Although the medieval and modern habitation has all but obliterated traces of the ancient city, sporadic finds suggest a Villanovan occupation of the site, with a decidedly Etruscan occupation for the Archaic period largely corroborated by mortuary evidence (i.e. the Archaic tombs in the Palazzone necropolis, as well as individual *principes* burials in the hinterland, such as at San Valentino and Castel San Mariano). In terms of the necropoleis directly related to the urban centre of Perugia or its immediate environs, there are no tombs dating to before the late sixth century BC, largely due to the expansion of the city during the medieval and modern periods. There is some evidence for the existence of Villanovan burials at some point, as attested by the recovery of a series of terracotta vessels, identified as related to a funerary context, not a domestic one, as well as an Iron Age *spada ad antenne* at Fontivegge. The majority of funerary evidence for the Archaic period comes from the necropolis at Palazzone, where four chamber tombs have been found, suggesting the existence of a community living in a settlement autonomous from the urban centre, and perhaps in control of the Tiber. The northern necropoleis of S. Caterina Vecchia and Sperandio and the necropolis at Monteluce to the east have returned materials dating to the late sixth and early fifth centuries. The materials recovered suggest an urban environment already formed and stratified; for example, from Sperandio comes the well-known sarcophagus of Chiusine

[11] Bruschetti (2009, 185).

manufacture depicting activities of the social elite, including banqueting. At S. Caterina Vecchia, a bronze *situla* was found, contemporary to the Sperandio sarcophagus and used as a cinerary urn.[12]

The Sperandio sarcophagus, dating to the late sixth century and named after the Porta dello Sperandio, near which it was discovered, presents an interesting funerary iconography. It depicts a juxtaposition of banqueting scenes with a procession of armed individuals carrying or leading what seems to be either possessions or spoils of war (livestock, pack animals, slaves etc.). As such this sarcophagus is not only significant because of its provenance, but because, regardless of its interpretation as a scene of conflict or migration, it depicts the mobility of an obviously elite group of people and sheds light on the interrelationship between different groups across the landscape.[13] Two other *cippi* of Chiusine manufacture, contemporary to the Sperandio sarcophagus, have been found in Perugian territory. This strengthens the hypothesis of a presence of a group of people at Perugia either with strong ties to Chiusi or indeed from Chiusi themselves. Indeed, a considerable number of people in Perugia of Chiusine origin is attested by gentilicial inscriptions found in the area.[14] The early history of Perugia is most likely tied to the reorganisation of Etruscan territory and expansion up the Ombrone and Reno valleys, and later through the Mugello and Giogo passes into the Po Valley.[15]

There is little documentation available for Perugia between the first quarter and the end of the fifth century, which might be attributed to a lack of systematic archaeological excavations. However, Nati suggests it may be due to a period of 'tight oligarchy', in which tensions between the aristocracy and emerging social classes may have resulted in the elimination of obvious forms of representations of power and overt manifestations of wealth. With the exception of a tomb found within a short distance of the necropolis at Frontone, which dates to the second half of the fifth century, finds dating to this period are sporadic, supporting Nati's hypothesis that luxury items may have been preserved and passed down through family groups rather than deposited in funerary contexts. Funerary depositions at Sperandio, S. Caterina Vecchia, and Monteluce resume in the early decades of the fourth century BC, coinciding with the foundation of new necropoleis at Frontone and S. Giuliana, to the south of the urban

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12 Nati (2008, 7–8).
13 Cenciaioli (2002, 50).
14 Nati (2008, 27–8).
15 Briquel (2002, 18–20); Cenciaioli (2002, 50–1).

centre. SS. Trinità, where a bronze cinerary urn dating to the early fourth century was found, may have likewise been founded during this period. From the third century to the first, incineration becomes the normative burial rite in the necropoleis of Perugia, especially multiple depositions over a period of time in the same chamber tomb. Also during this period, new burial areas continued to be founded, especially in relation to the major thoroughfares from Perugia; some of these newly founded necropoleis attest to the westward expansion of the urban centre, e.g. Elce and S. Galigano.[16]

The initial efforts toward urbanization within the city can be seen in the Attic pottery deposited in tombs in various necropoleis around the city. The first inscription in the sixth century BC, which was written in an alphabet related to that of Chiusi or Volsinii, may attest to this;[17] however, this is the extent of the urban development until the beginning of the fifth century, when the first monumental sanctuary was constructed. The lack of control and organization over the Perugian hinterland suggests a significant degree of mobility both within and without the territory of Perugia.

With regards to the greater hinterland of Perugia, human activity on the northern shores of Lake Trasimene was sporadic and generally would not qualify as permanent settlement. Specifically, the topography of this area—densely forested and hilly—made for difficult travel and communication; this is in direct opposition to the area to the southwest of the lake, including the Magione plain, which was highly cultivable and connected with the surrounding territory via land and river routes.[18] Evidence for occupation of the Lake Trasimene area is largely sparse until the Archaic period, but flourished during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, correlating with the development of Chiusi. This was not only because of the difficulties inherent to that particular geographical area, but also because in many ways it existed as a 'no man's land' between the spheres of influence of Perugia and Cortona. In fact, these boundaries may have been recognized as early as the beginning of the sixth century. Near Monte Gualandro, on the boundaries between the hinterlands of Perugia and Cortona, a funerary monument has been recovered, which shows two warriors armed with shield, sword, and spear fighting each other. This monument marked the

[16] Nati (2008, 8–9).
[17] Stopponi (1991, 87).
[18] Historical accounts describe the Clanis river as navigable towards the Tiber during antiquity: Strabo 5.2, Plin. *NH* 3.1. See Bruschetti (2009, 185).

grave of an eminent personage, certainly a warrior, and is interpreted to be indicative of elite control over the fringes of the territory.[19] A short distance from Perugia, along the ancient Via Amerina—built in the third century BC, but along the course of previous roads—a byroad breaks off near Corciano towards Trasimeno and Cortona; along this track, traces of offerings to the deity *Pethns Calusna*, originating from the territory of Cortona, as ascertained from the indicator *tlenacheis*, suggesting evidence for a possible village settlement here.[20]

To the south, the territory of Perugia is delimited by the areas of San Venanzo and the Fersinone stream, near the boundary shared with Orvieto. In this area important tomb complexes have been discovered, associated with noble households and attributable to *principes* dominant in a territory not yet urbanised; located at Castel San Mariano, San Valentino, and Villanova, these are arranged in almost a vertical axis, more or less the same distance from Perugia: San Mariano at 13 km, San Valentino at 17 km, and Villanova at 15 km. San Valentino and Villanova are located along the road to Orvieto; Castel San Mariano on the way to Chiusi.[21]

The political extent of Perugia to the east seems to be represented by the settlement remains discovered at Civitella d'Arna, attested in pre-Roman times as an *oppidum* as well as a place of worship, as shown by a cache of schematic bronze votive figurines attributable to the Esquiline, Nocera Umbra, and Ancarano style groups. Despite a lack of secure archaeological evidence for the Archaic period in the area of Civitella d'Arna, many scholars agree that the settlement at Arna, at least from the fourth century BC, was within the political sphere of Perugia, as was the case with the site of Bettona farther south, and both sites were important as strongholds in controlling the left bank of the Tiber in this region. Arna is mentioned in the literary sources of its importance within the region during the Classical period, especially in association with conflicts between the Romans and alliances of Etruscans and other Italic peoples.[22]

With respect to the early history of the site of Civitella d'Arna, from the Bronze Age until the sixth or fifth centuries BC next to nothing has been found through archaeological enquiry, with the exception of some sporadic finds in the vicinity of the city, including a Villanovan fibula dating to around the eighth century BC. Little is visible of the urban plan today,

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19 Roncalli (1989, 112).
20 Bruschetti (2009, 186).
21 Cenciaioli (2002, 51).
22 Donnini & Rosi Bonci (2008, 3).

and it must have been relatively small, given the area of the summit of the hill. For the period between the sixth and fourth centuries, most of the archaeological material uncovered is represented by various groups of bronze votive figurines, now housed within the Bellucci collection at the Museo Archeologico di Perugia. During the second half of the fourth century, the evidence for settlement at Civitella d'Arna is securely identified with the discovery of a necropolis, within which both inhumation and cremation burials are attested. Moreover, urns stylistically linked to both Perugia and Assisi are found, underlining the importance of Civitella d'Arna as an intermediary between the right and left banks of the Tiber.[23]

Of the fortification walls there are no visible remains; however, the early excavators of the site found visible remains and suggest that Etruscan construction techniques were utilised to construct the walls.[24] Archaeologically attested activity at the site of Civitella d'Arna and its hinterland is sporadic; however, the authors suspect this settlement may be a weak attestation for the ancient pathway between Salaria and Fabrianese, perhaps connecting Perugia with the Adriatic coast. From the fourth century onward, the small urban area of Civitella d'Arna was bounded to the northeast by the necropoleis of Pescara, Osteria, and La Madonna. It was characterised by flourishing economic trade with various parts of the Hellenistic world, as shown by an exceptional amount of luxury funerary objects and imported goods found within the necropoleis. This settlement shows a marked Etruscan influence, as does other centres nearby in this area, such as Bettona to the east of the Tiber. Roughly 14 km from Perugia, Bettona is hypothesised by Stopponi to be a satellite centre of Perugia. It was bordered by Assisi to the northeast and Arna to the north and was located at a strategic position near the Chiascio and Topino rivers.[25]

The issue of mobility becomes central when discussing the evidence for human activity in the Perugian hinterland during the Archaic period. Although the early documentary evidence for rural settlement in the periphery of the urban centre is all but non-existent,[26] open-air peak sanctuaries have been identified at Pasticcetto di Magione, Colle Arsiccio, Caligiana, Monte Acuto, and Monte Tezio. Hundreds of Umbrian bronze

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23 Donnini & Rosi Bonci (2008, 147–8).

24 Donnini & Rosi Bonci (2008, 13).

25 Stopponi (2008, 30). Stopponi notes that the ancient name of the Topino river, the Tinia, might be significant.

26 Roncalli (1989, 112).

votive figurines were uncovered at these sites, which were located at strategic positions not only along key routes, but also at an altitude visible from other peak sanctuaries. Specifically, the sanctuary of Monte Acuto di Umbertide, although founded during the Late Bronze Age as a fortified settlement, became a sanctuary in the late sixth or early fifth century BC. Excavations have revealed a pseudo-rectangular enclosure whose walls about 3 m wide, preserved to a height of 1 m, built with stones quarried from the site, aligned and constructed without mortar. The area included a sacrificial pit, the enclosure, and the votive offerings, consisting of about 1800 schematic votive bronzes of human and animal figurines of southern Umbria production, especially the Esquiline group. Also present were ex-voto laminates dating to the second half of the sixth century BC. The position of this open-air sanctuary, interpreted as sacred to a pastoral-agricultural god, on the peak of Monte Acuto (927 m), is definitely strategic with respect to territorial control. The sanctuary is linked visually with other open-air sanctuaries in both Etruria and Umbria, such as Monte Ansciano (Gubbio), Monte Subasio (Assisi), Monte Torre Maggiore (Terni), Monte San Pancrazio (Calvi), and Monte Tezio (Perugia).

That the majority of figurines were of the more simplistic schematic type suggests frequentation by a largely pastoral demographic. In contrast, the votive deposit on Monte Falterona contained thousands of pieces of *aes rude* and arrowheads, 620 bronzes ranging from anatomical votives to elaborate kouroi, and various terracotta and pottery fragments.[27] The difference between the assemblage of Monte Falterona and those of the cult sites within the Perugian hinterland could be explained by the strategic location of Monte Falterona between the Casentino and Mugello valleys (and from there, further into the Po Valley), as well as its association with a healing cult.[28] The remarkable amount of figurines found in these deposits, as well as their locations within the hinterland of Perugia, a frontier city, is significant in terms of the evidence for the movement of people across supposed ethnic boundaries. Given the limited growth of Perugia until relatively late, the lack of a defined external boundary and centralised control of the centre over its hinterland is concurrent with Perugia's retarded development.

[27] MacIntosh Turfa (2006, 99).
[28] Izzet (2007b, 126).

5. *Identity Reinforcement in Perugia during the Republic*

It is during the fourth and third centuries that Perugia truly develops an economic and commercial autonomy, and assumes a new active political role amongst the remaining Etruscan centres, a pattern evident at other northern and internal cities as well (Cortona, Arezzo, Chiusi, etc.). It is also during this period that Perugia constructed its city walls, important not only for defensive purposes, but indicative of both the means to organize and mobilize significant manpower and the development of a clearly delineated civic identity. The earliest phases of construction of the Perugian city walls date to the second half of the fourth century, although the majority of the circuit appears to have been built during the later third century. These walls are about 3 km in length and attest to the extensive resources and manpower available to Perugia during this period. There is no single immediate reason for the construction of the defensive circuit, although it seems likely to have been prompted by a combination of factors, such as the threat of the Gallic invasion in the fourth century and the influx of settlers in the Perugian hinterland, some of which may have come from Volsinii (Orvieto), destroyed in 264. The destruction of Volsinii furthermore resulted in the increase in importance of Perugia as a major Etruscan centre in the north, possibly necessitating a monumental expression of civic identity. With the construction of these boundary walls came both civic defence as well as a symbolic delineation of what was City and what was Not.

Indeed it is for this period that Perugia is first mentioned in the historical record. Perugia is listed as a participant in various military skirmishes against Rome in 311 and 308 BC, as well as the battle of Sentinum in 295 during the Third Samnite War.[29] Despite this military rebellion, however, Perugia maintained its economic well-being, and for the late third century the city is documented as having sent men and supplies, specifically wheat and lumber, to contribute to Rome's wars against Hannibal and Carthage.[30] After the destruction of Volsinii by the Romans in 264 BC, Perugia assumed the predominant economic functions in the Upper Tiber Valley. Moreover, Perugia also experienced an influx of population, as attested by the increase of necropoleis and tombs in the Hellenistic period. Although this is most likely due to the economic prosperity of the

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29 Liv. 9.41, 9.37, 10.30.

30 Liv. 23.17, 28.45.

city during this period, some of this influx can be possibly attributed to emigration from the newly destroyed Volsinii, especially former slaves and freedmen (such as Cai Carcu and Cai Cutu).[31] Likewise, the construction of the Via Amerina, one of the first of the paved Roman roads, probably during the second half of the third century, would have greatly facilitated economic development.[32] This marked growth is also evidenced by a larger occupation of the coastal strip along Lake Trasimene, documented archeologically by a series of rural settlements spread both along the narrow coastal plains and on the hillsides, where the terrain allows. This increase is due to a change in the management of agricultural resources and a more efficient use of land as the population demands increased, as well as an agricultural system based on the working of larger commercial estates.[33]

The increasing importance of stones marking territorial boundaries within the Perugian hinterland seems to be a direct effect of this increase in population; however, it is also evident at other sites in central and northern Etruria. These boundary, or *tular*, stones are difficult to incorporate in an archaeological study, because of their imprecise or even unknown provenance. It is interesting to note, however, that of those of known origins are all from the north-east Etruscan boundary region,[34] including three from Perugia. The most famous of these is the so-called Perugian Cippus, dating to the third or second century, which records a legal property agreement between two Etruscan families. That the bottom portion of the *cippus* is rough-worked indicates it was probably placed into the ground at the boundary site. The preponderance of boundary stones dating to the third to first centuries could be indicative of a phenomenon similar to the motivations behind the Vegoia prophecy, which equates the moving of boundary stones to sacrilege. This suggests that a fear of land reforms by Rome heightened the importance of physically defining one's territory.[35]

Related to the increased observance of boundaries, the worship of Selvans is attested primarily from the fourth century onwards, especially in central and northern Etruria. Selvans, which many associate with the Roman god Silvanus, acted as sacred guardian over agricultural properties

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[31] Bruschetti (2002b, 92).
[32] Barker & Rasmussen (1998, 267).
[33] Roncalli (1989, 112).
[34] Lambrechts (1970).
[35] Heurgon (1959); Bruschetti (2002b, 92).

Figure 1. Bronze statuette of Selvans found outside the gates outside of Cortona. Third century BC.

and boundaries; the latter were associated with a specific aspect of the god, Tularia. Although in Perugia no remains of a temple to Selvans/Silvanus has been found yet, there is epigraphic evidence for one. A fragment of a double-sided Latin inscription was found in a stretch of the Etruscan wall records that the *duovir* Gaius Firmius Gallus built and paved, at his own expense, a road called Via Thorrena from the altar of Silvanus to the area of Tlennasis. During the excavation of the Piazza Cavallotti a votive deposit dating to the third to first centuries BC was found underneath the Roman roads; this might be associated with this temple.[36] A terracotta statue, found near Compresso in the Perugian hinterland, although not

[36] Pfiffig (1969).

Figure 2. Terracotta statue found near Compresso, Perugia, of an unknown deity. Second–first century BC.

formally identified as Selvans, strongly resembles the only known depiction of Selvans, found at Cortona.[37]

Both the chronological and geographical distribution of evidence of Selvans worship indicates that it was prevalent in areas under pressure, but not yet subsumed, by expanding Roman power during a politically unstable period. Within the area around Perugia specifically, it may also indicate demographic pressure from an increased population, due to either, or both, immigration or economic prosperity.

One of the most interesting categories of evidence, and indeed the most abundant, for group identity is funerary evidence, specifically the evolution of funerary inscriptions over the course of the third to first centuries. A short distance from Perugia, at Ponte San Giovanni, is the necropolis of Palazzone and the Hypogeum of the Volumni, one of the most significant

[37] De Grummond (2006, 145, fig. VII.4). However, Battista Passeri (1774) interpreted it as a depiction of a Lar Praestitis.

examples of Etruscan funerary architecture of the Hellenistic period. The necropolis dominates the side of the valley and contains about 200 tombs dating to the Hellenistic period.[38] The inscriptions on the cinerary urns found in the Volumni tomb include a single bilingual (Etruscan/Latin) inscription dating to the end of the first century BC. It combines the *praenomen* Publius with a Latinised version of the Etruscan cognomen, Violens. What is most interesting, however, is that each inscription is not a direct translation of each other. The Etruscan inscription contains the matronymic *Cahatial*, whilst the Latin one contains both the matronymic *Cafatia natus* and the patronymic *A*(*uli*) *f*(*ilius*).[39] Other major family tombs also document the transition from Etruscan to Latin during this period. The *Cai Cutu* tomb, which also dates from the third to first centuries, contains 50 cinerary urns, six of which were inscribed in Latin and post-date the Social War.[40] Adams suggests that the variability evident in later Etruscan and early Latin inscriptions, specifically the presence of decidedly Etruscan morphemes in Latin inscriptions and vice versa, signify that a significant language shift has taken place. These idiosyncratic language patterns, such as the inclusion of the matronymic, the retention of Etruscan names in Latin texts, and the use of filiation with *clan* in Etruscan inscriptions, represent simultaneously the retention of a cultural identity and the process of language death.[41]

6. *Conclusion*

With respect to the correlation between boundaries and identity, Perugia was far slower in undergoing an urbanisation process, and thus in the construction and expression of its civic identity and control over its hinterland. This weak control, and the resultant permeable boundary, was manifest in the numerous peak sanctuaries within the Perugian hinterland, dating to the sixth and fifth centuries, which produced hundreds of votive figurines of Umbrian manufacture; compare this with the poradic finds of the same schematic type of figurines elsewhere in Etruria (Fig. 3).[42]

[38] Cenciaioli (2002, 54).
[39] Bonfante & Bonfante (2002, 69).
[40] Feruglio (2002).
[41] Adams (2003, 182–3).
[42] With the exception of Fiesole, where 31 were found, attributed by Colonna (1970, 36, 55–7) to the presence of a few Umbrian bronze workers in the area.



Figure 3. Map of Perugia and its hinterland. Seventh–fifth centuries BC.

The vast quantity of these figurines, as well as their simple form, suggest the presence of populations living in the boundary area between Perugia and Umbria, who were likely very mobile due to a seasonally nomadic pastoral lifestyle, but had limited resources. This boundary can be contrasted with boundaries elsewhere in Etruria, such as the highly contested boundary between Veii and Rome, which were fortified from a much earlier period.[43] As the city developed and flourished during the fourth and third centuries, however, evidence of urban control over the periphery and the expression of a Perugian civic identity can be seen. Most notably, the construction of city walls in the second half of the fourth century signified not only the ability of the city to mobilize extensive manpower and resources in order to complete such a project, but the delineation and expression of a clearer concept of urban space. Likewise, the establishment and growth of such sites as Civitella d'Arna and Bettona represent an extension of Perugian political and economic power beyond the Tiber and fortified what was essentially the Etruscan frontier to the east (Fig. 4).

Although not under direct subjugation by the Romans (indeed the city of Perugia itself remained largely untouched by Roman military incursions until 41–40 BC, when the city was burned as a result of the conflict between Octavian and Mark Antony), marked changes in the organization of the Perugian territory and the expression of identity were the result of indirect Roman intervention. As a boundary site on the periphery of Etruria, Perugia was able to maintain some semblance of autonomy; and yet, by the end of the first century, Perugia had been almost completely assimilated into the cultural fabric of Roman Italy. Far from a binary approach to resistance/assimilation, what this suggests is a complicated cultural-political context in which circumstances may be favourable or unfavourable to the expression and maintenance of a particular group identity. Whilst the circumstances of the fourth and third centuries—political instability, economic autonomy and prosperity, social competition—were conducive to the expression of a strong group identity and the observance of strong civic and ownership boundaries, those of the first century—namely, the grant of citizenship after the Social War—incentivised assimilation into a much larger and more lucrative (economically, socially, and politically) Roman network, including the use of Latin.

However, as some aspects of an Etruscan identity were maintained, namely the Latinization of Etruscan *cognomina*, it stands to reason that

[43] Neil (2012).



Figure 4. Map of Perugia and its hinterland. Fourth–second centuries BC.

some aspects of their previous group identity (namely those related to descent groups) were significant enough to maintain. Most importantly, the variability in the assimilation process between different areas of Etruria suggests that our comprehension of ancient identity—and especially that of an ancient Etruscan ethnicity—requires a nuanced approach that takes into account the interplay between various levels of identity. What is evident from this exercise is that specific facets of identity, be it descent group, political, socio-economic, or ethnicity, become relevant or irrelevant depending on the historical context. By the first century BC in Perugia local ethnic identity is downplayed in order to participate in and actively assimilate into a larger Roman network.

RECONSIDERING *SOCII* IN ROMAN ARMIES BEFORE THE PUNIC WARS

Patrick Kent*

1. *Introduction*

There are few topics in the military history of the Roman Republic that are as fundamental to our understanding as the importance of Italian soldiers marching across the peninsula in Roman armies. The exploitation of allied manpower was one of the keys to Roman military success from the wars in Italy long before the Punic War to the conquest of the Mediterranean Basin. However, for too long historians have relied on the authority of Polybius' description of the Roman army in the second century, without giving sufficient attention to other sources that focus on the period before the Punic Wars. The assumptions that have dictated the modern understanding of the role of allied soldiers in Roman armies warrant reconsideration and deeper investigation. This paper will explore some of the difficulties associated with military cooperation in early Italy, the place of the Italian allies in that system, and how it relates to later periods when Roman domination was far greater.

2. *Sources and Historiography*

The characterization of Rome's use of their Italian allies has changed little since the days of Mommsen, and is mostly based on Roman accounts of the second century. In 1881 Mommsen said that "without a doubt the non-Latin allied communities... were registered on the list of contingent-furnishing Italians (*formula togatorum*)".[1] Rawlings, in 2007, stated that, based on the *formula togatorum*, "it is highly probable that at least 50 percent of any army that Rome raised [during the conquest of Italy] would have comprised of allies, especially after the settlement of 338 BC".[2]

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[1] Mommsen (1881, 423): "ohne Zweifel [werden] auch die nichtlatinischen föderierten Gemeinden... in das Verzeichnis der zuzugpflichtigen Italiker (*formula togatorum*) eingetragen."

[2] Rawlings (2007, 52).

The nature of the *formula togatorum* has been debated, but it is usually linked to the treaties between the Romans and their allies.[3] These treaties supposedly compelled Rome's allies to provide military assistance when called upon. In part, the need to explain aggressive wars led to the idea of the *foedus iniquum*,[4] although this has now largely been abandoned. Certainly in recent years the army has featured prominently in a number of studies of Roman-Italian relations, but always with these same underlying assumptions.[5]

Ultimately, the modern characterization of Roman armies and their allies is intimately linked to the ancient sources, and they had no qualms about asserting Roman domination. The most complete account of the Republican army comes from Polybius in the mid-second century. After describing the levy of citizens, he says that "the consuls send word to the leaders of the allied cities of Italy, which they want to contribute allied soldiers for the campaign, declaring the number of men as well as the day and place at which those selected must present themselves".[6] In an earlier passage concerning the preparations for the Telamon campaign in 225, Polybius echoes the idea of Roman domination of the military resources of their Italian allies.[7] He says that not only were large forces raised, but that the Romans gathered lists of men from their allies from which a comprehensive account of Italian manpower was put together.[8] While not going so far as to describe Rome's use of allied manpower as a formal treaty obligation, Polybius certainly seems to suggest such an arrangement. However, exactly how the Romans were supposed to have kept track of allied manpower numbers and determined obligation is a matter of debate.[9]

3 Baronowski (1984).

4 Badian (1958, 25–30).

5 E.g. Hantos (2003); Jehne (2006); Rosenstein (2006); Pfeilschifter (2007).

6 Plb. 6.21.4: κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς οἱ τὰς ὑπάτους ἀρχὰς ἔχοντες παραγγέλλουσι τοῖς ἄρχουσι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεων τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας, ἐξ ὧν ἂν βούλωνται συστρατεύειω τοὺς συμμάχους, διασαφοῦντες τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τὸν τόπον, εἰς ὃν δεήσει παρεῖναι τοὺς κεκριμένους.

7 Plb. 2.23–4. Elsewhere (12.5.2), he says of Italian Locri that they were "required by the Romans to send support over the sea according to their treaty (κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας)", although he does not mention fighting ships or men being demanded.

8 Brunt (1971, 545–8) argues that the *formula togatorum* was created because of the demands of the Telamon campaign.

9 Salmon (1982, 169–71); Brunt (1971, 545–8); Ilari (1974, 57–86).

The other major source for the Middle Republic, Livy, reinforces the idea of Roman domination of their allies' military resources. Livy says that in 193, the consul Q. Minucius

> sent an edict to the allies (*socii* and *nominis Latini*), or rather, to their magistrates and ambassadors, who were required to give soldiers, that they should meet him on the Capitoline. From these he apportioned fifteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, based on the number of *iuniores*.[10]

Other passages of Livy are similar. In 209, when twelve Latin colonies had insisted they could not provide soldiers, the consul asked the representatives of the other colonies "whether they had any soldiers ready *ex formula*".[11] The other eighteen colonies assured them that "they had soldiers in readiness *ex formula*, and, if more were needed, more would be given".[12] In 204 the colonies complained "that even if a lower number were required *ex formula*, it could hardly be met".[13] Livy, however, does not limit himself to the Second Punic War and afterwards. For the year 459 he links allied military assistance explicitly with treaties, saying "the Hernici and Latins were ordered [by the Romans] to provide soldiers *ex foedere*".[14] The 'right' of the Romans to requisition soldiers supposedly went back even further, to the time of the kings, and was confirmed and renewed in the *Foedus Cassianum* of 493, as well as in subsequent treaties down to 340 when the Latin League was dissolved.[15] The use of naval resources in the second century is also linked to treaties by Livy.[16]

It is hardly surprising that modern historians interpret Roman use of Italian military resources as they do. Polybius, while not going so far as to link military obligation and treaties, certainly asserts Roman domination of their allies. Livy follows suit, but is far more explicit at times, clearly

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10 Liv. 34.56.5–6: *Item sociis et Latino nomini, magistratibus legatisque eorum, qui milites dare debebant, edixit ut in Capitolio se adirent. iis quindecim milia peditum et quingentos equites, pro numero cuiusque iunorum, discripsit.*

11 Liv. 27.10.2: *Ecquid milites ex formula paratos haberent.*

12 Liv. 27.10.3–4: *Milites paratos ex formula esse, et, si pluribus opus esset, pluris daturos.*

13 Liv. 29.15.13: *Vix, si simplum ex formula imperetur, enisuros.*

14 Liv. 3.22.4: *Hernici et Latini iussi milites dare ex foedere*. For a complete list of attestations of obligations to provide soldiers see Alföldi (1965, 107–10).

15 Liv. 1.32.3. See Alföldi (1965, 111–13).

16 Liv. 26.39.5; 35.16.3, 8; 36.44.5–7, 42.1–2; 42.38.9; *cf.* Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.50. However, Liv. 36.4.9 indicates that Carthage was included in this list of communities with treaty obligations, contrary to what is known about the treaty between Rome and Carthage. Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.17, 5.50–1 mentions naval obligations concerning Messana, a city in Sicily instead of Italy, but is not clear on what kind of ship was required, calling it a *cybaea* and a *biremis*. See below concerning Spain.

linking military obligation and Roman-Italic treaties. For both authors the Romans were clearly the masters of Italy, using the resources of their allies as they saw fit. To be sure, it was these resources that allowed the Romans to absorb horrendous losses, e.g. to Hannibal, and then proceed to subordinate the Mediterranean Basin from Spain to Asia Minor. However, an important aspect of Roman and Italian military relations is largely left out, namely how the Romans and Italians interacted in the period before the Punic Wars. Polybius does not indicate that his descriptions predate the Punic Wars. While Livy does indicate Roman domination far back into Roman history, there are problems with his characterization. However, a careful examination of the accounts of Italian military actions in the time before Rome's ascension to world power reveal a picture that is far more complex.

For early Roman and Italian history, the sources are difficult. A variety of records and accounts of early days survived in the form of pontifical records and family oral traditions, all of which were used by Rome's first historians (writing in the mid-third century), such as Fabius Pictor. Naturally, the earlier one looks, the less reliable the information. For the most part, it is agreed that, towards the end of the fourth century, evidence increases in trustworthiness.[17] However, some events from even earlier were so famous that they were remembered long afterwards. Livy relied almost entirely on the Roman historical tradition, mostly in the form of the annalists of the late second and early first centuries, although occasionally using older sources. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, on the other hand, supplemented his Roman sources, which were the same as Livy, with Greek sources, including local historical traditions and the memoirs of Pyrrhus.[18] To be sure, these authors and their own sources felt free to embellish and modify their works in order to promote certain concepts or traditions, but by piecing together isolated events, it is possible to reveal the importance of social networks and personal relationships in the use of allied manpower.

[17] Oakley (1997, 38–72).

[18] Pyrrhus: Dion. Hal. 20.1.2. Dionysius likely used a Greek source for his account of Neapolis in 328, see Oakley (1998, 640–2); Frederiksen (1984, 210–12).

3. *Inter-Community Politics in Italy*

Too often, Roman military and political institutions (as opposed to weapons or tactics) are considered in a near vacuum, the result of internal development alone. Before considering Rome's army, it is first necessary to understand the nature of inter-community politics in Italy more broadly, which gave rise to the military traditions that the Romans relied on. A close examination of the interaction of communities in the period of 343 to 265 shows that the supposition of obligatory military service implies a level of dominance on the part of the Roman state that simply did not exist. While our sources nearly always portray the Romans as an inarguable superpower during the conquest of Italy, through minor details and inference it is nonetheless possible to catch glimpses of a more realistic level of Roman power. For example, Livy claims that the battle of Lautulae in 315 between the Romans and Samnites was a Roman victory.[19] However, he acknowledges that some of his sources claimed it was a grievous defeat, a view that is supported by the 'revolts' (as the Romans termed it) of a number of Aurunci, Volsci, and Apulians; at the same time conspiracies were apparently hatched in Capua and other cities of Campania. Less than a decade later, the Romans were unable to prevent one of their oldest allies, the Hernici, from first contributing men to a Samnite army and then revolting from Rome in the face of Roman investigations.[20] Indeed, in this period, *many* of Rome's allies 'revolted' at one point or another, often multiple times. Men gathered from potentially hostile communities would hardly have provided a reliable force of soldiers and could have easily compromised the fighting ability of the Roman army. The same can be said for Rome's opponents. The Lucanians, or parts thereof, changed sides between the Romans and the Samnites/Tarentines multiple times, hardly proving reliable allies to any other community.[21]

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[19] Liv. 9.23, 25–6. See Oakley (2005, vol. III, 300–3) for a more in-depth discussion of the defections of 314.

[20] Liv. 9.42.8–11.

[21] The Lucanians fought against the Italiote Greeks with Dionysius I in the early fourth century, Diod. 14.100–3. They fought against his heir Dionysius II, Diod. 16.5. In 326 they established relations with the Romans, which were immediately abandoned thanks to Tarentine manipulation, Liv. 8.25–7. Sometime afterwards, the Lucanians returned to their Roman allies; in 299 the Samnites unsuccessfully tried to garner support from them, Liv. 10.11.11. After 293, when Livy's narrative is lost, specific information is nearly nonexistent. However, from 282 to 272, eight triumphs by Roman generals are recorded in the *fasti triumphales*, often in conjunction with Samnites, Tarentines, and Bruttians. Lucanian forces joined Pyrrhus for the battle of Ausculum in 279, Dion. Hal. 20.1. After 272, the

Over the course of the Roman conquest of Italy, similar shifts in alliances occurred too frequently to elaborate in detail here, but the events from 343 to 338 (the First Samnite War and the Latin War) clearly illustrate the chaotic nature of inter-community relations in Italy and the role of military alliances. For example, in 343 the Campanians came to the aid of their neighbors the Sidicini against Samnite raiders. But when the Samnites pressed towards Capua, the Campanians turned to the Romans who, along with the Latins, fought the men of Samnium to a standstill. When Rome made peace with the Samnites in 341, the Campanians, Latins, and Sidicini joined forces to continue the war, only to face a Roman-Samnite alliance, which defeated Latium, Campania, and the Sidicini. In each of these cases of warfare, two or more communities called upon the military assistance of allies. Indeed, the Latins carried out their own military operations independent from the Romans while the war with the Samnites still raged, conduct that the Senate was forced to acknowledge as within their rights, when, after peace had been made in 341, Samnite envoys complained of continued Latin hostility.[22]

Military alliances were vital to the well-being of any community in the peninsula. Warfare was endemic in fourth-century Italy; it was necessary for communities to band together, either to defend against aggressive neighbours or to overcome enemy alliances in offensive campaigns. Alliances begat alliances in an endless cycle. Over the course of the conquest of Italy, the Roman army included peoples from all over of the peninsula. In 279 at the battle of Ausculum against Pyrrhus the Roman army was accompanied by Latins, Campanians, Sabines, Umbrians, Volscians, Marrucini, Paeligni, and Frentani.[23] In other battles, Apulians and Samnites were also to be found on the Roman side. We must remember, however, that the same can be said about other Italian armies. At Ausculum Pyrrhus included Tarentines, Bruttians, Lucanians, and Samnites in his army. At the battle of Sentinum in 295 the Samnites, Etruscans, Gauls, and Umbrians had united against the Romans, whose army was also accompanied by large numbers of allies.[24] At various times we find Romans, Apulians, Hernici, Aequi, Marsi, Paeligni, Vestini, and others with Samnite armies.

Lucanians seem to have remained Roman allies until the Second Punic War, when they again changed sides on a number of occasions between the Romans and Hannibal. For this period see Fronda (2010).

[22] Liv. 7.38.1, 8.2.9–13.

[23] Dion. Hal. 20.1.5–8.

[24] Liv. 10.18; Plb. 2.19.5–6; Zon. 8.1; Diod. Sic. 21.6.

Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls often fought alongside and against each other. In addition there were the geographically determined alliances which included cities and tribes of Latium, Etruria, Campania, Samnium, and various areas of the central Apennines in individual leagues and confederations. The repeated presence of certain peoples on different sides of conflicting armies should be emphasized. Alliances were constantly being forged, broken, and reformed, but always around the central idea of military cooperation.

It is important to realize that the use of allied soldiers was not limited to the Romans, but was a common feature of the military environment of Italy. However, such cooperation was not limited to the terms of treaties. The Samnites did not force obligatory military service on the many peoples that joined them in war. They did not create a complex hierarchical system of military exploitation. It is dangerous to infer that the Romans transcended the military environment in which they existed based on the accounts of later historians writing at a time when the Romans were the masters of the Mediterranean, let alone Italy. The fluid nature of alliances at this time indicates that the Romans did not enjoy a level of dominance that allowed them to conscript men from potentially hostile communities, let alone ensure that they preformed their duties in combat situations. We must not separate the Romans from their Italian roots, which dictated the importance of alliances and military cooperation. As one Tarentine is recorded to have said before advocating an alliance with Pyrrhus, "it is dangerous to fight alone".[25]

4. *Alliances, Friendship, and Voluntary Cooperation*

A central component of our conception of Roman-Italian military relations is the belief that the supposed obligations of allies to provide soldiers were dictated by formal treaties. Unfortunately, there is a lack of any examples within the Italian peninsula other than the *Foedus Cassianum*. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the treaty read:

> Let there be peace between the Romans and all the Latin cities as long as the heavens and the earth remain in place. Let them not make war on each other nor bring in foreign enemies nor grant safe passage to those who would make war upon either. Let them assist each other with all their forces

[25] App. *Samn.* 7.3: πολεμεῖν μόνους ἐπισφαλές.

> when either is attacked. Let each have an equal share of the spoils and booty taken in common wars. Let lawsuits regarding private contracts be settled within ten days and in the community where the contract was originally made. And let it not be permitted to add anything to or take anything away from this treaty unless both the Romans and all of the Latins agree.[26]

This alliance was, first and foremost, a military agreement. The treaty does not explicitly place the Romans in a dominant position, instead specifying equality, dictating a mutual defence pact, seemingly between equals.[27] Alföldi has pointed out how historians have sought to portray Rome as mistress of central Italy from an early date to a sceptical Greek audience.[28] In the case of the *Foedus Cassianum*, and regarding other military obligations found in the ancient sources, later Roman power influenced the perception of earlier periods. Roman-Italic treaties in all likelihood routinely involved mutual defence clauses, but these were for defensive purposes only. The question then becomes how the Romans exploited allied manpower in offensive campaigns, which we know many allies participated in.

Perhaps the most obvious answer is that despite its terms regarding mutual defence, the *Foedus Cassianum* nonetheless served as a tool for Roman military domination. After all, the Romans always preferred to style their wars as defensive in nature. How far they were prepared to go in order to justify their claims is clear in the outbreak of the First Punic War.[29] In fact, warfare in early Italy has all of the hallmarks of being largely reactive in nature. Raids and campaigns were launched in response to similar actions by enemies in a cycle that could stretch far into the past, as was characteristic of the long wars between Rome and nearby Veii. Reactive does not necessarily mean defensive, but the two can be easily

[26] Dion. Hal. 6.95.2: Ῥωμαίοις καὶ ταῖς Λατίνων πόλεσιν ἁπάσαις εἰρήνη πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔστω, μέχρις ἂν οὐρανός τε καὶ γῆ τὴν αὐτὴν στάσιν ἔχωσι; καὶ μήτ᾽ αὐτοὶ πολεμείτωσαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μήτ᾽ ἄλλοθεν πολεμίους ἐπαγέτωσαν, μήτε τοῖς ἐπιφέρουσι πόλεμον ὁδοὺς παρεχέτωσαν ἀσφαλεῖς, βοηθείτωσάν τε τοῖς πολεμουμένοις ἁπάσῃ δυνάμει, λαφύρων τε καὶ λείας τῆς ἐκ πολέμων κοινῶν τὸ ἴσον λαγχανέτωσαν μέρος ἑκάτεροι; τῶν τε ἰδιωτικῶν συμβολαίων αἱ κρίσεις ἐν ἡμέραις γιγνέσθωσαν δέκα, παρ᾽ οἷς ἂν γένηται τὸ συμβόλαιον. ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ταύταις μεδὲν ἐξέστω προσθεῖναι μηδ᾽ ἀφελεῖν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὅ τι ἂν μὴ Ῥωμαίοις τε καὶ Λατίνοις ἅπασι δοκῇ. See Cic. *Balb*. 53; Liv. 2.33.9, who mention that the inscription remained on public display as late as the first century, but neglect to actually provide a copy.

[27] Dion. Hal. 6.95; Cic. *Balb*. 53. Festus (276 L), quoting L. Cincius, records that the Latins at an early date met at the spring of Ferentina to determine whether the commander of the joint Roman-Latin army would be Roman or Latin. It is possible to accept the ambiguity of such a statement as the result of the mutual defence pact dictated by the treaty, *contra* Cornell (1995, 299).

[28] Alföldi (1965, 124).

[29] Lazenby (1996, 31–42). See Roselaar in this volume.

conflated when it suits one's purposes. To be sure, Rome was the dominant city in Latium long before the fourth century and could have used the *Foedus Cassianum* as a means of obtaining military assistance from their Latin allies. However, such an action cannot be construed in the fashion that Livy does. The Romans had no legal basis to demand men whenever they wished, and, prior to the late fourth century, the difference in the level of power between the Romans and the Latins was insufficient to allow them to make such demands. Such a characterization might fit the second-century situation, but not the fourth and earlier. At the same time, the potential for domination represented in the *Foedus Cassianum* does not sufficiently explain the phenomenon of military cooperation in the rest of Italy.

There were many other factors that contributed to military cooperation in early Italy. The reputations of Rome's great leaders extended well beyond the city, and it was often through these men that Rome exploited allied soldiers. In 310, when Rome faced renewed warfare against the Etruscans, the consul Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus sent his brother to scout into the Ciminian Forest. He ended up at Camerinum in Umbria, which, as a sign of friendship, voluntarily promised to provide men and supplies to the Roman army should it ever be nearby.[30] There can be little doubt that the name of Fabius played a significant part in establishing friendly relations, which is confirmed in 291 when the defeated and disgraced consul Q. Fabius Maximus Gurges was ordered by the Senate to employ his father, Rullianus, as a lieutenant, whom "the allied forces assisted in memory of his previous deeds".[31] Rullianus was not the only prominent commander of his day that had a great deal of sway over the people of other communities in Italy: "A remarkable power of command was found in [L. Papirius Cursor] that was equally effective with citizens and allies."[32] Reputation played a key role in Roman politics, and it is little wonder that the reputation of great men extended beyond the City as Roman armies marched further and further afield. Men like Rullianus and Cursor, who could each boast of three triumphs over far-ranging areas, garnered renown well beyond their home community and would have been rallying points for men seeking to further their own reputation

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[30] Liv. 9.36.

[31] Dio Cassius 8.31: τά γε συμμαχικὰ προθύμως οἱ, μνήμῃ τῶν παλαιῶν αὐτοῦ ἔργων. See Liv. *Per.* 11.

[32] Liv. 9.16.16: *Et vis erat in eo viro imperii ingens partier in socios civesque*. See Dio Cassius, 8.24. Front. *Strat.* 2.4.1 confirms allies in the armies of Cursor in 293.

through military action.[33] Even in later periods of Roman history, the charisma of great generals could play a significant role in the recruitment of armies, as it did with the Scipiones.

The Romans relied heavily on individual leaders in allied communities. In 280, Oblacus Volsinius led a group of his fellow Frentani in the Roman army that faced Pyrrhus at Heraclea.[34] Around the same time, the Romans installed in the allied city of Rhegium a garrison of Campanians and Sidicini under a Campanian commander named Decius Vibellius, a man from a prominent Campanian family.[35] Even as late as Polybius' day, the consuls relied on local leaders to recruit the *socii* for the Roman army.[36]

Groups of Italian soldiers under their own commanders served not only as allies, but also as mercenaries within Italy and beyond, especially in the wars of Sicily.[37] Certainly Decius, the commander of the Rhegian garrison, acted like a mercenary captain akin to the Mamertines when he seized the city for himself. One may also recall the Fabii leading their retainers in a private war at the Cremera River in 477.[38] The culture we know best, that of Rome, was centred around personal military glory, which played a vital part establishing one's reputation and position within the community, and the same can be said for other Italian peoples.[39] For example, in 340 during their war with Rome the Latin commander L. Numisius persuaded hesitant Volscian communities to send additional men only

[33] L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus (cos. 298) certainly thought it necessary to highlight his personal achievements on his tomb (*ILLRP* 309).

[34] Dion. Hal. 19.12.

[35] Plb. 1.7; Dion. Hal. 20.4; Liv. *Per.* 12; Diod. Sic. 22.1.3. For a discussion of the problems associated with the sources for this story see Walbank (1957, 52–3).

[36] Plb. 6.21.4. The Roman garrison of Clastidium was commanded by Dasius of Brundisium and acted as a granary for Roman operations in Cisalpine in 218 (Liv. 21.48.9–10). A force of 8,500 men led by the Samnite Numerius Decimius saved the *magister equitum* M. Minucius Rufus in 217 (Liv. 22.24.11–14).

[37] The propensity for Oscans to serve as mercenaries within Italy and abroad, such as the Mamertines and others in Sicily, is well known. The Samnites also drew upon mercenaries from surrounding peoples for their own armies (Liv. 8.38.1). A group of Lucanian exiles served as the bodyguard of Alexander of Epirus in Italy (Liv. 8.24). In the face of Pyrrhus' invasion of Sicily, the Carthaginians hired Italian mercenaries; they did so again in the Truceless War of 242 (Zon. 8.5; App. *Sic.* 3).

[38] Liv. 2.49–50.

[39] Eckstein (2006, 118–60) gives an excellent account of the central nature of warfare in Italy in this period. However, he focuses too much on the external factors that determined the 'anarchic system.' A middle ground between internal and external pressure seems preferable.

by falsely claiming victory over the Roman army.[40] Close social relations between Romans and other Italian communities are evident from Etruria to Magna Graecia during this period.[41] In all of the dealings of allied communities, we hear precious few references to treaty obligations. Indeed, the Romans had no qualms about refusing to interfere in the local affairs of their allies. Even when the allied Aurunci asked for military aid against aggressive neighbours in 337, the Romans delayed until their allies were driven from their own city.[42]

Social relations played an important part in the military-political relations between the Romans and other Italian communities, but again such connections were not limited to Rome. Samnite military assistance for Neapolis in 327 was linked specifically with individuals linked through ties of hospitality (ἰδιοξενὶα), which the Romans attempted to disrupt by establishing their own relationships.[43] After the battle of Lautulae in 315, a number of young men persuaded their fellow Ausones, who were at peace with Rome, to provide men and materials to the Samnites.[44] Another group of individuals persuaded the city of Nuceria to abandon their Roman alliance in favour of the Samnites.[45] Likewise, it was through disaffected young men of Lucania that the Tarentines were able to pry the Lucanians (once again) away from their Roman alliance.[46] Given the lack of any formal diplomatic corps among the communities of Italy, it is no surprise that the Italians and Romans relied heavily on private connections for inter-community relations. Such relations facilitated military cooperation among different Italian communities, supplementing any existing formal alliances. After all, even formal alliances relied heavily on individuals to act as guarantors.[47]

It may be useful to consider the Roman use of Spanish allied soldiers in Spain during the Second Punic War. Over the course of the war, Roman commanders went to great lengths to establish relations with local

[40] Liv. 8.11.8–9.

[41] A man from Volscian Fundi named M. Vitruvius Vaccus maintained a house on the Palatine Hill in Rome in the middle of the fourth century, Liv. 8.19.4; Cic. *Dom.* 101. Fabius Caeso had been educated in Etruscan culture and language while he had stayed in the house of a family friend in Caere, Liv. 9.36. For Magna Graecia see Zon. 8.2, 6; Latium: Liv. 8.3.3.

[42] Liv. 8.15.

[43] Dion. Hal. 15.8.5.

[44] Liv. 9.25.3–9.

[45] Diod. 19.65.7.

[46] Liv. 8.27.

[47] For the *pater patratus*, Liv. 1.24; Plb. 3.25.8. See Wiedemann (1986, 488–90).

leaders, which provided the base for the use of local soldiers in the Roman armies.[48] The Carthaginians did likewise.[49] The importance of the individual can be seen when the future Africanus was rumoured dead and two tribes that had recently established friendly relations with the young general immediately attacked other Roman allies.[50] It is quite clear that the Romans utilized existing local military traditions. However, it is important that we not relegate Rome's Italian allies to a purely passive role in comparison to the Romans. The Spanish leaders had a variety of motives for choosing sides in the conflict. As situations changed over the course of the war, both within the communities of Spain and in the ascendancy of Roman and Carthaginian armies, Spanish leaders regularly changed sides. Spanish leaders and communities did what seemed best to each, allying themselves with the outside powers campaigning in Spain in order to further their own agendas.[51] However, the use of Spanish forces was also regulated by treaties; Appian relates that in the early second century, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus the Elder modified these treaties at the request of local communities, to limit the military requisitions that Roman governors were making.[52] Thus, in Spain we see a complex relationship of individuals, personal relationships, and treaties all facilitating military cooperation. It should be kept in mind that this Spanish situation occurred later in Roman history, when it was far more powerful than in pre-Punic War Italy, but the picture presented here has remarkable parallels with what we have seen for the earlier period.

At the same time, in Italy many allies came to the Roman army voluntarily, which means that the Romans did not exert direct force, at least not always.[53] Many allied contingents in Samnite armies were said to have

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[48] Cn. Cornelius Scipio in 218: Liv. 21.60.4. The Cornelii a few years later: Plb. 3.98; Liv. 22.22. P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus: Plb. 10.34.2–35.8; Liv. 27.17.1–3.

[49] Indibilis came to the aid of the Carthaginians with 7,500 men against the Romans, Liv. 25.34.6.

[50] Liv. 28.24.3–4.

[51] Indeed, similar behaviour was normal in other Mediterranean societies: Polybius' account of Greek affairs is full of treaties, between Rome and Greek communities and between Greeks themselves, which were made and broken as situations developed.

[52] App. *Iber*. 43–4.

[53] Camerinum, the Lucanians, and the Apulians voluntarily offered soldiers for the Roman army (Liv. 8.25.3, 9.36). Apulians came to the aid of the Romans against Pyrrhus apparently of their own volition (Dion. Hal. 20.3.2; Zon. 8.5). There are no references to the Romans forcing allied soldiers to march with them in this period, either via treaties or direct military pressure.

likewise served of their own volition.[54] In Italy at the battle of Ausculum, the Frentani leader Oblacus Volsinius came to the Roman army commanding his own group of loyal warriors.[55] Roman command structures were apparently lacking, as he set out to engage Pyrrhus in single combat early in the battle, and immediately charged the king when he saw an opening with little regard to any battle-plan formulated by the Roman general. Unfortunately for him, Pyrrhus' *hetairoi* intervened and killed the Italian in order to save their king. This shows that the Romans not only shared the military traditions common in Italy, but relied on those traditions in their use of allied soldiers.[56]

5. *Conclusion*

Military cooperation was a complex phenomenon in early Italy. Prior to the Punic Wars, all of the peoples of Italy, not merely the Romans, were combining their military forces with allies in order to supplement them. Despite the difficulties with the sources, the military traditions of Italy need to be investigated in more detail. Modern scholars, largely following the bias of the sources, are too quick to retroject later characteristics of Roman-Italian relations into earlier periods. Formal alliances between communities played their part in military cooperation, but there were other factors in play. An Italian-wide military tradition existed, in which the Romans fully participated; this tradition was upheld by overlapping personal relationships of local leaders. It facilitated the use of allied manpower, adding another level to the interaction of communities. It is necessary to explore the larger framework of military cooperation of the Romans and Italians before the Punic Wars in order to understand how it developed and changed over time. In turn, by gaining a better idea of Italian military tradition, it is possible to reinterpret later Roman use of allied manpower—as represented in the narratives of Polybius and Livy—at the height of the Republic's power in the century leading up to the Social War.

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[54] Hernici (Liv. 9.42.8–11); Aequi (Liv. 9.45.5–18); Apulians (Liv. 8.37.5–6); Aurunci (Liv. 9.25.5); Marsi and Paeligni (Liv. 9.41.4).

[55] Dion. Hal. 19.12; Plut. *Pyrr.* 16.8–10.

[56] Rawlings (2007, 49–53).

INTEGRATION AND ARMIES IN THE MIDDLE REPUBLIC

Nathan S. Rosenstein*

1. *Introduction*

Any project aiming to investigate the points of contact between Romans and Italians from the mid-fourth down to the early first centuries has got to take a long look at war. The Republic's conquest of an empire in these years linked the Republic and its allies economically, since Rome paid for allied soldiers' rations of grain. But more importantly, they and the legionaries shared equally in the spoils. Victorious generals handed out identical donatives to Roman and allied soldiers, and as near as we can tell their access to opportunities to plunder was the same, meaning that *socii* and legionaries stood an equal chance of going home with a full purse. Politically and administratively, making war involved the Republic in mobilizing and organizing its allies on a massive scale through the mechanism of the *formula togatorum*, even though how this worked in detail remains unclear. The *formula* brought more Italians and Romans into closer proximity with one another more often and for longer periods of time than any other institution in the middle Republic. For that reason, it is important at the outset to offer some sense of just how massive an undertaking this was.

2. *The Level of Mobilization*

Figures 1 through 3 model three snapshots of the scale of Roman mobilization of its allies: in the latter part of the third century, just prior to the Hannibalic War, and in the middle and the later second century, around 168 and 124.

Over the course of the second half of the third century, down to Hannibal's invasion of Italy, Rome's typical military establishment was four legions per year. The size of the allied contingents that accompanied them is likely to have varied considerably, to judge by the ratios of *socii* to legionaries in the armies fielded in 225 and later in the first part of the

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second century.[1] Rather than try to establish the average number of allies accompanying a legion, it is better to work with a range in order to avoid over- or under-estimating the burden imposed on the *socii*. The ratio of the latter to Romans could vary from one-to-one to as much as two-to-one.[2] Polybius, drawing on Fabius Pictor, puts the total number of allies at about 361,000 men in 225 BC, but this figure is generally taken to represent only *iuniores*, which should mean men below the age of 46.[3] However, the Romans did not typically require military service of citizens beyond their early 30s, the point at which at the latest they will have married and begun to raise a family; one must presume that the same held more or less true for the allies.[4] If so, it means that while 361,000 allied men may in theory have been liable to be called up, in practice allied communities will have been drawing the contingents they sent to serve with the legions from a smaller pool, the roughly 243,000 men between the ages of 17 and 34 (assuming a stable population at r = 0.0 and an age structure close to Coale-Demeny[2] Model West 3 Female, that is e_0 = 25). Figure 1 attempts to provide some idea of the proportion of this group that will have ever had to serve.

Since we also do not know how many years recruits typically served during their period of liability to the draft, we need once again to consider a range of terms of service (whether these were continuous or episodic). During the third century 4,500 Roman infantry and cavalry typically constituted a legion, and thus four legions comprised 18,000 legionaries. If an equal number of *socii* accompanied them, over the 18 years that an age-cohort of allied men between 17 and 35 might have been conscripted, a total of 324,000 man-years of military service will have been required of them, while if the ratio of *socii* to legionaries was as high as two to one, the number of man-years will naturally have been double that figure. Figure 1 models the numbers of *socii* who might have had to serve during those years. For example, if each recruit conscripted from that age group served a total of 6 years, 54,000 of them, about 22 percent, will have had to serve, while if each served an average of 12 years, only 27,000 or a little over 11 percent will have been conscripted. If, however, the number of

[1] Plb. 2.24.1–17 with Brunt (1971, 44–53, 423–5). See Afzelius (1944, 62–79).

[2] On the 2:1 ratio see Vell. 2.15.2.

[3] On the interpretation of these figures see Brunt (1971, 44–6), but note Lo Cascio's (1999; 2001) dissent. Brunt's interpretation is defended now by Hin (2008, 191–3).

[4] Rosenstein (2004, 82–4).



Figure 1. Demands on allied manpower ca. 225 to accompany 4 legions.

soldiers in the *alae* were twice as numerous as the legionaries, then at an average term of service of six years 111,600 or nearly half will have had to serve, while an average hitch of a dozen years will have dropped that percentage to something less than a quarter. The most likely percentages are those that fall in the middle of Figure 1, but it is not possible to see any of these numbers as providing anything more than a general impression of the relative burden Roman war making imposed on the allies during the second half of the third century, down to 218.

By the mid-second century, that burden will have increased dramatically, since Rome typically fielded eight or nine legions a year down to 167, with the total sometimes higher. Any attempt to move beyond this general statement is bedevilled by the fact that we have no figures for the size of the allied population following 225. In that case, the best we can do is estimate the allied population based on a range of plausible ratios of allies to Romans. In 225 that ratio was about 1.7:1, and it seems unlikely that in the aftermath of the Hannibalic War and the devastation inflicted on the Italian population during that conflict the proportion of *socii* in the population of Italy would have exceeded that figure around 168. On the other hand, it could well have been less, although how much less is difficult to determine.

A few years ago, Cornell revived Toynbee's thesis that the damage done to southern Italy was so severe that it seriously impeded an economic

and demographic recovery there, against Brunt's claims to the contrary.[5] So the allied population may not only have been much diminished by the war's end, but it may not have recovered as rapidly as Rome's.[6] In that case, we might see the ratio of Italian *socii* to Romans as no better than 1:1, or possibly even lower. Figures 2a and 2b therefore have been constructed on the basis of the assumptions incorporated in Figure 1 as well as the possibility that the ratio of Romans to Italians in the general population might have ranged anywhere from about 1:1.7 (Fig. 2a) to 1:1 (Fig. 2b). They also assume that nine legions were mobilized annually. What they suggest is that if the allied population had recovered robustly from the shocks of the Hannibalic War and if the numbers of soldiers the Romans typically demanded from the *socii* was no greater than what they conscripted from their own citizens, the burden on the allies would have been fairly modest—perhaps no more than a quarter or so of men aged 17 to 34 would ever have had to serve if each served a dozen years. If, however, the number of allied troops serving with the Republic's armies was significantly greater than the number of legionaries or if the size of the allied population was no greater than Rome's, the burdens the allies bore would have been much heavier, while if both conditions obtained, they would have been unsustainable.

Figures 3a and 3b model the situation around 124 based on the same set of parameters that Figures 2a and 2b incorporate. The burden on the allies had by that point diminished somewhat, since after 168 the Romans' annual mobilization averaged only about six and a half legions. Still, only in the most optimistic scenario of a higher ratio of allies to Romans and modest demands for allied manpower does the burden seem moderate, between about 14 and 28 percent of men 17 to 34. At the other extreme, it would clearly have been intolerable.

It must be emphasized once again that none of these figures can be taken to reflect reality. They simply establish what can be considered the bounds within which reality is likely to lie. What they tell us is that from the mid-third century down to the later second (and certainly beyond) a significant portion of all allied men—perhaps between a quarter and well over half; hundreds of thousands of men, in other words—spent a period of years serving with the legionaries in Rome's armies. Eight- to ten-year

5 Cornell (1996).

6 On the growth of the Roman population in the period following the Hannibalic War, see Rosenstein (2004, 141–55).



Figure 2a. Demands on allied manpower ca. 168 BC to accompany 9 legions if allied adult males are 1.7 times as numerous as Roman adult males.



Figure 2b. Demands on allied manpower ca. 168 BC to accompany 9 legions if allied adult males equal the number of Roman adult males.



Figure 3a. Demands on allied manpower ca. 124 BC to accompany 6.5 legions if allied adult males are 1.7 times as numerous as Roman adult males.



Figure 3b. Demands on allied manpower ca. 124 BC to accompany 6.5 legions if allied adult males equal the number of Roman adult males.

hitches were probably typical, but even six years is a very long time to spend together. And we should remember that armies even in the third century were normally kept in the field year-round for years at a time, creating regular opportunities for sustained periods of contact between allied and Romans soldiers.

3. *Contacts between Romans and Italians in the Army*

Up until a few years ago, most scholars would have viewed that contact as having made an important contribution to the Romanization of Italy. Romans and their Italian allies after all were growing increasingly close in custom and outlook over the course of the middle Republic, or so it was believed, and long service as comrades in arms was thought to have contributed much to that process. As Toynbee put it almost half a century ago, "thousands of citizens of . . . ally states will have been serving side by side with as many thousands of Roman citizens in the same formations; and the army will have been a gigantic melting-pot in which allies and Romans will have been fused together into a single body social".[7] Lately, however, some scholars have begun to challenge this optimistic picture of the integrative effects of comradeship in arms. They have taken their cue from Mouritsen's powerful critique of the long-standing scholarly consensus that the Social War arose out of the Italians' frustrated desire for Roman citizenship.[8] If Mouritsen is right in his assertion that the Italians proudly preserved their ethnic identity all along and sought not integration but independence from Rome in 91, then obviously there cannot have been all that much melting going on in the military pot. Instead, some have argued, Roman military practices worked to keep the *socii* serving with the legions well aware of their separate and unequal status.[9] They point out that soldiers who fought together had to be able to communicate with one another if they were to survive the rigors of combat and prevail over their enemies.

Military effectiveness therefore required the Romans, in assembling the contingents of *socii* that would fight alongside the legions from among a polyglot collection of allies, to muster them by language. They drew the

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[7] Toynbee (1965:2, 110); see also Keaveney (1987, 11–14, 28); Gabba (1976, 28 and n. 61); Dyson (1992, 53–4); further references in Mouritsen (1998, 67–8).

[8] Mouritsen (1998).

[9] Pfeilschifter (2007), *cf.* Jehne (2006).

cohorts and cavalry *turmae* that made up the *alae* of their armies from communities of linguistically similar *socii*. Those in immediate command of these units, the *praefecti cohortis*, were appointed from among the leading figures of these same communities because they were able to translate the Latin of the superior officers, the Roman consuls and *praefecti socium*, into languages that their men could understand.[10] However, what enhanced effectiveness in combat undermined integration in the camps, not only between *socii* and Romans but among the allies themselves. Pfeilschifter, for example, writes: "[T]he army was anything but a melting pot; not only was there no mingling with the Romans, but the allies did not have many contacts with each other. The individual cohort, one's fellow-countrymen—essentially the people one could talk to—remained the points of reference for the allied soldier, from the levy to life in the camp, combat, marching and, eventually, discharge."[11] Their condition stood in striking contrast to that of the legionaries who in the process of being levied and assigned to a legion were mixed with men from many different regions of the *Ager Romanus*.[12]

Yet if all this is so, it should occasion at least some mild surprise that after 89 BC, the enrolment of thousands of legionaries drawn from among both the former allies, now all Roman citizens, as well as the Latin-speaking old citizens produced no obvious diminution in military effectiveness. The legions' record over the Republic's last generation was mostly one of success. It is true that the war in Spain did not go smoothly, but that was mainly a matter of generalship: Metellus and Pompey just could not match Sertorius in that regard. But the legions that fought under Lucullus and Pompey in Asia seem to have had as little trouble vanquishing the armies that faced them as those that served there a century or more earlier. And the slaughter that the opposing armies inflicted on one another in the civil wars stand as grim testimony to the effectiveness of their war craft. How could this be so, if success in combat required that soldiers be able to communicate effectively with one another? One might suppose that, at least as a temporary expedient, legions were recruited from particular regions of Italy in order to ensure linguistic homogeneity, like the Picene levies Pompey brought to Sulla in 83 or the 'Larks' who fought for Caesar in Gaul.

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[10] Jehne (2006, 245).
[11] Pfeilschifter (2007, 31).
[12] Jehne (2006) for a recent summary.

But these were obviously special cases; we have no reason to believe that ordinary recruitment was not carried on more or less as it had always been, with the military tribunes of each legion being enrolled selecting a soldier in turn from small groups of recruits of similar age and physique, as it was done in Polybius' day.[13] That process would have resulted in men from different parts of Italy being indiscriminately mixed together regardless of language. And legions in the field regularly required *supplementa* to bring them back up to full strength, so unless care was taken to levy replacements in the same areas as the legions they were being sent to, the result would have been to compromise the mutual comprehensibility among the soldiers in a monolingual legion. It is far more likely, in my view, that non-Latin speaking new citizens recruited into the legions all received a crash course in that language. We have no evidence for such language instruction, of course, but it seems not beyond the realm of possibility that they got a rough and ready, informal education in basic Latin in the process of being trained for combat and for the duties they would have to perform in camp.[14] And given the numbers of new citizens enrolled in the legions between the end of the Social War and Actium, military service seems likely to have made an important contribution to the general spread of Latin throughout the peninsula.

4. *Life in the Camps*

Consequently, it is worth taking another look at the character of interaction between Roman legionaries and *socii* in the years prior to the *leges Iulia* and *Plautia* and especially at the army camps, where the bulk of the contact between the two will have occurred. The theoretical layout of mid-republican camps is well known from Polybius' description in Book 6 and Fabricius' much reproduced diagram.[15]

Schulten verified the latter's general accuracy with his excavation of Lager III at Numantia, Q. Fulvius Nobilior's encampment over the winter of 153/2 (Fig. 4). A recent and very important monograph, Dobson's *The Army of the Roman Republic*, has restudied Schulten's work and in the process

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[13] Plb. 6.20.1–7.

[14] Compare the language training of non-Francophone recruits into the French Foreign Legion, see Jordan (2005, 113–14).

[15] Fabricius (1932, 79).



Figure 4. Plan of the Roman winter camp at Numantia 153/2 BC (Lager III). From A. Schulten, *Numantia IV: Die Lager bei Renieblas* (Munich 1929). Plan XVII.1.

added a great deal to our knowledge of Republican castrametation.[16] What follows relies heavily on his work.

In considering how the physical arrangement of those camps affected the potential for interaction among the soldiers they contained, what immediately strikes one is the separation between the Romans and their Italian allies (Fig. 5).

Cohorts of *socii* are not simply placed along the *agger* that surrounds the camp; their tents are arranged in a U-shape around open areas, the *conversantibus*, whose open sides giving access to the street face away from the centre of the camp where the maniples of *hastati, principes*, and *triarii* pitched their tents. The only point at which direct contact between *socii* and Romans appears likely is across the street separating the *turmae* of allied cavalry from the maniples of the *hastati*, a distance of some 60 feet or about 17.75 meters.[17] Here the open sides of the squares faced one another (except at each end of the street), creating the potential for interaction as the soldiers went about their business in the camp. Yet class differences may have worked to limit contact. Like their Roman counterparts, allied cavalrymen were drawn from the upper strata of their communities. These were men who owned at least one horse and were attended by a servant.[18] Legionary infantry on the other hand came from a much broader socio-economic spectrum. Allied *equites* would have had much more in common with their Roman counterparts, but these were located at some distance from them.

Roman practice in disposing the maniples, cohorts, and *turmae* within the camp had naturally not been developed with socializing in mind. The arrangements seem intended to facilitate the egress and entry of the army, so that individual units could form up in the *conversantibus* and then assemble in proper marching order in the streets beyond. The *extraordinarii* infantry for example and the rest of the van could exit by the *porta praetoria*, the cohorts of the right *ala* with their baggage through the gates on their side of the camp followed by their cavalry while the maniples of the first legion at the opposite end of the camp were marching out at the same time through the gates on their side along with their baggage and cavalry. The second legion would follow the right ala, and the left *ala* the

16 Schulten (1914–29); Dobson (2008).

17 These are Roman feet of 29.6 cm; Polybius, however, in giving the measurements of the camp, uses Hellenistic feet of 35.5 cm, see Oxe (1939). Hence Plb. 6.30.1 gives the distance as 50 feet.

18 Erdkamp (1998, 37–9).



Figure 5. Reconstruction of a Roman army camp for two legions according to Polybius. From M. Dobson, *The Army of the Roman Republic* (Oxford 2008). Figure 31.

first legion, so that the entire army could exit quickly and smoothly and find itself in proper marching order once outside the camp.[19] Thus it made military sense for the allied cohorts to face the street next to the *agger*, since otherwise they would find themselves trying to form up in the same area as the allied cavalry. And since the second legion marched out after the first, its *hastati* could wait to form their column in the street beyond their tents until after the cavalry of the right *ala* had departed. Still, what contributed to military efficiency frustrated social intercourse.

Simply looking at the physical layout of the camp, however, fails to consider other important aspects of life there. An army typically broke camp early in the morning, marched until midday, then halted and constructed its camp. Once that work was done the remainder of the afternoon and evening was free for rest and preparing meals. Every four or five days in the course of a long march the army stayed put for a day.[20] Ravaging an enemy's territory, waiting for its army to accept an offer of battle, or conducting a siege might necessitate considerably longer sedentary periods, while a winter encampment like Nobilior's at Numantia would keep an army in one spot for several months. Soldiers therefore might have substantial amounts of time beyond that taken up with drills and fatigue when their duties slackened somewhat and left them at leisure in camp.

These camps were fairly big places. The half-camp that Polybius describes has an area of about 58 hectares (or 144 acres), of which about 20 percent or so might be taken up with tents, baggage, animals, and equipment, leaving about 46.6 ha (115 acres) of open space. This averages out to a little less than 13 m^2 per man if the number of allies more or less equalled the number of Romans. That might seem fairly generous, but if we look at where the soldiers actually lived the picture is rather different. In Dobson's reconstruction, the tents themselves were small, only 10 × 10 Roman feet or about 8.75 m^2, so small in fact that only six of the eight *contubernales* could sleep in one at a time (Fig. 6).

They were adequate for eight only because the soldiers are assumed have slept in shifts, two of the eight standing guard duty at each of the various night watches.[21] The *conversantibus*—the open area around which the tents were pitched—measured only 1,587 m^2 for an allied cohort or about 3.6 m^2 per man, that is an area slightly smaller than 2 × 2 meters

19 Plb. 6.40.1–7.
20 Kromayer & Veith (1928, 422–3).
21 Dobson (2008, 85–8).



Figure 6. Reconstruction of the layout of the billets for a cohort of allied infantry. From M. Dobson, *The Army of the Roman Republic* (Oxford 2008). Figure 30.

(a little less than 40 square feet, an area a bit larger than 6 × 6 feet). The legionaries had even less space available around their immediate living quarters. The effect of such cramped quarters would have been to push many of the soldiers into the open areas beyond the *conversantibus*. They might have drifted out onto the streets just outside the *conversantibus*, but we need to remember that these men remained with the standards year-round for years on end. It is difficult to believe that in that time they will not have fairly quickly begun to venture much farther afield, particularly since there will have been any number of enticements for them to do so.

Soldiers were a tempting source of profit. They were paid in coin, a scarce commodity in many parts of the ancient world, and they might possess various items of plunder. Both were things that a variety of camp followers were eager to get their hands on, and they could offer a variety of goods and services in exchange. The rations issued to legionaries and allies alike consisted of wheat probably supplemented by wine and oil. That is a pretty bland diet, particularly over the course of six to twelve years. It is hardly surprising therefore to find sutlers (*lixae*) accompanying Roman armies. So common were they that Livy at one point remarks on their *absence* from an army's train in 187 to emphasize how penurious the country was that the army was campaigning in and hence how little plunder it was likely to take in the rugged Ligurian mountains against a tough enemy.[22] The sutlers, we can assume, could furnish the soldiers with a much more varied diet than the porridge or flatbread that wheat alone could offer. In 110 it was a mark of the lack of discipline among soldiers in the army of A. Postumius Albinus that they sold their wheat rations and bought bread, foreign wine, and other luxuries from the *lixae*,[23] but it is difficult to believe that better-behaved troops would not have purchased vegetables, a bit of meat, and various relishes from sutlers to dress up their porridge whenever they had the chance.[24]

Soldiers were also superstitious,[25] so it is once again not surprising to find soothsayers and diviners in the army's camp at Numantia in 134, and we may suspect that they found their way to other camps in Spain and elsewhere. And while we may doubt that when Scipio took command at Numantia he expelled as many as 2,000 prostitutes along with the soothsayers, there is every reason to believe that plenty of the former were

22 Liv. 39.1.7.
23 Sall. *BJ* 44.5.
24 For *lixae* see Liv. 23.16.8, 14; 28.22.3; 31.49.11, 40.28.3.
25 E.g. Pictor frag. 25 Peter = Plin. *NH* 10.34.

likewise a common feature around Republican army camps.[26] We hear nothing of soldiers gambling, but to judge from the behaviour of soldiers in other armies at other times it is not difficult to imagine legionaries and *socii* whiling away their leisure hours at dice and other games. All of these activities as well as many others will over the course of months and years in camp together have furnished Romans and their Italian allies with many opportunities for contact.

5. *Integration in Army Camps*

The question then becomes what was the character of the interaction to which that contact gave rise: was it superficial and fleeting or was there extensive engagement between the two sides? This brings us back to the issue of language. Pfeilschifter and others are certainly right to believe that individual cohorts and *turmae* were recruited from allied tribes and cities on the basis of language, so that all the soldiers in them could understand one another.[27] What deserves equal emphasis in this regard, however, is the fact that this practice will have turned Roman armies into something akin to the Tower of Babel. The very fact that so many different units spoke different languages will have created the need for a *lingua franca* among them, which would naturally have been Latin. We know that the linguistic landscape in third- and second-century Italy was complex. Latin seems to have made substantial inroads in a few areas. Its use was limited in others, while in many places it remained unspoken by the vast majority of inhabitants.[28] But rather than focus on what languages the *socii* will have understood when they arrived at camp, it is more important to ask whether allied soldiers could have picked up enough Latin over the course of several years with the legions to comprehend and make themselves understood in that language. In view of the ease with which new, non-Latin speaking citizens seem to have been integrated into the Roman army after the Social War, one would guess that acquiring a rudimentary to pretty fair facility with the language would not have been beyond the ability of many of them. A few might have become fairly fluent.

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[26] App. *Iber*. 85; Liv. *Per*. 57; Val. Max. 2.7.1.

[27] Although how the *formula togatorum* worked to distribute the burden of military service among the allies we do not know.

[28] See e.g. Bispham (2007, 4–6) for a brief recent discussion.

Even so, what does this all add up to? Did the fact that ordinary Roman and Italian soldiers may have rubbed shoulders frequently, exchanged crude jokes, or complained to one another about their officers, food, or military life in general make the army a 'melting pot'? In this regard, it is worth pointing out that we Americans used to describe our country in the same terms, but over the past half century we have found the analogy increasingly unhelpful in trying to understand issues of integration and identity in the United States. All the gains that the U.S. has made in integrating citizens of different ethnic origins into the American mainstream have not caused us to forget those differences. It is therefore difficult to believe that military service with their legionary counterparts made allied soldiers want to become Romans, much less that they grew increasingly like them. But to understand integration in these terms, as Mouritsen has forcefully shown, is to buy into a historiography based on a nineteenth-century ideal of nationalism that is completely inappropriate to the case of Rome and Italy between the third and early first centuries. What is needed instead is a different idea of what integration means and a different yardstick against which to measure its progress.

A good place to begin the search for these can be found in American attempts to achieve that end, and in particular the effort to integrate African Americans within the United States' armed forces. Integration in twentieth-century America certainly has not meant that black Americans wanted to become white. Rather it has entailed a struggle for equality in dignity, in respect, and in the opportunities for advancement in life, including in military service, while still retaining a pride in their African American identities. Thinking of integration and identity in the Roman armies of the middle Republic in these terms puts us in a better position to understand what was going on. For perhaps it mattered far less to allied soldiers that they did not enjoy voting rights at Rome—for after all, how many of the legionaries they served with had ever exercised their franchise in the *comitia*?—than that they enjoyed the respect and even admiration of their comrades in arms. And if so, how might we measure the degree to which integration in these terms was a feature of middle Republican military life?

Here, too, the American example can help. Down to the Korean War the U.S. army had a long and shameful history of segregating black and white soldiers. African American troops were typically given low-status, often dirty jobs and denied opportunities for advanced training and assignments. They were usually kept out of units that would see combat, save for a few all-black divisions, which were mandated by federal statute.

However, the effects of this segregation were all too apparent when it came to actual fighting. In the early stages of the Korean conflict, one of these black divisions, the 24th, performed very poorly in battle. Its soldiers, with a few notable exceptions, had a tendency to flee rather than stand their ground, so much so that it eventually had to be disbanded. Earlier, in the Second World War, segregation had likewise often proved a serious impediment to military effectiveness. Black soldiers had little interest in fighting within a system that denied them dignity and respect. However, once manpower demands in Korea and in World War II compelled the army to integrate black soldiers into predominately white front-line units, where they were treated much more equally, they proved as capable in combat as any other American soldiers.[29]

Obviously, Roman and allied soldiers were not combined into the same units; they fought in their separate legions and *alae*. However, if effectiveness in combat depends to a significant extent on how much a soldier feels his efforts are valued and rewarded, then by that measure Italian *socii* were well integrated into Republican armies. For there is no question but that the contribution Rome's allied contingents made to its victories was enormous, certainly equal to that of the legions. From this perspective, occasions when allied contingents at times appear to have done most of the heavy lifting in battles[30] represented opportunities rather than exploitation. Combat offered them the chance to demonstrate their valour, the key virtue in the martial culture of mid-republican Rome, and so earn the respect of their Roman comrades.[31] That the allies embraced these opportunities eagerly emerges in examples of their heroism and self-sacrifice in combat. At the battle of Heracleia in 280, it was an Italian cavalry officer, not a Roman, who singlehandedly attacked Pyrrhus at the cost of his life.[32] At Pydna a troop of Paeligni and Marrucini made the first, furious assault on the Macedonian phalanx, suffering heavy casualties as a consequence, and other cases of disproportionately high losses in battle suggest similar instances of exceptional bravery.[33] And at Beneventum in 212, a cohort of Paeligni refused to obey a consul's order to retreat. Its prefect instead

[29] Nally (1986, 162–83, 255–69).

[30] E.g. Liv. 31.21.7–15.

[31] So rightly Pfeilschifter (2007, 36 and n. 38), against Toynbee (1965:2, 134) and Harris (1984, 97).

[32] Dion. Hal. 19.12.1–5; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 16.8–10.

[33] Pydna: Plut. *Aem.* 20.1–3. See also Liv. 44.41.9, 42.8; 31.22.2; 40.32.7, 40.13.

hurled its standard into the Carthaginian camp and dared his men to follow him in to recover it.[34]

One group of allies' consciousness of their contribution to Roman victories is summed up in their boast "no triumph over and no triumph without the Marsi".[35] That notion of an equal partnership in war was also reflected in the fruits of victory. As noted at the outset of this chapter, allied soldiers seem to have laboured under no disadvantage when it came to plunder, decorations, or donatives.[36] Even the supposed differences in the punishments to which Roman and allied soldiers were liable are overdrawn: the former were just as much subject to corporal punishment and even the death penalty as the latter.[37] If there were minor differences in the allies' conditions of service, that was, well, because they were different. There is, to repeat, no reason to think that the allies wanted to become Romans. What they wanted was equality, and where it counted most—in equality of opportunity and honour—they seem to have gotten it.

6. *Conclusion*

That equity undoubtedly carried over into camp life and enabled the Romans to integrate effectively into their war effort allied contingents drawn from a variety of tribes and towns. But it was integration without identification; the allies remained conscious of themselves as ethnically distinct. And because so many Italians experienced military service with the legions in the third and especially the second centuries, the conviction that they were as just as good as their Roman comrades in arms will have been widespread in civilian life among the Republic's allies. That sense of equality born out of their comradeship in war may in turn have contributed much towards fuelling the growing resentment the *socii* felt at what they perceived as the ways in which the Romans were violating it in the decades leading up to the Social War, a resentment that grew to the point where the allies finally resolved that their dignity left them no choice but to end their partnership with Rome.

34 Liv. 25.14.4–6.
35 App. *BC* 1.46. See also Strabo 5.4.2.
36 Pfeilschifter (2007, 36–7).
37 *Ibidem* 37 n. 40.

APPIAN, ALLIED AMBASSADORS, AND THE REJECTION OF 91: WHY THE ROMANS CHOSE TO FIGHT THE *BELLUM SOCIALE*

Seth Kendall*

1. *Introduction*

In the autumn of 91 BC a Roman praetor named Quintus Servilius was killed in the city of Asculum, a fate shared by his legate Fonteius and all other Romans to be found in that city. This massacre was the responsibility of a group of angry *Picentes*, members of an Italian tribe which was allied to Rome but which—apparently unbeknownst to the Romans—was also secretly part of another alliance, one struck up amongst several others of Rome's Italian allies who all alike had come to find their association with Rome intolerable. It would not have been lost on the *Picentes* that armed reprisal for Asculum would be visited upon them eventually, and it probably would have been equally obvious that once the Romans acquired a greater understanding of this confederacy of their erstwhile *socii*, military action would likely be taken against all of its members too. That the Italians understood the inevitability of such a response is made reasonably clear by Appian, whose *Bellum Civile* is the most complete of the several sources in which this event is narrated.[1] His account notes that the allies were ready for the coming violence, but according to an anecdote found only in that author, they apparently tried to prevent it: before hostilities completely erupted they sent a deputation to Rome to explain that they were driven to their current extremity from the desire to obtain the Roman citizenship, and, presumably, to offer peace in exchange for it. In Appian's account, the Senate apparently only listened as far as the envoys' initial comments before cutting them short and sending them

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[1] Specifically 1.38–9. Other sources include Vell. 2.15.1; certain details are confirmed by Cic. *Font.* 41 (which mentions only the death of Fonteius); Diod. Sic. 37.12–13 and Liv. *Per.* 73, which both describe the death of Servilius—though the latter names him a proconsul—and the general slaughter but omit discussion of Fonteius (Oros. 5.18.3 does likewise, but describes the praetor as a *Caius Servius* who was sent as a legate); and Flor. 2.6.9, which narrates the murders of certain nameless persons "deputed from Rome" (*trucidatis . . . qui aderant ab urbe legatis*).

away with their full petition unheard, adding curtly that the Italians could send ambassadors only after they had repented of their misbehaviour. Full-fledged war followed immediately.

It bears repeating that this dispatch of negotiators is only reported in Appian, but there seems to be no convincing reason why the report should not be considered accurate; Appian does occasionally get facts wrong, to be sure, but he is not known for complete fabrication. Indeed, such an embassy very much reflects what an almost unanimous ancient tradition holds about the allies and their desire for the citizenship, which is that this desire was so fervent that it was the cause of the war about to erupt (it is reported as thus in Appian, for example, but also in Cicero, Diodorus Siculus, and Strabo, as well as descendants of Livy such as the *Periochae,* Florus, and Velleius).[2] It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that, while the allies wanted *civitas* and wanted it badly enough to fight for it, they would be willing to forestall doing so temporarily and see if they could get the Romans to acquiesce to their demands through diplomacy.

If it can be allowed that the allies did actually send agents in the hope that they could gain the franchise without fighting, it would turn out that that hope was a vain one, as the haughty dismissal of the Italian agents by the Senate already mentioned clearly indicates. For modern historians with the perfect hindsight that comes from knowing what happens next, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Senate's decision to pursue this course of action constitutes a most grievous error: the allies had put into its hands the chance to avoid a war that would prove to be devastating, and the *patres* arrogantly spurned it. So catastrophic would this mistake turn out to be, in fact, that leave may perhaps be given to speculate why it is the Romans had made it. Some scholars assert that the allied embassy forced their decision, asserting that the Italian envoys were not there to request just *civitas* only, but also to make additional demands so outrageous that the Romans could not help but refuse them.[3]

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[2] More precisely in App. *BC* 1.34–5; Cic., *Phil.* 12.27; Diod. Sic. 37.18 (see also the related anecdote in 37.13); Strabo 5.4.2; Liv. *Per.* 71; Flor. 2.6.18; Vell. 2.15.2.

[3] This is the theory of Mouritsen (1998), who holds that the allies insisted on having one of the consuls and half of the Senators be drawn from their number (138–9); for this reason, he implies (141), it is little wonder that the Romans rejected peace on these terms. The basis for this claim, however, is more than a little dubious. What Mouritsen basically argues is that, in the first place, Appian is not the only historian to include details about the allied deputation, but is merely the only one to put them in their proper context. Another source preserves the details, a source that is (by Mouritsen's own admission) 'unlikely': Livy. Livy, however, does not provide those details in the place where they might be expected. Instead of putting any record of the Italian emissaries and their stipulations

However, such an assertion cannot gain support from the sources. As was noted earlier, the only source for this deputation is Appian, and his text makes it reasonably clear that the *socii* did not get to present their case fully. Instead, it seems that the Romans heard only so much of the what the representatives came to say as their mention of allied desire for *civitas* (or, rather, complaint at not having it) before sending them away, leaving their full plea unvoiced and, in all probability, unrecorded.[4] Therefore, whether the allies had intended for their negotiators to make the fairly

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in the now-lost Book 72 (which covered the events of 91), he uses them as the basis for his discussion of a much earlier episode involving the delegation sent by the Latins in 340 to prevent war with the Romans (8.4). Demands for one of the consuls and half of the Senate would, according to Mouritsen, have been an anachronism for 340, although he provides no evidence for this (he does cite Cornell (1989b, 361), although that work provides no more of a justification for why these demands were 'clearly anachronistic' than Mouritsen does).

This construction gives rise to a number of questions, of which the first is why Livy would not put the embassy in its proper place (and it is reasonably clear that he did not: no mention is made of it in the *Periocha* of that book, which does report such minor details as the wearing of the war cloaks; it is also absent from such descendants as Oros. 5.18.15 and Florus). According to Mouritsen, Livy felt compelled to omit mention of the deputation due to pressure from Augustus, who needed history altered to suit his propagandistic purposes. Conceding for the moment that this is what actually occurred, a further question arises, which is why Livy engaged in this legerdemain in transposing the events of 91 to 340, as opposed to simply omitting the episode entirely. Mouritsen has no answer for this; perhaps he means to suggest that, although Livy was content to bow to this pressure from on high, he apparently could not let the anecdote go. Alternatively, perhaps Livy simply needed to add some verisimilitude to the fourth-century episode for which records were scant. Either way, Livy simply dressed the Italians in the costumes of Latins from two centuries earlier and set events from the year 91 back into 340.

All of these arguments are ingenious, but in the end are completely unsupported by evidence. As will be seen, it is extremely likely that no one knew the specifics of what the allies came to ask from the Romans due to the haste with which their petition was rejected, and thus no one could furnish Livy with the particulars to put in the wrong place. Moreover, there is not one detail furnished by Mouritsen to suggest that Livy's story about 340 is, in fact, 'anachronistic'. Therefore, there seems no reason at all to suggest that Livy knew what the allies sought in 91, and Mouritsen's arguments fail to persuade.

[4] However, the above does not necessarily mean that no record of the envoys and their mission existed. It is at least possible that some record would have been kept of the dispatch of negotiators by the *socii*, as well as its ultimate lack of success and why. Although this would amount to a record of what was practically a non-event, it might nevertheless have been available. A notice of this kind may explain why it is that discussion of the envoys never appears in Livy, but does appear in Appian: it might very well be that Livy either did not consider it worth noticing, or did and put it in Book 72, but neither his Epitomator nor his descendants thought it worth repeating. Appian, however, apparently disagreed, and thus kept the notice in his own work. As far as Appian's own use of Livy, see Haug (1947, 224–31); Gabba (1956, 89–101), who both argue that Livy was indeed used, though probably that use only really began around his treatment of events beginning in the year 88.

modest request for the citizenship only, or had also instructed them to ask for more extravagant concessions in addition to the franchise, appears to be a moot point: Appian seems to indicate that the Senate did not need to hear the complete message of the allies to make up its mind for war. Consequently, it seems clear that the Romans made their decision for reasons of their own, unrelated to any allied extortion.[5]

Assuming this reading of Appian is correct, it would follow that allied demands did not push the Romans into war. If they did not, there remains the question of what did. To put it another way: since the Romans evidently made the choice to fight the *socii* independently of what the allies might have said in their deputation, it may be wondered what made the Romans believe that war would be preferable even to hearing, much less to giving in to, allied demands. Unfortunately, no guidance into their decision can be gotten from any ancient authority. Indeed, most sources do not indicate that there was even a choice to be made: only Appian mentions this delegation. All other sources frame their narrative in such a way that Rome commenced to battle immediately after the slaughter at Asculum. Yet if Appian is to be believed, it would seem that the Romans really did face an alternative to combat, which they rejected, having heard nothing more about allied demands than that admission to Roman citizenship was among them. That, however, seems to have been enough; even if the franchise was all the *socii* wanted, the Romans apparently decided that war was better than giving it to them. Hence, an answer to the first question is discerned, but another question follows immediately: why was the prospect of bestowing *civitas* upon the allies so hateful to the Romans that war seemed like a better option?

2. *The Senate's Knowledge of Allied Preparations*

One possible reply must be that perhaps the Romans did not see the problem in the terms just presented. Instead, it may have been that they thought that if they maintained a firm hand, the allies would not dare to fight them. Of course, modern scholars know full well that this was not so,

[5] So Keaveney (1987, 126, 130 n. 58), who does not explain why the negotiators were not heard, having enumerated earlier (99–113) the reasons why he believes the Romans were set against granting *civitas* on any occasion, much less when one of its magistrates and many of its citizens had just been murdered.

that the allies had been preparing for war for some time, and that neither the will nor the weapons were lacking. However, the Romans seem to have been ignorant of these facts, or at least were not completely aware of them. Appian reports that the Senate was only beginning to catch wind of what the allies had been doing in secret before Asculum. If this is so, it may well have seemed to the *patres* that the allies would not fight. Even if they did, the affair might merely turn out to be a repetition of the uprising of Fregellae thirty-five years before, when an allied city had deserted its *foedus* and was quickly and completely crushed by Rome.[6] Under such a misapprehension the fathers would have had no cause for undue alarm: if worst came to worst and fighting did break out, they would simply go and annihilate this current revolt with the same relative lack of difficulty with which the former demonstration had been met. This would likely have seemed to be a better course of action than entering into complicated discussions with the *socii*, especially in light of the message these discussions might send to other Roman subjects. If force would resolve their difficulties with the allies efficiently and swiftly—and it is plausible that the Romans believed this to be so, given their ignorance of the magnitude of what was arrayed against them—it accords well with their customary choice to use this force rather than diplomacy.[7]

Therefore, it is not completely unthinkable that the Romans sent the Italian ambassadors away oblivious to the gravity of their peril. On the other hand, while Appian does report that the Romans did not know just how ready for war the *socii* were, he also reports that the Romans had suspected that something was amiss. In fact, they had already sent investigators into the field to see what the allies were doing before Asculum; the unfortunate Servilius was one of them, and Appian states that his murder was the result of a harangue he delivered to the *Picentes* containing veiled threats that indicated he had discovered their plans.[8] The fact that they initiated this investigation provides evidence that the Senate ought to have recognized the distinct likelihood that the conspiracy was larger in scope than that of Fregellae had been. As was no doubt well known, part of why that earlier revolt had been so easily wiped out by Lucius Opimius

[6] See Ascon. 17.b; Liv. *Per.* 60, as well as many other sources mostly concerned with anecdotes about L. Opimius, the Roman commander.

[7] Plb. 1.37.7.

[8] Diod. Sic. 37.13 adds that the tone employed by Servilius was not one used between free men and allies but was that usually directed to slaves promising dire punishments.

had been because it was a single city standing alone against Rome.[9] It would stand to reason that the allies in 91 would have learned the lesson from that episode and consequently would have united in greater numbers. In fact, it may well have been that this was beyond doubt: the language in Appian strongly hints that the embassy sent to Rome consisted of delegates from the eight peoples mentioned as being on the verge of war. This in turn would make it less likely that the allies could be brought to heel by sheer intimidation, and that the force required to compel them would be greater. Even if the embassy was not so composed, the Senate was filled with men of political and strategic experience. These were the sort of men who should have foreseen that the *Picentes* would have help from other *socii*, and that a very serious disturbance might be in the wind. It is difficult to believe that no one in the Senate appreciated the possibility of such a disturbance, and therefore that the Senate behaved as they did from blithe insensibility that they might have a major undertaking on their hands.

If there were any Senators who had an insight into what Asculum might become, they would also have comprehended what would be required to suppress the uprising. For one thing, fighting would be required, and fighting would call for a great deal of men. Just how many men would be necessary could not have been known, although even the most conservative estimate would have suggested the need for a few legions' worth. Raising even a few legions' worth would pose difficulties in light of the fact that Rome's own soldiers, namely the allies, who usually fought for Rome, would be rising against them; there would therefore be fewer men available for the army, and depending on the extent of the uprising, perhaps far fewer. This would not only be of consequence to Rome at the beginning of the uprising, but would continue to be so after its defeat: basically, every man lost by death or an incapacitating wound was one which would be taken from the Commonwealth's forces, such that even a victory would mean that there would be a much weaker military to

[9] See, however, *Vir. ill.* 65.1, which states that the men of Asculum had been involved in the *defectio* alongside the Fregellani. This is dismissed by Keaveney (1987, 64–8), who observes that, since Asculum was not completely destroyed as Fregellae had been, it must have been that Asculum had not risen, since its destruction would certainly have occurred had it done so. Perhaps Asculum had been approached by the Fregellani, and may have even agreed to take part, but decided not to do so when the moment of crisis came. Aid that was promised but not rendered might explain why the Asculani were mentioned here. Either way, it seems fairly clear that they neither furnished Fregellae with enough aid to prevent its destruction, nor with enough to incur Rome's wrath upon themselves.

cope with whatever unknown perils might threaten in years to come. The armies would, therefore, have to include a greater percentage of Roman citizens than Rome had for some time typically enlisted, and prescient senators would therefore have recognized that raising them would involve forced conscription.[10] This would turn out to be precisely what eventually transpired: an anecdote about Vettienus, who cut off parts of his hands to avoid being drafted, suggests that there was a draft to avoid.[11] Conscription would bring with it problems, not least an unpopularity so great that senate and tribunes had taken steps to halt conscription four times in the sixty years prior to 91.[12]

Moreover, this larger proportion of Roman soldiers might not only pose problems to the mustering officer, but would also make things more difficult for the generals who would be leading them: commanders would have to plan their battles knowing that the deaths and injuries would now be borne almost entirely by Roman soldiers, with all the consequences that would entail (see below). Once armies were raised, there was also the fact that the war would be taking place on Italian soil, near or even on Roman property: the millions of sesterces to be lost through burned fields, butchered livestock, liberated or murdered slaves, and wrecked villas would almost certainly be on the minds of those Senators who could predict an extensive campaign.

It therefore seems inconceivable to assert that a vast allied revolt and the problems associated with putting it down were unforeseeable. Admittedly, the Senate may not have known how many of their allies were in this *coniuratio*, and its more optimistic members might have believed that the problem could be contained to Asculum, that it could be extinguished by mere terror of Rome, or that if combat were needed, violence would be light. Nevertheless, even men of average intelligence could discern the possibility that a great many of the *socii* might be involved in the revolt, that vigorous effort might be needed to suppress it, and that potentially great costs in money and manpower might need to be paid for such an effort. However, rather than entertain the option of negotiating their way out of a war whose suffering might have been predicted, the senate

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[10] Brunt (1971, 402–8); Gabba (1976, 5–12).

[11] Val. Max. 6.3.3c.

[12] The Senate agreed to the bid of Appius Claudius to cancel the levy in 140 and attempted to bar the consul from leaving with the army until consul Q. Servilius Caepio drove off the tribune's lictor at sword-point (Liv. *Ox. Ep.* 54); tribunes imprisoned the consuls to stop the *dilectus* in 151 and 138 (Liv. *Per.* 48, 55).

nevertheless chose not to discuss terms with the Italians and took the road that headed directly to war.

These conditions—the decision to act contrary to self-interest, a decision made collectively by people who could see the dangers involved, and in the presence of a viable alternative such that the decision was not one of compulsion—are exactly those which constitute Tuchman's definition of 'folly'.[13] This is, however, a fault for which the Romans were not necessarily known, and recognition of this fact suggests the following conclusion: if the Romans did have the opportunity to make the choice, and if this choice was not impelled by any demands from the allies more preposterous than the citizenship, and if their choice was made with the full consciousness of what the outcomes might be, then it must have been the case that war seemed better than giving in to the allies.

This conclusion leads directly to another: since all the allies were allowed to make known was the desire for *civitas*, it must have been that the extension of the citizenship itself was calculated as being more deleterious than a war, even one on a grand scale. The potential objection raised above, that the Romans may not have seen the issue in terms of a choice either granting the citizenship or fighting, can perhaps now be discarded: the Romans manifestly did see it in this manner, and acted accordingly. When seen from this perspective, the Senate's peremptory ejection of the ambassadors appears much less precipitous. Once it became clear that the embassy was going to ask for *civitas*, the Romans quickly weighed the consequences of what that might mean. This would probably not have been difficult, since the Senate had had several occasions over the past forty years to think on the problem. The issue had come up as early as 125 during the consulate of Fulvius Flaccus,[14] had arisen again as part of the legislative programme of Gaius Gracchus,[15] and was fresh on their minds due to the very recent tribunate of Livius Drusus, who had proposed extending the franchise to the allies earlier in 91.[16] At all of these junctures, the Senate had had to do the mathematics with which they were now faced, and even though the issue was slightly different in late 91 than it had been earlier in the year (see below), practice had made their determination a fairly easy one: the risk of war with all its costs would be the more desirable outcome.

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[13] Tuchman (1985, 5).
[14] App. *BC* 1.21, 1.35; Val. Max. 9.5.1.
[15] Plu. *CG* 4; Vell. 2.6.3; App. *BC* 1.23.
[16] Liv. *Per.* 71; App. *BC* 1.35; Flor. 2.6; Vell. 2.14; Diod. Sic. 37.2.

However, there remains the final question: Why would this be so? Why would the Romans have considered the possibility of granting the franchise to the allies so unpleasant that they believed a (possibly catastrophic) war to be a more attractive option?

3. *The Undesirability of Allied Citizenship: The Army*

An attempt to provide answers to this question must reiterate that it was the citizenship itself that was objectionable, a fact which the particulars surrounding the franchise issue in 91 make transparent. This is because the circumstances under which the subject of enfranchisement had arisen were different in this instance than when the question had arisen in the past, in 125, 123, and earlier in 91. In all those cases, the issue of *civitas* had always been connected with agrarian reform dealing with the use of *ager publicus* (usually introduced as a way to smooth over allied protests over reclamation of *ager publicus* they claimed as their own). The Roman Senate and its magistrates, drawn as they were from large landowners whose wealth by law had to come from land which they either owned or used without owning it (legally or otherwise), tended automatically to oppose tinkering with *ager publicus*. Logically, if the enfranchisement of the *socii* would lubricate this process, any measure introducing it would necessarily have been doomed. However, in late 91 the issue of the franchise was not concerned with *ager publicus*. This means that the extension of *civitas* was something considered, and found repellent, on its own. Why that was so is not revealed in the sources, since the citizenship as a simple bequest had apparently never been considered by the Senate. However, the implications of mass enfranchisement are such that they afford ample room to conjecture any number of reasons for why the *patres* would have opposed giving in to such a demand, since the repercussions for doing so might indeed make war seem like a better option.

A suitable starting point might be found in the obvious military considerations, which experienced soldiers, as most Senators were supposed to have been, could have seen immediately. One of these concerned the numbers of soldiers available to the legions. By 91 the Romans had long made use of Italian soldiers;[17] Velleius goes so far as to claim that a 'Roman army' actually consisted of twice as many Italians as Romans,

[17] See Badian (1968, 5–6), who comments on Rome's practice of making sure it always outnumbered its enemies, or of trying to do so even if they could not guarantee this.

a claim which modern scholars have tested and asserted to be comparatively accurate, at least by the year 91.[18] These numbers would still in theory be accessible to the Romans upon allied enfranchisement, but in practice *civitas* might substantially diminish them due to the fact that, as citizens, the Italians would now have rights which they did not have as *socii*. One of these would be the ability evade military service should the *dilectus* be suspended. Citizens could not be compelled to serve, while non-citizen *socii* bound by obligations of their *foedera* could, and this had the potential to endanger the strength of the legions.

In addition, upon enlistment the one-time allies would have to be treated the same way as Roman soldiers. Anecdotes abound about the harshness of Roman military discipline, which often involved the meting out of humiliation and even death for the slightest of infractions. Both *socii* and Romans were ostensibly subjected to this, but Roman citizens were protected from excesses of severity in ways that allies were not. Because commanders were either former or current magistrates who needed to be elected and re-elected to continue in their careers, they would almost certainly avoid reputations as martinets and be lenient on the reprimands visited upon Roman soldiers, who were voters. The Italians were not voters, however, and ferocious punishments could therefore be doled out to them without political fallout. Furthermore, by 91 the two most feared punishments—flogging and the death penalty—could no longer be visited upon Roman citizens following the passage of the *leges Porciae*.[19] Non-Roman citizens, however, lacked both protections, and the extent of the brutal penalties visited on Italians is shown in the career of Scipio Aemilianus: during the Numantine War Roman soldiers found

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[18] Vell. 2.15.2. See Brunt (1971, 686); Rosenstein in this volume.

[19] For limits on scourging see Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.163, *Rab. Perd.* 12; Sall. *Cat.* 51.20; Liv. 10.9.4. The latter also mentions that the *leges Porciae* forbade the death penalty (see Cic. *Rab. Perd.* 8; Sall. *Cat.* 51.40), although it is implied there that this protection extended from prohibition on civilian execution without right of appeal (and consequently applicable only to Roman citizens); Cic. *Rep.* 2.54 suggests the same. It is therefore possible that even soldiers who were citizens could be executed, and Nicolet (1988, 109) notes that there were examples of decimation after the passage of the *leges Porciae*, though Plu. *Crass.* 10 mentions that the practice had been of long desuetude when it was revived by Crassus and the majority of examples which mention it date from the Caesarian civil wars and beyond; see Smith (1875, 327). Perhaps, then, these decimations were special cases; either way, even after noting the decimations Nicolet concludes that the right to appeal was enjoyed by citizens, and so comes into alignment of opinion with the assertion made by Salmon (1967, 307) and Keaveney (1987, 14–15) that the *leges Porciae* functionally removed the threat of the death penalty and essentially eliminated the danger of execution.

out of ranks were beaten with vines—they could not be scourged—while *socii* were to be beaten with rods.[20] Aemilianus also ordered deserters to be thrown to the wild beasts during gladiatorial shows he put on after the overthrow of Carthage in 146; Valerius Maximus adds that it was only *exterarum gentium transfugas* who were so treated.[21] Even as late as 107 a Latin could be put to death by scourging for dereliction of duty, as the affair of Turpilius recounted in Sallust shows.[22]

Furthermore, allied soldiers gave Roman generals the luxury of disposable bodies with which the high casualties sometimes necessary to win victories could be absorbed: "(t)he Romans were prepared to fight to the last Italian".[23] Romans in the army were apparently not so employed, probably due to the political consequences which would have fallen upon a commander with a reputation as a butcher. Likewise, particularly unpleasant duties could be shifted onto the allies. Once made into citizens with the vote, however, *socii* could no longer safely be exploited this way, which would put significant constraints on those Romans who might seek to win wealth, fame, and election to higher offices through military command.

Finally, allied soldiers, upon enrolment as citizens, would have to be given equal shares of whatever *praeda* or land was distributed to soldiers after victories. It seems this was usually done already by custom, but not necessarily by law,[24] as it now would have to be.[25] The inclusion of new citizen-soldiers in the distribution could potentially result in less of these spoils of conquest to go around, since there would now be many more claimants.

[20] Liv. *Per.* 57.

[21] Liv. *Per.* 51; Val. Max. 2.7.13. Aemilius Paullus at Pydna had similarly ordered allied deserters to be trampled by wild elephants, VM 2.7.12.

[22] Sall. *Iug.* 66–9.

[23] Salmon (1967, 307). Badian (1958, 149) also mentions the high casualty rates and attributes them to Roman tactics and the particular use those tactics made of allied soldiers, see Toynbee (1965, 133–5), drawing conclusions from Liv. 40.40, listing enormous numbers of allied losses compared to those suffered by Romans in the same engagement.

[24] Except in the case of the Latins, who, according to Sherwin-White (1973, 22), were already given equal shares by the ancient *Foedus Cassianum*.

[25] Sherwin-White (1973, 22). There is no evidence to suggest otherwise than that all Italians were given equal shares; so Mouritsen (1998, 43); Keaveney (1987, 14–15); Badian (1958, 150–1). Salmon argues that the Romans always got a larger share of the *praeda* (1982, 126), and that by 177 the allies got only half as much (1967, 309).

4. *Economic and Political Problems of Enfranchisement*

This was not, however, the only effect of bestowing *civitas* that the Senate would have to ponder; there were also economic ones. To some degree these were related to military concerns, in that one of the other primary advantages of the *foedera* made with the *socii* was that the latter would not only furnish soldiers for Rome's armies, but would also pay for their expenses. If the military organizations of the allies were like that of the Romans, then allied communities supplied their soldiers with food,[26] pay, and equipment (although the cost of the latter might be taken from the soldier's pay, as it was in Rome),[27] and did so with funds that were raised through taxes. Indeed, it is known for certain that at least some of the allies did this, having been made to do so by direct Roman compulsion during the Hannibalic War according to Livy.[28] However, after 168 the Romans themselves no longer paid such taxes.[29] There is no indication that the Romans used their own funds to supply and feed the Italians who served with them, and in fact there is compelling evidence to the contrary. Appian notes that in the time before the Gracchi "the Italians became few and lacking in manpower, having been wasted by poverty, taxes, and military service".[30] As non-citizen *socii* the Italians had to pay these taxes,[31] but as *cives* they could claim exemption from them as long as the *aerarium* was full. This would have represented a gigantic increase in Rome's

[26] Salmon (1982, 84, 318 n. 198) refutes the assertion made by Frank and reiterated by Rosenstein (2004, 30, 49, 64, 204 n. 16), that the Romans supplied the allies on active duty with rations, which he claims is based on a misinterpretation of Plb. 6.39.15. The Greek reads: *δίδοται δὲ τοῖς μὲν συμμάχοις τοῦτ᾽ ἐν δωρεᾷ*: τοῖς δὲ Ῥωμαίοις τοῦ τε σίτου καὶ τῆς ἐσθῆτος, κἂν τινος ὅπλου προσδεηθῶσι, πάντων τούτων ὁ ταμίας τὴν τεταγμένην τιμὴν ἐκ τῶν ὀψωνίων ὑπολογίζεται, πάντων τούτων ὁ ταμίας τὴν τεταγμένην τιμὴν ἐκ τῶν ὀψωνίων ὑπολογίζεται. Salmon seems to be suggesting that what Polybius meant was that the allies did not deduct the cost of rations from the pay of the soldiers, as the Romans did, and hence the grain by which the allied soldiers were fed was "a gratuity to the allies" (in the sense that these themselves did not pay for it as much as their taxpayers at home did). Rosenstein argues that the Romans supplied grain freely to the allies while making their own soldiers pay for theirs, a disparity in allied favour which seems most unlikely.

[27] Gabba (1976, 9), citing Plb. 6.15.23.

[28] Liv. 29.15. In fact, this passage states they were required to deposit the amount needed to pay their soldiers in the Roman treasury for later dispensation; this was noted by Toynbee (1965, 17–20, 115–16).

[29] As discussed in Nicolet (1976, 1–12); this did not mean that Romans no longer paid taxes of any kind (they continued to pay port duties, for example), nor that the Romans were no longer *liable* for the *tributum*, just that it never needed to be collected from them after 167. See also Brunt (1971, 21–2 n. 5).

[30] App. *BC* 1.7.

[31] Keaveney (1987, 15, 20 n. 27).

military expenditures, if Velleius is indeed right that the allies furnished twice as many men as Romans did for the 'Roman' army. Enfranchisement would mean three times the costs to be paid to keep the same numbers of men under the colours. Such expenditures would almost certainly overwhelm Rome's income, as can be inferred from the arguments made by the Senate against the Gracchan *lex frumentaria*[32] that even the slightest additional outlay of funds would empty the state's coffers. Those arguments may have exaggerated the threadbare state of Rome's funds, but it is almost certain that the trebled costs of raising an army of the customary size after the extension of *civitas* would result in a shortfall that would have to be met through taxes on all citizens.

There were, furthermore, other pecuniary reasons for opposing the franchise. Enfranchisement would mean that former allied businessmen would now be eligible to compete for state contracts to supply the army, which they could not do as allies.[33] They would also be able to bid for contracts to collect taxes in the provinces.[34] As citizens, Italians could also frequent the metropolis and make use of its water supplies, enjoy games, and feast at banquets there without any future possibility of expulsion by means of the sort of laws that could thrust non-Romans out of the city, as several laws passed in the second century had done. The unchecked presence of these *novi cives* would in theory diminish the availability of such commodities for everyone. A magistrate responsible for one of the expulsion laws—Fannius, whose law was promulgated in 122—acquired approval for it from the Roman populace by reminding them how resident aliens were already making use of the city's resources in this manner.[35] 'Old' citizens would likewise compete with the new for bribes at election-time and other sundry plums of being a *civis.*[36] It was likely that the allies had asked for the *civitas* precisely to acquire all these various military, economic, and public benefits: if granted, the Romans would have to stop exploiting the *socii* altogether.

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32 See Cic. *Off.* 2.72; *Tusc.* 3.48, stating that Gracchus had depleted the treasury through his corn laws.

33 Brunt (1988, 127).

34 For summary of contracting opportunities see Hill (1952, 52–9); they included the manufacture of weapons, operations of state-owned mines, fisheries, and forests, collection of rents from *ager publicus* (*scriptura*), harbour duties (*portoria*), and all other taxes owed to the Roman treasury, either from its citizens or from its overseas subjects, as well as responsibility for transport of food; see also Brunt (1980, 85); Morley (1996, 6).

35 Iul. Vict. 6.4.

36 Brunt (1988, 127).

Enfranchisement would also affect Rome's politics. As equal citizens, the former allies would be able to vote, and their votes could shape Roman foreign and domestic policy in a way that could lead it in directions not anticipated or desired by Rome's older citizen body. This was all the more true because Rome's allies far outnumbered actual Romans, and Appian records that these concerns were very much present in the minds of the *patres*.[37] New citizens would also be able to run for office, with the potential to acquire, if elected, the ability to take a direct hand in government. Even if actual election would prove beyond them, the new citizens could and probably would field candidates for offices; as a result, the limited number of magistracies would have a far greater pool of potential applicants for them, making the competition for them even more brutal.

Finally, a law which would grant the allies *civitas* would have to be proposed and promulgated by an already-elected Roman magistrate. If this were to be done successfully, the magistrate who had acted might win the gratitude of an enormous host of persons—and, importantly, voters—aided by the law which would bear that magistrate's name for time immemorial. The potential for any one Roman to gather that much influence would probably have been met with great opposition. Indeed, there are several incidents recorded throughout Roman history in which men proposing laws widely acknowledged as good and useful nevertheless saw them opposed and defeated due to the popularity that their passage would bring to the would-be legislator. [38]

5. *Romans: The Master Race?*

The concession of the franchise to *socii* would bring profound disruptions to Rome's financial, military, political, and social fabric. In light of this, while the decision to risk the uncertainties of war rather than face the certainty of these changes may seem short-sighted and self-serving, it is understandable. Less so, perhaps, are other reasons which have been asserted by some scholars as to why Rome desired not to incorporate its allies into their citizen body. One of these is a feeling of superiority which

[37] App. *BC* 1.49.

[38] For numerous examples of this tendency in the first century see Gruen (1974, 211–59). Other examples from earlier are provided by Keaveney (1987, 62, 99), in the context of the Gracchi (whose enemies repeatedly expressed a fear that the brothers were aiming at a tyranny which they could gain through the popularity they gathered by means of their laws) and Livius Drusus.

came from conquest, a *superbia* which in turn led to arrogance and exclusivity, a feeling akin to what might be referred to as chauvinism.[39] The Romans, it is argued, had come to think of themselves as the 'master race', and thus to think that the Italians were unworthy of being made Roman *cives*. Some evidence of this feeling amongst the Romans may be found in the sources: Appian notes that part of the opposition to the franchise proposal of Flaccus in 125 came from the hateful notion that Rome's 'subjects' might become equal citizens with themselves, and Diodorus observes that, during the war to come, the Romans drew inspiration in battle from the fear lest they be seen as inferior to those whom they considered their own inferiors.[40]

It cannot be denied that by 91 the Romans were often very cavalier in their treatment of the allies: they had apparently always felt free to build roads through allied territory (though the benefits of having the road may have done much to mitigate the intrusion),[41] and had on a few occasions passed laws which demanded certain behaviour from them, such as during the suppression of the Bacchic cult.[42] They had also from time to time felt free to use allied cities, either as safe havens for those they wished to protect, or as prisons for those whom they wished incarcerated.[43] More

39 Keaveney (1987, 99–113) makes much of this, citing on (102) what he believes to be examples in the form of Rome's expulsion of *rhetors*, actors, and other purveyors of non-Roman culture.

40 App. *BC* 1.21; Diod. Sic. 37.24.

41 Potter (1987, 132–3) suggests that there was a "huge impact that the vast works of engineering must have made upon the local populations", which may not have always been positive. For example, there was the fact that the roads through allied land would require *socii* to give up the territory upon which those roads were built, and they would have to endure disruption caused by construction and by the army of workmen engaged in the building. However, the resulting improvement of infrastructure could more than compensate, especially since the *aerarium* paid for these improvements, according to Wiseman (1970, 125, 144–6). Elsewhere, Wiseman (1971, 44, 139 n. 3) observes that by means of his road-building initiatives C. Gracchus had made himself very popular with "a multitude of contractors and artisans" (App. *BC* 1.23), with the implication that these were Italian workmen and artisans hired to build the roads.

42 Keaveney (1987, 29–30). Into this category may fall Rome's laws forbidding use of rivers for agriculture in ways which might diminish Rome's water supply or make rivers like the Tiber more difficult to navigate, see Morley (1996, 104–5). Harris (1971, 108–13) argues that such laws were exceptional, and that Roman need for Italian manpower would preclude their over-involvement in the internal affairs of allied communities. Mouritsen (1998, 39–58) agrees, and even goes so far as to suggest that even the Bacchanalian suppression was not extended to the Italian communities; however, this is unlikely.

43 Instances of this type of quartering are noted in several passages in the sources, e.g. Liv. 32.26.5, 45.42.4, 45.43.9–10; Paus. 7.10.11. Diod. Sic. 37.16 tells us that in 91 the Cilician pirate Agamemnon was freed from prison in Asculum, where the Romans might have kept him since 100, when Antonius triumphed over the pirates; App. *BC* 1.42 says that Venusia

egregious still were the notorious misdeeds of men like Postumius Albinus, who on a trip through Praeneste as consul demanded lodgings, pack animals, meals, and an honour guard from the city, and actually had these demands met by the Praenestines (even though, according to Livy, pack animals, food, and tents were customarily furnished by the Republic to consuls so that they not burden the allies).[44] This incident had been motivated by a petty personal grudge, but it inspired future consuls to behave as Postumius had done, and Livy asserts that the example was indeed followed. This would seem to be corroborated by a speech from Gaius Gracchus, which recounts how an unnamed consul ordered a local magistrate at Teanum Sidicinium to be flogged for not having the public baths cleaned and available for his use on arrival and how a praetor had done likewise at Ferentinum.[45] That Gracchus was not exaggerating may be seen in a speech by Cato, in which the consul Quintus Thermus had local magistrates (probably in Etruria) scourged for not having attended properly to his supplies.[46] Similar is the behaviour of the censor Fulvius Flaccus, who practically destroyed a temple of Juno in Bruttium to gain access to its roof tiles, which he wished to use on a temple of his own in Rome.[47]

However, some scholars go further than accusing the Romans of reckless pomposity. They accuse the Romans of something like racism, at least in their treatment of Samnites and others of Oscan heritage; such treatment, these scholars claim, was not because these were not Romans, but because they were Oscan.[48] It is possible that there were indeed Romans

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guarded Oxyntas, son of Jugurtha; these last two instances might have been a cause of resentment against Rome. See Harris (1971, 110–11); Mouritsen (1998, 42 n. 16); Roselaar (forthcoming).

44 Liv. 42.1.

45 Gell. 10.3.3. In the next section Gellius cites an episode quoted by Gracchus in which a young man who was not yet a magistrate had a Venusian flogged to death for a joke.

46 Gell. 10.3.17–19; see Liv. 34.56.

47 Livy 42.3. See Badian (1958, 148); Toynbee (1965, 114–15); Mouritsen (1998, 42 n. 16); Salmon 1967, 323–6; 1982, 198 n. 326).

48 See Salmon (e.g. 1967, 323–6), who suggests anti-Samnite hatred as the source of magisterial abuse of Italians and in Rome's suppression of Fregellae. The subject of racism in the classical world in general and amongst the Romans in particular is addressed by Isaac (2004), although he would judge anti-Samnite attitudes more as 'ethnic prejudice' than as racism. Racism, he argues (23–5), was generally attached to peoples from different geographical areas or to those with physical characteristics suggesting similarities to those from different geographical areas. The Samnites and other Italians apparently did not qualify for this sort of hatred, though irrational dislike of them based on their ethnicity and/or culture was certainly possible.

who harboured such prejudices; if so, however, it does not seem that these attitudes were held by the majority of the Romans; at the very least, they had not always affected Roman citizenship policy, if they ever had.[49] In fact, evidence demonstrates, to the contrary, that the Romans had once been extremely generous with their *civitas.*[50] The testimony of Cato regarding the admission of foreigners as a source of Rome's strength seems to indicate this one-time favourable attitude towards enfranchisement,[51] as does Cicero's paean to Roman openness in the *Pro Balbo*.[52] Additionally there may have existed the *ius adipiscendi civitatem Romanum per magistratum* to the Latins, showing that Rome apparently retained some willingness to give the franchise to individuals. Clearly Rome did not seem to object officially to the idea of giving *civitas per se*, least of all on racist grounds; what drew their objection was giving it to large numbers of people, for reasons detailed above.

6. *Conclusion*

In the autumn of 91 BC a Roman praetor named Quintus Servilius was killed along with his legate and all other Romans found in Asculum. In most of the ancient sources, war between the Romans and a confederacy of their Italian allies followed immediately. Yet Appian states that commencement of hostilities was not immediate; an embassy was sent to Rome to offer a way out of war, to which the allies were being driven from lack of acquiring Roman citizenship. At this point the Senate sent them away; the bequest of citizenship alone was sufficient for the Romans to decide that war would be better than granting it. Ironically, the Romans chose war rather than grant the franchise, only to be compelled to extend *civitas* to end the fighting less than two years later. We have seen why the Romans appealed to arms first; it just so happened that the βία to which the Romans turned was not sufficient to avoid, but only enough to delay, the changes that were coming.

[49] As Isaac (2004, 134–6, 145) notes, the Romans did not labour under an urge to keep their lineage pure.

[50] Badian (1971, 375–85). Gruen (2011, 210, 243–50) emphasizes that the myths of Rome's origins tell the story of the city founded by the descendant of an Trojan and native Italians, who were really the descendants of Greeks anyway. Gruen is perhaps the latest of many scholars to note that it was Roman policy to enfranchise freed slaves no matter what their origin, which the Greeks found striking.

[51] Gell. 18.12.

[52] Cic. *Balb*. 13.

THE *LEX LICINIA MUCIA* AND THE *BELLUM ITALICUM*

Fiona C. Tweedie*

1. *Introduction*

In a fragment of the *Pro Cornelio* preserved in Asconius, Cicero condemns the *Lex Licinia Mucia* of 95 as *inutilis* and *perniciosa* to the Republic:

> 'I see that everyone is agreed that the Licinian-Mucian law concerning the return to one's own citizenship, although two consuls who were the wisest of all we have seen passed it, was not only useless but very destructive of the public good.' He means L. Licinius Crassus the orator and the Q. Mucius Scaevola, who was *pontifex maximus*, orator and jurist. For these two passed the law he is talking about during their consulship for restoring the *socii* to their own citizenships. For since the Italian peoples were gripped by a great desire for the Roman citizenship and because of this a great part of them were presenting themselves as Roman citizens, the law seemed necessary to return each of them to their own citizenships. The feelings of the leaders of the Italic peoples were so alienated by this law that it was even the main reason for the *bellum Italicum* that broke out three years later.[1]

This is a strong condemnation, especially given that he has just praised the consuls who passed it as *sapientissimi*. Asconius elaborates on these lines and explains that a large number of *Italici* had been seized by such a desire for the Roman citizenship that they were conducting themselves as Romans. The consuls decided that these allies should be returned to their own citizenries and passed a law to this effect. Despite their wisdom, the law had the disastrous effect of alienating the spirits of the Italian *principes* and was, Asconius says, the main reason for the war that broke out

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[1] Asc. 67–8C: *Legem Liciniam et Muciam de civibus redigendis video constare inter omnis, quamquam duo consules omnium quos vidimus sapientissimi tulissent, non modo inutilem sed perniciosam rei publicae fuisse.*

L. Licinium Crassum oratorem et Q. Mucium Scaevolam pont. max. eundemque et oratorem et iuris consultum significat. Hi enim legem eam de qua loquitur de redigendis in suas civitates sociis in consulatu tulerunt. Nam cum summa cupiditate civitatis Romanae Italici populi tenerentur et ob id magna pars eorum pro civibus Romanis se gereret, necessaria Lex visa est ut in suae quisque civitatis ius redigeretur. Verum ea lege ita alienati animi sunt principum Italicorum populorum ut ea vel maxima causa belli Italici quod post triennium exortum est fuerit.

All translations are my own unless noted otherwise.

three years later. The nature of this law and the impact it had on Roman relationships with the allied communities in the tense years before the outbreak of the *Bellum Italicum* are of central interest to any study of the integration of the allies into the Roman state.

The law has, however, received relatively little scholarly attention. When it is examined, the law tends to be treated as merely a symptom of Roman attitudes towards the *socii* or as part of internal Roman factional struggles. When we see the tumultuous events of the tribunate of M. Livius Drusus in 91, blaming a law passed several years earlier for the war does seem to be exaggeration on Asconius' part. This paper will argue, however, that Asconius' claim has merit. Much has already been written on what the Roman citizenship may have represented to the Italian allies and the extent to which they really desired it. This paper is not going to revisit those debates. Rather, it will re-examine the *Lex Licinia Mucia* in the political context of the 90s BC and restore a widely overlooked element to the discussion: the Roman census. The law was passed in 95, following the closing of the census of 97–6. Tensions with the allies came to a head in 91 as a new census was being conducted. By bringing back the census, as the means by which membership of the Roman citizen body was confirmed or refused, into our consideration of the debate over the status of the *socii* during the 90s, it becomes clear that the *Lex Licinia Mucia* was a critical link in a chain of events that culminated in the outbreak of violence in 91.

2. *Cicero and the* Lex Licinia Mucia

Cicero mentions the *Lex Licinia Mucia* in several different contexts which encompass rhetorical and philosophical works as well as forensic speeches. Although no total picture of the law can be extracted from his comments, the diversity of these references means that they can be weighed against each other and we can be reasonably confident about some aspects of the law. The first of these statements comes in the *Brutus*: "For Lysias is certainly an Athenian, because he both was born and died at Athens and performed all the functions of a citizen, although Timaeus, as if acting under the Licinian-Mucian law, calls him back to Syracuse."[2] This jocular

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[2] Cic. *Brut.* 63: *[Lysias] est enim Atticus, quoniam certe Athenis est et natus et mortuus et functus omni civium munere, quamquam Timaeus eum quasi Licinia et Mucia lege repetit Syracusas.*

reference yields little, although it suggests that the law has become a by-word for over-scrupulous judging of citizenship.

In the *De Officiis*, Cicero appears to defend the law, although elsewhere he is critical of it:

> They, too, do wrong who prevent foreigners from the enjoyment of a city and expel them, as Pennus did in the time of our fathers and Papius more recently. For it is right not to allow one who is not a citizen to conduct himself as a citizen; the very wise Crassus and Scaevola passed such a law. To ban foreigners from a city, however, is contrary to humanity.[3]

In this passage, Cicero contrasts this law with those of M. Iunius Pennus (*tr. pl.* 126) and C. Papius (*tr. pl.* 65), which expelled all non-citizens from the city. Such a measure, he says, is *inhumanum*. A law that prevents foreigners from passing themselves off as citizens is, however, quite appropriate in Cicero's estimation. Cicero again describes the consuls Crassus and Scaevola as *sapientissimi*, a high accolade. The important point to emerge from this passage is the contrast with expulsion measures. The *Lex Licinia Mucia* should not be interpreted as having required the *peregrini* to leave Rome. It only demanded that they not falsely claim citizenship. The *De Officiis* was addressed to Cicero's son and is a work of ethics. He can defend the *ratio* of the law in an ethical context, although not its political pragmatism.[4]

Cicero twice refers to the law in the *Pro Balbo*. The first reference recounts the only known trial under the law and will be discussed in detail later. In the second reference to the law Cicero discusses means of obtaining citizenship:

> But if by that most severe Servilian law the leading men and the most serious and wisest citizens allowed that road to citizenship to lie open as

[3] Cic. *Off.* 3.47: *Male etiam, qui peregrinos urbibus uti prohibent eosque exterminant, ut Pennus apud patres nostros, Papius nuper. Nam esse pro cive, qui civis non sit, rectum est non licere, quam legem tulerunt sapientissimi consules Crassus et Scaevola. Usu vero urbis prohibere peregrinos, sane inhumanum est.*

[4] Weiss (1925, col. 2395) adds *Sest.* 30 as a reference. This attribution cannot, however, be correct, since here Cicero is dealing with expulsion of the *socii* and Latins from Rome: "The allies and Latins had nothing more bitter to bear than—and it was very rare—being ordered by the consuls to leave the city: and they could return to their own communities, to their own household gods, and in that general inconvenience no particular disgrace fell on anyone by name." (*Nihil acerbius socii et Latini ferre soliti sunt quam se, id quod perraro accidit, ex urbe exire a consulibus iuberi: atque illis erat tum reditus in suas civitates, ad suos Lares familiaris, et in illo communi incommodo nulla in quemquam propria ignominia nominatim cadebat*). It is more likely that Cicero is referring to the laws of Pennus and Fannius. In this passage, too, Cicero does not approve of the expulsions.

> ordered by vote of the people to the Latins, that is the treaty-states, and if the Licinian-Mucian law did not find legal fault with this, especially when that type and title of prosecution and the reward which no one could obtain except through the conviction of a senator could not be very agreeable to any senator or any good man, was it possible to doubt that, if in that kind of issue the reward conferred by juries was confirmed, the judgement of our generals should be valid?[5]

He notes that the *Lex Licinia Mucia* did nothing to alter the provisions of the *Lex Servilia* under which a citizen of a treaty-state could gain Roman citizenship by successful prosecution of a senator *de repetundis*. Although this means of gaining citizenship was distasteful because it involved the disgrace of a senator, the law did not revoke it. This demonstrates that the law had a very specific aim. It was not concerned with harassing allies who had received their citizenship through approved channels, nor did it attempt to restrict the ways in which a non-Roman might gain citizenship. It must therefore be understood as a measure against a specific group: those who were claiming to be citizens without having received a grant at all.

The reference to the law in the *De Oratore* is one of the most intriguing and the only one to allude to the specific circumstances that gave rise to it:

> Often a verse is thrown in humorously, either as it is or slightly changed, or part of a verse, as a verse of Statius was by Scaurus when he was angry; from which some say that your law about the citizenship, Crassus, was born: 'Shh! Quiet! What is this row? You who have neither mother nor father, such assurance? Be off with that pride of yours.'[6]

Here, 'C. Caesar Strabo' comments that there are some who believe that Crassus' inspiration for the law was Scaurus' angry quotation of a verse from Statius. The conversation at this point is about the use of verses in an oratorical setting. No more discussion of this occasion is given and Caesar

[5] Cic. *Balb.* 54: *Quod si acerbissima lege Servilia principes viri ac gravissimi et sapientissimi cives hanc Latinis, id est foederatis, viam ad civitatem populi iussu patere passi sunt, neque ius est hoc reprehensum Licinia et Mucia lege, cum praesertim genus ipsum accusationis et nomen <et> eius modi praemium quod nemo adsequi posset nisi ex senatoris calamitate neque senatori neque bono cuiquam nimis iucundum esse posset, dubitandum fuit quin, quo in genere iudicum praemia rata essent, in eodem iudicia imperatorum valerent?*

[6] Cic. *De Or.* 2.257: *Saepe etiam versus facete interponitur, vel ut est vel paululum immutatus, aut aliqua pars versus, ut Stati a Scauro stomachante; ex quo sunt non nulli, qui tuam legem de civitate natam, Crasse, dicant: 'St, tacete, quid hoc clamoris? Quibus nec mater nec pater, tanta confidentia? Auferte istam enim superbiam.'*

moves on to a quip by M. Antonius. Unsurprisingly, this mention of the law has given rise to considerable speculation among scholars about the occasion of Scaurus' anger. Gabba argues that the trial of C. Norbanus (*cos.* 83) was the occasion on which Scaurus snapped at the crowd of allies, as he appeared as a witness for the prosecution.[7] According to Gabba, the allies had flocked to Rome to support Norbanus, himself a new citizen. Their attempt to intervene outraged Scaurus and the result was the *Lex Licinia Mucia*. While this explanation is superficially attractive, it has two major flaws. The first concerns the status of Norbanus. There is no strong evidence that he was a new citizen or indeed from Norba.[8] Even if he had been, this would make him of Latin, rather than Italian, ancestry. The link between the *principes Italicorum populorum* and a possible ex-Latin is indirect at best. Even if he were a new citizen, there is no suggestion that Norbanus' citizenship was disputed at his trial, meaning that the implications for other Latins and allies were minimal. Secondly, it is difficult to see how the law would have answered the immediate problem of the Italian allies disrupting the trial. From Cicero's comments in the *De Officiis*, it is clear that the law was not an expulsion measure and heckling Scaurus hardly amounts to 'impersonating a citizen'.[9] A noisy group of allies had drawn attention to themselves by their behaviour on some occasion, but the trial of Norbanus is an unlikely context.

Gruen's suggestion that the law indicates the "depth of Scaurus' resentment towards new citizens" is not a sufficient rationale for the law itself.[10] Merely annoying Scaurus is unlikely to have been a sufficient crime to prompt a major piece of legislation and the light tone in the *De Oratore* at this point does not stress the connection. All the text indicates is that a group of non-citizens (or new 'citizens') had drawn attention to themselves by interrupting Scaurus. Like Scipio Aemilianus' contemptuous remarks about the freedmen in the urban mob, Scaurus' angry quotation reflects an aristocrat's intolerance of being interrupted and insulted. The fact that his remark was recorded at all indicates that it was felt by his contemporaries to be a clever use of the quotation. To take it as evidence

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[7] Gabba (1953, 265).

[8] Badian (1964, 49) and Gruen (1966, 46 n. 85) both question the Norban connection. Badian is prepared to accept that he was a new citizen, which Gruen doubts. Badian draws a parallel with M. Perperna (*cos.* 130), but in this case citizenship had originally been claimed by the father (Val. Max. 3.4.5).

[9] Gabba (1953, 260) in fact argues that the law did not expel non-citizens from Rome.

[10] Gruen (1966, 47).

of xenophobia is to push the reference too far. The fact that the law was passed by both consuls (and had the backing of Scaurus) indicates that it was felt to be an important measure. To understand the *ratio* of the law, I believe that it is preferable to look beyond the immediate factional context to contemporary ideas about citizenship.

3. *The Census and the Citizenship before 95* BC

The business of registering, counting and categorising the Roman citizenry was conducted in the great quinquennial ritual of the Roman census. It was by being enrolled in the census that one's citizen status, being *in numero Quiritium*, was confirmed and the important business of deciding who was and who was not a citizen lay in the hands of the censors. In order to understand why a law concerning the claiming of Roman citizenship by non-Romans was judged necessary in 95, attention must be given to the census of 97. Brunt argues that the *Lex* was a 'piece of legal pedantry' passed in response to a gradual infiltration of the Roman citizen rolls by allies over many censuses. His argument that the law was intended to reassert Roman control over membership of their citizenry is also favoured by Gruen and Bates.[11] Direct connections with the period between 100 and 95 may, however, be detected. During these years, demand for Roman citizenship grew among some groups of *socii* and Rome's refusal to engage constructively with their desires fuelled tensions between the communities.

In 100, three years before the census of 97, Rome and Italy defeated the marauding bands of the Cimbri and their allies in a desperate campaign that gave real meaning to the alliances that bound the inhabitants of the peninsula. The euphoric atmosphere that followed the defeat of the Cimbri surely influenced the census of 97. This victory was presented as the salvation of *tota Italia* and feelings of unity among the participants in the campaign were at a high point. The role of the saviour of *Italia*, C. Marius, is critical to what followed. Marius recognised the importance of the allies to Rome's success and employed a policy of liberality with the citizenship, demonstrated by such gestures as his enfranchisement of a troop of cavalry from Camerinum[12] and the citizenship provisions in

[11] Gruen (1966, 40); Bates (1986, 273); Brunt (1988, 131–2).
[12] Plut. *Mar.* 28.2.

the colonial laws that L. Appuleius Saturninus passed for him.[13] Badian maintains, with some evidence, that the censors of 97, L. Valerius Flaccus and M. Antonius, were the political allies of Marius and hence that they had been lenient in enrolling large numbers of Marius' Latin and Italian supporters.[14] Flaccus had been described by P. Rutilius Rufus as "more Marius' servant than his colleague" when they shared the consulship of 100.[15] Antonius' relations with Marius are more doubtful, but his defence of M'. Aquillius, at which Marius appeared as a character witness for the defence, suggests that the two were not hostile.[16]

Gruen objects to the lack of direct evidence of Antonius as "an advocate of the Italians", but so little is known of any Roman politician's 'Italian policy' that this in itself is not a serious hindrance to believing that he could have conducted a liberal census.[17] Unfortunately, the lack of any census figures for these years means that we are unable to see whether the census of 97 produced a marked increase on the previous one. The evidence we do have, that shortly after the closing of the *lustrum* a law was passed to investigate false claims of Roman citizenship, indicates that there were objections to the registrations that had been made. This carries a serious criticism of the censors themselves, implying that they had wrongly accepted non-citizens onto the rolls. Badian reads the law as essentially anti-Marian in its intention.[18] Factional motives for attacking censors close to Marius are, however, only part of the story. In these years, greater questions about the meaning of the citizenship were also being contended.

Extending Roman citizenship to large numbers of Latins and Italian *socii* had implications not only for Rome, but also for the non-Roman communities of Italy. In the past the Latins had raised concerns about the effect of migration to Rome on their capacity to continue to meet their military quotas.[19] There is no evidence that the *Lex Licinia Mucia* was passed at the request of the allies, but major changes to the citizenship structures in the peninsula had far-reaching implications for all the

[13] Cic. *Balb*. 48.
[14] Badian (1964, 48).
[15] Plut. *Mar*. 28.5.
[16] Gruen (1966, 39–40); Alexander (1990, 44). The cynical might suspect that Marius' tears during Antonius' speech had been pre-arranged by the two of them (Cic. *De Or.* 2.196).
[17] Gruen (1966, 40). The strength of even Marius' commitment to enfranchisements is questioned by Brunt (1988, 131–2).
[18] Badian (1958, 213–14).
[19] Liv. 39.3.4–5; 41.8.6.

communities concerned. Behrends explores the ways in which the law might be understood to fit with the philosophical stances of the two consuls and their concepts of the state.[20] He stresses the demands of *ius civile* and *ius gentium*, which he sees as central to Crassus' philosophy. The influence of Stoicism, which stressed the importance of common humanity, can be detected in the emphasis on the *ius gentium*. In book two of the *De Natura Deorum*, which deals explicitly with Stoicism, Cicero explains that the universe was created for the enjoyment of gods and men and that its contents belong to them.[21] By analogy, he says that Athens and Sparta were created for the Athenians and Spartans and belong to those *populi*. Implicitly, then, although the world belongs to all men, Athens does not belong to a non-Athenian or Rome to a non-Roman. Tension can thus arise between the inclusive nature of Stoic ideas of humanity and the exclusive membership of a city-state.[22]

Behrends sees the *Lex Licinia Mucia* as an attempt by the two consuls to negotiate these tensions. As the passage from the *De Officiis* discussed above makes clear, physical expulsion is contrary to the ideal of hospitality demanded by the *ius gentium*, but appropriation of a citizenship not one's own violates the integrity of the *ius civile*. The *Lex Licinia Mucia* insisted that the allies respect the fact that they were not Roman citizens but members of their own *civitates*.[23] Compelling the allies to return to their own citizenries could be justified as an act of respect to those communities which would otherwise have been depleted. Conversely, falsely claiming a citizenship not one's own was, Behrends argues, an abuse of the hospitality demanded by *ius gentium*.[24] The law represents an attempt to defend the integrity of the citizenship while respecting the bonds of humanity. It is this that allows Cicero to defend the wisdom of the consuls while acknowledging the detrimental effects of the law.

The preceding discussion makes the *Lex Licinia Mucia* appear very mild in its intentions. Cicero, however, criticises its effects as *perniciosa rei publicae* and Asconius blames it for causing the *Bellum Italicum*. Whatever its philosophical justifications, the effects of the law must have been severe. Only one prosecution under the law, that of T. Matrinius of Spoletium, is attested:

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[20] Behrends (2002, 22–32).
[21] Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.154.
[22] Behrends (2002, 25–6).
[23] Behrends (2002, 27).
[24] Behrends (2002, 32).

> Therefore, when a few years after this present of the citizenship a very severe investigation of the citizenship was conducted under the Licinian-Mucian law, was anyone from the treaty-states, who had received citizenship, brought to trial? For T. Matrinius of Spoletium, one of those to whom C. Marius had given citizenship, was prosecuted, being from a Latin colony among the first for reliability and reputation. When L. Antistius, a man skilled in speaking, prosecuted him, he did not say that the people of Spoletium had not ratified the deed—for he saw that states are accustomed to ratify what concerns their own rights, not ours—but that the colonies had not been founded under the Appuleian law, by which law Saturninus had carried for Marius the right to make three citizens in each colony; he denied that this benefaction could be valid, as the foundation itself had been set aside. This has no resemblance to the present charge; anyway, so great was the authority of C. Marius that he did not employ L. Crassus, his relation by marriage, a man of extraordinary eloquence, but with a few words himself defended and won his case by his own moral weight.[25]

This leads us to several possibilities: Matrinius' was the only trial that took place, it was one of a handful, or there were many trials but only Matrinius' has been recorded. In weighing up these possibilities, Bauman concludes that there were probably not a great number of trials but that the *ratio* of the law offended the *socii* deeply.[26] The context in which Cicero reports on Matrinius' trial is critical to our interpretation of the passage. The *Pro Balbo* is a speech defending the citizenship granted to Balbus of Gades by Pompey. Thus, Cicero's interest at this moment is in successfully defended grants of citizenship made by generals. Matrinius had received his citizenship from Marius, so it furthers Cicero's argument to point to an example of a grant being defended by little more than the *auctoritas* of a great *imperator*. It is not helpful to Cicero's case to report large numbers of other trials, especially if these resulted in convictions, as one of the themes of the *Pro Balbo* is Rome's policy of liberality with the citizenship. Matrinius' trial requires further investigation.

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[25] Cic. *Balb.* 48–9: *Itaque cum paucis annis post hanc civitatis donationem acerrima de civitate quaestio Licinia et Mucia lege venisset, num quis eorum, qui de foederatis civitatibus esset civitate donatus, in iudicium est vocatus? Nam Spoletinus T. Matrinius, unus ex iis quos C. Marius civitate donasset, dixit causam ex colonia Latina in primis firma et inlustri. Quem cum disertus homo L. Antistius accusaret, non dixit fundum Spoletinum populum non esse factum,—videbat enim populos de suo iure, non de nostro fundos fieri solere,—sed cum lege Apuleia coloniae non essent deductae, qua lege Saturninus C. Mario tulerat ut in singulas colonias ternos civis Romanos facere posset, negabat hoc beneficium re ipsa sublata valere debere. Nihil habet similitudinis ista accusatio; sed tamen tanta auctoritas in C. Mario fuit ut non per L. Crassum, adfinem suum, hominem incredibili eloquentia, sed paucis ipse verbis causam illam gravitate sua defenderit et probarit.*

[26] Bauman (1983, 367).

According to Cicero, Matrinius had received a grant of citizenship from Marius under a *Lex Appuleia*. This law, for the foundation of colonies, contained a provision that Marius might create a certain number of citizens in each. L. Antistius launched his prosecution on the grounds that as the colonies had not been founded, the grants themselves were void. Marius appeared for his client and, in Cicero's presentation, won the case easily. Cicero notes that Marius did not call on L. Crassus to assist in the defence but implies that he could have done so. Gruen believes that this reference shows that Crassus had "showed his willingness" to assist Marius.[27] Bauman rejects the interpretation, saying that Cicero's purpose at this point is to build up Marius' prestige: he had no need of Crassus' *eloquentia*.[28] It is no compliment to Marius, however, to argue that he "managed perfectly well" without help that would not have been available in any case. It is a far greater compliment to Marius to say that he handled the case himself even though Crassus and his exceptional *eloquentia* were available. Not only was Crassus the dominant orator of the day, he was one of the authors of the law, so his appearance for the defence would have been a huge blow to the prosecution.

Although I do not believe that the law was designed exclusively to attack Marius, this trial does appear to be an attempt to exploit it for factional ends. Matrinius' prosecutor is known only as L. Antistius, but Badian identifies him as L. Antistius Reginus, the tribune of 103 who freed the elder Caepio from prison and accompanied him into exile.[29] Badian argues that Matrinius' trial should be interpreted in the context of the factional struggles of 95 and was designed to put pressure on Marius' standing with his allied *clientes*. Gruen suggests that the prosecution was intended to destabilise Marius' relationship with L. Crassus and Q. Scaevola by using their law against him.[30]

On balance, this prosecution does appear to have been aimed as much at Marius as at Matrinius. The other major trials in 95, those of Norbanus and the younger Q. Servilius Caepio (*quaest.* 100), revisited the unrest at the time of Saturninus' tribunates. Marius had been forced to abandon Saturninus and, by challenging the grants he had made under Saturninus' legislation, Antistius was able to remind everyone of how compromised Marius had been in 100 and to test his relationship with the *boni*.

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[27] Gruen (1966, 48).
[28] Bauman (1983, 368).
[29] Val. Max. 4.7.3. See Badian (1964, 48–9).
[30] Gruen (1966, 48).

Saturninus' colonial legislation had contained a provision for Marius to make a certain number of grants of Roman citizenship in each colony. As previously noted, the prosecution maintained that as the colonies had not been founded, the citizenship grants could not be valid. The prosecution, then, had much wider implications than merely returning Matrinius to Spoletium. Had Matrinius been convicted, all the grants that Marius had made to his veterans would have been invalidated, which would have been a terrible blow to Marius' standing and his relationship with his veterans. The fact that Cicero says that Marius' own *gravitas* and *auctoritas* carried the day is significant: these were on trial as much as Matrinius.

The fact that Matrinius successfully defended his claim to citizenship indicates that the Marian veterans were not the law's true target. There must have been another group of victims. We must now turn our attention to the means by which Roman citizenship was conferred. In the *Pro Caecina*, Cicero is insistent that it is not possible to take away Roman citizenship: it must be repudiated either by accepting the citizenship of another *civitas* or by some act such as refusal to register in the census or serve in the army.[31] On this basis, he claims that the *Lex Cornelia* of Sulla, which deprived some communities in Italy of their Roman citizenship, was in fact invalid. In his enthusiasm as a defence lawyer, however, Cicero seems to be glossing over some technicalities in this representation, because Roman citizenship was not always as secure as he suggests at this point. As the prosecutions of Matrinius and Balbus demonstrate, a claim of citizenship could be challenged on the grounds that the grant itself was technically invalid.

The *Lex Claudia* of 177, which is frequently overlooked in this context, is a particularly interesting precedent for the *Lex Licinia Mucia*, since it cancelled Roman citizenship claimed by Latins exercising the *ius migrandi* after the census of 179–8. According to Livy, various Latin communities complained repeatedly to Rome about the drain on their manpower caused by this migration and were ignored by both the consuls and censors in 178.[32] In 177 they secured a sympathetic hearing and the consul C. Claudius Pulcher passed the *Lex Claudia*. The Latins claimed that the condition for migration, leaving children in the Latin community, was being either circumvented or completely ignored, which would have provided technical grounds for invalidating the claims of citizenship.

31 Cic. *Caec.* 98–100.
32 Liv. 41.8.6–8.

It appears, however, that the law operated at a more general level than just targeting those who had failed to leave sons at home. Livy states that the law of 177 decreed that anyone who was himself or whose parents were registered in an allied community in the censorship of M. Claudius and T. Quinctius (i.e. in 189, twelve years previously) should return to that community before the first of November:

> Then C. Claudius, with the authorization of the senate, proposed a law concerning the allies and decreed that all allies [and members] of the Latin name, who themselves or whose ancestors had been registered among the allies (and) Latin name in the censorship of M. Claudius and T. Quinctius or thereafter should all return, each to his own state, before the Kalends of November. The investigation of those who should not have returned was decreed to L. Mummius the praetor.[33]

This was despite the fact that these men had been included in the census at Rome (*Romae censi*). The *Lex Claudia* indicates that Rome was prepared to cancel registrations in the census on a broad scale, even if they were apparently sound, if they believed that there was a good reason for doing so.

5. *The* Lex Licinia Mucia *in Practice*

Analogy with the *Lex Claudia* gives us some sense of who the victims of the *Lex Licinia Mucia* may have been. The censors of 97 appear to have accepted not only those Marian veterans who should have received citizenship in a colony, but many other Latins and *socii* who put themselves forward. This latter group, lacking a personal grant of citizenship, would have been vulnerable. The operation of the law is critical to reconstructing its impact. Comparison with the *Lex Claudia* suggests that a trial was the culmination of the legal process. The purpose of the law of 177 was to return these migrants to their home communities, both physically and legally. Although the *Lex Licinia Mucia* was concerned only with registrations and did not require physical removal, the legal intention, removing *socii* from the Roman citizenry, was largely similar. The *Lex Licinia*

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[33] Liv. 41.9.9–11: *Legem dein de sociis C. Claudius tulit <ex> senatus consulto et edixit, qui socii [ac] nominis Latini, ipsi maioresue eorum, M. Claudio T. Quinctio censoribus postue ea apud socios nominis Latini censi essent, ut omnes in suam quisque ciuitatem ante kal. Nouembres redirent. Quaestio, qui ita non redissent, L. Mummio praetori decreta est.* Trans. Sage & Schlesinger, modified. See on these expulsions Coşkun (2009).

Mucia probably required that anyone who had been registered in an allied community at a certain date should reregister in that community unless he could demonstrate why his claim to Roman citizenship should be honoured. Only by refusing to return himself to the rolls of Spoletium would Matrinius have opened himself up to prosecution. For allies who had assumed that acceptance by the censors meant that they were now Roman citizens, this investigation would have been both unexpected and humiliating. Lacking any sort of public prosecutor, trials only occurred in Rome if a willing prosecutor existed. Matrinius may have been especially targeted by Antistius, who was anxious to see if the law could be used for his own ends. *Socii* unable to call on Marius or a similarly weighty patron would have faced the alternatives of complying with the law or risking condemnation if they too caught the eye of a willing prosecutor.

Cicero's description of an *acerrima quaestio* under the law suggests that in fact a larger number of trials occurred than is commonly imagined. If significant numbers of allies were condemned, we can begin to understand the terrible impact that the law had on relations between Rome and the allied communities, especially if the *principes* of the allied communities numbered among the victims.

Badian argues, by analogy with the case of Balbus, that the law must have carried a capital penalty.[34] This seems overly severe even for an *acerrima quaestio* and defeats the purpose of the law, which was, after all, to return the offenders *in suae civitatis ius*. Rather than execution, I would suggest that the punishment on conviction was flogging. Previous debate at Rome concerning the rights of the allies had emphasised the importance of the citizen right of *provocatio* and the protection from flogging that it carried. Indeed, non-citizen status is even referred to as *ius virgarum*.[35] The consuls of 138, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica and D. Iunius Brutus, commenced the levy by having deserters publicly flogged before being sold, demonstrating forcefully that these men had forfeited their membership of the Roman citizenry.[36] In his speech on the rights of the allies, C. Gracchus mentioned several cases of Roman cruelty to non-citizens.[37] The public floggings of M. Marius of Teanum Sidicinum and the quaestors of Ferentinum highlight the use of beating by Roman magistrates to stress the non-citizen status of their victims. Further analogy can be made with

[34] Badian (1970–1, 407).
[35] Plin. *NH* 7.136.
[36] Liv. *Per*. 55.
[37] Gell. *NA* 10.3.

the action of M. Claudius Marcellus (*cos*. 51) who beat a man from Novum Comum in order to demonstrate that he did not recognise Caesar's extension of the citizenship.[38]

Legislating for the public flogging of Rome's allies may seem to be a severe step for a man such as Crassus, whom Cicero presents as the epitome of *humanitas*. The law was, however, intended to make a strong statement and Roman attitudes to cruelty frequently discomfort modern audiences. The fact that the law did not carry a capital charge could be considered lenient. There was clearly a strong connection in the Roman mind between citizenship and immunity from beating, not to mention a powerful desire on the part of the Latins and allies to avoid this treatment. Flogging would thus have made the point strongly that those condemned under the *Lex Licinia Mucia* were not citizens while enabling them to limp home to their former *civitates*. The humiliation for the *principes Italicorum populorum* would have been acute.

This insult might be sufficient to explain Asconius' claim that the law was responsible for the outbreak of the *bellum Italicum*. An even stronger link between the law of 95 and the crisis of 91 can however be found. In 92, a new census was due to be held; new censors, L. Licinius Crassus, consul in 95 and one of the authors of the law, and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, consul in 96 and *pontifex maximus*, were elected. The disagreements between these two are famous,[39] but I would argue that this sniping masks agreement in more important matters. The two of them combined to pass an edict censuring the Latin *rhetors*.[40] This is sometimes interpreted as a continuation of the anti-ally sentiment of the *Lex Licinia Mucia* and Gabba suggests that these rhetors were the focus of Latin agitation at Rome.[41] There is evidence that the censors' objections to these men and their teachings were more deeply founded than this. In the *De Oratore*, Cicero has 'Crassus' justify this measure by saying that the young men were learning nothing but cheekiness from these teachers. He explains that the so-called Latin teachers were offering rhetorical training without the philosophical grounding that the Greek school demanded. While all pupils benefited from the rigorous education that they received in the Greek schools, the students of the Latin teachers merely learned a

38 Cic. *Att.* 5.11.2; Plut. *Caes*. 29.2.
39 Suet. *Nero* 2.2; Val. Max. 9.1.4.
40 Cic. *De Or.* 3.93; Gell. 15.11.2.
41 Gabba (1953, 269).

collection of tricks. This 'short-cut' was offensive to those who believed that oratorical skill should be built on thorough understanding of philosophical principles.[42] 'Crassus' goes so far as to suggest that the youth were rendered duller, not more acute, by this inadequate instruction. As Cicero insists elsewhere in his own voice, training in oratory without attendant development of good character produces dangerous good-for-nothings.[43] Thus, in the serious matter of the education of Rome's future leaders, the censors showed themselves to be in accord.

The new census was the moment at which compliance with the *Lex Licinia Mucia* would be tested. A puzzling piece of evidence from Diodorus Siculus reveals the tensions that the impending census provoked.

> The Marsic leader Pompaedius embarked on a grandiose and fantastic venture. Assembling ten thousand men drawn from the ranks of those who had occasion to fear judicial investigations, he led them to Rome, with swords concealed beneath their garb of peace. It was his intention to surround the senate with armed men and demand the citizenship or, if persuasion failed, to ravage the seat of empire with fire and sword. Encountering Gaius (= Gnaeus) Domitius, who asked him, 'Where are you going, Pompaedius, with so large a band?', he said: 'To Rome, to get citizenship, at the summons of the tribunes.' Domitius retorted that he would obtain the citizenship with less risk and more honourably if he approached the senate in a manner which was not warlike; the senate, he said, was in favour of granting this boon to the allies not under compulsion but by petition.[44]

Mouritsen dismisses this story as "too fantastic to be taken at face value" and argues that it is the product of the paranoid atmosphere in Rome in 91.[45] When we allow, however, that there was much more contact between Rome and some of the allied *principes* than Mouritsen is prepared to admit, this anecdote in fact gives some fascinating insight into the urgent exchanges that were taking place.[46] The 'Gaius Domitius' with whom Silo speaks is usually understood to be Cn. Domitius, the censor.

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[42] Gruen (1990, 190) concludes that this explanation for the edict in the *De Oratore* is correct. Describing Hellenic culture as the new *mos maiorum* is perhaps taking the argument too far: Cicero's Crassus is quite clear that the lack of proper foundation offered by the Latin rhetors was the problem. See Wallace-Hadrill (2008).

[43] Cic. *Inv.* 1.1.

[44] Diod. Sic. 37.13. Trans. Walton, modified.

[45] Mouritsen (1998, 125 n. 51).

[46] Mouritsen (1998, 124–5) argues that the relationship between Drusus and Silo was greatly exaggerated once the war had broken out and Silo had emerged as one of the heads of the anti-Roman league. The famous anecdote of Silo's exchange with Drusus' nephew, the future M. Porcius Cato Utensicus as a stubborn toddler (Plut. *Cat. Min.* 2.1–4; Val. Max.

Of particular significance to this episode is Diodorus' statement that Poppaedius assembled 'those with reason to fear *euthuna*'. *Euthuna*, a public review, might reasonably refer to the process by which the new censors would ensure that the *Lex Licinia Mucia* had been obeyed; that is, that all those who should have re-registered themselves in their home communities had done so and that they did not try to re-enrol at Rome. The threat of investigation would have caused a panic among those Latins and *socii* who had failed to comply with the law but also reminded those who had of the insult that they had suffered. Thus, tensions around the citizenship would have been renewed as the new censors took office. The fact that one of them had sponsored the earlier law can only have increased the fears among the allied communities that they were going to be treated harshly.

The massive reform package proposed in 91 by the tribune M. Livius Drusus with its provisions for granting citizenship to the Italian allies can be placed into the context of the *Lex Licinia Mucia* and the census of 92. In Diodorus' account, Silo claims that he has been summoned to Rome 'by the tribunes' in order to claim the citizenship. This places the incident at any time after the tribunician election for 91, when Drusus was either in office or tribune-elect and moving on the *rogatio de sociis*. Although the appearance of this incident in the extracts from Diodorus makes it seem that Silo just happened to bump into Domitius on his way to Rome, the meeting was probably quite deliberate. Receiving word that Silo was on his way to Rome with a large group of followers either to agitate at a meeting or even to attempt to obtain citizenship by force, the senate sent one of its leading members out to meet him and negotiate. Domitius spoke with the immense *auctoritas* of the *pontifex maximus* and censor. Critically, he was not the sponsor of the offending law, so was better placed to address the allies' fears. Spoken by a censor, Domitius' assurances that the allies' concerns were going to be taken seriously will have carried considerable weight with Silo. Thus he agreed to turn aside from his march and wait peacefully.

3.1.2), indicates, however, a high degree of intimacy and ease between these men: their relationship is better understood as one of *hospitium* going back generations. See for this Patterson and Lomas in this volume.

6. *Conclusion*

As outlined above, despite their personal differences L. Crassus and Cn. Domitius could agree on serious matters. I would argue that the censors were able to agree when it came to the question of enrolling the allies. In the urgent atmosphere that produced Silo's march, they realised that they had to act. While Bauman doubts that Crassus performed a *volte face* on the allied issue, accepting them into the Roman citizenry does not require the massive reversal in policy that is sometimes imagined. Evidence of the crisis brought about by his earlier legislation combined with his personal commitment to *humanitas* will have convinced Crassus that the earlier exclusive attitude was impractical and that it was better to recognise and reward the contribution made to Roman society by the *socii*.[47] He remained committed to the principle behind his earlier law: the allies must receive a formal offer of citizenship from Rome. Once appropriate legislation had been passed, however, he was open to their enrolment. *Humanitas* was highly valued by Crassus and extension of the citizenship to the allies would recognise the valuable services they performed for the Roman state. Thus his particular protégé, the promising Drusus, appears with the necessary proposal. Except, as we know, events did not turn out as Drusus and his sponsors had planned. The Roman plebs, encouraged by the opponents of the great reform, refused to accept the legislation to enfranchise the *socii* and neither Crassus nor Drusus survived 91. In the aftermath of Drusus' assassination, the disappointed *Italici* had recourse to secession and war.

When the census, as the means by which access to the Roman citizenship was ultimately controlled, is given its proper weight in our understanding of the conflicts surrounding the extension of the Roman citizenship, the role of the *Lex Licinia Mucia* in fuelling the resentments that ultimately led to the war becomes clear.

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47 Bauman (1983, 370) questions whether Crassus supported Drusus' franchise proposals.

MEDITERRANEAN TRADE AS A MECHANISM OF INTEGRATION BETWEEN ROMANS AND ITALIANS

Saskia T. Roselaar*

1. *Introduction*

It has long been established that many Italian allies of the Romans—by which I mean those living in Italy, but not possessing Roman citizenship—were active in trade throughout the Mediterranean, from the early third century BC onwards. It stands to reason that Rome would protect her allies while they were trading outside Italy. Although the direct economic benefits of Italian trade were not great for Rome, the economic welfare of her allies was an issue which the Romans had to take seriously. The Italian allies were liable to pay taxes to their respective states, whose political stability therefore depended on their citizens' ability to afford these taxes. Furthermore, the number of soldiers that could be supplied by the allies depended on their economic welfare. Finally, the Romans often used maltreatment of allies for their own political gain: an attack on an ally was an attack on Rome, and had to be answered appropriately.

In this article I review the motivations for Roman support of Italian allies with regard to overseas trade. I will investigate whether such intervention was motivated by Roman ideology, which dictated a duty to assist its allies, or if a more practical motivation can be detected, namely to protect Roman (economic or strategic) interests, by assisting its allies. If such interventions increased in number or scale during the Republican period, this may indicate a growing awareness of the importance of the Italians for the Roman state, and thus an increased level of integration between Rome and the Italians.

2. Bellum Iustum: *The Duty to Protect Allies*

There was a strong tendency in Roman historiography to emphasize the benefits of Roman rule for her allies and subjects. In general, the Roman state felt an obligation to protect its allies. Dionysius of Halicarnassus explains how Roman law benefited them:

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> Every colony of Rome and every city that had joined in alliance and friendship with her and also every city conquered in war had such protectors and patrons among the Romans as they wished. And the senate has often referred the controversies of these cities and nations to their Roman patrons and regarded their decisions binding.[1]

Cicero states:

> Wars were waged in the interest of our allies or to safeguard our supremacy; ... the senate was a haven of refuge for kings, tribes, and nations; and the highest ambition of our magistrates and generals was to defend our provinces and allies with justice and honour. And so our government could be called more accurately a protectorate of the world than a dominion.[2]

The allies were often included in prayers for the wellbeing of the Roman people:

> Gods and goddesses who inhabit sea and lands, I pray and beg you that whatever under my authority has been done, is being done, and will be done, may prosper for me, for the Roman people, for the allies and Latins who by land, by sea, and by rivers follow the lead, authority, and auspices of the Roman people, and of myself; and that you lend your beneficent aid to all these acts and make them successful.[3]

The obligation to provide protection was most tangible when Rome's allies were attacked by an enemy: in such cases Rome often sent military aid to her ally. If allied interests were harmed, this was a reason for a *bellum iustum* by the Romans.[4] In 268, for example, the Senones "settled between the Alps and the Po, and then, not content even with this territory, they began to wander through Italy; finally they besieged the city of Clusium. The Romans intervened on behalf of their allies and confederates; and, according to the usual custom, ambassadors were sent to protest".[5] Usually an embassy was sent out first; if this had no effect, military action was undertaken against the offender.

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[1] DH 2.11.1.

[2] Cic. *Off.* 2.26–7. See also Cic. *Off.* 1.22, 1.35–6; *Rep.* 3.34–5; DH 2.72, 1.5.2; Liv. 9.20.

[3] Liv. 29.27.1–3, a prayer by Scipio Africanus in 204 BC; see also 31.5, 31.7. According to App. *Gall.* 13, the Romans even undertook the protection of any people, without there being an obligation because they were allies: "It was the practice of the Romans to make foreign friends of any people for whom they wanted to intervene on the score of friendship, without being obliged to defend them as allies." However, in such cases Roman interference could easily be perceived as meddling by the people involved, rather than as genuinely welcome assistance.

[4] Albert (1989).

[5] Florus 1.13.6. See Liv. 9.2 for protection of Luceria against a Samnite attack.

From an early period it is clear that economic as well as political motivations could play a role, as when Capua requested Roman aid in 343.

> Many [Senators] realised how the largest and richest city in Italy, with a very productive country near the sea, could become the granary of Rome, and supply every variety of provision. Notwithstanding, however, loyalty to treaties outweighed even these great advantages.... [The Senate answered] 'Therefore we refuse to employ on your behalf against the Samnites arms which would offend the gods sooner than they injured men. We shall, as is just and right, send an embassy to our allies and friends to ask that no hostile violence be offered you.'[6]

This passage shows at the same time that duty towards allies was important and that economic motivations could play a role in Roman external policy. In this case, the economic interests of Rome are presented as having been overshadowed by the pre-existing treaty. In other cases, as we shall see, the economic motive was presented as the most important reason for Rome's assistance. Thus we can see that the Romans were often ready to intervene with military aid when an ally was under threat from a third party. This protection did not limit itself to cases of armed violence, but extended to other kinds of threats.

3. *Economic Motivations for Protection*

In some sources the Romans reacted to threats against their allies that were not military, but could be grouped under the heading 'economic'. Cicero indicates that 'economic' threats were sufficient cause to start a war: "How many wars, and what serious ones, do you think that our ancestors undertook, because Roman citizens were said to have been ill-treated, or Roman vessels detained, or Roman merchants plundered?"[7] Although he refers only to Roman citizens, we shall see that Rome was not averse to assisting its Italian allies for similar reasons. Of course there was no strict boundary between direct military attacks and economic threats; piracy, for example, was directed against trading vessels, and therefore threatened the economic activity of merchants, but it was also carried out with violence, and often incurred a violent reaction from the Romans. In most cases several motivations will have played a role. Nevertheless, it can be

[6] Liv. 7.31. See Rink (1986, 19).
[7] Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.149.

argued that the economy of the Italian allies was an important consideration in the minds of the Romans, and that it is possible to reconstruct an 'economic policy' towards the Italians.

Several wars may have been started, at least partially, with economic considerations in mind. Already in the fourth and early third centuries trade was sometimes mentioned as a motive in declaring war;[8] however, we cannot be sure that the sources are always reliable. However, from the mid-third century economic motivations seem to have played a role in most wars. It has been suggested that one of the motivations for the First Punic War was the threat constituted for Italian trade by growing Carthaginian power. Rome was also allied with several Greek states; if Rome could not protect them, there was the danger that the Greeks might instead ask Carthage for help in preserving the trade they carried out with Sicily and southern Italy.[9] Appian even suggests that the war was started mainly for economic reasons: "The Carthaginians ... ceded Sardinia to the Romans as compensation for injuries they had inflicted upon Roman merchants during this war."[10] Thus, both economic and political motivations were at play: the capability of Rome to protect the trade of her allies at the same time increased its political prestige among the allies.

The fear of Italian merchants for Carthaginian power was not unfounded; even after the war Carthaginians still harassed Italian merchants, e.g. in 238:

> The Carthaginians, when they captured at sea traders coming from Italy to Libya with supplies for the enemy, brought them into Carthage, and there were now in their prisons as many as five hundred such. The Romans were annoyed at this, but when, on sending an embassy, they recovered all the prisoners by diplomatic means, they were so much gratified, that in return they gave back to the Carthaginians all the remaining prisoners from the Sicilian war and henceforth gave prompt and friendly attention to all their requests. They gave permission to their merchants to export all requirements for Carthage, but not for the enemy.[11]

[8] Diod. 16.5.3 (359/8); Liv. 10.2.4 (302); Plu. *Pyrr.* 9.2 (290–87), 15.2; Paus. 1.12.1, 4.35.5–7. See Marasco (1986, 77–9, 86).

[9] Thiel (1954, 132).

[10] App. *Hisp.* 1.4. Zonar. 8.18 states that the Romans "secured Sardinia from the Carthaginians ... by charging them with injuring Roman shipping".

[11] Pol. 1.83.7–10, see 3.28.3. App. *Lib.* 5 calls the traders 'Romans'. See Val. Max. 5.1.1a; Eutr. 2.27. Gruen (1984, 310 n. 115) argues that these merchants were probably Italians; see Càssola (1962, 51–2). Derow (2003, 53) suggests that the merchants were from the "coastal colonies of Italy", of which Latin Brundisium was one.

In this case the Romans were ready to defend the interests of their Italian allies; first, by freeing the prisoners; and then by allowing them to continue to trade with Carthage, as long as they did not trade with those directly fighting Rome.[12] It therefore seems that during the whole episode they were anxious to put Italian economic interests first: they could easily have forbidden the Italians to trade with Carthage, but judged that this would have had negative consequences for local Italian economy.

A much debated example is the First Illyrian War which started in 229. Polybius emphasizes the Illyrian attacks on Italian merchants as a cause for the war:

> To return to the Illyrians. For a long time previously they had been in the habit of maltreating vessels sailing from Italy, and now while they were at Phoenice, a number of them detached themselves from the fleet and robbed or killed many Italian traders, capturing and carrying off no small number of prisoners. The Romans had hitherto turned a deaf ear to the complaints made against the Illyrians, but now when a number of persons approached the Senate on the subject, they appointed two envoys, C. and L. Coruncanius, to proceed to Illyria, and investigate the matter.[13]

Cassius Dio specifies that these merchants came from Brundisium:

> When the Issaeans had attached themselves to the Romans, the latter, desiring to show them some prompt and ready favour in return, so as to get the reputation of aiding such as joined their cause, and also to punish the Ardiaeans, who were annoying those who sailed from Brundisium, sent envoys to Agron.[14]

As Brundisians, they may have been Roman citizens, Latin colonists, or Italian allies from the cities in southern Italy. Even though, apart from Polybius and Dio, our sources do not emphasize the role of the Italians in this affair, the fact that Issa was involved is important: much trade was carried out between Issa and Italian cities in the third century and from Issa further into the East.[15]

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12 Vollmer (1990, 50).

13 Pol. 2.8.1–3. See Zoumbaki (1998, 112); De Souza (1999, 76–80); Eckstein (2008, 33).

14 Dio fr. 12.49.2. App. *Ill.* 7 does not mention traders, but only says that Issa asked for Roman aid. Apparently Sicilian interests were involved as well, since the Romans later dedicated spoils from the war in the temple of Zeus at Syracuse; Liv. 24.21.9; see Eckstein (2008, 33–4).

15 Walser (1954, 316); Hammond (1967, 590); Petzold (1971, 218–19); Derow (1973, 125–6). See Marasco (1986, 39–44); Vollmer (1990, 23–4) for trade carried out by Romans and Italians in the fourth and third centuries BC.

The importance of the Italian merchants' request in the outbreak of the war has been debated. Some scholars argue that the sufferings of the Italian merchants were not sufficient to call the Roman Senate into action; Polybius indeed states that Italian demands had long been ignored. Dio suggests that the Romans only took action when Issa requested this. In that case the intervention was based more on worries about the growth of Illyrian power than economic motivations.[16] It cannot be denied that there was a clear political message to the Roman intervention: Polybius shows that by protecting her allies, Rome would also "get the reputation of aiding such as joined their cause". He emphasizes that "the Illyrians were not then the enemies of this people or that, but the common enemies of all",[17] so that by their actions the Romans had served everybody's interests. Clearly, the Roman aim was to show that it was now the main power in the Adriatic.

Nevertheless, economic considerations did play a role; Polybius describes how the Illyrians captured Phoenice, which was close to Corcyra, an important harbour for Italian trade.[18] Furthermore, the fact that Polybius presented the complaints by the Italian merchants as a valid cause for Roman intervention shows that he wanted to present the economic welfare of its allies as a legitimate reason for intervention by the Roman state. In his further account of the war the Italians do not play any role; however, the war ended with a treaty, in which the Illyrian queen Teuta agreed to sail south of Lissus with not more than two, and unarmed, ships.[19] This was a clear attempt to keep the sea free from pirates, since it would give merchants a safe corridor to sail from Italy to the east.[20]

Other wars too seem to have been motivated, at least partially, by economic considerations. In 221 BC, for example, "war was made upon the Istrians, because they had plundered some ships of the Romans, which were bringing a supply of corn, and they were entirely subdued".[21] It

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[16] Badian (1952, 75); Walser (1954, 311); Derow (1973, 128); Vollmer (1990, 49–50, 79); Pohl (1993, 69–70, 81–2); Dzino (2010, 49). Marasco (1986, 73–81) points out that Illyrian piracy existed since the fourth century BC, but that it had been kept under control by the kingdom of Epirus. It was only after the fall of this kingdom in 233–2 that the Illyrians became a serious threat to trade in the Adriatic Sea.

[17] Pol. 2.12.5–6.

[18] Pol. 2.5.6–8. See Oost (1954, 10–11).

[19] Pol. 2.12.3.

[20] Petzold (1971, 210–13); Vollmer (1990, 79); Eckstein (2008, 52). Musti (1978) argues that economic reasons are not the main focus of Polybius' narrative, although they were important in Roman policy.

[21] Eutr. 3.7. See App. *Ill.* 8; Liv. 21.16.4; Oros. 4.13.16, Zonar. 8.20.

may be that these ships were near Istria to supply the Roman armies fighting against the Gauls in Cisalpina,[22] but it is also possible that they were exporting grain from Cisalpina to Greece.[23] It is not clear that they belonged to allies as well as Romans. However, if the ships were destined for Cisalpine Gaul, the grain would have come from further south along the Adriatic coast, where most people were allies of Rome. If they sailed from Gaul to Greece, they would have been owned by Veneti or Cenomani, who were allies of Rome.[24]

In 190 BC "the praetor despatched two vessels belonging to the Italian allies and two Rhodian ships . . . to the Strait of Cephallenia. This sea was infested by pirates . . . and supplies from Italy were cut off".[25] In this case the action against the pirates was undertaken by the allies of the Romans, both Italians and Greeks, although at the command of the Roman praetor. Usually, however, the Romans were more actively involved in actions against pirates. In 182 they acted at the request of Latin and extra-Italian allies: "Duronius was also to command in Histria, because news was received from Tarentum and Brundisium that the fields on the coast were being plundered by pirates from overseas. The same complaint was made by Massilia about the ships of the Ligurians."[26] He discovered that the Illyrian king Gentius had abducted Roman and Latin merchants: "Duronius further stated that injuries had been inflicted on many Roman citizens and Latin allies in his dominions, and it was reported that Roman citizens were being detained in Corcyra."[27] In this case the victims of piracy on the Adriatic are reported to have been only Roman citizens and Latin allies (*civibus Romanis et sociis Latini nominis*); however, it is unlikely that there were no Italian merchants involved, since they are known to have been active in trade across the Adriatic.

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22 Dell (1970, 34).

23 Marasco (1986, 44–64, 96–7). He also points out (pp. 61–4) the importance of other export products from Italy to Greece, see Athen. 5.109a, 3.116c; DH 20.15.1–2; Cic. *Brut.* 22.85, Pol. 23.9.12, 23.17.3.

24 Dell 1970, 34–6; Marasco (1986, 58). The wars against the Ligurians which started in this period may also have had the aim of securing trade routes between Massilia and Italy, and to secure harbours en route, which would have been especially beneficial for the Italian allies; see Thiel (1954, 343, 350–1); Marasco (1986, 71–2, 97).

25 Liv. 37.13.11–14.1. See Marasco (1986, 45); De Souza (1999, 88–90).

26 Liv. 40.18. See De Souza (1999, 92). In 178 the *duumviri navales* again took action to patrol the Adriatic Sea, see Liv. 41.1.

27 Liv. 40.42.4–5. See Wilson (1966, 91–2).

Although, in many cases, the Roman intention to assist Italians, or other allies, played a role, there are also some cases where the Romans refused to help. In 189

> Cydonia was at war with Gortynia and Gnossus, and it was reported that a large number of Roman and Italian prisoners were kept in slavery all over the island. Fabius . . . sent messengers to the various cities requiring them to lay down their arms, search out all the prisoners in their towns and villages and bring them in. . . . The Cretans took no notice of these orders and . . . no city restored the prisoners.[28]

The Roman state, however, did not resort to arms to free its own citizens or its allies. There were likely many more cases of enslavement of Romans and Italians, as is attested by the presence of slaves of Roman and Italian descent at Delos. Among these are Romans, but also Samnites, Lucanians, Messapians, Bruttians, and 'Italians'.[29] It is possible that these people were the victims of piracy. The Roman state did not attempt to free them or to stop trade in people of Roman and Italian descent, apart from general attempts to limit piracy. Of course, it would be hard to keep track of people who had been enslaved and harder for such people to bring their fate to the attention of Rome in the first place.

Notwithstanding the Roman efforts, piracy proved to be impossible to eradicate. In the later second century action was undertaken against the inhabitants of the Balearic Islands: "But merely because a few criminals among them had formed partnerships with the pirates of the high seas, they were all cast into disrepute, and a sea expedition was made against them by Metellus, surnamed Balearicus."[30] This period saw an increase in shipping between Italy and southern Gaul, so it was necessary to keep the seas safe for trading.[31] Several treaties of the late second and early first century BC show a concern with the Romans to safeguard the allies from the actions of pirates. The *lex de provinciis praetoriis* (100 BC) states:

> The Roman people <will have> care that the citizens of Rome and the allies and the Latins, and those of the foreign nations who are in a relationship of friendship with the Roman people, may sail in safety, and on that

[28] Liv. 37.60.2–5. See Vollmer (1990, 23–4). He adds the example of the prisoners taken by Hannibal after the battle of Cannae, and states that these were Italians which the Romans refused to buy back; however, Liv. 22.58–61 does not mention Italians, only Romans.

[29] SGDI II. 1800, 1960, 1985, 2000, 2042–3, 2045, 2116, 2227; IG XII, 1.517 (from Rhodes), all dating from the early second century BC. See Vollmer (1990, 24).

[30] Strab. 3.5.1. See Liv. *Per.* 60.9; Florus 1.43.1–3; Oros. 5.13.1.

[31] De Souza (1999, 92–6).

> account and according to this statute they have made Cilicia a praetorian province.[32]

The Greek text is not entirely clear as to who are intended with the phrase σύμμαχοι, ὀνόματος Λατίνου, ὁμοίως τε τῶν ἐθνῶν οἵτινες ἐν φιλίαι τοῦ δήμου Ῥομαίων εἰσιν; σύμμαχοι ὀνόματος Λατίνου seems a translation of the phrase *sociis nominis Latini*. However, since all others in the friendship of the Roman people are also mentioned, it seems more likely that this law was to benefit all groups who were allied to Rome.[33]

Around the same time the Numidian War broke out, for which one of the immediate causes was the murder by Jugurtha of Italian traders in the town of Cirta:

> When this was reported at Cirta, the Italiotes, on whose valour the defence of the town depended, were confident that in the event of surrender they would escape injury because of the prestige of Rome. They therefore advised Adherbal to deliver himself and the town to Jugurtha, stipulating merely that his life should be spared and leaving the rest to the senate. But Adherbal, though he thought that anything was better than trusting Jugurtha, yet because the Italiotes were in a position to use compulsion if he opposed them, surrendered on the terms which they had advised. Thereupon Jugurtha first tortured Adherbal to death and then made an indiscriminate massacre of all the adult Numidians and of traders whom he found with arms in their hands.[34]

This passage shows a number of important points: firstly, the position of the Italians, who were able to compel Adherbal to surrender, and furthermore their trust in the "prestige of Rome", believing that this would be sufficient to protect them. On the other hand, in Sallust's account the murder of Adherbal seems more important than the death of the Italians. Secondly, the Senate is described as acting on the instigation of the Roman people, rather than that of the Italians; the Senate only acted "when [it] from consciousness of guilt began to fear the people".[35] Nevertheless, the

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32 Cnidos copy, col. II, l. 7–11; col. III, l. 29–35 = SEG 3.378. See Ferrary (1977); Morstein-Marx (1995, 227–39) (who confusingly calls this law *lex de Cilicia Macedoniaque provinciis*, and on p. 133 refers to the *lex Cnidia* as if this is a different law); Crawford et al. (1996); De Souza (1999, 108–15).

33 Crawford et al. (1996, 259). Sherwin-White (1984, 98) thinks this refers only to Latins and Italian allies, but there is no reason to assume that allies outside Italy were excluded, see Ferrary (2002, 135).

34 Sall. *Iug*. 26.1–27.3.

35 Morstein-Marx (2000, 472–6). Schneider (1989, 224) argues that the number of Italian settlers and traders in Cirta was small, and that Sallust exaggerated the importance of this episode.

fact that Sallust mentions the Italian merchants shows, firstly, that it was considered normal for them to be there and, secondly, that the attack against them was a factor in the outbreak of the war.

It is clear that Rome's actions to assist Roman, Latin and/or Italian merchants often resulted from requests for help from Rome's Italian or overseas allies. Trade outside Italy became increasingly important for many Italians in the late third and second centuries. Therefore, if Rome was really concerned about the economic situation of her Italian allies, it would make sense that she was concerned about piracy and other 'economic' threats.

The question arises whether the Romans were themselves concerned about the welfare of their allies, or whether their interventions were undertaken only in reaction to requests. In general, the policy of the Roman state was reactionary, as in the case of requests to return emigrated allies to their home towns in 187 and 177.[36] In the cases we have seen so far, the Roman state seems not to have acted until it was notified by the allies that something had happened. Some scholars have therefore argued that the fate of the allies only played a minimal role in the decisions of the Senate. Harris states:

> The wish to defend Italian merchants or to help Italian economic interests in other ways contributed little or nothing to the causes of most Roman wars.... What [the Italians] wanted from Rome was not that the Senate should start wars on their behalf... but the protection provided by the distant and rarely used threat of Roman intervention, and the assistance of Roman officials in the local affairs of the provinces and client-states.[37]

However, Harris' "threat of Roman intervention" includes the possibility of armed intervention; if the Romans had never employed this tactic, then the threat would have been void.

It has been argued, furthermore, that the Romans expended remarkably little effort to contain the pirate threat.[38] It was not until 102 that Rome took direct action against them, but even then, the results were unimpressive. Only in 67, with Pompey's command, did Rome take decisive

[36] Liv. 39.3.4–6, 41.8.6–12, 41.9.9–12, 42.10.3.

[37] Harris (1984, 101). See Gruen (1984, 310): "The political implication of maintaining a hold on the Italian 'confederacy', rather than direct economic advantage, prevailed in those decisions".

[38] Morstein-Marx (1995, 306): "abiding indifference only rarely punctuated by significant responses", but cf. pp. 229–30, 235. See Hammond (1968, 20); Pohl (1993, 69); Lampela (1998, 211–12); Ferrary (2002, 134).

action, but this was most likely motivated by threats to Rome's grain supply, rather than by the sufferings of Rome's allies.[39] On the other hand, this judgment seems unfair; we cannot expect that the Romans would have been able to mount a large-scale attempt at any time before the first century. They did try several times to end pirate threats, but simply failed.[40]

In many cases, there does not seem to have been a need for an official request for help from the allies; the simple fact that they were attacked was considered sufficient reason, for the Roman state, to initiate a violent response. For example, when, in 238, the Carthaginians captured Italian traders "the Romans were annoyed at this" and sent an embassy. In the case of Jugurtha's murder of Italians, Sallust simply says: "when this outrage became known at Rome and the matter was brought up for discussion in the senate", without referring to any request for help by allies. It seems, therefore, that the Senate did take the interests of the allies to heart, and that it was not completely reactionary in its actions to protect Italian interests.

The first serious attempt to stop pirate attacks was undertaken in 102 BC, when Roman and Italian trade in the East was at an unprecedented level. The two developments are likely connected; this would mean that commercial interests did play an important role in the formulation of policy in the Senate.[41] In short, we may conclude that the Roman state, in many cases, did take the interests of its Italian allies seriously, and that an attack on them could be used as a valid reason for armed conflict, even without an official request by the allies. However, the abilities of the Roman state to interfere effectively were limited.

4. *Intervention in the Economic Situation of Allies*

Roman intervention did not limit itself to armed violence. Rome could use economic measures to reward or punish its allies, and in this way played an important role in their economic development. A clear example for intervention in the economy of a non-Italian ally is Rhodes, one of the major trade hubs in the eastern Mediterranean. It suffered a serious

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39 Morstein-Marx (1995, 231–2, 306–11).
40 Càssola (1962, 33–4).
41 Gabba (1976, 83).

decline in its economic welfare after the Third Macedonian War (172–168 BC), in which Rhodes had given only half-hearted support to the Romans. Rhodes lost its territory on the mainland, from where it had enjoyed large revenues, and suffered from the fact that the Romans turned Delos into a tax-free harbour.[42] Rhodian ambassadors to Rome emphasized the economic setbacks the island had suffered through the Roman intervention: "While the harbour-dues in former times were farmed for a million drachmae, they now fetch only a hundred and fifty thousand, so that your displeasure has only too heavily visited the vital resources of the state."[43]

The Romans' decision to turn Delos into a tax-free harbour had astonishing effects on its economy.[44] Delos now became the central trading port for the eastern Mediterranean, and most goods passed through this harbour. Some scholars argue that this decision was taken with a special view to the interests of Italian traders, who would benefit from lower prices and a secure supply of goods, especially slaves.[45] A similar argument has been made with regard to the destruction of Corinth in 146, which again is supposed to have benefited Delos, and thereby the Italian and Roman merchants who traded there.[46] On the other hand, the sources never state that the economic benefits for Romans and allies were a consideration. Some scholars have therefore argued that the economic benefits of this decision, although they might have been foreseen by the Roman state, were not specifically meant to aid Romans or Italians. The main aim was political, namely to punish Rhodes.[47] However, Romans and Italians did benefit from these measures, and it is unlikely that the Roman Senate would have taken such a decision while being completely unaware of its economic consequences. Economic and political motivations went hand-in-hand in this case.

Even if the decision to make Delos a tax-free harbour was not specifically meant to benefit the Italians, they were undoubtedly the group who benefited most from this arrangement. A large number of inscriptions recording the presence of people from Italy have been discovered on the

[42] See the analysis of Rome's motivations in Gruen (1975); Wilson (1966, 100–5) for Delos' economic prosperity.

[43] Pol. 30.20.7–9, 30.31.6–12, 16–18. See Rauh (2003, 73–5), who emphasizes that trade was still carried out at Rhodes after 167, but on a smaller scale.

[44] Strabo 14.5.2. See Rauh (2003, 54–65) for a description of Roman Delos.

[45] Càssola (1962, 62–3); Gruen (1975, 80); Pohl (1993, 136).

[46] Schmitt (1957, 166 n. 3).

[47] Hatzfeld (1912, 374); Wilson (1966, 102); Gruen (1984, 299, 311–12); Rink (1986, 21).

island. This is not the place to go into much detail concerning the ethnic background of Italian traders on Delos, and in the East in general, but it is clear that many of them were from southern Italy and the Oscan-speaking areas. In Hatzfeld's seminal study, he claimed that most Italians recorded on Delos came from southern Italy, and were, therefore, not Roman citizens.[48] Others have argued against this, and claimed instead that most Italians on Delos came from central Italy, especially Rome and Latium, and that they were, therefore, citizens.[49]

However, many of the names attested on inscriptions from the East are also known from inscriptions in Oscan and other non-Latin languages spoken in Italy. These names are attested not only after 167, but from the early third century onwards. For example, the Staii are reported on Delos already in the last quarter of the third century.[50] Amphora stamps record trade carried out by Dazos Daziskou Auzantinos, clearly an Apulian name.[51] After 167 a large increase occurred in the Oscan *gentilicia* on Delos, such as the Audii, Granii, Offillii, Oppii, and Steii.[52] On the Agora of the Italians, built *c.* 110 BC, various Oscan names appear, such as the Aufidii, Novii, Paconii, and Sehii, as well as the Apulian Tutorii.[53] Some Italians mention their place of origin, including Naples, Cumae, Velia, Petelia, Heraclea, Locri, Tarentum, Azetium, Canusium, Ancona, and Fregellae.[54] Such people did not limit their activities to Delos only: a third-century amphora stamp from a man named Trebius Loisius appears in Elis.[55] Inscriptions from Rhodes record Italian settlers of Bruttian origin.[56] The examples are endless, attesting to the wide spread of Italians from an Oscan or southern Italian background, all over the Eastern Mediterranean, from the early third century onwards.

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48 Hatzfeld (1912); Gabba (1976, 85); Bresson (2002) for Rhodes.

49 Wilson (1966, 87–8, 108–10), who argues that Romans, Latins, and Campanians were dominant; Càssola (1970–1, 317), although his figures do not support this statement outright; Cébeillac-Gervasoni (1998, 177–8, 189; 2002, 23–4); Rizakis (2002, 112, 125).

50 Hatzfeld (1912, 102). These names, as well as those below, appear in Oscan inscriptions, as recorded in Rix (2002), indicating that these people were of non-Roman descent. For Messapian names see Parlangeli (1960).

51 Hatzfeld (1912, 102, 144); *BCH*, 8. p. 120, nos 4–5; Silvestrini (1990, 257–9).

52 Hatzfeld (1912, 108). Audii: 129 n. 6, 159–60, no. 8; Zoumbaki (1998, 155).

53 Hatzfeld (1912, 115); Lamboley (1996, 388); Silvestrini (1990, 259–60).

54 Hatzfeld (1912, 130). He argues (p. 131) that many people were from Puteoli, but the names he mentions as evidence are not specifically Puteolan.

55 Hatzfeld *BCH* 8, p. 94, n. 2; p. 142; CIL 10.8051; *IDelos* 1408A. See Zoumbaki (1998, 155). It is found on amphora stamps in Sicily, Southern Italy, Carthage, and elsewhere.

56 Lomas (1995, 482).

Of course, trade links between Italians and the Eastern Mediterranean had already existed before the conquest of Italy by the Romans. Such links were not severed by the conquest;[57] it would make sense, instead, that the Romans would leave such links intact, either to promote the economic welfare of their allies, or to make use themselves of the opportunities created by the Italian experience in trade. This is especially likely in the case of Brundisium. Zonaras described how the Romans took economic motivations into consideration when they conquered this town in 267:

> Next [the Romans] made an expedition into the district now called Calabria. Their excuse was that the people had received Pyrrhus and were overrunning their allied territory, but in reality they wished to get possession of Brundisium; for the place had a fine harbour, and for the traffic with Illyricum and Greece there was an approach and landing-place of such a character that vessels would sometimes come to land and put out to sea wafted by the same wind. They captured it, and sent colonists both to this point and to others as well.[58]

I have argued elsewhere that the local elites of Brundisium continued to play an important role in local government after the conquest and the settlement of a colony here in 247–4.[59] The town served as the main transport harbour for goods from its Apulian hinterland.[60] However, the foundation of Brundisium as a colony, and its role as the main export harbour of Italy, directly influenced the economic situation of Tarentum, which had previously held that position: "From the extremity of Iapygia, as far as Sipontum, everyone coming from the opposite coast to put in to an Italian harbour crossed to Tarentum and used that as an emporium for the exchange and sale of merchandise, the town of Brundisium having not yet been founded."[61] Thus Brundisium's foundation interfered with the economic development of Tarentum, even if this was not a Roman aim in itself.

In most cases, therefore, the wish to improve the economic situation of the allies, or to share with them economic benefits, is not directly stated in the sources as a motivation for Roman expansionist policy. Any benefits seem to have been a side effect from decisions made on political

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[57] Yntema (1995, 388).

[58] Zon. 8.7. Brundisium prospered as a harbour town in the second century, see Pol. 10.1.9.

[59] Roselaar (2011).

[60] Varro 2.6.5; Strab. 6.3.7–9. See Marasco (1986, 44–64); Manacorda (1994, 83–4); Yntema (1995, 403); Silvestrini (1998, 83).

[61] Pol. 10.1.5–9.

grounds. Sometimes, however, Rome's allies were the express beneficiaries of the economic policy of Rome. For example, when making treaties with defeated enemies, which resulted in tax exemptions for the Romans, Latins and/or Italians were sometimes included as beneficiaries of such measures, as in a *Senatus consultum* of 187 BC: "The Ambracians should have all their property restored to them; they should be free to live under their own laws; they should impose such harbour dues and other imposts by land and sea as they desired, provided that the Romans *and their Latin allies* were exempt."[62] In this case, the benefits were only valid for Latins,[63] but in other cases Italians benefited as well.

However, the system of alliances which the Romans created—a small group of Roman citizens, tied to a much larger group of allies, who were disadvantaged in their dealings with Romans, but profited from their association with Rome in the outside world—only worked as long as the benefits the allies drew from it outweighed the disadvantages of being subject to Rome. Momigliano therefore argued that "the *motive force* behind Rome's unending wars in the third and second centuries BC was the necessity of keeping the Italian allies busy, the claim being that they could not have been expected to remain loyal if they had not been given very regular opportunities to acquire glory and plunder and the economic benefits of overseas conquest".[64] The allies therefore played an important role in Rome's economic policy.[65] This was, as Càssola argues, "aperta e intelligente", because "l'arrichimento degli alleati era vantaggioso anche per Roma e per gli uomini d'affari romani".[66]

On the other hand, Harris argues that the actual benefits for allied states were small; they did not receive part of the booty or indemnities paid by defeated states, or of provincial taxation, and they continued to

[62] Liv. 38.44.3: *In libertate essent ac legibus suis uterentur; portoria, quae vellent, terra marique caperent, dum eorum immunes Romani ac socii nominis Latini essent*. See Wilson (1966, 91); Càssola (1962, 63); Zoumbaki (1998, 151). Gruen (1984, 310–11) argues that this was motivated by internal political strife between M. Fulvius Nobilior and M. Lepidus.

[63] Wilson (1966, 92) argues that the Latins were usually considered equal to Romans by the Roman state: "As the Senate acted, if spasmodically, to protect Roman traders, so it acted for Latins, and they were probably regarded by provincials in much the same light as Romans." However, for provincials the distinction between Latins and other allies was not important; the term Rhomaioi, attested in the Greek East, included Romans, Latins, and Italians, see Bleicken (1990, 113–20).

[64] Momigliano (1975, 46), paraphrased in Harris (1984, 91).

[65] *Contra* Badian (1952, 73–5).

[66] Càssola (1962, 63–4 (quote p. 64), 70–1).

pay *tributum*. Only the individual soldiers received booty.[67] However, even though the direct benefits of Roman conquest did not accrue to the Italians, they undoubtedly profited from their association with Rome. Most areas in Italy show unprecedented economic prosperity in the second century. Many individual Italian allies were active in overseas trade. This meant that local elites became wealthier and invested their wealth in public building projects on a scale never before seen.[68] It was not only the elite who benefited from this; even small towns show more prosperity in the third and second centuries. In Gravina, for example, third-century coins from Bithynia have been found, showing that Italians profited from overseas trade.[69] Fine wares from the small settlement of Valesio, in the territory of Brundisium, show that even small villages had access to imported fine wares.[70]

It was a common approach of the Romans to win the support of local elites by safeguarding their economic wellbeing. This is evident, for example, in a letter of T. Quinctius Flamininus to the Chyretienses of 197–4 BC, where he states that "all landed property and buildings belonging to the public domain of the Roman state which are still in its possession we give to your city, so that in this too you may learn our character and the fact that we are determined to seek absolutely no financial profit".[71] Thus, the Romans aimed to be viewed as the *patroni* of the local elites.[72] These elites valued their local autonomy, but also knew that, if the need arose, they could approach the Romans for help, for example in disputes between two independent states.

Allies clearly viewed the Romans as the supreme authority and assumed that by referring to them, they would receive a fair judgement. The choice of law court was not an automatic right for all allies: in the *Senatus Consultum de Asclepiade*, Asklepios and his associates are expressly granted the right to choose which court they want to use: the local, the Roman, or those of independent cities.[73] However, many allied towns and individuals

67 Liv. 41.13.8. See Harris (1984, 97, 100); Patterson (2006c, 610).
68 Càssola (1970–1, 318); Harris (1984), Wallace-Hadrill (2007, 84–5, 448).
69 Small (1992, 15).
70 Yntema (1995).
71 IG 9.2.338 = SIG^3.593 = RDGE, no. 33.
72 Sherk (1969, 213).
73 SC de Asclepiade ll.17–20 (CIL 1^2.588 = IGGR 1.118 = ROL 4.444–51 = RDGE, no. 22).

approached the Roman Senate, or individual magistrates, for decisions.[74] Although the Romans did not actively regulate how lawsuits between allies, rather than involving Romans or Latins, were settled, they were clearly willing to mediate when approached by allies.

It is clear, therefore, that in the late Republic it became generally accepted that Rome was the central power in the Mediterranean, and that many allies valued the possibility of approaching an 'independent' adjudicator, which could make decisions that were considered binding by all parties. However, as in other cases we have seen, it is clear that Rome acted only on the request of its allies. Rome only took direct action when its strategic interests were involved, as in the decision to make Delos a tax-free port.

6. *Conclusion*

It is clear that the Romans did have the interests of the allies in mind in formulating their foreign policy. The word policy may be too strong, since the Romans were mostly reactionary in their defence of their own and their allies' economic interests. However, this was a general characteristic of Roman rule. Rome's policy was mostly reactionary: it only acted when requested to do so by its allies. Only when Rome's strategic interests were directly involved did Rome take action without a request. In such cases, it was clearly happy to use attacks on its allies as a pretext for military action. An 'economic' attack on an ally was a legitimate excuse to start a war against the offending party, showing that it was part of Roman ideology to defend their allies, not only in a military, but also in an economic sense.

The Italians are not always defined as a specific group; they are sometimes grouped with all other allies. They do not always enjoy the same benefits as the Latins, as in the decision concerning Ambracia. However, of course, they benefited indirectly from actions against piracy and the creation of a free port at Delos. In the later second century the ideology of the Romans more clearly included all allies, as is clear from the

[74] A number of inscriptions from Delos honour Roman magistrates who had ruled favourably. See Càssola (1970–1, 312–3); Ferrary (2002, 135–6, 141); Rauh (1993); Morstein Kallet-Marx (1995, 161–77).

lex de provinciis praetoriis. This law shows a developing ideology of empire, which continued to grow in the first century BC.

The increasing importance of all allies in Roman economic and foreign policy was conducive to integration in a general sense. It was clear that allies of Rome enjoyed considerable benefits, not only in direct protection by the Roman army, but also in increased opportunities for material gain and in ready access to the Roman legal system. Thus, they were encouraged to remain loyal, and to exert themselves to maintain and increase Roman rule. The allies benefited enormously from their association with the Roman state, as is clear from the economic prosperity of many Italian towns. This, in turn, led to increased social relationships between Roman and Italian elites throughout the second century BC. However, in the late second century, the allies became increasingly dissatisfied with their legal position as non-citizens in the Roman state, which eventually led to their demand for citizenship. It is clearly not a coincidence that these demands grew ever stronger exactly at the time that Italian allies played a crucial role in Rome's overseas economy.[75]

[75] Gabba (1954).

OUTPOSTS OF INTEGRATION? GARRISONING, LOGISTICS AND ARCHAEOLOGY IN NORTH-EASTERN HISPANIA, 133–82 BC

Toni Ñaco del Hoyo & Jordi Principal*

1. *Introduction*

The history of the Roman presence in the Iberian Peninsula, from its first arrival in the North-East in 218 to Numantia's fall in 133 and further beyond, is closely connected to the long-term history of its armed forces, their actions, and collateral damage.[1] According to our historical record, periods of intense warfare were followed by others of lesser violence, depending on the irregular outcomes of a war which was never expected to last that long. For decades the Republic made extraordinary efforts to keep its armies fully functional, disregarding strains on internal composition and logistical needs, and pressured by a war economy, which considered natives to be only spoils of war, and objects of auxiliary recruitment when necessary. Throughout this period, the early pacified regions of Hispania Citerior, and particularly the North-East coast and its hinterland, were garrisoned, primarily as a response to logistical and defensive strategies, but also in order to integrate local populations into the 'new Roman order', as allies and subjects.[2]

As recently stated, such garrisons were not just controlling the defeated natives; they were also very important for the security of Roman supply lines. As a matter of fact, the Roman bases in the North-East did this very efficiently, and, furthermore, played a key role in organising the occasional wintering of the regular armies, as well as channelling new recruits and supplies towards the inland fronts, particularly during major military operations.[3] Then, from Numantia's fall to the beginning of the Sertorian Wars in 82, a gap in the literary evidence clouds our view on the actual Roman military policy in Hispania, except for isolated reports on fights against first Lusitanians and then Celtiberians. This paper intends to

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[1] See recently: Morillo (ed.) (2003); Morillo et al. (eds.) (2003); Morillo et al. (eds.) (2009, esp. vol. 1, 239–561 and vol. 2, 563–692); Cadiou (2008); Cadiou et al. (eds.) (2008).

[2] Le Roux (2006, 126–30).

[3] Cadiou (2008, 279–361).

shed new light on this little-known period, using a much broader historical approach and the analysis of two North-East sites. It may come as no surprise that it constituted a historical crossroads, not only for Roman military intervention in the Far West, but also in the history of the Late Republican expansion over the Mediterranean.[4]

2. *Military Archaeology: Two Case Studies from North-Eastern Hispania*

We present two study cases: El Camp de les Lloses (Tona, Barcelona), apparently a Roman Republican *vicus*, and Monteró (Camarasa, Lleida), a Roman Republican *castellum*. Both of these were located in North-Eastern Citerior, present-day Catalonia (fig. 1).

According to the preliminary research accounts, resulting from several archaeological campaigns and a new interpretation of the remaining historical sources for this period, both sites might have been used as outposts of the Roman army, with logistical, defensive, and, perhaps, recruitment functions. Their morphology, limited chronological lifetime, and varied material culture all offer interesting insights into the integration of Romans, Italians, and natives in the military context of Hispania Citerior for the last years of the second century and the first decade of the following one.

2.1. *El Camp de les Lloses*

The site is situated in the municipality of Tona (Barcelona province) on the Southern Vic Plain, on a natural and strategic crossroads that controls the communications from inner Catalonia to the coast. It consists of a cluster of three different buildings (buildings A, B, and C), dated 125–75, which follow the typical Italian architectural pattern for *atrium* houses,[5] clearly an *atrium testudinatum* type in our case (fig. 2).

From a functional point of view, building B would appear to be domestic in purpose, whilst building A seems to combine both domestic and manufacturing activities, a conclusion based on the definite identification of a metalworking area in the front part of the house. As for building D,

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[4] Ñaco (2006, 149–67); Arrayás Morales (2007, 49–50); Belarte, Olmos & Principal (2010).

[5] Robertson (1943, 302–6); Gros (2001, 30–8, 82–4).



Figure 1. The North-East Iberian Peninsula with location of the case study sites.



Figure 2. El Camp de les Lloses (schematic plan).

the excavated area should correspond to the rear part of a house, a *hortus*.

The metalworking area in building A consists of three metallurgic workshops, which operated contemporaneously. The first one, located in room 3, was devoted to the working of iron; it was a sort of forge, where several kinds of instruments and tools, mostly related to woodwork, were created and repaired, such as nails, knives, scissors, weapons, and a cart wheel. The workshops in rooms 8 and 20 were devoted to bronze working; a great deal of broken or useless bronze items, e.g. pieces of furniture, vessels, domestic objects, and even sculptures, some of them high quality Italic pieces (fig. 3a), were collected and stored here, recycled, and transformed into small nails (fig. 3b). The manufacture of these nails was the main productive activity of these workshops.

Building B must have been a proper house with domestic and public areas. Several objects belonging to a conspicuous *lararium* were found near a wall niche (including a portable *arula*, fig. 3c) in room 11; a great number of tableware vessels, various game pieces, and a small writing seal (fig. 3d), indicating some type of administrative work, were also discovered in this building.

The presence of coins is also worth noticing: more than 150 have been discovered in the whole site, mostly Iberian bronze coinage (fig. 3e). Ceramics give a glimpse of the daily life in El Camp de les Lloses. A combination of imported and local wares, with an outstanding prevalence of the latter, determines the consumption trends of the site. Local Iberian wares were wheel made (common and service vessels) and handmade (kitchen pottery). On the other hand, imported ceramics were mainly tableware (Italian black-gloss pottery) and amphorae (mostly Campanian, but also from Northern Africa), with some examples of Italian kitchen pottery.

Another important aspect of the site is the presence of infant burials, a well documented Iberian funerary practice, but unknown to Romans and Italians.[6] Inhumations of this kind, two of them with grave goods, have been discovered in each building (see fig. 2); although they are located in different parts of the houses and do not seem to follow a specific spatial pattern, they were associated with room re-modelling. Also worthy of mention is a casual discovery, in the 1920s, 100 metres east of the site, of a figurative stela, representing warriors in combat. The iconographic study links the stela to the Southern Aragonese types, which are dated to the

[6] Gusi & Muriel (2008).



Figure 3. Selection of archaeological materials from El Camp de les Lloses: a) Bronze objects, b) Bronze nails, c) Roman *arula*, d) Seal box, e) Iberian coinage.

late second century,[7] and they were not necessarily funerary in nature or function, but may also be interpreted as territorial markers or identifiers for native groups of warriors.

2.2. *Monteró*

As for Monteró, it is situated at the gates of the pre-Pyrenean range, at the top of an isolated hill on the right bank of the river Segre. Although difficult to approach, it has an unparalleled view over both the river (north/south-west) and a large plain, which looks south-east, up to the present city of Lleida (ancient *Ilerda*). Therefore, due to its geographic location, Monteró proves to be an excellent strategic point from which the territory and its communication network can be easily controlled. Up to the present day, two areas have been excavated, both dated 125–75.

Area 1 is located in the middle of the hilltop (fig. 4a). Here two different clusters of structures can be identified. The first one, to the west, appears to be a set of complex rooms following an L-shape pattern, some of them (the northern ones) with elaborated pavements in *opus signinum* and painted walls; this western zone was affected by a fire, which provoked its final collapse. In the second cluster, only one building has been discovered, as well as the remains of a perimeter wall, which could have functioned as a rampart. In the building sector 12, tableware was abundant and a rolled lead foil was found (fig. 5a).

Between zones 2 and 8 an empty, 7 metre wide space was detected, which could be interpreted as an open space or central street. Area 2 is located in the north (fig. 4b). It consists of structures following a sequence of anteroom (front, east)/room (rear, west); the whole area was strongly affected by erosion and modern human activity.

Material culture shows considerable similarities with El Camp de les Lloses. As for the pottery, here too local wares predominate over imported ceramics, with Italian material present: tableware, amphorae, and even kitchen pottery; North African amphorae are also well documented. Where the presence of metallic objects is concerned, we find vessels, some styluses, weights, and even game pieces. As regards coinage, only Iberian coins have been discovered so far. Armaments have also been found in the site; we have examples of bronze arrowheads, lead *glandes* (fig. 5b),

[7] Quesada (1999–2000); Burillo (2001–2002); *contra* Garcés & Cebrià (2002–2003).

Figure 4. Monteró (schematic plan): a) Area 1, b) Area 2.



Figure 5. Selection of archaeological materials from Monteró: a) Lead foil with Iberian inscription, b) Lead *glans*, c) Bronze figurine.

and iron spears. However, the most remarkable finds are three lead tablets/foils with Iberian texts. The three documents are palaeographically dated to the second century, which fits the chronology of the site. Although it is not possible to obtain a satisfactory translation of the Iberian language, the foils appear to be a sort of inventory, combined with personal names;[8] these have accordingly been interpreted as a list or some kind of request.

A further piece of evidence that could lead us to consider Monteró as a Roman outpost is its 'urban' plan, as well as the architectural characteristics of the buildings, which portray interesting similarities with the structure of Roman Republican camps. Area 2 clearly resembles the remains of a back-to-back double infantry barrack block, i.e. a set or row of *contubernia* of the *hemistrigium* type, with the *arma/papilio* layout, as may be seen, for instance, in the Peña Redonda camp at Numantia.[9] Area 1 could be following the same pattern, with a possible officer's quarter in the Northern extremity, at the head of the row of barracks.[10] From an architectural point of view, the Monteró features appear to follow, in principle, a clear Roman military layout; but it actually does not correspond to a canonical 'legionary' camp, either through the extension of the settlement, nor through the 'irregular' disposition of the hypothetical barrack rows. However, the exceptional topography of the site chosen for occupation, its strategic value, and the nature and number, of the troops assigned to the place, allow us to think of specific conditions and adaptations enacted so as to fit the necessities of the outpost. In conclusion, all the evidence leads us to suggest that Monteró may have been a *castellum* garrisoned by Iberian auxiliaries, primarily devoted to defensive tasks, in view of its geostrategic situation.

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8 Ferrer, Garcés, González, Principal & Rodríguez (2009); Camañes, Moncunill, Padrós, Principal & Velaza (2010).

9 The architectonic resemblance between barracks south of Schulten's proposed *praetorium* at Peña Redonda (specially blocks 14–19), and those of Area 2 at Monteró is amazing (in terms of layout, measurement and disposition); see for Peña Redonda, Pamment Salvatore (1996, 102–5); Dobson (2008, 341–7).

10 As stated in the classical description by Polybius on the layouts of tents of the legionary maniples (Plb. 6.30.5), as well as by pseudo-Hyginius in his work *De Metatione Castrorum* 1. Several good archaeological examples of these arrangements can also be found in some Roman camps at Numantia, such as Peña Redonda and Renieblas (Camps III and V), *cf.* Pamment Salvatore (1996, 53, 150–1); Dobson (2008, 88–9, 159–60).

3. *North-Eastern Hispania Citerior and Its Historical Background*

The question now arises as to what the Republican intervention in Hispania at the end of the second century consisted of, because the scarcity of sources may give the wrong impression of this being an uneventful period of 'peace'. But we need hardly emphasize that there was a great deal at stake in Roman foreign affairs at the time, and that Hispania probably became one more piece in the board game. It appears clear enough that the creation of Transalpine Gaul (*c.* 125) and its subsequent profound instability, the Cimbrian invasion (114–102), Jugurtha's war (111–107), and the two Sicilian slave wars (132 and 104) were all events that portray a situation of turmoil in the West. In addition to this picture, Rome was firmly advancing in the East since the creation of the province of Asia (132–129), as shown by the ongoing intervention in Illyricum and Thrace throughout the period, the measures taken against piracy in Cilicia (102–100), and the increasing pressure on Greek internal affairs towards the breakout of the first war against the kingdom of Pontus (89), just when the Social War in Italy (91–89) was finishing.[11]

Unlike the extensive literary reports on military operations during the Hannibalic War or the main Celtiberian and Lusitanian campaigns of the second century, the historical evidence is rather scant regarding the activity of the Roman army between Numantia's downfall in 133 and the outbreak of the Sertorian War in 82. Furthermore, the picture is even more blurry for North-Eastern Hispania Citerior, which had already been pacified for nearly a century. This silence has been often described as the most convincing consequence of the extension of Roman peace over the local populations, after the end of the Celtiberian War. In fact, a senatorial commission of ten members travelled all the way down to Numantia in 132 to help Scipio Aemilianus organise the aftermath of such a long war. It is noteworthy, however, that evidence for the work plan and the actual decisions undertaken by the senators, as well as any long-term consequence derived from such political and military measures, is extremely limited, consisting only of a short passage from Appian (*Iber.* 99–100).[12]

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11 See recently Konrad (2006, 173–8).

12 See an example of the traditional approach in Roldán (1980). However, the evidence seems to indicate that the effectiveness of the eventual policies implemented by the *decemviri* after Numantia was moderate: Richardson (1986, 156–7). Recent studies insist on the presence of a second commission, dispatched probably in 104, along with a third

According to the literary record, some colonists from Hispania Citerior took part in the foundation of Palma and Pollentia by the consul Q. Caecilius Metellus (*cos.* 123), who had been entrusted with the mission of eradicating piracy from the Balearic Islands and the Western Mediterranean.[13] Furthermore, from 114 to 82, we know of military actions in both Hispanic provinces and the nearby regions, which, as a whole, seems to jeopardize the idea of global peace after 132. Only a few names of Roman magistrates operating in Hispania are recalled in the fragmentary lists of the *Fasti* and the rather obscure literary and epigraphic sources remaining for this period. It is worth noting that, except for Manius Sergius, a proconsul known only from a few milestones from the North-East, not a single magistrate can be located with certainty in Citerior between 132 and 98. It is in this period that T. Didius (*cos.* 98) was assigned to this consular province, followed in 93 by the consul C. Valerius Flaccus, who actually remained in his post as proconsul until 83/82, both being remembered for their fights against rebel Celtiberians. As for Ulterior, we have several names, starting with C. Marius, the future consul, who served as propraetor in 114. Moreover, an inscription from Alcántara has preserved the text of a *deditio* from an unknown *populus* to L. Caesius in 104.[14]

The years 102–98 seem to have been a period of change, which saw the end to conflict in Hispania Ulterior and Transalpine Gaul by 102; from then on most of the military operations were moved to inner Citerior.[15] It appears likely that, between 133 and 102, the Celtiberians and other peoples from Citerior did not constitute a serious problem for the Republican commanders, since uprisings and instability occurred mostly in Ulterior and on the other side of the Pyrenees. Actually, the Celtiberians aided Rome and halted the invading Cimbri and Teutones from Gaul in 104.[16] The extensive use of Celtiberian auxiliaries from Citerior in support of the Roman legions may lie behind their later uprising, when the conditions set up in the original agreements with Rome were somehow broken after

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one in the nineties, with similar peaceful missions. See Pina Polo (1997); Goukowski (1997, 92–3, 137–8); Richardson (2000); Barrandon (2007).

[13] Str. 3.5.2; Flor. 1.43; Oros. 5.13.1; Plin. *NH* 3.77; Mela *Chron.* 2.124–5. See most recently Pena (2005); Orfila, Chávez & Cau (2006).

[14] García Riaza (2002, 50–6).

[15] App. *Iber.* 100. See Richardson (1986, 156–71, 192–3; 1996, 83–92); Salinas de Frías (1995, 81–6); Crespo Ortiz de Zárate (1998); Brennan (2000, vol. 2, 498–503); Beltrán Lloris (2008, 135–7); Cadiou (2008, 114–22, and esp. 114 n. 169); Evans (2008).

[16] Liv. *Per.* 67; App. *Iber.* 99.

102.[17] As will be seen below, the Roman intervention in Transalpine Gaul in the 120s[18] and the above-mentioned invasions seriously affected vast areas of Italy and Southern Gaul from 114 to 102,[19] creating a profound instability, the real magnitude of which has often been underplayed by modern historians, probably due to the lack of evidence in comparison with other periods. Nevertheless, this traditional perspective is starting to change in view of some recent interpretations.[20]

4. *Garrisoning and Logistics: The North-Eastern Outposts in Context*

As we know, a *praefectus praesidii* commanding the Roman garrison left in the Phoenician town of Gades in 206, just when the Punic armies moved to Africa to face the last part of the Hannibalic War, became the object of a severe complaint by the local authorities to the Roman Senate, seven years later.[21] For decades, most scholars have argued that military garrisons, such as this one, played an essential role in the so-called 'Republican strategy of conquest' of the Iberian Peninsula, helping to secure the political control of already-pacified regions, as well as the main land routes, which allowed the regular armies to access the inland *limes*.[22] Very recently, however, Cadiou has reviewed this phenomenon from a completely different angle. As regards the Gades episode, he believes it should not be explained only in political terms. For him, as soon as the Punic armies left the Iberian Peninsula in 206, Gades became a firmly established logistical base, serving not only the Roman positions in the Southern Iberian Peninsula, but also the subsequent military operations of the Hannibalic War in Africa.[23] In general terms, unlike some of his predecessors, Cadiou has recently argued against the existence of any sort

17 López Sánchez (2007, 305–10).

18 Badian (1966); Ebel (1976, 64–95); Hermon (1993); Goudineau (2000); Tarpin (2007); Gros (2008, 15–18).

19 App. *Illyr.* 4; Flor. 1.38.3. See Valgiglio (1955, 15–16); Demougeot (1978); Burns (2003, 72–3).

20 Evans (2005, 54): "I would suggest that not only was the Cimbrian War at the end of the second century BC the greatest challenge to Roman supremacy in the West since the Hannibalic invasions, but that it also triggered a further thirty years of instability in Spain, a region which was crucial to the Empire's survival."

21 Liv. 28.37.10; 38.1; Cic. *Balb.* 15.34; 17.39. See Ñaco (2009a, 98–103; 2009b).

22 Tibiletti (1953, 68–9); Knapp (1977, 100–3, 209–10). Garrisoning has also been studied in relation to the clauses of a surrender (*deditio*) in the Hispanic context: García Riaza (2002, 212–14). See a further discussion in Ñaco (2006, 156–61).

23 Cadiou (2003, 87–8).

of 'occupation army' in connection, as has often been said, with an early Roman provincial organisation. Instead, according to his view, some of the outposts we find in inland locations were directly related to the logistics of Roman armies operating on a large scale for extended periods.[24]

However, the archaeological, epigraphic, and numismatic evidence from our two study cases portrays a more complex system, in which a coexistence throughout the period *c*. 120–90 between primarily defensive garrisoning (Monteró) and logistical bases (El Camp de les Lloses) seems to be the most plausible explanation. What is really significant is that the best archaeological data recovered for any kind of logistical, or defensive, outpost located in an early-pacified region, such as the North-East, actually dates to over a century after the arrival of the first Roman armies to the Iberian Peninsula. Everything seems to indicate that the North-East continued to play a key role in Roman defensive strategy and also in military logistics, as it had for the last century, equally before and after the Celtiberian defection of 102–98.

If so, supplies, but also troops, including local auxiliaries and other resources would have been dispatched from the coast, through a series of depots, to the war fronts. Only a sophisticated army, used to massive military operations, such as the one from the Middle and Late Roman Republic, would be able to organise a chain of logistics depots, defended by garrisons, in which supplies were stored and weapons and other apparel repaired, for the use of passing armies.[25] Erdkamp mentions a fascinating parallel in Caesar's Gallic Wars, only half a century after our period. This passage outlines the importance of local auxiliaries as those in charge of logistics outposts, a crucial role in his Gallic campaigns. According to the text, Caesar entrusted 10,000 auxiliaries from the Aedui with the mission of securing his corn supplies in several strongholds, leaving infantry troops and cavalrymen all along the path followed by his own legions, whilst he himself was leading most of his army to the final part of the war.[26]

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[24] Cadiou (2008, 279–416). There has been some speculation on the existence of *praesidia* in connection with early phases of Roman presence in the North-East, such as in Emporion and Tarraco, but the evidence is inconclusive for such an early period, see Cadiou (2008, 328–50).

[25] Roth (1999, 187–8).

[26] Caes. *BG* 7.34: *Hoc decreto interposito cohortatus Aeduos, ut controversiarum ac dissensionis obliviscerentur atque omnibus omissis his rebus huic bello servirent eaque quae meruissent praemia ab se devita Gallia exspectarent equitatumque omnem et peditum milia decem sibi celeriter mitterent, quae in praesidiis rei frumentariae causa disponeret, exercitum in duas partes divisit.* See Erdkamp (1998, 70).

5. *Epigraphic Evidence on Road Building and Its Connection to the North*

It may not be coincidental that the oldest milestones from Republican Hispania, roughly dated to the last quarter of the second century, are located in the North-East, in an area close to El Camp de les Lloses. Actually, three milestones can be traced just a few miles from this site, on a road probably connecting this flat region of inner Catalonia to the Via Heraclea, which in its turn ran North-South along the Mediterranean coastline. The inscriptions carry the name of *Manius Sergius, procos.*, an otherwise unknown magistrate in office in Hispania Citerior, whose activities have originally been dated to 110 with no more convincing arguments than that of a scholarly guess.[27] More recently, a parallel inscription has been noted, belonging to a second magistrate, Q. Fabius Labeo, whose name is also recorded in two early milestones from Lleida. Labeo is not mentioned either in the *Fasti* or in any other literary sources connected with Citerior, but according to Crawford he is to be identified with a moneyer of 124, grandson of the consul of 183.[28] If we take into account that six years was the minimum required for a moneyer to become praetor, his office as proconsul in Hispania Citerior should have run from 118 to 114—which actually corresponds in our list with M. Marius—, or perhaps after 113. All things considered, a chronology of 120–110 for both series of North-Eastern milestones seems to be the more plausible option so far.[29]

Moreover, it has also been suggested that there exists a historical link between such milestones and the road-building programmes in Transalpine Gaul from 120–118 onwards. If a rather controversial Polybian remark is to be considered, the construction of the *Via Domitia* may have contained plans to extend works down to Citerior.[30] Furthermore, we would like to draw attention to a well-known passage from Strabo, which shows very clearly that one of the Republic's main interests in Transalpine Gaul was the security of transport routes, in particular that of its army, by

27 Broughton (1986, vol. 1, 543); although accepting the new chronology in vol. 3 (1986, 86).

28 Crawford (1974, vol. 1, no. 273, p. 294).

29 Fabre, Mayer & Rodà (eds.) (1984, no. 175, p. 211); Richardson (1986, 167); Salinas de Frías (1995, 82–3); Díaz Ariño (2008, 90–2).

30 Plb. 3.39.8: "From Emporium to Narbo it is about six hundred stades, and from Narbo to the passage of the Rhône about sixteen hundred, this part of the road having now been carefully measured by the Romans and marked with milestones at every eighth stade." See Beltrán Lloris & Pina Polo (1994, 112–13); Salomon (1996); Chevallier (1997, 203); Mayer & Rodà (1997, 115); Arrayás (2007, 55–6); Arnaud (2007, 503–5).

means of the road running from Italy to Hispania, as the Greek geographer explicitly states. According to his description, it becomes possible to imagine that, at least for the first decades of its existence, the Transalpine province was itself a mere line of several fortified strongholds—Narbo among them—securing a road which, in turn, was surrounded by a 'cordon sanitaire' of a few miles on each side.[31]

Powerful military reasons seem to lie behind the first Republican road-building programme ever designed in Hispania, which was closely connected to the one designed on the other side of the Pyrenees from the 120s. It can hardly be surprising to note that only a few miles from where the early milestones of Manius Sergius were located stands one of our sites, El Camp de les Lloses, containing an interesting mixture of local and foreign influences in its material culture. Therefore, we may presume that such a military logistical outpost, perhaps garrisoned by a mixture of Roman, Italian, and local troops, undertook, amongst other activities, a major role in road building, as has sometimes been proposed.[32] If our view is correct, the road may have been used to direct military supplies or even to channel local auxiliaries to the Roman armies. This perhaps led to the final control of Transalpine Gaul, as well as to the suppression of the Cimbri, either in Gaul or in inland Citerior, during the last decade of the second century, and even of the Celtiberians after 102. In any case, North and South seemed to be closely interconnected, and road-building was a necessary feature to supply food and manpower to the Roman armies involved in all these operations.

6. *Numismatic Evidence: For Whom was Iberian Coinage Minted?*

The numismatic record has always been controversial when Republican Hispania is concerned, and not only because of the endless debates on the chronology and function fulfilled by Iberian coinage, but also because we cannot find well-documented coin hoards for most of the second century.

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[31] Strabo 4.6.3: "These were the first of the Transalpine Celti that the Romans conquered, though they did so only after carrying on war with both them and the Ligures for a long time—because the latter had barred all the passes leading to Iberia that ran through the seaboard. And, in fact, they kept making raids both by land and sea, and were so powerful that the road was scarcely practicable even for great armies. And it was not until the eightieth year of the war that the Romans succeeded, though only with difficulty, in opening up the road for a breadth of only twelve stadia to those travelling on public business." See Pralon (1998, 21–2); Evans (2008, 87–8).

[32] Molas (1993, 138).

After some hoards containing Punic and Greek coins, as well as the Iberian imitations of drachmae from Emporion, all related to the Hannibalic War and the first Iberian uprisings, hoarding ceased until the very end of the second century. This is not the right place to discuss this problem, but perhaps the most feasible explanation is that there were hardly any new local coins in circulation at the time. It is likely that most of the so-called 'Iberian coinage' was not minted before the last decades of the second century, whereas the early hoards had responded to a different kind of minting and circulation, directly related to the financing of the armies during the operations of the Roman and Carthaginian armies in the Iberian Peninsula.[33]

For us, the truly significant issue in the debate lies after this gap of nearly a century, when coin hoards reappear in our period, a phenomenon that indirectly shows us how relevant this territory became in military terms at the time. It is hardly surprising to note that most of the recorded hoarding in Ulterior has been dated between 119 and the first years of the following century. Accordingly, we must interpret the evidence along with the few literary texts we have, in order to conclude that the Roman military efforts in the South tried to control the instability provoked by several Lusitanian uprisings; these eventually continued till the outbreak of rebellions of Celtiberians between 102 and 98, then became rare in the next decade.[34] As to the numismatic background of Hispania Citerior, and the North-East in particular, the picture is not very different, although the reasons behind the turmoil and the hoarding itself are clearly of a different origin. In 1982, Villaronga launched the idea that some late-second century hoards from the North-East might have been a reaction to the alleged invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones south of the Pyrenees,[35] which some uncertain literary sources date to *c.* 104. Accordingly, these hoards, mainly located in the present provinces of Girona and Barcelona, might be indicating the 'road map' followed by the Cimbrian invaders in the North-East, moving later into inner Citerior through the Ebro Valley, and even going south and to some areas of the Levant, where hoards with similar dating have been identified.[36]

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33 The literature on this arduous debate is huge, and a recent synthesis may be found in Cadiou (2008, 524–43). We strongly support López Sánchez's view of a later dating for the Iberian coinage, as suggested in (2005, 513–14; 2007, 287–320; 2010). See Lockyear (2007, 69).

34 Chaves (1996, 489–91).

35 Rico (1997, 43); Evans (2005).

36 Villaronga (1982, 24–32); 1985; Ripollès (1982, 295–6).

This traditional explanation, however, seems far too simplistic, particularly after López's new proposal of a later dating for this coinage, and its more likely function as evidence for auxiliaries enrolled in the Roman armies. In brief, regardless of the historical credibility of the actual invasion of the North-East by the Cimbri, which still remains a rather controversial matter, what is argued here is, in essence, that the numismatic evidence provided by the North-Eastern coin hoards needs to be related to a wider historical background, which, in turn, ought to see a deeper connection between Citerior and Transalpine Gaul than has been traditionally accepted.[37] Moreover, thanks to archaeological analysis, we are able to add further relevant information to the picture. This brings us back to the logistical and defensive roles of the garrisons on behalf of the Roman army, as stated above. Therefore, it is not strange or coincidental to have already found large quantities of Iberian coins at El Camp de les Lloses and Monteró, in comparison to the relatively modest size of the sites.[38]

Having identified a mixture of local traditions with some external influences, reflected for example in the housing, it is hardly surprising to acknowledge the extensive use of Iberian coinage—some of which was probably even minted here, considering the high quality of some of the preserved coins—along with the nearby presence of graffiti and figurative representations which use the Iberian alphabet and native decorative motives. Further research on how these 'melting pot' sites were organised seems to be necessary; but, thanks to numismatic evidence, we may already have real proof, for most of our historical period, of native involvement in the military operations of the Roman army, regardless of their exact location. Thus, according to López's view, Iberian coins, such as the ones found in our two North-Eastern outposts, were surely minted as a means of pay or token for the *auxilia externa* eventually hired by the Roman armies, either serving here permanently or lodged temporarily.[39] Therefore, the North-Eastern coin hoards may be a reflection of the increase of military activity within the region, although they do not necessarily draw a 'road map' of the actual invasion. What we do know is that the whole region was indeed affected by warfare in one way or another, and this explains why such coins were hidden.

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[37] Ebel (1976, 41–63); Soricelli (1995, 51–2); Evans (2005, 44). Despite the long debate on the chronology of some 'Iberian' coins minted in Gaul, such as '*Neroncen*', it seems to be more reasonable to date these coins in parallel to the later dating of the other Iberian coinage South of the Pyrenées, see Richard (1973, 142).

[38] Duran, Mestres & Principal (eds.) (2008, 130–9); Ferrer et al. (2009, 132–3).

[39] See n. 33 on López's proposals.

7. *Conclusion*

It cannot be a coincidence that in the last decades of the second century we find a period of military stress in the North-East, related to the final control of Transalpine and the Cimbric and Teutonic invasions up to 102, as well as the earliest evidence for road-building in Hispania, always linked to the army. Therefore, in order to understand the function of some North-Eastern outposts, dated archaeologically to this same time period, as well as some milestones and Iberian coins attributed to it, we should be looking for the origin of the supply and recruiting efforts these sites were surely involved in. Surprisingly, the answer seems to point outside of the Iberian Peninsula, and, more specifically, to the north. If, as we believe, Monteró and El Camp de les Lloses functioned as defensive outposts, logistics depots, and centres for recruitment of *auxilia externa*, since at least *c.* 120, it may seem reasonable to presume the existence of a network of other sites from the North-East and elsewhere in Citerior, acting similarly on behalf of Roman interests.

Very probably, although a Roman or Italian garrison commander would have been in charge of each site, the natives were responsible for most of the logistical and defensive operations and were eventually called to serve as auxiliaries. As such, military compromise and martial spirit could have constituted a first step in their integration into the Roman world. Essential work on behalf of the Roman armies would have been carried out, such as guarding supplies for troops in transit, organising local auxiliary recruitment, and taking care of weapon repairs, as well as manufacturing other utilities and eventually minting coinage. In regards to the latter, numismatic evidence might help us identify other similar sites in the future. This paper calls for a more accurate study of the real needs of the Roman armies operating during the Transalpine and Cimbrian campaigns, even if they might have been supplied with food and manpower from outposts located far from the actual war fronts, including from Citerior, if the necessary communications were available.[40]

[40] Research supported by RICIP 2009–00001 (2010), a project funded by the Catalonian Government, and HAR2010–19185 (2011–2013), funded by the Spanish Government. We want to warmly thank all the comments made by the audience in Manchester, and some previous discussions with Dr. Fernando López-Sánchez, Ms. Imma Mestres, and Ms. Montserrat Duran, held at El Camp de les Lloses Interpretation Centre (Tona, Barcelona). Any remaining mistakes are solely ours.

SAMNITE ECONOMY AND THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT OF ITALY IN THE FIFTH TO THIRD CENTURIES BC

Daniel C. Hoyer*

1. *Introduction*

The traditional view of central Italy in the early and middle Republican periods holds that the people living in the Apennine highlands, particularly the Samnites, were essentially uncivilized, violent, and a constant nuisance to the more highly developed communities in Latium and Etruria. Livy, for example, wrote that Samnites in the fourth century BC "dwelt in villages in the mountains and would raid the plain and coastal regions with a contempt for their cultivators, who were of a milder character, while they themselves were rough mountain-dwellers".[1] Such views, moreover, have been endorsed by several modern scholars. Most notable is Salmon, who claims that "Samnium was an economic backwater" which imported "nothing of demonstrable overseas provenance," relying rather, as Livy had claimed, on plundering their neighbours for sustenance or mass migrations.[2] Related to this view is the idea of defensive imperialism, popular especially in the first half of the twentieth century, which asserts that most of the warfare in the early and middle Republic was caused by Rome defending herself and her allies against the aggressive activity of her Italian neighbours.[3] In short, the interaction between Romans and Samnites has often been envisioned as a clash of civilizations, pitting the highly advanced political and economic systems of Rome against the backwards tribes living in the Apennine highlands. Rome's eventual victory, seen in this light, is thus presented as both remarkable in having overcome such

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[1] Liv. 9.13.7. Oakley (1997, 155–6) notes that, for Livy's audience, the term mountain dweller "might connote the backward, the brutish, and the sordid". See Dench (1995) for a discussion of Roman literary representations of Samnites and other Italians.

[2] Salmon (1967, 76). Similar arguments have been made more recently, largely following Salmon's analyses. See particularly Oakley (1993, 12–4); Torelli (1999, 5); Patterson (2006c, 606–8). *Cf.* Cornell (1995, 305, 345), who, while acknowledging that the Samnites were more advanced than it is often thought, argues that they were still "relatively poor and backward" in comparison with Rome.

[3] Frank (1914); Holleaux (1921); Badian (1968); Sherwin-White (1984).

a formidable, warlike opponent, as well as noble in having exposed this underdeveloped area to the benefits of Roman-style civilization.[4]

Recent evidence, however, belies much of this picture. In particular, there is now a good deal of archaeological material suggesting that many parts of eastern Italy actually had fairly well developed economic systems as early as the fifth century BC, and that many of the communities of Samnium were economically linked with Campania, Apulia, and Magna Graecia, as well as with areas outside of Italy. This view of the economic activity which occurred in central-eastern Italy before the Roman period, namely by the beginning of the First Punic War, has important implications for how the early interactions between Rome and her Italian neighbours are conceived. For, if we accept that there was a significant amount of agricultural activity in Samnite territory, as well as economic links between the various communities in Samnium and throughout eastern Italy, then it is reasonable to accept too that the conflicts between these groups and the Romans involved more than simply a clash of civilizations.

In other words, there was very likely more at stake in these conflicts than military domination and freedom from raids. That there seems to have been significant levels of agricultural activity and trading on the part of the so-called uncivilized group ought to suggest that there might have been economic motives on both sides prompting these conflicts. Thus, in light of all the evidence now available, it is necessary to rethink our approach to this crucial period in Roman history, and to focus on analyses which not only highlight the rivalry between the Romans and Samnites for political and military dominance, but also account for the competition over access to and control over the material resources and the economic wealth of central-eastern Italy. In this paper, then, I will briefly review some of the archaeological evidence that has been uncovered in the past few decades, most of which strongly suggests that the level of agricultural exploitation, manufacture, and trade throughout Samnium was much greater than has traditionally been thought. I will then explore how this evidence can be used to enrich our understanding of Roman expansion in this area of Italy from the fifth through third centuries BC, arguing that understanding the competitive environment within Italy and the actions

[4] This is, essentially, part of the Romanization model of the conquest of Italy. Important recent discussions of this controversial topic include Torelli (1995; 1999), Mouritsen (1998); Keay & Terrenato (2001).

such an environment fostered is a useful and compelling way to explain the events during this pivotal period in Republican history.

2. *Samnite Economy*

There has been a great deal of archaeological work conducted in the last few decades in Samnite territory, which lies mainly within the modern province of Molise. These studies have produced extremely important material concerning the economic life of the Samnites, which suggests that, contrary to the traditional view of these peoples as primitive and underdeveloped, there was actually a high level of economic activity in the region before the wars with Rome: agricultural exploitation, both sedentary crop harvesting and transhumance livestock rearing, ceramic and textile manufacturing, and trade; there are even some indications of early urban development. Lloyd captures the impact of this archaeological work well, in stating that "the picture of economic life in Samnium is increasingly akin to that of the more advanced regions of Italy".[5] It is important, then, to detail some of these finds and to highlight their significance in terms of the Samnite economy before exploring how this work can change our perceptions of Roman-Samnite conflicts during the fifth through third centuries BC.

It must be noted at the outset, however, that the archaeological material I present in this section is not completely uncontroversial, and surely some objections can be raised against the interpretations of several individual pieces adduced as evidence of Samnium's economic development. This is particularly the case with the dating of certain artefacts and the identification of the provenance of some of the amphorae and terracotta remains, especially that done primarily from typological analyses. Crucially, however, support is lent to the interpretations of the evidence noted here by the sheer abundance of material that has been found from such a wide range of sites in Samnite territory, all pointing in the same direction, as well as the fact that so many of the individual finds have either secure or at least likely dates that line up well with the interpretations offered. Thus, when taken all together, the full body of material tells a consistent and coherent story about the economic development of the Samnite peoples before the Roman takeover of Italy had been completed.

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[5] Lloyd (1995, 206).

What this archaeological material suggests, then, is that a fairly high degree of economic development in at least parts of Samnium had been reached already by the late Iron Age. There is evidence that intensive agricultural exploitation and inter-regional trade developed both in the Biferno River valley, a relatively fertile region on the Adriatic coast, as well as around Caudium and Saticula in the Volturno River valley near Campania, by the later sixth century BC.[6] This evidence comes particularly from ceramics, many of which have been found around Larinum in the Biferno Valley, identified as originating in Apulia and Campania, suggesting economic links with these areas. There is similar ceramic evidence from Caudium and around Saticula. It is quite likely, then, that Caudium and Saticula were part of an exchange network that ran along the Volturno River, linking these two places with eastern Campania and the Tyrrhenian coastal region, as well as with areas further north, such as the Pentri settlements of Bovianum and Saepinum.[7]

This intensive exploitation of the region's natural resources seems to have increased in the fifth and fourth centuries, likely as the result of population increase and as economic links with other Italian groups were further advanced. This development is most striking in the case of Larinum. As mentioned, Larinum is located in the heart of the most fertile area of Samnium, and had a reputation as being an important grain producer.[8] This high grain productivity, moreover, seems to have been present at a very early date, since a mill and large threshing floor from an early period have been found near Larinum, indicating grain harvesting and processing.[9] By the end of the fourth century BC at the latest Larinum had become the hub of economic activity in the Biferno valley, taking advantage of its high agricultural output and opportunities for trading with Apulia, Magna Graecia, and throughout south-eastern Italy.[10] One effect of this was that many of the smaller villages around Larinum seem to have disappeared during this period, their populations probably streaming into the budding city, leaving a great deal of the land in the lower Biferno valley for intensive agricultural production.[11] This is the area, in fact, where most of

[6] Di Niro (1991, 53); Faustoferri (1991, 72–5); Sarno (2000, 58–9); Gualtieri (2004, 43).

[7] Di Niro (1991, 55); Sarno (2000, 58–9).

[8] Plb. 3.101 and 107 mentions grain being requisitioned from Larinum by Rome during the Second Punic War.

[9] Lloyd (1995, 204).

[10] Torelli (1984, 28); De Benedittis (1987, 516–21); Lloyd (1995, 185).

[11] Lloyd (1995, 197); Gualtieri (2004, 42–3).

the large Samnite farmsteads were found.[12] Moreover, the appearance of amphorae in the region, both locally-made and imported from elsewhere, suggests that some wine or olive oil was being produced in Samnium and certainly that such goods were being imported from elsewhere in Italy and consumed in the region.[13] In sum, it is fairly certain that a significant amount of grain, and likely also some wine, was being produced in the area before the beginning of the third century BC.

Not only was agricultural productivity in the lower Biferno valley high, but there is similar evidence from the less fertile areas higher up in the Apennines, particularly in the territory of the Pentri and Carricini. Mills and threshing floors have been found, for example, at Monte Vairano and Venafrum, which have been dated to the fifth or early fourth century BC.[14] Animal rearing likewise appears to have been an important part of the pre-Roman Samnite economy, especially in these highland areas. Indeed, this is the aspect of the Samnite economy which scholars have tended to concentrate on most, and there is ample archaeological evidence to support this.[15] Many loom weights have been found throughout the region, implying that wool and probably leather as well was being harvested in significant quantities.[16] Many animal bones too, notably of sheep/goat and pig, have been found at several sites in Pentri territory, lending further support to the notion that animal husbandry had an important role in the region's economy.[17] Unfortunately, we are unable to determine whether these goods were produced primarily for local consumption or for trade, as it is difficult to identify trade of textiles in the material record.

Concomitant with this agricultural activity is ceramic and textile manufacture, for which there is abundant archaeological evidence as well: kilns have been found at Monte Vairano and Larinum; pottery 'workshops' have been identified at Bovianum, Saepinum, Venafrum, Larinum, and likely also at Caudium; there is some evidence of wool manufacturing at many of these sites, and at Larinum there are some signs of iron working.[18]

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12 Lloyd (1995, 201).

13 De Benedittis (1991a, 140).

14 Lloyd (1995, 185); Capini (2000, 256).

15 *Cf.* Dench (1995, 126–8), who rightly points out that Apennine pastoralism is more of a modern preoccupation than it was for Roman writers. Although there was certainly a much wider range of economic activity occurring in the region, we should not discount the importance of pastoralism altogether.

16 Lloyd (1995, 203).

17 *Ibidem*, 204–5. Lloyd takes such activity as akin to Apulia's important leather industry during the second Punic War (Liv. 22.54.2).

18 Lloyd (1995, 205–6); De Benedittis (1991a, 140); Capini (2000, 256).

Together, the evidence demonstrates fairly securely that many Samnite communities were acting as centres of processing and manufacture at this time, making amphorae, terracottas, and textiles to serve the local populations. In addition to these production centres, many goods have been found throughout the region which appear to have been imported from other parts of Italy and around the Mediterranean. This includes a wealth of ceramics found at Larinum originating from Apulia, Campania, and elsewhere along the Adriatic coast and dated to the sixth and fifth centuries BC.[19] Significant numbers of terracotta artefacts have also been identified at Monte Vairano as coming from the volcanic regions of western Italy, likely Campania and Magna Graecia to the south.[20] Additionally, over 100 Rhodian amphora handles from the pre-Roman period have been found at Monte Vairano.[21]

Admittedly, such manufacturing and trade became more prominent after the Roman period had begun, because Roman hegemony fostered the integration of the various regional markets throughout the peninsula. However, the concordant evidence from a variety of pre-Roman sites in the area strongly suggests that these activities were occurring even before the Roman conquest. Moreover, it appears that, in general, trade links existed from at least the sixth century BC between the Adriatic coast and the highland areas of Samnium, between Larinum and Apulia and Magna Graecia, as well as between Campania, Caudium, and Saticula—the northwest areas of Samnium along the Volturno river around Venafrum—and into Latium.[22]

One of the reasons this evidence is so important is because, as Gualtieri put it, it should encourage scholars "to tone down an accepted clear-cut distinction between urban settlements . . . and village communities of the 'non-urban' hinterland" and promote the idea that there actually was a fairly high degree of urban development in Samnium and elsewhere before the Roman period, even if this is a different type than Roman or Greek urbanism.[23] This sort of urban activity is particularly apparent at Larinum. By the end of the fourth century BC Larinum shows signs of an already well-ordered street system and some monumental building; it even began

[19] Faustoferri (1991, 72–4); Lloyd (1995, 206–7).
[20] Capini (1982a, 11); Lloyd (1995, 206).
[21] Morel (1991, 191); Lloyd (1995, 206).
[22] Di Niro (1991, 55); Terzani (1991, 111); De Benedittis (1991b, 54); Lloyd (1995, 206); Tagliamonte (1997, 250).
[23] Gualtieri (2004, 38).

issuing its own coins in the third century BC.[24] A similar move towards urbanization at the same moment, although admittedly on a somewhat smaller scale, seems to have occurred around Monte Vairano, Saepinum, Bovianum, and elsewhere in the Apennine highlands.[25] Typically, these highland settlements have been labelled 'hill forts' with the idea that they were not urban in a Greco-Roman sense, but were simply large defensive installations used as centres of refuge by local inhabitants in times of crisis.[26] It has recently been suggested, however, that these hill forts actually represented a sort of 'urbanization in progress'.[27] In other words, although not as sophisticated or advanced as some of the contemporary urban centres of Rome, Magna Graecia, Etruria, or even Larinum, it appears that these Apennine hill forts nevertheless were the site of some manufacture and public building, as well as economic, religious, and administrative activity.

When taken together, therefore, the unmistakable impression gained from this archaeological evidence is of a fairly high degree of resource exploitation by Samnite communities before the Roman period, as well as extensive trade links uniting Samnium with Campania, Latium, Apulia, and Magna Graecia, a situation quite different from the traditional account of Samnite life prior to the late third century BC. There are, furthermore, important ramifications to this conclusion. Since many Samnite communities appear to have had strong economic interests, we need to explore how they sought to protect and promote these interests. As I will explain in detail below, these interests often collided with those of other Italian communities, especially Rome. This created an environment of competition that had a tremendous influence on the actions undertaken by both Romans and Samnites and on the Roman conquest of Italy from the fifth to the third centuries BC.

3. *Italy's Competitive Environment*

It is well known that Rome was involved in nearly constant warfare with other Italian peoples from the late fifth to early third centuries BC, notably with Latins, Etruscans, Campanians, and Samnites. A great deal of

[24] Torelli (1984, 34); Di Niro (1991, 55); Lloyd (1995, 197).
[25] Capini (2000, 260); Gualtieri (2004, 40–4).
[26] Oakley (1995).
[27] Gualtieri (2004, 38).

scholarship has focused on this period and has provided very compelling analyses of the causes and nature of Roman expansion throughout Italy beginning in the fifth century and leading ultimately to their conquest of Italy a few centuries later.[28] As mentioned, defensive imperialism models of Roman expansion were at one time very common, although these have largely been replaced, following Harris, with arguments stressing Rome's aggressiveness and its drive towards conquest. Although Harris himself notes that non-Romans, especially Samnites, did themselves engage in aggressive behaviour, he argues convincingly against defensive imperialism models by demonstrating how the benefits of war, whether material gain or the glory resulting from successful campaigning, as well as the structure of Roman aristocratic competition, better explain the frequency and regularity of warfare in this period than a focus only on Rome's need for security.[29]

Harris' arguments about the unique bellicosity of Rome have been extremely influential on subsequent scholarship. The main tenets of his work have been picked up and expanded in recent years by those seeking to explore further why Romans were so aggressive, what they were trying to accomplish, and how they managed to be so successful at it. Fairly standard now is the view, in line with this trend, that Rome's wars in this period were part of a deliberate and aggressive expansionist program that began in the fifth century BC with the seizure of Veii.[30] One limitation with many of these interpretations, however, is that they tend to discount the goals and actions of Rome's rivals and, thus, can only really explain part of how and why Rome conquered the peninsula.[31] More attention needs to be given, therefore, to Rome's Italian competitors, trying to determine what resources these other groups had available to them and what strategies they were pursuing. In this way we can produce a more complete account of events during this crucial, but still misunderstood period of Italian history.

The early history of the Samnite people and their interactions with Rome provide a perfect example of how focusing on the competition between

[28] See particularly Harris (1979); Oakley (1993); Cornell (1995); Torelli (1999).

[29] Harris (1979, 10–40, 176–80). See Rich (1993, 38–44) for an interesting discussion of the debate between proponents of defensive imperialism and those supporting the idea of Roman bellicosity.

[30] Cornell (1995, 319); Torelli (1999, 2–8); Patterson (2006c, 607).

[31] Rich (1993, 42) makes a similar claim, noting that although Harris convincingly argued against defensive imperialism models by pointing out that they are too monocausal, the alternative approach equally suffers from too narrow a focus.

the various Italian groups over political, military, and material gain, rather than exploring only Rome's motivations, can expand our appreciation and understanding of Rome's eventual conquest of the Italian peninsula. Samnites became involved in Italy-wide competition in the middle of the fifth century BC, when they attacked and gained control over much of Eastern Campania. Open conflict with Rome broke out only in 343 BC when the people of Capua asked their allies, the Romans, for help expelling the Samnite invaders. Although Rome had signed a peace treaty with the Samnites in 354 BC, it responded to Capua's call for help.[32] This began the First Samnite War, which lasted from 343 to 341 BC, with Romans and Samnites fighting essentially for control over Campania.[33] This Samnite action is particularly important for several reasons. Firstly, it is from the collision of Samnite and Roman interests in this area that conflict between the two groups first broke out, a conflict not settled ultimately until the Social War. Secondly, it demonstrates that right from the first stages of conflict Samnites were pursuing their own interests and clashing with other Italian groups. The rest of this paper will explore the latter point in more detail, attempting to discern what these interests might have been and how the Samnite people were trying to fulfil them.

Unfortunately, not much is known of the political and military makeup of the Samnite communities at this or at any other period. It is important to emphasize that there never was a single, coherent political body incorporating the various Samnite towns and villages before the Roman period, no 'Samnite state'. Rather, the area which we call Samnium was made up of different, semi-autonomous communities belonging to one of four tribes, the Pentri, Hirpini, Caudini, and Carricini, plus the Frentani of the southeast.[34] Each tribe was comprised of a *touto* which represented the various communities of that tribe, although we simply do not have enough information to judge how these groups functioned politically and whether there were regular assemblies or not. Our best evidence comes

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[32] Salmon (1967, 189–93) plausibly claims that this treaty was a defensive alliance against a possible Gallic attack, as well as a mutual assurance that neither side would attack the other, leaving both to pursue their aims against Etruscans, Sabines, Aequi, and Volsci on the Roman side, and Campanians and Apulians on the Samnite side.

[33] Cornell (2004, 121–3) makes a strong case that the so-called Samnite wars ought to be considered rather as a single Great Samnite War. I use here the conventional fourfold division for clarity, but I agree that the causes of and events in these wars were certainly quite closely connected.

[34] It is unclear whether to classify these people as Samnite or Apulian, although they were "closely related by language (Oscan)" and "probably by ethnic background" to other Samnites, Lloyd (1995, 182).

from Livy, who mentions that in times of war two or more tribes would ally in a single 'federation' under one commander.[35] These federations were likely short-lived, probably surviving only as long as the reason for which they were formed lasted. Practically, this would mean that common pan-Samnite action was extremely rare and difficult to accomplish, with each community or *touto* acting principally to serve its own interests, uniting only when and for as long as those interests were fully aligned.

When we are told that Samnites attacked Campania in the fifth century, then, we cannot be certain which Samnite communities actually took part in the action. The most obvious candidates are the Caudini communities of Caudium and Saticula, located just to the east of Capua, although this is conjectural. What does seem fairly certain, though, is that the purpose of this action was to gain access to some of Campania's fertile soil, the principal reward that this area had to offer an invading force. This land could have been used to alleviate problems of overpopulation, which has often been suggested as being a constant problem among the Samnites.[36] This conclusion, however, is based largely on the idea that Samnite territory was poor agriculturally and therefore could not support a very large population, although the evidence presented at the beginning of this article suggests that this was not really the case. Even if removing excess population was not the primary motive, the Campanian land would have also been valued for its agricultural productivity, which further suggests that the Caudini were involved in the attack. For, as discussed above, it is fairly certain that Caudium and Saticula were economically active during this period, taking advantage of their access to the Volturno River which connected Campania to other Samnite areas such as Bovianum and Saepinum. Expanding their reach into Campania, then, would have given these Caudini communities an even greater pool of resources for both their own inhabitants' consumption as well as material to be traded with other groups. These are, in fact, probably the same considerations that the Romans had when it was decided to come to Capua's aid.

This competition over resources and territorial control between Romans and Samnites continued throughout the fourth century BC. According to Livy, part of the peace agreement of 341 BC specified that Rome would not interfere with Samnite attacks against the Sidicini.[37] Again, we are not

[35] Cornell (1995, 345–7) offers a concise summary of the little we know of the political and administrative makeup of the Samnite confederation.

[36] For this view see particularly Salmon (1967, 35–48, 189); Oakley (1993, 12–14).

[37] Liv. 8.1.

told which Samnite communities were involved in this, but Livy does note that the Sidicini were joined by Campanian and Latin allies in a successful counter-attack on the Samnites. Both Romans and Samnites were further engaged in numerous battles during the 330s BC against their neighbours, including Epirot Greeks, Campanians, Volscians, and various Latin communities. In 330 BC, the two powers were again at odds after some Volscian towns came to Rome for protection against Samnite aggression.[38] Then, in 328 BC, Rome established a colony at Fregellae, located along the Liris River not far from Samnite Venafrum, which, as we have seen, was an important economic centre in the region. Fregellae was seemingly meant to act as a buttress against Samnite aggression and a seat from which to launch attacks into Samnite territory, as well as to deflect some of Venafrum's economic advantages for Roman benefit.[39] The Samnites also increased their aggressive behaviour at this time, since they apparently lent military aid to an attack made against Romans living in the Campanian city of Palaeopolis in 327 BC.

The colonization of Fregellae, together with Rome's anger at the Samnite role in the Palaeopolis attacks, resulted in the Second Samnite War from 327 to 304 BC.[40] The part played by Fregellae and Roman colonization generally are quite important here, because this war largely consisted of Samnites fighting to reclaim territory and solidify their hold over crucial economic and strategic centres, while the Romans were trying to extend their own reach further into Campanian and Samnite territory, largely through the establishment of colonies. Salmon, in fact, declared that it was at this time when "the great period of Roman colonization began, the period when it made its most significant contribution to Roman history".[41] The importance of these colonies for both the Romans and Samnites is underscored by the peace agreement made after the famous capture of Roman troops at the Caudine Forks in 321 BC. Although this event occurred around Caudium, part of the agreement, according to Livy, was that Rome withdraw from Samnite land and abandon her colonies.[42]

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[38] Liv. 8.19.1.

[39] *Cf.* Di Niro (1991, 101) who says that Fregellae was the base of operations for Roman military action during the Second Samnite War.

[40] Both Liv. 8.23 and App. *Samn.* 3.5 claim that anger over the establishment of Fregellae was a primary cause of the war.

[41] Salmon (1955, 63).

[42] Liv. 9.4.4. See Coarelli (1998, 31–2) for a discussion of this passage and the significance of Fregellae for both sides during this war.

Clearly, a major cause of the conflict at this time was over control of certain key areas in central Italy.

Nor did this involve only Fregellae. In 315 BC, Rome attacked Samnite territory, laying siege to Saticula. In that same year Samnites engaged Romans in a battle at Lautulae, and later joined Sora in a revolt against Rome.[43] Sora was recovered by the Romans in 314 BC, although we are told that in that same year several Auruncian cities and then Luceria revolted from the Romans and fell to the Samnites.[44] Luceria was a key link joining the Caudini and the eastern Samnite lowlands around Larinum to Apulia, and had been a hotly contested area from at least 320 BC. Luceria was quickly recovered by the Romans and a Roman colony was then established. After a major victory over Samnite forces at Caudium in 313 BC, the Romans solidified their hold over Campania, whose lands had been the site of many battles during this war, by establishing colonies at Suessa and Saticula. In 311 BC Rome was able for the first time to penetrate into the heart of Samnium, capturing the large and important Pentrian city of Bovianum, where Livy says a great amount of booty was captured and distributed to the Roman soldiers.[45]

Roman victory in this war was now at hand, and in 304 BC the peace treaty of 354 BC was renewed. By this time, Rome's sphere of control was extensive and it had become unmistakably the most powerful entity in Italy. Conversely, the Samnites had lost much in the war: they had to forsake their interests in Campania; they were effectively pushed behind the Liris River after Rome had regained control over Fregellae; Bovianum, the centre of Pentrian political and economic life, had been captured; and they had lost links to Apulia once the Romans had taken Luceria. Still, some Samnites were strong enough to participate in two more wars against the Romans. In the Third Samnite War, a coalition of Samnites, Gauls, Etruscans, and other Oscan tribes attacked Rome. Rome and her allies defeated this coalition at the battle of Sentinum in 295 BC, which was followed by the capture of Samnite Venafrum, pushing Samnite territory further east across the Volturnus River. In the Fourth and final Samnite war, Samnites participated in another coalition against Rome led by Epirus' King Pyrrhus.

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43 Liv. 9.23.4 says the battle at Lautulae was indecisive, but other sources claim it was a Samnite victory, notably Diod. Sic. 19.72.7. For Sora, Liv. 9.23.2 says that the Sorans attacked Roman colonists there, but later claims that the colony at Sora was not established until 303 BC. Patterson (2006a, 200) argues these were garrisons rather than formal colonists.

44 Liv. 9.25–6.

45 Liv. 9.31.5.

The Romans, who at this time had already established a firm hold over a great deal of the resources and manpower of Italy, again emerged victorious. This victory was followed up by the establishment of colonies at Beneventum in 268 BC and Aesernia in 263 BC, effectively confining the Samnites to a small area of mountainous land in the Pentri territory and the lower Biferno River valley. No Italian group was any longer a serious threat to Roman hegemony in the peninsula, but they were now in conflict with Carthaginian interests in Sicily and Sardinia, a conflict which resulted in the Punic Wars and, ultimately, Rome's transformation into a Mediterranean-wide Empire.

4. *Roman Colonization and Economic Competition*

Two points emerge immediately from this abridged outline of the Samnite wars. Firstly, it is clear how numerous and frequent the attempts were by both Romans and Samnites to extend their territorial control by attacking neighbouring areas and by making, and then quickly breaking, alliances with other groups to gain an advantage over their competitors. The second and related point is that colonies were clearly a crucial feature of the way Rome sought to defeat the Samnites and to maintain control of their newly won territories. Indeed, colonies and the role of colonization in securing for Rome her Italian conquests have rightly been emphasized in modern scholarship.[46] As with other aspects of the conquest of Italy, however, colonization is often treated entirely from a Roman point of view, being seen as a means for Rome to gain military outposts in or near enemy territory and to increase its access to resources. These are surely vital aspects of Rome's conquest of Italy, but such a one-sided view obscures the fact that many battles had to be fought against competing interests before Rome was able to gain control over these areas and their resources.

Furthermore, that Rome profited with their colonial holdings by increasing their access to resources is, as is frequently noted, a reasonable claim, but requires further elaboration. It requires, first of all, explaining what resources were available for Roman expropriation and how precisely these resources benefited Rome. Secondly, many scholars either imply or explicitly state that colonization was entirely a Roman

[46] See particularly Salmon (1970); Brunt (1971); Harris (1990); Oakley (1993); Cornell (1995); and, more recently, Bradley (2006); Rich (2008).

achievement.[47] This raises the question why, if colonization was so successful an economic and military strategy for the Romans, was it not imitated by Rome's competitors? Thus, either a convincing answer has to be given to this question, or we must allow for non-Roman colonization or some other strategy aiming at a similar effect.

With respect to the first point, it is widely thought that, in addition to simply being a *locus* from which Roman and allied soldiers could engage in military activity, colonies provided a means for Romans to alleviate the increasing overpopulation and growing numbers of landless peasants by providing them with land. These colonists formed an additional pool of army recruits, since owning property was a qualification for service. Moreover, colonies allowed Rome to extend civic rights and responsibilities to allies as well as some conquered peoples, thereby incorporating a great deal of Italy's human resources into the Roman state.[48] Recently, however, Rosenstein has questioned how much of an effect such colonial allotments would have had on solving overpopulation in Rome, extensive military service, or peasant landlessness, if this indeed was widespread at this time.[49] He argues convincingly that neither the number of colonial allotments assigned during this period nor the frequency of colonial settlement was sufficient to have had any meaningful effect on these problems.

Still, it is not doubted that establishing colonies gave the Romans access to an increased pool of material resources. These would have been consumed by the colonists themselves, traded with other areas for different goods or for profit, and used to provide food and clothing for soldiers. This later point is worth emphasizing, for, as Rosenstein argued, "year-round warfare had become the norm by the later fourth century", meaning that soldiers were not reliant on gaining leave to tend to their farms but gained subsistence through plunder and by rations or pay for their service.[50] This required, however, that there were enough goods available to the Romans and their military allies to provide for the soldiers' needs.[51] This is a crucial point, for it means accepting that these areas of central

[47] Notably, Toynbee (1965:1, 140); Salmon (1969, 13–17); Cornell (1995, 351–2); Rich (2008, 52). Note, however, that there are some hints in Livy that non-Romans established colonies, and it has been argued that the Latin League, not Rome alone, was actually responsible for many early Latin colonies, see Bradley (2006, 171–2). See also Roselaar (2011).

[48] Cornell (1995, 320, 364–8); Rich (2008, 52).

[49] Rosenstein (2004, 59–62).

[50] *Ibidem*, 52.

[51] *Ibidem*, 30.

Italy had the material wealth needed to sustain a local colonial population as well as to furnish food and clothing to soldiers stationed in the area. This, however, largely contradicts the traditional notion that many areas outside of Latium and Campania, such as in Samnium where many of Rome's colonial efforts were aimed, were economically underdeveloped. The archaeological evidence presented at the beginning of this paper supports the idea that much of Samnium did indeed have the means to supply these goods. Therefore, given that Rome's colonies were established in areas with a pre-existing system of agricultural exploitation and even trade links with other areas, we can safely posit that these colonial holdings would have helped to ensure that Roman soldiers had access to these important resources. Colonies, thus, had a military dimension that went beyond simply being placed in strategic locations, but one connected with the economic situation of the area.

Another important but frequently overlooked feature of Roman colonization is that the territories and the resources used for colonization by the Romans were targeted partly because they were being contested by Rome's rivals. In other words, the same territory and the same goods were being sought by other Italian groups as well, and for the same purposes. This brings us back to the second point I raised concerning traditional accounts of Roman colonization; namely, whether non-Romans engaged in any activity resembling Roman colonization, or, if not, why not. The answer seems to be that, in fact, Samnites and likely other groups were indeed trying to accomplish the same things which Romans were with their colonies, even if the Samnites went about it in slightly different ways and were not able or willing to devote the same resources which the Romans were and, therefore, were less successful in their attempts. This is perhaps a controversial point, since colonization is usually viewed as an exclusively Greco-Roman achievement, since we have no evidence of Samnite colonies in the Roman mould. I want to stress that I am not trying to argue that any group other than the Romans ever established a Roman-style colony. I fully recognize that Roman colonization was a unique phenomenon in many respects, particularly with regard to how well Rome was able to organize and mobilize resources and to extend Roman and Latin citizenship to solidify control over their colonial holdings.[52] What I am arguing, however, is that the goals typically ascribed to

[52] See, however, Bispham (2006) and Bradley (2006) on how Roman colonization in the Republic was much more varied and loosely controlled than is often assumed, and was not always the product of a massive state-led mobilization effort.

Romans with their colonial efforts existed also for Samnites: the desire to gain a military stronghold near enemy territory, to acquire plunder and access to agricultural goods, and as a means to dispose of excess population. Surely, Samnite attempts to capture Capua, Saticula, Suessa, Fregellae, and other areas were not fundamentally different from Rome's seizure of Cales, Saticula, Luceria, and Bovianum, even if the Romans went about it in a somewhat different manner and were more successful in holding their conquests in the long term, which, I believe, partly explains why only Roman and no Samnite colonies show up in our sources.

The unmistakable fact that Rome was more successful in acquiring and holding conquered territory than any of her rivals is an extremely important issue, especially considering that this simple fact may go a long way in explaining why Rome was able to defeat her Italian rivals en route to gaining the supremacy over all Italy. Unfortunately, there is not sufficient space here to explore adequately why this might have been the case, apart from giving the obvious answer that Rome simply won more battles and therefore had more land to conquer and hold. I would like to suggest briefly, however, that the difference in the internal socio-political makeup between these two peoples played a key role in their differential success. It is worth emphasizing again that the Samnites were at best a loose confederation of different tribes, not a coherent state, whereas Rome was an autonomous city-state. As mentioned, the Samnites often engaged in collective military action under a single general commander, but this seems to have been simply a temporary alliance for a specific purpose, after which the alliance presumably broke up until the next occasion arose. I believe that this, in part, prevented the Samnites from following up on any victory and solidifying their hold over captured territory, such as in Capua, Sora, and Fregellae. Each tribe would have had competing priorities, with the tribes closest to the new land being most likely to want to consolidate their control, such as the Caudini with Capua in the fifth century BC, while other tribes would be less willing to devote resources to this endeavour. Furthermore, since their alliance was largely military in nature, the Samnites as a group seemingly lacked the administrative capabilities to organize the movement of people and reorganizing of civic structures on the scale that Rome was able to do.

The crucial point here, though, is that it was not only Romans who were acting aggressively and seeking to extend their sphere of control, but that Samnites and other groups were competing for the same things. Exploring the nature and effects of this competition, moreover, presents a more complete picture of the Roman conquest of Italy. It allows us to

widen our analytical scope to include not only the causes and nature of Rome's rise to power, but also the context in which this rise occurred, namely in the face of and largely as a response to competition from other Italian peoples, Samnites as well as Campanians, various Latin communities, Etruscans, Tarentines and other Greeks in south Italy, as well as Gauls.[53] All of these groups were striving to increase their military prowess relative to the others and to widen, or at least to maintain, their territorial control. Nor is the idea that Samnites vied with Rome, at least in the fourth century BC, for the supremacy of Italy particularly controversial. Both Diodorus Siculus and Appian, in fact, hold this view.[54] Although these sentiments are mixed with disparaging remarks about the barbaric primitivism of the Samnites, as described above, it does indicate that these authors were willing to believe that the Samnites were serious rivals of Rome, at least at certain times.[55]

5. *Conclusion*

It is fair to say, then, that nearly all of Italy during the course of the fifth to the third centuries BC was embroiled in a fiercely competitive environment, an environment which carried certain constraints and incentives to the various rivals with equal force. We can clearly see these forces acting on both the Romans and Samnites during this period of intense Italian conflict: each side frequently made and broke alliances and peace treaties trying to gain the upper hand over their rivals, such as between Romans and Samnites in 354 BC, 341 BC, 321 BC, and 304 BC, between Samnites and Palaeopolis in 327 BC, Samnites and Volscians in 330 BC, and Etruscans and Gauls during the Third and Fourth Samnite Wars, as well as several short-lived alliances between Campanians and Latins against both Roman and Samnite aggression; additionally, many battles were fought to increase control over contested land which, crucially, had the added benefit of simultaneously restricting a competitor's access to that same

[53] Eckstein (2006) explores how Italy's competitive environment affected the various Italian communities during this period, although his Realist perspective does not allow that economic or domestic political motivations played an important role. This same approach has been taken more recently by Fronda (2010) who also seeks to explain Rome's rise to hegemony within a competitive Italian environment; however, his focus is on the Hannibalic wars.

[54] Diod. Sic. 19.101.1; App. *Samn.* 3.1.

[55] For Roman authors' ambiguous and conflicting attitudes to Rome's rivals, see Dench (1995).

territory. Precisely this sort of battle lay at the heart of the first two Samnite wars and both sides sought to improve military effectiveness through extending control over territory. Such territorial extension provided not only strategically located bases for military operations and expanded each side's recruitment base, but also helped secure access to the food and clothing needed by soldiers while, just as importantly, removing that same access from competitors.

Understanding the nature and effects of the environment of competition which existed in Italy during the fifth through third centuries BC thus provides the best means for explaining all of the evidence we possess about this period, not only concerning Rome's aggressive behaviour and her conquest of Italy, but also for Samnite behaviour and the different motivations behind their actions. As we have seen, many Samnite communities were fairly well-developed in many respects and had their own economic interests to protect, their own military objectives, their own series of alliances, and their own internal social and political characteristics. Perhaps never truly able to equal the military, administrative, and economic might of Rome, even when united, surely the various Samnite communities were legitimate rivals to, and at times seriously threatened, Rome's control over Italy. Put simply, the conquest of Samnium was not a completely one-sided, Roman affair, nor was Rome the only Italian community engaged in aggressive actions during the middle Republic.

What is needed, therefore, is a different approach to this period of Italian history, one which accounts for the various intersecting and possibly changing motivations which propelled Roman and Samnite action, external as well as internal factors, and one which better accounts for the evidence concerning Samnite economic development than the traditional accounts. Competition over military, political, and material gain is, I argue, a compelling focal point for such a new approach. Focusing on this competition helps to explain the motivations behind the actions taken by Romans and Samnites as being driven in large part by attempts to gain an advantage over the other side. Moreover, this competition-based model can shed light on the activity of the Etruscans, Latins, Campanians, Gauls, Tyrrhenians and other south-Italian Greeks, and other groups in and around the Italian peninsula. In this way we can get past the 'clash of civilization' model of Roman expansion and the conquest of Italy and study how the goals and deeds of non-Roman Italians played a role in shaping the events of this critical period.

THE WEAKEST LINK: ELITE SOCIAL NETWORKS IN REPUBLICAN ITALY

Kathryn Lomas*

1. *Introduction*

Networks of personal contact and obligation between individuals, particularly those of elite status, were an important feature of the societies of ancient Italy throughout Antiquity. They could be mediated through various means—kinship and intermarriage, formal guest-friendships or a variety of other ties of obligation. These went well beyond purely personal relationships, and could have wide-ranging significance. They served as important conduits for contact between Romans and Italians, and between different areas of Italy. They also acted as channels for spreading cultural ideas and influences, as well as forming powerful economic, political and social networks. However, their essentially fluid nature and the fragmentary nature of the evidence can make it difficult to examine their extent and their modes of operating. In particular, it can be difficult to get an accurate sense of what they could or could not be used to achieve. The vocabulary of personal relationships is difficult to evaluate in terms of the closeness of a relationship and the obligations involved,[1] so it can be difficult to get a grip on their impact on the development of Italy and the relations between Italians and Romans. As Brunt famously noted,[2] the intricate links of kinship and friendship between the Roman and Italian nobility did not prevent the outbreak of the Social War.

The fact that much of our evidence is limited to connections between Romans and Italians also restricts what we can infer. It seems very likely that there was a complex network of connections between Italians of leading families from many different states and regions, and that contacts between Roman aristocrats and notables from other Italian states were simply part of this wider network and pattern of behaviour. However, the sparseness of evidence of such connections makes it difficult to construct

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[1] Hellegouarc'h (1963); Deniaux (1993, 75–89).
[2] Brunt (1988, 31).

a detailed picture of interconnections between Italian communities in the period of Roman conquest.[3] For the early to mid-first century BC, however, we have a much greater amount of evidence thanks to the works of Cicero, which chart his network of social relations in some detail. Although this takes the paper a little beyond the chronological scope of this volume, it permits analysis of Cicero's network of contacts, and those of his associates, which may allow us to establish if, and how, patterns of behaviour changed in the period of transition from independence to Roman citizenship.

This paper will review the evidence for interconnections and social networks between members of the Roman and Italian elite with reference to the early and middle years of the first century BC. It will examine possible strategies for creating, maintaining and exploiting such connections and will focus on two types of relationship, which may have operated in different ways, but which seem to have been equally vital to the relations between high-status individuals and families from non-Roman backgrounds. *Vicinitas*, or neighbourliness, is a geographically-determined relationship which implied some degree of social obligation between people from the same area.[4] *Hospitium*—guest-friendship—was, in contrast, a means of formalising relationships of reciprocal hospitality between individuals and families from different areas or communities, often extended over many generations.[5] It was a long-established feature of aristocratic behaviour in Italy, although the nature and importance of *hospitium* in linking Romans and Italians may have changed during this period.

2. *Local Networks: The Power of* Vicinitas

The term *vicinitas* is relatively rare in Roman literature, but it is notable for its much higher frequency of use by writers of the first century BC, and especially so by Cicero. In essence, *vicinitas* is a geographically bounded concept, deriving from *vicinus*—a neighbour, literally someone from the same *vicus* or district. It first occurs in the work of Terence, used in the sense of neighbourliness, and is mostly used in Latin literature to denote

[3] Patterson (2006, 151–2) collects the available evidence for personal connections between Italian aristocrats beyond Rome.

[4] Wiseman (1971, 47–52); Deniaux (1993, 91–5); Lomas (2004).

[5] Wiseman (1971, 33–8).

geographical proximity or a more general sense of affinity.[6] However, Cicero not only uses the term significantly more often than other Latin authors, but does so in a rather different manner.

The people who counted as one's *vicini* were, first and foremost, one's fellow-citizens. Cicero, for instance, refers to the people of Arpinum as his *vicini*, with whom he shared a close bond. However, it is clear that *vicinitas* is not just restricted to people from the same *municipium*. In legal cases featuring Italian defendants, it seems to be important for the *vicini* of the defendant—and first and foremost the people from their home *municipium*—to turn out to support them.[7] In the *Pro Plancio*, however, Cicero describes Plancius' supporters as comprising not only Plancius' own *municipales* from Atina, but also a wider network of support based on *vicini* from neighbouring towns in Southern Latium, such as Aquinum, Sora, and even Arpinum.[8] *Vicinitas* was a finite concept and appears to be restricted to the immediate region with which a person is associated. In his defence of Rabirius Postumus, for example, Cicero draws a distinction between support from *vicini* and a less intense and reliable pool of support from a wider region.[9] The obligations of *vicinitas* were clearly limited to the immediate neighbourhood. Such obligations were not, however, restricted to people who actually came from the same *municipium* or same area, but could also be incurred by simply owning adjacent or nearby properties. In a letter to L. Lucceius, Cicero urges Lucceius to support him because they are friends and colleagues at Rome, but says that he would in any case be obliged to do so because of their ties of *vicinitas*.[10] In this case, however, the *vicinitas* he refers to is not conferred by coming from the same place or region, but simply by owning adjacent villas. Nevertheless, it illustrates the point that proximity and networks of neighbourhood contacts could be used to mobilise support for a variety of personal and political ends.

Cicero describes *vicinitas* as both a very useful way of calling in favours and mobilising support, and as a means of enhancing personal status. Sextus Roscius of Ameria, for instance, is defined in terms of a complex network of local and wider interactions and relationships. He is described as the pre-eminent man in his *municipium*, but also as dominant amongst

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6 Lomas (2004, 110–12).

7 *Cael.* 5; *Planc.* 20–3; *Mur.* 47.

8 *Planc.* 1–4, 20–4, 72.

9 *Rab. Perd.* 8.

10 *Fam.* 5.15.2; see also *Off.* 2.64.3; *Att.* 5.10.5.

his wider circle of neighbours—his *vicini*. He was also the *hospes* of several eminent Roman families, including the Metelli, who took in the younger Roscius during his trial.[11] The standing of the Roscii is, therefore, defined on three levels: their importance within their own city, their status and social network of contacts in neighbouring communities, and their connections with the Roman nobility.

The obligations conferred by *vicinitas* could be used to achieve a wide variety of social, economic and political benefits. Cicero frequently refers in his legal speeches to support given to the accused by his *vicini*, and uses this as a form of character reference. Copious support from a defendant's fellow townsmen and *vicini* was offered as a proof of good character, and absence of such support was used as a means of discrediting a defendant or witness.[12] Networks of contacts based on *vicinitas* were also important in mobilising electoral support, although the importance of this and how it might have worked are a matter of debate. The *Commentariolum Petitionis* explicitly states that cultivating one's *vicini* was particularly important for a new man seeking election, and some of the forensic speeches make reference to the role of *vicini* in electoral canvassing. Part of the argument of the *Pro Plancio* rests on the assertion that Plancius had been better than his rivals at mobilising his *vicini*, and Murena is said to have had support from his *vicini* while canvassing.[13] The extent to which voters from outside Rome could influence elections or votes on legislation is, however, difficult to assess, and Millar must surely be correct in suggesting that the number of Italians who came to Rome to vote must have been both variable and heavily weighted towards those from central Italy.[14] Conversely, *vicinitas* could be used to evoke public disapproval. In the *Pro Cluentio*, Cicero describes how networks of social contacts between peoples from communities along the Via Appia were used to whip up demonstrations of hostility towards Sassia as she travelled from Larinum to Rome.[15]

Cicero's strong personal sense of *vicinitas* is well known, and he paints a vivid picture of the social networks within his own region. His involvement with the Cluentius case was due to his connections with Aletrium,

[11] *Rosc. Am.* 15–18, 27; for a parallel case cf. *Planc.* 22–3.

[12] *Rosc. Am.* 15–18, 27; *Planc.* 22–3; *Cael.* 5.

[13] *Planc.* 22–3, *Cael.* 5, *Rab. Perd.* 8; *Muren.* 47; on regional networks and the political process see also *Mur.* 16–19, 42, 69; *Comm. Pet.* 24.2, 30.2, 31.3, 32.7. See Gabba (1986, 653–63); Millar (1998, 29–30); Mouritsen (2001).

[14] Millar (1998, 28–35); Mouritsen (2001, 118–23).

[15] *Cluent.* 192–4.

whose leading citizens approached him as a *vicinus* to defend the Fabricius brothers, two of the men involved in the case.[16] He also claims to have a personal interest in the local network of Plancius' supporters, drawn from Aquinum, Casinum, Sora, and Arpinum, as well as Plancius' native *municipium* of Atina.[17] Cicero was also assiduous on behalf of Arpinum and neighbouring cities: he used his connections to expedite collection of rents owing to both of these cities, and in the case of Arpinum he specifically linked this to local politics, and to the celebration of local festivals.[18] The rents owing to Arpinum were particularly important because Cicero was keen to use his influence to boost the chances of his son, his nephew, and a family friend being elected as aediles.

Cicero's letters give an insight into the importance of local and neighbourhood ties, although unlike in the speeches, he rarely uses the term *vicinitas* overtly. Instead, social ties deriving from geographical proximity are alluded to indirectly or individuals are described as *municipales* or *tribules* rather than as *vicini*.[19] Nevertheless, the obligations of *vicinitas* are clearly important. They appear most frequently in letters of recommendation, requesting favours or assistance on behalf of Cicero's network of contacts, or recommending his various contacts to other friends.[20] The emphasis in the letters is on the personal relationship between Cicero, his correspondent, and the people being recommended, underlined by the use of terms such as *observantia* (respect), *necessitudo* (close connection), or *familiaritas* (familiarity, intimacy),[21] in order to underline these social bonds, but ties of *vicinitas* are often present in the background to the recommendations, suggesting that this was an important way of mobilising assistance, favours, and support. It seems that *vicinitas* could confer obligations to provide assistance in a wide variety of contexts. For instance, Cicero wrote to the magistrates of an unnamed town in Latium on behalf of Q. Valgius Hippianus, requesting them to resolve an ongoing dispute about Valgius' property at Fregellae;[22] he seems to have been

16 *Cluent.* 46–9, 57.

17 *Planc.* 1–4, 20–4, 72.

18 *Fam.* 13.7, 13.11. He also states the importance of this connection in a famous passage, *Leg.* 2.5.

19 For instance *Fam.* 13.58, 13.11, 12. See Deniaux (1993, 91–5).

20 Collected and analysed in Deniaux (1993).

21 Deniaux (1993, 83–95) defines *observantia* as denoting an unequal relationship, implying some difference in age or social status, while *familiaritas* denotes a close connection and *neccesitudo* implies some level of reciprocal obligation.

22 *Fam.* 13.76; see also *Att.* 5.1.3–4, 16.10.1. The town is likely to have been either Fabrateria or Aquinum, which had administrative authority over Fregellae, Deniaux (1993, 91).

acting on the basis of *vicinitas*, in his capacity as a prominent local senator. He also drew on his connections with C. Cluvius of Puteoli to expedite the collection of rents owing to Atella and with C. Cupiennius of Cumae to assist the city of Buthrotum in Asia.[23] Both men were neighbours of his and linked to him by ties of *vicinitas*, since he owned properties at Puteoli and Cumae and was on close terms with the Cluvii.[24]

There are some problems in interpreting this evidence, particularly given that many of the most direct attestations of *vicinitas* comes from legal speeches, and therefore from contexts in which Cicero may be distorting or exaggerating for forensic advantage, or may be adopting a persona to appeal more effectively to the jury.[25] Nevertheless, the picture painted by Cicero in his legal speeches, of complex local networks of social connections between leading families and individuals which could be used to generate various forms of social, legal, and political cooperation, is consistent both with the evidence of his other writings and with other evidence from Italy.[26] It cannot, therefore, be dismissed as part of Cicero's rhetoric, but must be examined as a representation of a significant form of social interaction between Romans and Italians.

3. *Guest-Friendship*

Social networks based on *vicinitas* are by definition based on locality and geographical proximity. Networks based on formalised guest-friendship (*hospitium*) are, in contrast, more geographically dispersed, and in fact would only have been useful if this was the case.

Hospitium appears to be a relationship which could cover a wide range of different uses and degrees of contact. Its basic function was to provide a relationship of reciprocal hospitality, which could be solemnised and recorded by an inscribed *tessera hospitalis*, which may have been kept as proof of the relationship. *Hospitium* was a hereditary relationship, and could link families together over several generations.[27] There is persuasive

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23 *Fam.* 13.7; *Att.* 16.16 D.

24 On the Cluvii, their business interests, and Cicero's properties on the Bay of Naples see Shatzmann (1975, 404–8); Andreau (1983). See also *Fam.* 13.56, a letter of recommendation on behalf of M. Cluvius to Minucius Thermus, requesting his assistance in the collection of money owing to Cluvius in Asia.

25 Lintott (2008, 33–6). See also Craig (2010) for discussion of Cicero's exploitation of the expectations of the jury in cases such as the *Pro Roscio*.

26 On Cicero's personal ties of *vicinitas*, see *Fam.* 13.11.

27 ILLRP 1066; Plaut. *Poen.* 1046–50. See Patterson (2006, 140–1).

evidence that from an early date many communities in Italy were linked together by personal relationships of this type between leading citizens. For instance, we have evidence of *tesserae hospitales* from Etruria from as early as the seventh century BC, although these are too fragmentary to provide any details other than the names of the signatories. Several late-seventh century *tesserae* have been found in the Orientalising complex at Murlo.[28] There is also an example from Rome, dating to the mid to late sixth century BC, which was found at the sanctuary of S. Omobono.[29] However, evidence for the archaic period is relatively slight.

Accounts of the fourth and third centuries, however, allow us to study in greater detail how such relationships may have influenced public life. Livy's account of a conflict between Privernum, Fundi, and Rome in 330 BC clearly demonstrates how the personal contacts and relationships between individuals influenced state action.[30] The key figure, Vitruvius Vaccus, is described as a citizen of Fundi. Despite this, he was the commander of the army of Privernum. The route by which he came to be a general for Privernum is not specified, but it implies that he was eligible for public office there, and may therefore have been a citizen of Privernum as well as of Fundi. In addition to his local ties, Vaccus also owned a substantial house at Rome, which was later destroyed as retribution for his treachery in revolting against Rome. The nature of the connection—whether it was by virtue of family connections, intermarriage, or some other relationship—is not clear, but it implies close interconnections between the elite of Fundi and Privernum. Although the nature of his relationships with Privernum and Rome are not clarified by Livy, it seems most likely that these were mediated by connections of family relationship or *hospitium*. Ownership of a house in Rome may imply close connections with the Roman elite, as well as with noble families in cities closer to home.

Some of the most detailed evidence for the influence of personal links between Italians comes from the period of the Hannibalic war. These suggest a pattern of close ties of kinship, *hospitium*, or other forms of obligation between Romans and Italians, and between Italians and Italians, but a systematic pattern is difficult to pin down. Most famously, the leader of the Capuan revolt in 216, Pacuvius Calavius, was part of a complicated family network.[31] He was related by marriage to both Appius Claudius (his

[28] Bagnasco Gianni (1996, 258); Maggiani (2005, 18–22).
[29] Rix (1991, ET La 2.3).
[30] Liv. 8.19–22. See Oakley (1998, 602–21).
[31] Liv. 23.2–5.

father-in-law) and Livius Drusus (his son-in-law). This may not have been unusual. Capua had the right of *conubium* (intermarriage) with Rome, and, according to Livy, a significant number of other Capuan families had also married into the Roman elite.[32] These close connections, paradoxically, seem to have complicated the situation rather than cemented the alliance with Rome. Livy's account of the events of 216 BC states that an earlier attempt to defect to Hannibal had been thwarted by the actions of Capuans with connections of kinship and *hospitium* at Rome, and that ties of *conubium* had inhibited even Pacuvius Calavius from rebelling until he felt that it was absolutely necessary.[33] However, he also implies that some element of the Capuan elite resented the disparity in status between themselves and their Roman in-laws and saw Cannae as an opportunity to reclaim power which they saw as draining away to Rome.[34] Livy cites as evidence—although with some scepticism—a source which suggests that the Capuans tried to negotiate for a share of political power at Rome by demanding that they be given access to the Roman consulship.[35] Whether there was such a massive and overt gulf in status between Roman and Italian elites in the third century as Livy implies is open to question, and it is possible that this is a retrojection of conditions and attitudes of the period of the Social War into an earlier era. What does seem clear, however, is that under some circumstances, close bonds such as kinship did not necessarily guarantee support, but could breed rivalry and conflict rather than alliance and co-operation.

Similar patterns are found elsewhere at the same period. Livy recounts various instances in which Campanians who had connections of *hospitium* or kinship with Roman leaders abandoned these to join Hannibal, including the betrayal of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in 212 BC by a Lucanian friend (described as *hospes et amicus*) called Flavus and the duel between T. Quinctius Crispinus and Badius the Campanian, said to have been a *hospes* and close friend.[36] In all cases, Livy strongly condemns these betrayals of ties of friendship and hospitality. Although he is clearly making a moral point to emphasise the iniquities of those who rebelled against

[32] Liv. 23.2.5–7. On the legal relationship between Rome and Capua, based on a grant of *civitas sine suffragio* in 340 BC, see Livy 8.11.6. See Oakley (1998, 514–15).

[33] Liv. 23.2.5–7. See Patterson (2006b, 148–9).

[34] Liv. 23.3.

[35] Liv. 23.7. See Fronda (2010, 103–26).

[36] Livy 25.15; 25.18, discussed by Patterson (2006b, 149–50).

Rome, he also underlines both the importance of these relationships and their potential fragility if exposed to other obligations and pressures.

The nature and significance of *hospitium* may well have changed over time. The fact that in the archaic period it was formalised in written documents, sometimes (as in the ivory *tesserae* from Etruria and Rome) written on prestigious materials and possibly displayed in elite houses suggests that it was an important relationship from which both signatories derived significant social kudos.[37] By the first century BC, however, the nature of *hospitium* may have been changing. It has been suggested that a growing disparity in status between the Roman senatorial elite and the elite families of other Italian cities meant that *hospitium* between a Roman and an Italian was no longer an equal relationship. Instead, it was one which conferred more status on the Italian but which shaded into a relationship of patronage on the part of the Roman participant.[38] However, this is not by any means certain.[39] Some Italian aristocrats wielded considerable social and economic influence, and it would be unwise to assume that they were necessarily less prestigious or influential than—for instance—a junior senator.[40] In any case, the number of *hospites* a person had was an important measure of social status. A large, extensive, and well-connected network of contacts conferred both enhanced status and practical influence, and as such *hospites* remained important to ambitious Romans.[41] The extent to which *hospitium* between two Italians may have become a more unequal relationship, as some members of the Italian elite began to pursue careers in Rome, is not easy to answer through lack of evidence, but we should at least consider the possibility that any changes in the relationship between *hospites* may have affected relations between Italians, as well as between Italians and Romans.

An examination of Cicero's web of relationships—our largest body of evidence for this period—throws an interesting light on relations of *hospitium* at this date. The extent to which it implied close personal contact—or even much contact at all—between *hospites* is open to question. In his speeches, formal connections between Romans and non-Romans are

[37] Patterson (2006b, 141–53).

[38] Wiseman (1971, 37–46, esp. 37–8); Patterson (2006b, 151–3).

[39] For a *vicinitas* and *hospitium* as more active and equal relationships, see Deniaux (1993, 136–44); Lomas (2004, 110–16).

[40] On the power and status of *equites*, particularly those of Italian origin, and their role in networks of social and economic influence, see Deniaux (1993, 128–33).

[41] Herman (1987); Patterson (2006b, 151–2).

mostly used for rhetorical effect, to make a moral point. Allegations of ill-treating someone who is a *hospes*, for instance the allegations of plots to murder *hospites* who were actually in the perpetrator's own house,[42] are a way of highlighting the enormity and shock-value of a crime or blackening an opponent's character. Similarly, the approval or support of one's *hospites* was advanced as a way of establishing good character. It also suggests that the number and social standing of one's *hospites* could be regarded as an indication of personal status.[43] In this context, *hospites* perform a similar role to *vicini*. Their presence and support enhances the standing and character of the defendant, while their absence or disapproval detracts from it.

Cicero's letters, however, cast some interesting light on his own network of *hospites*, both within and outside Italy. They allow us to examine his relations with them, and also cast some light on the relationship of *hospitium* in action. Firstly, his *hospites* come from a wide variety of backgrounds and include Romans, Italians, and provincials. They include men such as Lyson of Patras, named as a *hospes* of long standing, and numerous other men from Sicily and the eastern provinces, as well as Italians such as Laenius Flaccus of Brundisium, and Romans.[44] They are also are of varied social status. In some cases, Cicero refers to other senators as *hospites*. Murena was asked as a *hospes* to provide accommodation for Cicero on at least one occasion[45] and Dolabella was presented with a copy of Cicero's books in thanks for his hospitality.[46] More frequently, he refers to some of his contacts amongst the Italian elite[47] and in the provinces in these terms.

[42] *Deiot.* 3–5 and *Cael.* 21 contain strong assertions that harming a *hospes* while he or she is under one's own roof is deeply shocking and impious.

[43] For example, *Rosc. Am.* 15–18 and *Balb.* 19, which cite the support of *hospites* as evidence of the strength of the defendant's case. *Hospites* could also be called on to canvass for candidates at elections: *Mur.* 41; *Sest.* 4. See Wiseman 1971, 130–42.

[44] Provincial *hospites* include: Lyson of Patras (*Fam.* 13.19, 13.24), Hagesaretus of Larisa (*Fam.* 13.25), C. Avianius Philoxenus (*Fam.* 13.35), Hippias of Caleacte (*Fam.* 13.37), A. Licinius Aristoteles of Melita (*Fam.* 13. 52); Andron of Laodicea (*Fam.* 13.67), Democrites of Sicyon (*Fam.* 13.78). Italian *hospites* include: Valerius of Rhegium (*Att.* 16.7), Papirius Paetus of Naples (*Fam.* 9.7), M. Laenius Flaccus of Brundisium (*Fam.* 14.4), and unnamed *hospites* at Terracina and Metapontum (*Fam.* 7.23; *Fin.* 5.4). For a full list, see Deniaux (1993).

[45] *Att.* 13.50.

[46] *Fam.* 9.12.

[47] For instance, the *hospites* who put him up at Canusium, Brundisium, and Leucopetra, *Att.* 1.13, 16.7; *Fam.* 14.4. Putortì (1934) argues that Cicero's connections with Bruttium and other areas of the Mezzogiorno may have been close, and argues that his journeys through

Guest-friends appear to vary quite considerably in their closeness to Cicero and in the frequency of contact with him. Some, such as Papirius Paetus, are clearly intimates with whom he had regular contact. He and Paetus corresponded frequently—there are twelve surviving letters as well as references to Paetus in others—and he is addressed by Cicero in familiar terms, suggesting a high degree of social intimacy. In other cases, in contrast, Cicero mentions *hospites* as parts of a general network of social contacts, along with clients and freedmen, which may suggest he viewed his relationship with some *hospites* as little more than a form of *clientela*.[48] However, Cicero seems to draw distinctions between people who are just *hospites*, those who are *hospites et amici*, and those who are connections of particularly long standing, which seems to suggest that the term covers a range of social relationships. A. Licinius Aristoteles of Melita, for instance, is described as *antiquissimus hospes meus*, although it is unclear whether he was a long-standing personal *hospes* of Cicero or whether the bond of *hospitium* was a family connection of longer standing.[49] On the other hand, some letters mentioning *hospites* are letters of recommendation written on behalf of various connections,[50] including several written to friends asking them to extend friendship and *hospitium* to his contacts in Greece and the eastern provinces, almost certainly as a *quid pro quo* for assistance and hospitality to Cicero during his travels outside Italy. Most of these are fairly formulaic and it is difficult to deduce the level of engagement and closeness of social contact. Certainly the people to whom they were recommended as possible *hospites* may not have known them personally. However, his dealings with C. Avianius Philoxenus, originally of Caleacte, suggest that provincial *hospites* could have a significant degree of contact with their Roman counterparts. Cicero succeeded

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the region in 58 and 44 BC and his travels to and from Sicily may imply that he had a more extensive network of *hospites* and other social contacts in these regions.

[48] *Att.* 1.20: *Nunc si me amas, si te a me amari scis, enitere per amicos, clientis, hospites, libertos denique ac servos tuos ut scida ne qua depereat*; see also *Fam.* 5.8, in which Cicero offers the assistance of all his *amici, hospites*, and clients to Crassus. Some, such as Atticus' host at Canusium, do not even warrant a name, and appear to be fairly peripheral; *Att.* 1.13. See Shackleton-Bailey (1965, 342–3).

[49] *Fam.* 13.52.

[50] These include Andron of Laodicea, recommended to Servilius Isaurica (*Fam.* 13.67); Democritus of Sicyon, recommended to A. Allienus (*Fam.* 13.78); Hippias of Caleacte, recommended to Acilius Glabrio (*Fam.* 13.37); Lyson of Patras, recommended to Sulpicius Rufus (*Fam.* 13.19, 13.24, 16.5); A. Avianus Philoxenos, the father of Hippias of Caleacte (*Fam.* 13.35) and Hagesaretos of Larissa (*Fam.* 13.25). Most of the letters of recommendation are collected in *Fam.* 13. See Deniaux (1993).

in obtaining the citizenship of Novum Comum for Avianus from Caesar, and also recommended both Avianus himself and his son Hippias—who seems not to have been included in the grant of citizenship—to Acilius Glabrio.[51] The extant letters to Glabrio refer to Avianus as a long-standing *hospes* and a *familiaris*, which seems to argue for a more active and ongoing relationship. There seems, therefore, to be a large variation, ranging from a relationship of close friendship and social equality, to one which is very distant bond and not far (if at all) removed from clientship.[52]

The same variation is perceptible in what *hospites* can be used to do. One of their important functions was as a source of accommodation when on the move.[53] Cicero makes reference both to being a guest in cases where the host is clearly present, and also to having access to the houses and villas of his *hospites* in their absence. He describes convivial stays with people who were obviously personal friends, but he also makes reference to stays in various villas where there is no indication that the owner was in residence.[54] For example, he stayed at a villa near Rhegium belonging to his *hospes* Valerius in 44 BC, but there is no reference to Valerius being resident at the time.[55] He also mentions a villa near Alsium in Etruria which was loaned out to a whole group of people by a man called Dida in 45 BC.[56]

A network of *hospites* also had an important function as a private information network. Cicero's stay at Leucopetra in 44 BC coincided with the arrival of a group of men from nearby Rhegium who brought news of Brutus. He also relied on some of his Asian *hospites* for news of Caecina in 46 BC.[57] Others *hospites* were used as an informal postal service. L. Paccius was entrusted with letters to Atticus, and Atticus' unnamed *hospes* at Canusium was asked to pass on letters.[58] Additionally, *hospitium* could be used as a general means of generating support when needed, whether turning up to support defendants in a trial, or supporting candidates canvassing for election.

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[51] *Fam.* 13.35: *Antiquus est hospes meus et praeter hospitium valde etiam familiaris*. See also *Fam.* 13.37.

[52] See Deniaux (1993, 145–60) on the variation in forms of address and ways of describing relationships in Cicero's letters of recommendation.

[53] See Patterson (2006b, 141–3) for non-Ciceronian examples.

[54] For example *Att.* 13.52; *Fam.* 9.26.

[55] *Att.* 16.7.

[56] *Att.* 13.50.

[57] *Fam.* 6.6.

[58] *Att.* 1.13, 4.16.

The extent to which such connections represent a close social relationship may have varied considerably. In some cases, networks of *hospitium* may include many people who have rarely met, and in which the actual level of contact and familiarity is low and infrequent.[59] As noted above, Cicero frequently petitioned friends to add his *hospites* to their own networks of contacts, so it is possible that extended networks could consist of people who had little direct personal knowledge of each other. Even when all parties were well-known to each other, the actual levels of contact may have been small or infrequent. The nature of networks of personal contacts, whether via kinship or *hospitium*, is, therefore difficult to evaluate. They seem to be very pervasive in Italy from an early date, although changing in nature over time. The taboo against harming a *hospes* or going against his interests is in theory a strong one, and to do so brought disgrace,[60] but in practice this did not stop it from happening, particularly in times of stress, such as the Hannibalic, Social and Civil wars. An important question which remains to be answered is, therefore, how significant personal ties of this type were, both in linking Italian communities amongst themselves and in providing a significant conduit between the Roman elite and the rest of Italy. The pervasiveness of these social networks must be set against the fact that they did not prevent conflict such as the Social War or outbreaks of hostility between people embedded in the same network of social relationships and obligations.

4. *Social Networks and Social Contacts*

One avenue which may cast light on this question is social network theory, which has been used to explore economic and social networks using both historical and contemporary data.[61] It is also a powerful tool for exploring the connections between different areas of the ancient world, and has been particularly widely used in exploring economic relationships and

[59] Patterson (2006b, 141–3) suggests that one function of a *tessera hospitalis* was to act as proof of the relationship if claims of *hospitium* were made between people who did not personally know each other.

[60] Cicero states that disgrace is incurred specifically when the *hospes* is currently a guest of the person who harms him, suggesting that perhaps it was not regarded so strictly in other contexts: *Deiot.* 3–5; *Cael.* 21.

[61] Scott (2000) gives a useful overview of the methods and techniques. See also Wellman & Berkowitz (1997) for case-studies of the application of social network analysis to historical data.

contacts between geographically distant areas,[62] but has been, at least until recently, less widely used in exploring social relationships. However, it may be a useful tool in tackling some of the ambiguities of social networks and their effectiveness, and this paper aims to see if this theoretical framework can shed any light on the strength of these types of social network, and how they may have influenced behaviour. A full-scale quantitative examination of the data is beyond the scope of this paper, and the Ciceronian evidence may pose problems for a formal mathematical approach. It can only provide a snapshot of Cicero's social relationships and is by definition only a partial record. Additionally, the difficulties of teasing out the nuances of social status implied by the vocabulary used by Cicero to describe personal relationships create difficulties in assigning weight or direction (measures of social inequality or the direction of who approaches who) to the links between individuals, which may limit the forms of analysis which can be undertaken.

However, one particularly influential study may be relevant to the question posed at the end of the previous section.[63] This approach, by Granovetter, examines networks as examples of 'strong' or 'weak' networks and ties, and evaluates the differences in the ways in which these operate. His model defines the strength of any particular interpersonal tie by a number of factors, including frequency of interaction, length of acquaintance, emotional intensity involved and the level of reciprocal services which characterise each tie.[64] In other words, ties such as family ties or close friendship, which involve close proximity, frequent interaction, and a high degree of reciprocal interaction, count as strong ties, while a mere acquaintance or a friend of a friend counts only as a weak one. Intuitively, this would suggest that networks of strong ties—typically kinship-based networks consisting of people linked by close family ties—were more resilient and effective in linking groups of people together than networks of weak ties.[65]

However, Granovetter's study suggests that this is not the case. Instead, it argues for an important role of weak ties in creating effective social networks. Although networks which consist only or mainly of strong ties

[62] See in particular Malkin, Constantakopoulou & Panagopoulou (2009) for the application of social network analysis to ancient history. On the techniques and uses of social network analysis, see Wellman & Berkowitz (1997); Scott (2000); Watts (2004).
[63] Granovetter (1973).
[64] Granovetter (1973, 1361).
[65] Scott (2000, 77–81); cf. Granovetter (1973, 1373–6).

are close-knit, they can also be inward-looking and exclusive, and the end result of a predominantly strong-tie network is not a fully functioning network but a more-or-less closed clique which cannot interact or cooperate effectively with other groups. The stronger the tie between any two individuals, the more likely it is that their networks of social contacts will overlap significantly. If the network also contains weak ties, however, it opens up greater possibilities for connection. Weak ties, however, have the capacity to create effective links both within and between networks. They act as bridges, providing shorter routes between points on a network and therefore quicker and more effective transmission of goods, information, or influence. Counter-intuitive though it may seem, Granovetter's study of the effectiveness of networks indicates that benefits were more likely to be obtained efficiently using weak ties—i.e. more distant relationships—than strong ones, since more distant ties were more likely to have a different circle of contacts. For example, if using a social network to obtain a job, the chances of success are significantly enhanced by using a wider network accessed by approaching more distant contacts rather than only close friends or relatives. Although the social ties with the people approached may be weaker or less direct, they open up a wider range of contacts and opportunities than would be the case if the person approached only their immediate circle of friends and relatives.

5. *Conclusion*

This model seems to have interesting implications for the study of social networks and contacts in ancient Italy. It is possible that in looking at networks of personal contacts as a force for social and political integration and cohesion we are expecting the wrong outcomes from them. Networks dominated by strong ties, such as kinship or intermarriage, may lead members of such a network to identify strongly with each other, but they may result in a number of fragmented cliques which are less effective in allowing members to achieve particular goals, and even produce factionalism and friction.[66] These alternative outcomes can perhaps be seen in the famous incident during the Social War when Roman and Marsic forces refused to fight, saying that they could not make war on their own relatives, and in the situation at Capua in 216 BC when resentment at a

[66] Granovetter (1973, 1373–5); Scott (2000, 78–81).

perceived level of exclusion by Rome despite the close web of intermarriage with the Capuan elite contributed to the revolt of the city.[67]

The networks of more distantly-related *hospites, vicini*, and friends maintained by Cicero and his contemporaries seem, however, to be very similar to Granovetter's 'weak tie' networks which rely on a more arms-length degree of contact, and on bridges between networks which allow an individual in one network to access a member of another network. Cicero's letters of recommendation, which implicitly create new links by recommending members of his own network of friends, *vicini*, and *hospites* to other friends and thus adding them to new networks (and creating new connections and obligations for himself in the process) seem to fit the model well.

Granovetter's study suggests these may have been highly effective as a means of transmitting social, economic, and political influence, precisely because they operated on a more distant and diffused model and therefore had a greater reach. For instance, relationships based on *vicinitas* (which is by definition based on neighbourhood-ness) seem at first glance to be geographically limited by definition. Cicero, however, places great emphasis on the importance of connections with *vicini*. In the *Pro Plancio* and elsewhere, he describes neighbourhood networks of contacts between communities, largely mediated through personal contact between leading citizens, into which he taps via his connections with Arpinum. Even though he retained family connections with Arpinum and took a close interest in the life of the town, he was at some remove from it in the day-to-day sense and at even greater remove from the affairs of other cities in Southern Latium—distance and infrequency of contact being a possible indicator of a weak tie, according to Granovetter.[68] Nevertheless, he was able to use his Arpinate connections to tap into a network via relatively weak ties if he needed to.

Turning to *hospitium*, we find that networks of *hospites* seem even more like weak-tie networks. Cicero's network of *hospites* was diverse and included people such as Papirius Paetus and the Cluvii, who enjoyed close contacts with him, but it also included many people with whom he had relatively sporadic contact, such as his *hospites* in the provinces. Although some of his letters of recommendation request very specific assistance from one friend on behalf of another, others are more generic and seek

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67 Diod. 37.15; Liv. 23.3.

68 Granovetter (1973, 1361–2).

simply to link one *hospes* or *familiaris* with another, creating a complex web of obligations, but also a fairly loose-knit one.

As noted above, evaluating the strength of a tie is difficult when the vocabulary of personal relationship and obligation is so unclear. In a situation in which *amicus* could be used of both a life-long personal friend, a current (but not necessarily lasting) political alliance, or someone whose basic relationship was more in the nature of patron/client, it is difficult to differentiate strong from weak ties. Equally, in a culture with no means of rapid transport or communication, frequency of direct face-to-face interaction—one of the measures used by Granovetter to assess the strength of a social tie—is not always a helpful index of strength of relationship. Nevertheless, the 'weak tie' network is potentially a useful model for understanding personal interactions in Italy. It may also help to explain the paradox that a set of social networks which are apparently close do not always result in integration and cohesion, but can lead to the outbreak of a conflict like the Social War, while others which appear much looser seem to have had a significant role in linking Italian communities and individuals together.

CONTACT, CO-OPERATION, AND CONFLICT IN PRE-SOCIAL WAR ITALY

John R. Patterson*

1. *Introduction*

In 91 BC a Latin comic actor called Saunio was about to appear on the stage in the city of Asculum. His talent for jokes and his humorous appearance made him a popular figure in the theatre, but this audience was a hostile one. The previous performer on the bill had just been murdered by one section of the audience after making hostile remarks about Rome, and Saunio, who himself was a favourite of the Romans, was afraid the people of Asculum would do the same thing to him: with some justification, since the festival ended with the killing of a Roman praetor and the other Romans in the city. Diodorus tells us that Saunio managed to escape a violent death by making an appeal to the audience:

> Know that I am not a Roman, but subject to the *fasces* just as you are, I traipse around Italy, peddling my graces in search of merriment and laughter. Spare then the swallow that belongs to all men alike, to whom the gods have given the privilege of building her nest without risk in any man's house.[1]

This paper explores the nature and extent of contacts between different parts of Italy, and different peoples of Italy, in the hundred years which preceded the Social War, as reflected in the travels of Saunio around the various communities of the peninsula. Traditionally, the second century BC has been seen as characterised by increasingly close links between Rome and the communities of Italy, culminating in an Italian desire for Roman citizenship;[2] therefore patronage ties, *hospitium* (guest-friendship), and marriage between Romans and Italians (to highlight only three aspects of this relationship) could be seen as factors which brought Rome and Italy

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1 Diod. 37.12 (Loeb translation, adapted); see also App. *BC* 1.38, assuming the two episodes are connected. Saunio's name suggests a Samnite origin, but Diodorus is explicit that he was a Latin, and Rawson (1991, 469–70) notes that the name was used to mean 'clown'.

2 See e.g. Brunt (1988, 93–143).

closer together.[3] By contrast, Mouritsen's work in particular has placed more stress on what divided Romans and allies than on what united them in the years leading up to the Social War, which he sees as a rebellion against Roman authority on the part of the Italians.[4] In this context, it is particularly worthwhile to investigate the nature of the links between different Italian communities. The rebels of 91 BC sought to establish a unity around the idea of 'Italia': issuing coins depicting their symbol, the bull (or *viteliu*) assaulting the Roman wolf, they chose the Paelignian town of Corfinium as their collective capital, which they named Italia.[5] An important element in the lead-up to the Social War, then, was arguably the creation of a collective identity around which the rebels (or some of them at least) could unite, despite the highly diverse political, geographical, cultural and linguistic patterns to be found across the peninsula. What mechanisms and patterns of contact were there which bound the Italian communities together, leaving aside the links which existed via Rome? Beginning with military service, the most obvious official context in which Italians from different communities could come together, I will review briefly a range of modes of contact including marriage, hospitality, migration and cultural influences, and conclude by focusing on some issues which divided rather than unified the Italians.

2. *Military Service*

The central function of Rome's alliances with the peoples of Italy was to provide manpower for the armies which were to expand Roman rule firstly across the peninsula and then around and beyond the Mediterranean.[6] Traditionally joint service in the Roman-led army has been seen as an important contribution to the process of integration between Rome and Italy: on this model, fighting side-by-side in the army exposed the Italians to the Latin language and to Roman culture, and contributed to the cultural and political Romanization which was supposedly the basis for their subsequent demand for citizenship. This idea has recently been critiqued, by Pfeilschifter in particular, who argued that the Romanizing influence

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3 For a recent review of the relationships between Romans and Italians in this period, see Patterson (2006b).

4 Mouritsen (1998); see also Sherwin-White (1973, 134–49).

5 Mouritsen (1998, 139–41); Pobjoy (2000).

6 North (1981, 6–7).

of military service has been exaggerated.[7] Rather than serving together in the ranks, he notes, Romans and Italians were recruited and deployed in separate units. While Romans served in the legions, each allied contingent (either a cohort of infantry or *turma* of infantry) operated under the leadership of a *praefectus* drawn from its own community, who in turn was under the overall command of a Roman officer appointed by the consul and known as *praefectus sociorum*.[8] In the camp, the allies were encamped together separately from the legionaries. Pfeilschifter argues that rather than developing links between Romans and allies, all these factors tended to contribute to enhancing the *internal* identity of the contingent from a particular community. Contingents from several small communities might be marshalled together, which would have helped to reinforce a sense of unity across local divisions.

In this context it is worth noting the special role of the so-called *extraordinarii* in the army.[9] Polybius explains that this was an elite corps of *epilektoi*, 'cavalrymen and infantry most fitted for actual service', who were drawn from all the allied contingents. One third of the cavalry, and one fifth of the allied infantry, were assigned to the *extraordinarii*.[10] A further selection of men was made from this group: when encamped these pitched their tents close to those of the army's commanders, for whom they also provided close support on the march.[11] The remainder of the *extraordinarii* were encamped together and, on the march, placed either in the vanguard of the army or (if an attack was expected from that direction) to the rear.[12]

This special role for the *extraordinarii*, and the arrangements made for them in the camp, are, I think, quite significant. They are clearly seen as an elite unit, and the preponderance of cavalry within them—one third of the whole body of the allied cavalry, which itself formed a very substantial component of the cavalry forces in the whole army—must have given the unit a social as well as a military prestige, on the assumption that only the wealthiest of the allied troops were able to afford service in the cavalry. Therefore, it is precisely in this sector of the Roman-led army that we can

[7] Pfeilschifter (2007); see Rosenstein in this volume for a more positive view.
[8] Ilari (1974); Keppie (1984, 21–3).
[9] Pfeilschifter (2007, 34–5); Dobson (2008, 52–3).
[10] Plb. 6.26.6–9.
[11] Plb. 6.31.2–3. For arrangements in the camp see Dobson (2008, 95–6); *cf.* Rosenstein in this volume.
[12] Plb. 6.40.4–8.

see Italians from different communities serving and encamped together in close proximity. The *extraordinarii*, or elements drawn from them, might be used for particularly challenging missions: one such example was the (ultimately disastrous) reconnaissance mission carried out by M. Claudius Marcellus and his consular colleague T. Quinctius Crispinus at Petelia in Calabria in 208 BC. Marcellus set out accompanied by 180 Etruscan cavalry and 40 cavalry from Fregellae ("who had always given Marcellus proof of their courage and loyalty", says Plutarch); but they were ambushed by the Carthaginians, the Etruscans fled, and despite the fierce resistance of the Fregellani, Marcellus himself was killed and Crispinus died of his wounds not long afterwards.[13]

In this case the outcome was catastrophic, but the story shows that it was not exceptional for cavalry units from different areas of Italy, potentially speaking different languages, to serve together on a mission. Probably only a limited knowledge of Latin was necessary for soldiers serving in the ranks (as opposed to those with command roles).[14] But in any case we could imagine the more affluent members of these communities to be the ones who were most likely to know Latin, facilitating communication between the different components of the *extraordinarii*. It may also be that soldiers from the Latin colonies were over-represented in these units, precisely because they were Latin speakers.[15] The fact that the *extraordinarii* were billeted together is also significant: it suggests that there may have been informal social interaction between the members of the contingent outside of their military co-operation. If so it is quite plausible that military service in the *extraordinarii* provided a means by which social links might be established or cemented between young men of the leading families of the allied communities of Italy.

3. Hospitium, *Intermarriage, and Migration*

Links of this kind may have resulted in the creation of bonds of *hospitium*, a relationship between two men of elite status, belonging to different communities, which entailed the obligation to provide hospitality together with other forms of assistance. There is a substantial body of

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[13] Plb. 10.32.1–6; Liv. 27.26–7; Plu. *Marc.* 29.

[14] For the situation in auxiliary units of the Roman army under the Principate, see Adams (2003, esp. 20 n. 61).

[15] Pfeilschifter (2007, 35).

evidence for such relationships between Romans and leading Italians in the third and second centuries BC, both from literary accounts and surviving bronze plaques known as *tesserae hospitales*.[16] While no such surviving artefacts (to my knowledge) attest relationships between individual Italians,[17] it is nevertheless highly likely that such relationships did indeed exist between Italian aristocrats, given the importance of *xenia* among aristocracies in the archaic world more generally, and the practical benefits for those travelling across Italy of staying with *hospites* rather than risking the accommodation offered by squalid local inns.[18]

Similarly, there is a tantalising scatter of literary evidence to suggest that Romans and Italians, and Italians from different communities, might marry one another.[19] For example, when the elites of Capua were punished by Rome for deserting to the Carthaginian side during the Second Punic War, Livy tells us that "those daughters [of the Capuans] who had married into other communities" were excluded from punishment.[20] Similarly we know that the tragedian Pacuvius, from the Latin colony of Brundisium, was the son of a sister of Ennius, who came from Rudiae in nearby Messapia.[21] For the period just after the Social War, a wealth of evidence for marriage relationships in Apennine central Italy is provided by Cicero's *Pro Cluentio*.[22]

Wiseman observed that "there is . . . excellent reason for believing in an 'international aristocracy' in Italy composed of the ruling families of Latin, Etruscan, Oscan, and central-Apennine towns, who intermarried freely among themselves, and among their social equals, the Roman nobility".[23] However, one difficulty in assessing how widespread the practice of intermarriage was is of course our ignorance of what laws might have existed to regulate marriage in the allied communities. A Roman citizen was legally allowed only to marry another Roman, or someone from a community with the right of *conubium*, or someone who had individually

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16 Badian (1958); Patterson (2006b, 140–3); Fronda (2010, 304–6, 317). See also Lomas in this volume.

17 It seems unlikely that the clay object found at Capua and bearing an Oscan text, now in the Chur museum (Vetter 1953, no. 102; Rix 2002, no. Cp 41) is a *tessera hospitalis*, though it is less clear what it actually was, see Crawford (forthcoming).

18 On *xenia* in general, see Herman (1987).

19 For marriage between Romans and Italians, see Patterson (2006b, 147–51); Lomas in this volume.

20 Liv. 26.34.3.

21 Plin. *NH* 35.19.

22 Moreau (1983); Fronda (2010, 320).

23 Wiseman (1971, 63).

been granted this privilege,[24] but that is not to say that unofficial or illegal marriages did not take place, and laws governing marriages between individuals from Italian communities are likely to have been different. A passage of Aulus Gellius gives us a glimpse into the laws governing marriage in one such Italian community, that of the Marsi: it was believed that the magical powers which enabled him safely to handle poisonous snakes would be lost if a man married outside his community.[25] It may be that Gellius is here referring to families particularly associated with snake-charming, but the passage illustrates our general lack of information about local laws and customs.

A related issue is the economic impact of marriage-dowries and inheritance practices which we know, from the Roman context, could lead to the break-up, or the agglomeration, of landed properties. Appian tells us that during the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus 'the rich' complained that often the lands being targeted by Gracchus for redistribution had been bequeathed to them or given to their daughters as dowries, and we know from a later passage of the same author that wealthy allies were aggrieved as much as their Roman counterparts by the activities of the land-commissioners.[26] 'Mixed marriages' between people from different communities might therefore have resulted in the acquisition of land in one territory by individuals with roots in another community. Such a scenario may lie behind the situation by which, for example, L. Betilienus Varus of Aletrium in Latium, who single-handedly transformed his home city with a series of public works in the late second or early first century BC, acquired land in the vicinity of Brundisium in Apulia for the production of olive oil for export to the East. Alternatively, this may simply have been a commercial purchase transaction (which in turn raises the issue of whether there was an equivalent of *commercium* between Italian communities), unless Betilienus—the presence of whose slaves is attested in the area—was simply renting the estate.[27] In any case the consequence was to bring a leading family from one part of Italy into close contact with a community in another part of the peninsula. Another example we could

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24 Treggiari (1991, 43–9); Cherry (1990, 244–6); Roselaar (forthcoming).

25 Gell. *NA* 16.11.1–2.

26 App. *BC* 1.10; 1.19.

27 CIL X.5807 = CIL I².1529 = ILS 5348 = ILLRP 528 with Zevi (1976); Manacorda (1994, 30); Wallace-Hadrill (2008, 117–20). Epigraphic and literary evidence indicates that in Sicily there were restrictions on outsiders purchasing land within a city's territory, though renting was permitted, see Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.93 (Segesta). *Cf.* Arangio-Ruiz & Olivieri (1925, 117) for the case of Tauromenium. I am grateful to Jonathan Prag for these references.

cite is that of the poet Lucilius, from the Latin colony of Suessa Aurunca in Campania, who had connections with Sicily and Sardinia, and apparently Consentia and Tarentum in south Italy as well.[28]

Betilienus produced oil on the estates he exploited in Apulia, but other agricultural strategies were also available for the affluent, in particular long-distance transhumant pastoralism, by which flocks were moved from summer pastures in the mountains to spend the winter in the lowlands. This practice seems to have become particularly important in the years which followed the Second Punic War, as suitable land became available in South Italy, the acquisition of wealth from Empire made the purchase of large flocks and tracts of land by individuals more feasible, and a level of peace and security was attained sufficient to allow the safe movement of large flocks of sheep up and down the peninsula. This form of exploitation, involving as it did the use of contrasting types of pasturage, by definition involved contact on the part of the owners with different areas of Italy, followed up by the physical movement of shepherds and their flocks. Modern literature has tended to focus predominantly on the role of members of the Roman elite in these operations—Varro, for example, whose writings attest his own involvement in transhumance—but the elites of Samnium and Apulia, with political and economic bases in the key areas concerned, would, if anything, have been even better placed to exploit these opportunities, building up a network of contacts across Italy.[29] In this context, it is interesting to note that Numerius Statius, apparently related to the notable Samnite family of the Staii, was involved in rebuilding the city walls of the north Apulian town of Herdoniae late in the second or early in the first century BC.[30]

We might also mention briefly other contexts in which members of Italian elites might come into contact with each other: migration between different parts of Italy is well attested. Large numbers of Samnites and Paelignians migrated to Fregellae, which, Livy tells us, provoked the leaders of the Samnites and Paelignians to complain about the matter to the Senate in 177 BC; meanwhile inhabitants of Latin colonies had moved to Rome.[31] We also know that individuals or families might find themselves

[28] Shatzman (1975, 277).

[29] Var. *R.* 2.1.16–7; 2.2.9; 2.9.6. See Garnsey (1998, 169–71). Dench (1995, 116–23) expresses some caution as to the possible involvement of the Samnite elites in what she terms 'big business' pastoralism.

[30] CIL I^2.3187 with Mertens (1995, 149, 241).

[31] Liv. 41.8.8. See Broadhead (2001; 2008).

migrating from their home town for political reasons, for example the Magii of Capua, who had remained loyal to Rome when that city joined Hannibal, are subsequently found living at Aeclanum, and again display their loyalty at the time of the Social War.[32] The upsurge of Italian involvement in trading in the Aegean is likely also to have provided a context in which Italians would have been in regular contact with one another, for example on the island of Delos.[33] The town of Puteoli on the Bay of Naples was called by the poet Lucilius a 'second Delos', and this cosmopolitan centre, together with the wealthy villas along the coast, would similarly have provided a centre for sociability and interaction between Italians and Italians, as well as between Italians and Romans.[34] Campania was a particular centre of theatrical activity, and the widespread adoption of Hellenistic style theatre complexes across southern and central Italy, for example at Pietrabbondante in the Apennines, as well as at Sarno, Teanum, and Cales, reflects not only an enthusiasm for Greek culture among the local elites, but also a willingness to spend their own (or the community's) resources on competitive emulation of other towns' facilities in the late second century BC, without Rome being involved at all: that city only acquired a permanent stone theatre in 55 BC.[35] Their knowledge of what other communities were doing was presumably the result both of social networks and of personal visits to the rival communities, perhaps on the occasion of public festivals. We have already seen, from the story of Saunio, that theatrical performers tended to travel all over Italy, and Cicero similarly lists men from Latin and allied communities among the leading orators of the second century BC.[36]

4. *The Role of Informal Contacts in Politics*

So there were clearly numerous contexts in which members of the Italian elites could make contact with each other. But how far did these links have an impact on the politics of pre-Social War Italy? While collaborations between different Italian peoples were by no means unknown previously—early in the third century, Samnites, Umbrians, Etruscans,

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[32] Vell. Pat. 2.16.2; Cébeillac-Gervasoni (1982, 63); Camodeca (1982, 134–5).

[33] Rauh (1993, 193–249) discusses how far Italians were to be found living on the island.

[34] D'Arms (1970, 1–17); Rawson (1985, 20–5).

[35] Rawson (1991, 471–2); Wallace-Hadrill (2008, 137–43).

[36] Cic. *Brut.* 169–70 with Rawson (1985, 34).

and Gauls co-operated in a campaign against Rome which culminated in the battle of Sentinum in 295 BC[37]—it is clear that by the early second century BC, links had been established between Latin and allied communities which allowed them to make collective representations to Rome in cases where they felt their interests were being threatened. One such example is the complaint made about migration to Rome by the Latin colonies in 177 BC: Cicero tells us that L. Papirius of Fregellae gave a speech *pro Fregellanis colonisque Latinis*, apparently on this occasion.[38] Similarly, representations were made by the Italian allies collectively to Scipio Aemilianus about the impact of Tiberius Gracchus' land reforms.[39] In 125 BC the Latin colony of Fregellae was destroyed after revolting against Rome: it seems impossible that Fregellae would have tried to 'go it alone' in such an ambitious, not to say risky plan, so we must imagine that the city was anticipating support from other Latin colonies.[40] This also seems to be implied by Asconius' observation that by destroying Fregellae, L. Opimius had "subdued the rest of the allies of Latin status who were disaffected".[41] Again, at the time of the outbreak of the Social War, Appian tells us that the rebels "sent envoys . . . and exchanged hostages with each other", but that "the Romans were unaware of these facts for a long time", while Livy's work contained an account of the "gatherings and conspiracies [of the Italians] and the speeches made in the conferences of their leading men".[42]

So there is ample evidence for allies and Latins communicating in the lead-up to the Social War as their collective grievances with Rome became more profoundly felt. But it is worth underlining that the earlier history of Italy had not always been one of happy co-operation between neighbouring peoples. The propensity of the Samnites and Lucanians for invading their lowland neighbours, for example, meant that there were long-term tensions between them and the inhabitants of Apulia and Campania; even cities physically located quite close to each other might have political histories and social and economic characteristics strikingly different from each other.[43] The history of ancient Italy contains numerous specific examples of rivalries between neighbouring communities, often centring

[37] Liv. 10.18–30 with Oakley (2005, 197–345).
[38] Cic. *Brut.* 170. I follow Malcovati (1955) rather than Badian (1955) in interpreting this passage.
[39] App. *BC* 1.19.
[40] Rawson (1998, 72); Mouritsen (1998, 118–9, 130).
[41] Asc. 17C.
[42] App. *BC.* 1.38; Liv. *Per.* 71. See Kendall and Tweedie in this volume.
[43] Terrenato (2001b).

on disputes over land or other resources, a pattern which the Roman hegemony in the peninsula did little to diminish.[44] In Campania, for example, we hear that a hotly contested boundary dispute between Neapolis and Nola was only resolved by the intervention of the Roman Q. Fabius Labeo (*cos.* 183 BC), whose solution to the problem was to confiscate the strip of land in question for the Roman state.[45] Such rivalries even persisted into the principate: during the 'year of the four emperors' in AD 69, the Campanian cities of Puteoli and Capua, which were traditionally rivals, supported opposite sides in the conflict, backing Vespasian and Vitellius respectively.[46] Fronda has demonstrated how in southern Italy during the Second Punic War traditional local enmities and allegiances played an important part in determining whether, in the aftermath of the Roman defeat at Cannae, individual allied communities continued to support Rome or deserted to the Carthaginian side.[47] However, he also shows that these long-standing enmities appear to have played much less important a part in determining whether a community supported Rome or joined the rebels at the time of the Social War; the increased level of interaction between Italian communities in the second century BC was arguably an important element in reducing these traditional hostilities.[48]

Of course not all the Italian allies joined the rebels in the Social War: of those known to have taken part in the rebellion, nearly all were from the Oscan-speaking communities of the central Apennines, together with Apulians, Lucanians, some towns in Campania, and the lone Latin colony of Venusia, which was surrounded by rebel territory. Explaining this pattern would involve tackling a wide range of issues, and I can only allude briefly to some of them. Social structure for example: Etruscan society was apparently highly stratified, with clear divisions between a ruling class and a subordinate class of unfree labourers;[49] by contrast, there are some indications that Samnite society may have been rather less economically and socially polarised.[50] Urbanisation may also be a factor to consider: Greek *poleis* and Etruscan cities in general did not join the rebellion: rather, the majority of the rebels came from areas which were comparatively

[44] Fronda (2010, 16–34).
[45] Cic. *Off.* 1.33; Val. Max. 7.3.4a.
[46] Tac. *Hist.* 3.57.
[47] Fronda (2010).
[48] Fronda (2010, 319–20, 327–9).
[49] Harris (1971, 114–29, 202–12).
[50] Dench (1995, 144–53).

little urbanised by the time of the Social War, or not urbanised at all. Population density may have been an issue: to judge by Polybius' figures for military contingents,[51] and the small number of finds of coin-hoards associated with ex-soldiers in Etruria, it would appear that the military manpower available to the Etruscans was limited;[52] by contrast the mountains of the central Apennines, Samnium in particular, traditionally had an overabundance of manpower which resulted in 'sacred springs' and invasions of nearby territories.[53] Finally, the grievances which caused discontent among the allies may have been differentially felt across Italy: the measures taken by Rome to expel migrants from the city, such as the law of 126 BC, would have been felt most strongly in those areas from which those migrants mostly originated, notably the central Apennines.[54] Similarly, the activities of the Gracchan land surveyors, which according to Appian were a major source of allied hostility, largely seem to have taken place in the south and centre of the peninsula, the areas in which the support for the rebellion was strongest.[55]

Relationships of marriage and *hospitium* bound Italians and Romans together in the years that preceded the Social War, but they did not stop the war breaking out;[56] similarly, the network of contacts that linked Italian with Italian in the same period was not sufficient to prevent an ultimate Roman victory. Fundamental differences in terms of population and social structure between different Italian peoples were arguably paralleled by a diversity of attitude across the Italian communities to the attractiveness of gaining Roman citizenship.

5. *Conclusion*

In reality the rebel forces only represented part of Italy. But in the years that followed the need to integrate Italians and Romans meant that the war was retrospectively depicted as a civil war, between Rome and *universa*

[51] Plb. 2.24 with Brunt (1971, 55).
[52] Crawford (1991).
[53] Tagliamonte (1996, 17–21).
[54] Cic. *Off.* 3.47 with Mouritsen (1998, 111) and Broadhead (2008). According to Asconius 67C, the *lex Licinia Mucia* of 95 BC, which clamped down on those falsely claiming Roman citizenship, alienated the Italian elites and was the 'greatest cause' of the outbreak of the Social War. See on this law Tweedie in this volume.
[55] Roselaar (2010, 252–3).
[56] Brunt (1988a, 31).

Italia, in Velleius' formulation.[57] In 70 BC, Rome and Italia were depicted on coins holding hands,[58] and in 32 BC, famously, *tota Italia* swore an oath of loyalty to Octavian.[59] But by then the flitting and nest-building of individual swallows like Saunio had been replaced by a movement of population on an unprecedented scale,[60] as a result of the civil wars of the first century BC and the veteran settlements which followed them.[61]

[57] Vell. Pat. 2.15.1.
[58] Pobjoy (2000).
[59] *RG* 25.2.
[60] Crawford (1996); Scheidel (2004).
[61] Versions of this paper were presented to audiences in Leiden and Manchester. I am very grateful to Luuk de Ligt, Rens Tacoma, and Saskia Roselaar for their respective invitations, and to those present on both occasions for their extremely helpful comments.

ROME AND ANTIUM: PIRATES, POLITIES, AND IDENTITY IN THE MIDDLE REPUBLIC

Edward Bispham*

1. *Introduction*

Roman colonization under the Republic continues to be a hot topic, debated under many aspects, urban and rural, religious and political, and as a function or a barometer of the expansion of Rome in Italy.[1] One point of debate has been to ask from what period we can speak of a normative colonial phenomenon, with standardised approaches to settlement of territory, urban planning, religious and political institutions, and a clear place within Roman hegemonic structures. Such a situation is clearly visible from the late Republic onwards, but it has recently been argued that nothing analogous existed in the Middle Republic. This line of argument seeks to understand 'colonization' at this period more as a bundle of non-standardized phenomena within a broad discourse of Roman expansion, within which engagement with indigenous traditions is accorded more room than has traditionally happened in Roman colonial studies.[2] This chapter seeks to make a further small contribution to this debate, taking as its particular focus two aspects of the relationship between Rome and a single colony, Antium: identity and autonomy.

2. *The Roman Colony at Antium*

The earliest history of Antium is obscure. It was acknowledged as belonging to the Roman sphere of control at the end of the monarchy and the start of the Republic, since it appears in the list of cities subject to Rome

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[1] Mouritsen (2004); Bradley & Wilson (2006); De Ligt & Northwood (2008); Sewell (2011) for an archaeological perspective. Note the detailed and cogent analysis of Roman colonial cults by Boos (2011). A panel at the Classical Association Conference 2010 was devoted to colonization; an important workshop was organised by Tesse Stek and Jeremia Pelgrom in Nijmegen in November 2010.

[2] Bispham (2000; 2006) express my own position; for adjustment of some arguments and more detailed consideration of some topics addressed there, see Boos (2011).

in the first Romano-Carthaginian treaty.[3] In fact such statements may have been largely aspirational, reflecting only intermittent control, and it is more probable that Antium was mainly outside Roman control at the start of the fifth century, and oscillated between Roman and Volscian spheres thereafter. The Volscian settlement of this period (including any phases of early Roman occupation) is poorly known archaeologically; indeed little is known prior to the late Republic, when Antium became a popular site for elite leisure. The Volscian settlement is presumed to lie beneath the modern urban centre of Anzio. In addition to some burials, parts of a series of defensive structures, both an *agger* / *vallum* system and wall(s), have been uncovered, with various phases between the late ninth and the fifth centuries; claims are made for expansion of the urban nucleus located in the area of Le Vignacce from the seventh century onwards, but much is still uncertain.[4]

Antium figures prominently in Livy's accounts of the Romano-Volscian conflicts. The city is recorded in Roman historical tradition as having become a Roman colony in 467. Apparently those who were settled as colonists—whatever that means at this time—included indigenous inhabitants, referred to universally by the sources as Volsci, as well as exogenous elements: Romans, Latins, and Hernici.[5] This Volscian presence in the colony is explained by our sources as caused by a lack of Roman volunteers for the settlement. As Cornell remarks, this reveals an anomaly in the material available to Roman historical sources, one which needed a rationalising explanation.[6] If this 'colonization' is genuine, and it seems possible that it is, the colony had some experience of mixed ethnic population well before its second, more famous, colonization by Rome in 338, to which we shall come presently. In any case, despite, or perhaps because of, this ethnic diversity, disaffection seems to have been quick to set in and rebellion followed in 459.[7]

Antium's reputation as a centre of Volscian piracy in this period is also clear: Dionysios of Halikarnassos twice refers to attempts to combat the

[3] Plb. 3.22.11; on the textual problems see Walbank (1957, 344–5); Scullard (1989, 524).

[4] See Coarelli (1985, 397–9); Guidi (1980, 42, fig. 3); Veloccia Rinaldi (1983, 14–15); Guaitoli (1984, 369–72, 380 fig. 12, 381); *cf.* AAVV (1986, 63) for early *necropoleis*: the 'western cemetery' has provided evidence for fifth and fourth century burials.

[5] Liv. 3.1.7; Dion. Hal. 9.59.2. See on early colonization Cornell (1995, 301–4), with a list of early colonies and their dates on p. 303; Northwood (2008). See Bispham (2000) for some possibilities for understanding 'colonization' at regal Ostia.

[6] Cornell (1989, 278–9).

[7] Liv. 3.4; Dion. Hal. 10.21.4–8.

wide-spread effects of Antiate mischief in the early fifth century.[8] Indeed some elaborate theories of wider geo-political configuration have been built on the threat posed by Antium in this regard. Ferenczy, for example, thought that the second Romano-Carthaginian treaty of 348 was partly a reaction to the threat to Roman interests of a reviving Latin League and the wider problem of piracy, not least that of the Antiates.[9] Whether these ships were (all) based at Antium, or at other sites along the coast, is uncertain: Nettuno has been canvassed as an alternative or supplementary base, and is a candidate for the site of 'Caenon' mentioned in Livy and Dionysios.[10]

By the third century Antium could be located in a more Romanocentric imaginary, articulated through mythical origins. The Greek writer Xenagoras in the third century related that Odysseus fathered three sons on Kirke: Rhomos, Anteias, and Ardeias, the eponymous heroes of, respectively, Rome, Antium, and Ardea.[11] This genealogy implies the three towns as existing on an equal footing, rather than reflecting Roman domination, and may therefore predate the definitive entry of Antium into Roman power. This seems to have happened with Roman victory in the Latin War of 341–338. At this point the indigenous population was absorbed into the Roman citizen body;[12] a colony of Roman citizens was also dispatched to the site:

> And a new colony was sent to Antium, with this proviso, that the Antiates, if they wished, should be allowed themselves to be enrolled as colonists; their long ships were taken thence, and the Antiate people was forbidden access to the sea, and given the citizenship.[13]

Livy tells us that the indigenous Antiates might join the colony if they wished; those who did not were granted Roman citizenship. I see no reason

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8 Dion. Hal. 7.37.3; 9.56.6. See Oakley (1998, 570).

9 Ferenczy (1976, 79–83).

10 Liv. 2.63.3; Dion. Hal. 9.56.5. See Guaitoli (1984, 381).

11 Xenagoras *FGrH* 240 F29. See Cornell (1975); Gruen (1992, 11, 16).

12 Their citizenship is commonly assumed to have been *sine suffragio*. Oakley (1998, 566) makes the case for enfranchisement *optimo iure.* However, while the old view of ethnicity as the criterion for determining which communities got full citizenship in 338, and which citizenship without the vote, has been discarded, *distance* from Rome in my view deserves more consideration as a factor governing this choice. Furthermore, citizenship *optimo iure* seems a less plausible cause for the sort of uncertainties of which the Antiates later complain (see below).

13 Liv. 8.14.8: *Et Antium nova colonia missa, cum eo et Antiatibus permitteretur, si et ipsi adscribi coloni vellent; naves inde longae abactae interdictumque mari Antiati populo est et civitas data.*

to doubt Livy when he says that the colony was open to the Antiates, the more so as he tells us that those Antiates who were given the Roman citizenship were those who had not elected to join the colony, which was clearly thus enrolled before the fate of the Volscian community was decided.[14] The rest of them must have continued to form some sort of Antiate polity, made up (probably) of *cives sine suffragio*, but perhaps otherwise little changed in terms of its institutions. This would have given rise to what some scholars call a 'double-community'.[15] Given the link between the grant of *civitas sine suffragio* and the creation of *municipia* in other contexts in the aftermath of the Latin War, it is certainly possible that this community, formed of Antiates who had refused to join the colony, was classed as a *municipium* by the Roman Senate, although it is not a necessary corollary of the post-war settlement.

Antium, alone of the cities whose fate was decided by the Romans in 338, received a citizen colony. The reasons for setting it up must have been peculiar, and indeed dictated by its peculiar location with respect to the other cities affected by the settlement. We have already noted that Antium was early on associated with piracy by our sources: one function of the colony may have been to control or discourage piratical practices. That the Antiates were now forbidden access to the sea points in the same direction. Nevertheless, the subsequent activities of the Antiates mean that this cannot be the whole story (see below). On the other hand, we might ask whether 'control' or 'supervision' of indigenous Antiates would not in fact have been obtained in sufficient measure by the act of incorporation or municipalization itself, as elsewhere it was in Latium and Campania. We may therefore surmise that watching over the Antiates came low on the list of colonial priorities.

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[14] See Galsterer (1976, 58). Salmon (1969, 81) may overstress the unpromising nature of settlement at Antium, especially if I am right in suggesting that the colony was not designed to keep the Antiates in line (see below). Salmon further suggests (75) that the Romans had trouble finding settlers, and that this, as well as a desire for some measure of conciliation, led to the inclusion of Volscians. Neither explanation is necessary in view of the permeability of the boundaries of the *populus Romanus* in this period, which Salmon himself notes. Some pro-Romans will have wanted to join, others less amenable to the new order may have been kept out. It is in any event unlikely that the number of Antiates joining the colony exceeded that of original colonists; we should probably think of pro-Roman elite families and perhaps their retainers.

[15] Where a pre-existing municipal or sub-municipal organization persisted beside, or subordinated to, a new Roman colony.

The colony's principal importance may rather lie in the need to protect the coast,[16] and especially river mouths and good harbours, and to secure and advertise Roman control over these against outside interests: it was on the coast that the great majority of Roman colonies was planted until the early second century BC. Nor were such threats imaginary: the coast between Antium and Ostia was exposed to seaborne raids, like that carried out by Greeks in 349 BC.[17] The coastal ports could act as *entrepôts* for corn supplies from Campania and Sicily, and for entrepreneurial commerce; as such they were the front line as far as commercial contacts with overseas rivals like Syracuse and Carthage were concerned. In the Romano-Carthaginian peace treaty of 348 BC the Romans had sought to prevent the Carthaginians from injuring Antium, as well as Ardea, Circeii, and Terracina.[18] The Latin War had within a decade significantly shifted the balance of power on which this treaty rested, and any Carthaginian objections to the new *status quo* were likely to centre on the coastal cities, where a return to greater independence from Rome might benefit Carthaginian traders.[19] As it was, the Roman colony was probably aimed at protecting the Antiates from outside interference as much as anything else.[20]

It is worth repeating how much we do not know about colonial Antium. Archaeologically the fourth-century settlement is largely unknown.[21] The number of the colonists is not recorded, but there is no good reason for thinking that it was 300, especially when Antiates were included in the final figure.[22] Equally, we know nothing about how the colony was administered, although we can infer some elements from limited data applicable to other early colonial centres, and as we shall see, the events of 319 BC are suggestive up to a point; we do know, for example, that the colony

[16] *Contra* Galsterer (1976, 43–4, *cf.* 59–60), but without good reason.

[17] Liv. 7.25.4.

[18] Plb. 3.24.16, *cf.* 3.24.6 on the 'harbours of the Romans'.

[19] Scullard (1989, 530–1) argued on the basis of shifting political realities in Italy, Africa and Sicily for the possibility of a revision of the 348 treaty in 343, as perhaps indicated by Livy.

[20] For a later period see Liv. 22.14.4 (217 BC): *Nec, si nullius alterius nos, ne civium quidem horum pudet quos Sinuessam colonos patres nostri miserunt ut ab Samnite hoste tuta haec ora esset, quam nunc non vicinus Samnis uret sed Poenus advena.* The reference to Samnites looks back to the wars of the last third of the fourth and start of the third centuries.

[21] Marleen Termeer draws my attention to votive material, and evidence for its production, in the area of Le Vignacce, some as late as the third century; there are chamber tombs of the fourth to second centuries constructed a little to the north.

[22] For scepticism about 300 as a colonial demographic norm at this time, see Bispham (2006).

had patrons, presumably the founding *triumviri* or their descendants. The colony probably had a limited administrative function for the surrounding territory; it is not certain what settlement(s) acted as administrative centre(s) for the viritane settlers in the *Ager Pomptinus*, but the colony may possibly have played a role here too.[23]

Within a generation of the settlement of 338, unforeseen implications of planting a colony beside an existing community of Volscians, some of whom had been inscribed among the colonists (*optimo iure*, we must presume) with the others probably obtaining the *civitas sine suffragio*, began to make themselves felt.

> And once the story had spread amongst the allies that the situation at Capua had been firmly established by Roman discipline, to the Antiates also, who were complaining that they were living without fixed laws, and without magistrates, the patrons of the colony itself were appointed by the Senate to establish its rights; not only Roman weapons but also Roman laws began to make themselves widely felt.[24]

The context is the appointment of the first *praefecti* at Capua (not to be confused with the *praefecti Capuam Cumas*); the connection between two instances of Roman institutional reorganisation may well be Livy's own way of imposing order on events which were merely contemporary but in fact unconnected.

There has been some dispute over which Antiates made the complaint, but it seems hard to believe that the colony, whatever it was like, could have been left without magistrates and laws, thus without adequate means of internal control and regulation, and *a fortiori* without the ability to exercise influence outside its own walls; it is equally hard to imagine that systems which were efficacious in 338 had somehow become corrupted over twenty years. Of course, citizen colonies of this kind were probably a new phenomenon in 338, but by 319 the experiment had been replicated a number of times on the template of 338, which ought to vouch for its viability. It thus becomes hard to see how the internal dynamics of the colony's institutions can have failed. It therefore becomes overwhelmingly likely that it was the settlement of indigenous Antiates, now probably *cives sine suffragio*, whether formally municipalised or not, which

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[23] See Galsterer (1976, 61); Termeer (2010) for the roles of early Roman colonies.

[24] Liv. 9.20.10: *Et postquam res Capuae stabilitas Romana disciplina fama per socios volgavit, Antiatibus quoque, qui sine legibus certis, sine magistratibus agere querebantur, dati ab senatu ad iura statuenda ipsius coloniae patroni; nec arma modo sed iura etiam Romana late pollebant.* See Humbert (1978, 186–90); Oakley (1998, 565–7).

complained that it lacked laws and magistrates.[25] Livy's *ipsius coloniae patroni* could be taken either way: *ipsius* may suggest that Livy imagined that 'the colony itself' was what needed rectification, but the specification of *coloniae* seems otiose if it was the colony which was complaining about institutional dysfunction.[26] Perhaps Livy had by this point forgotten exactly what he had said earlier about the settlement after the Latin War, and was trying to smooth out what seemed to him evidential wrinkles.

Be that as it may, on balance it seems better to imagine that the colony was faring well enough, but that the indigenous settlement, although given Roman citizenship in 338, had had few proper provisions established for its internal regulation, being instead left to get on with life by itself; indeed a number of its leading families had left to join the colony. Without further organisation and instruction, both internal administration and relations with the colony must have been difficult. Questions of identity, and of the legal rights consequent on different statuses, and of the interactions of identities and statuses must have become increasingly vexed. In other words, not only may the Volscian Antiates have been unsure about how to conduct themselves as Roman citizens, but also how they were to relate to the colony in their midst, and its colonists; such problems will only have become more acute as time passed and the colony became established.

For Sherwin-White the sending of the first *praefecti* to Capua in 319 recalled the practices of Hellenistic interstate arbitration.[27] The same can in my view be said of the intervention of the colonial *patroni* at Antium. To get some idea of the sorts of problems which may have been at issue with two non-integrated and diverse civic groups operating together in close proximity, as well as how such problems were resolved, we may look to Hellenistic Asia Minor. Dossiers such as that about the *sunoikismos* of Magnesia-under-Sipylos and Smyrna in the 240s are revealing in this regard. Smyrna absorbs both military *katoikoi* stationed at Magnesia, and Magnesian citizens, as long as they were free Greeks. Smyrna provided money for building new houses, and took over the security of Magnesia and its fortifications. A subsequent adjustment had to be made for a group

[25] Oakley (2005, 275), although he raises the possibility that the passage may be a Livian invention.

[26] A similar position in Oakley (1998, 565–6), for whom *ipsius* implies a contrast with *Antiatibus*; he also notes that the mention of *iura* later in the passage would be fatuous if the constitutional rectification of the colony was meant.

[27] Sherwin-White (1973, 43). Oakley (2005, 276) suggests Roman intervention at Arretium in the late fourth century as another possible instance of Roman arbitration in local disputes (Liv. 10.3.2, 5.13).

of *katoikoi* based at the fort of Palaiomagnesia, who were themselves a diverse bunch, including a Persian contingent, who had been serving for different lengths of time and had thus accrued differential benefits from different kings. The chief cause of discontent was that some but not all had enjoyed royal grants of land with exemption from tax; to remove a potentially divisive imbalance the Smyrnaians made a series of land grants to the disadvantaged soldiers; in return they were allowed to appoint their own commander to Palaiomagnesia.[28]

Of course there are many important differences between the situations of Antium in late fourth century and that of Smyrna in the mid-third, not least that the 'military' settlers at Antium have the whip hand, not the civic community. But there are also instructive parallels, and a level of detail about how ethnically diverse and legally distinct bodies faced the problems of sharing citizenship and coalescing without abandoning their own identity completely, all within the wider context of an exacting hegemonic regime which exercised a remote and intermittent supervision. For the moment the Smyrnaian dossier is suggestive in one way which is particularly important, and which points the way to what may be going on at Antium: synoikism. We hear nothing of the indigenous community after 319, only of the colony. One possible explanation is that the *patroni* gave *iura* to the non-colonial Antiates by absorbing them into the colony itself; if so, they were probably formalising a position whereby the colony's increasing gravity had slowly been sucking the life out of the other community, contributing to its institutional decline.

3. *Colonists and Pirates at Antium*

The relationship between colonists and non-colonists, Romans and indigenes, is not simply a question of whether we can impose some tidiness on a situation which seems not to conform to what *Staatsrecht* would lead us to suspect. Certainly in some respects the situation at Antium became more 'normal': the colony prospered, the other community vanished, absorbed into the colony at a stroke, or having withered away despite the intervention. But in other respects things were far from normal. When Strabo comes to Antium in his description of Italy, he tells us something quite remarkable about the inhabitants during the Hellenistic

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28 *OGIS* 229 = Austin² 174 = Bagnall & Derow² 29. See Errington (2008, 130–1).

period, something which seems much more problematic and harder to fit within customary colonial parameters than what we have been considering to date.

> But earlier [the people of Antium] used to possess ships and to be partners with the Tyrrhenians in piracy, even though they were already subject to the Romans. For this reason first Alexander . . . and then Demetrios, sending back to the Romans those pirates who had been captured, added messages of accusation. He said that he was granting them the return of the men because of the Romans' kinship with the Greeks; but that he did not think it right that the same men should both command Italy and at the same time send out pirate ships; that on the one hand they should honour the Dioskouroi in their *agora*, having dedicated a temple to them whom all call Saviours (*Sōtēres*), but on the other hand to send into Greece, their homeland, to plunder it. And the Romans stopped them from carrying on activity of this sort.[29]

Strabo's information is striking, but before we consider its implications, we must put it into context. First of all, what is piracy? It is important to remember that 'pirate' is a label imposed by others far more often than it is a label of self-identification. Traffic in human beings was endemic in the Aegean, but it became piracy for one state when conducted to the disadvantage of its citizens by another state or individuals belonging to this state. Pirates then, like bandits, are such in the eye of the beholder.[30] We may like to insist on a further distinction between states whose monopoly on legitimate violence leads them to discountenance raiding by their citizens on the one hand, and on the other states which regard their subjects' right to raid and profit from raiding as inalienable, and not subject to interference, still less restriction, by the state authorities.[31] In

[29] Strab. 5.3.5: καὶ πρότερον δὲ ναῦς ἐκέκτηντο καὶ ἐκοινώνουν τῶν ληστηρίων τοῖς Τυρρηνοῖς, καίπερ ἤδη Ῥωμαίοις ὑπακούοντες. διόπερ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος πρότερον ἐγκαλῶν ἐπέστειλε, καὶ Δημήτριος ὕστερον, τοὺς ἁλόντας τῶν ληστῶν ἀναπέμπων τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, χαρίζεσθαι μὲν αὐτοῖς ἔφη τὰ σώματα διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας συγγένειαν, οὐκ ἀξιοῦν δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας στρατηγεῖν τε ἅμα τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ ληστήρια ἐκπέμπειν, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ ἀγορᾷ Διοσκούρων ἱερὸν ἱδρυσαμένους τιμᾶν, οὓς πάντες Σωτῆρας ὀνομάζουσιν, εἰς δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πέμπειν τὴν ἐκείνων πατρίδα τοὺς λεηλατήσοντας· ἔπαυσαν δ᾽ αὐτοὺς Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιτηδεύσεως. See Braccesi (1975, 12, 25).

[30] See De Souza (1999, ch. 3); Gabrielson (2003). For the idea that traders from unwelcome quarters might find themselves labelled as pirates, see Wiemer (2002, 111–17). This is not to adopt a relativistic position, and say that there was no piracy, simply shades of entrepreneurial activity in human resources, or that there were no states which were strongly and rightly identified with habitual raiding (there clearly were, Kretans and Aitolians for a start); but that the term always comes in our sources with a health-warning.

[31] Gabrielsen (2003, 398–404).

the present case, Alexander and Demetrios labelled the perpetrators as pirates. This probably means, given Antiate 'form' in this activity, that the kings were unhappy at the capture and sale of Greeks (presumably Greeks over whom they claimed to exercise hegemony) by barbarians, in this case from Antium, but it could equally mean no more than that the Antiates were unwelcome in Aegean or Macedonian waters for a variety of reasons, which might or might not include plundering.

Piracy, or the acquisition of people and other plunder by force, was very common in Italian waters in the fourth century BC. Much of this activity is attributed by our (universally Greek) sources to 'Tyrrhenians'. So, for example, a rare Athenian colony of this period, founded in the Adriatic in 325/4 BC, was intended partly to offer protection against 'Tyrrhenian pirates'.[32] For 359/8 Diodorus records severe harrying of the Adriatic coastline by pirates; the problem is unlikely to have been confined to a single year.[33] Who are these Tyrrhenians? Some were certainly Etruscans, but scholars have argued that the term is used in Greek sources to indicate western (or as we might say even today, Tyrrhenian) Italians in general, Italians whose particular origins those Greeks neither knew, nor cared too closely to identify. This is in fact made explicit by one writer who did enquire more deeply about the history of ethnic groupings in Italy, Dionysius.[34] So, for example, we find one pirate leader, who was caught and executed by Timoleon, named as Postomion;[35] he is widely recognized by scholars to be a Postumius, and therefore a Latin.[36] It should be noted, further, that this one-size-fits-all identification suffers from the perennial fault of such classifications, namely that there are always exceptions.

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[32] *IG* II^2.1629, ll. 217–33, trans. Harding (1985, no. 121).

[33] Diod. Sic. 16.5.3. See De Souza (1999, 41). In Diodorus' source this notice probably formed part of a larger narrative, with Diodorus only excerpting the point at which the problem grew particularly outrageous, or was combated.

[34] Dion. Hal. 1.25.5; 29.2. Followed by Bakhuizen (1988); De Souza (1999, 50–3), citing evidence from Delos, Athens, and Rhodes; Harris (2007, 305). Note that piracy is not specifically mentioned in *IG* 12, 2.148, l. 73 (Delos, 298 BC), and that *SIG*^{3} 1225 (Rhodes, early third century) distinguishes action against pirates from that against Tyrrhenians (*contra* Harris (2007, 317), there is no proof in the text that the engagements which cost the lives of the Rhodians in this case took place in the West).

[35] Diod. Sic. 16.81.3.

[36] De Souza (1999, 50); the only Greek attestations of this or a similar name in the published volumes of the *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names* are all from Ionia; all seem to be imperial, and to derive from the Roman name Postumius; see attestations in Corsten (2010, 377).

For example, Diodorus' Sicilian sources distinguished Apulian pirates from others.[37]

'Tyrrhenian' 'pirates', wherever precisely they hailed from in Italy, were notorious from the archaic period onwards, famous as early as the *Homeric Hymn to Dionysos* in the sixth century, and noted for their cruelty by Aristotle.[38] The refusal of the Caeretans to engage in piracy is striking precisely because of the widespread perception that piracy was an Etruscan métier.[39] Some were of course really pirates, and some were Etruscan. But some of this 'piracy' is a gratuitous mislabelling of Etruscan naval hostility to western Greeks, which successive Greek historians belaboured. Modern scholars have taken up the refrain. Some have thought that the Lemnians expelled by Miltiades in the late sixth century were really Etruscans, and pirates to boot: Thucydides certainly equated people whom he called 'Tyrrhenians' on Lemnos with the 'Pelasgians' who could be found in northern Greece. Scholars have not been slow to link this with Herodotus' assertion that the Pelasgian language was not Greek.[40] Some scholars have built on this associative web, noting a similarity between Etruscan and the language of a handful of Lemnian texts, and elaborated various formulations of a theory whereby the Lemnians were a 'remnant' population of an older phase which included or was dominated by Etruscan settlers, some or all of whom were pirates.[41] Others have been more cautious: Barker and Rasmussen note that there is no culturally Etruscan material evidence on Lemnos and argue that by 'Tyrrhenian' Thucydides really meant Pelasgian, and not specifically Etruscan.[42]

As to the linguistic argument: there are marked points of contact in formulae for what appears to be the giving of age and the use of a 'pertinentive' case form in what seems to be a dating formula, but there are also

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[37] Diod. Sic. 16.5.3 (reign of Dionysios II); 21.4 (reign of Agathokles).

[38] *Hom. Hymn Dionysos* 7; note the earliest depiction of the myth, on a Black Figure pot, Spivey & Rasmussen (1986, 2–8). Iamblichus, *Protr.* 8.48 (= Aristotle, *Protr.* fr. 10b Ross) mentions tying captives face-to-face with rotting corpses, see Barker & Rasmussen (1998, 89).

[39] Dion. Hal. 1.11; Diod. Sic. 5.40; Strab. 6.2.2, 267C (= Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F137a). Caere: Strabo 5.2; 2.3, 220C, and note Pasquinucci (1988, 48–9) on Caere's ties to Rome as promoting this favourable portrait. See Tarn (1913, 85–6) for the fourth and third centuries. See Giuffrida Ientile (1983); Musti (1989).

[40] Thuc. 4.109; Hdt. 1.57, *cf.* Dion. Hal. 1.30.1–3 on Etruscan autochthony and difference. Note also the claim that Etruscan Spina was founded by Pelasgians.

[41] Epigraphic evidence: the Kaminia *stele*; the 'La Tita' loom weight from the sanctuary of the Kabeiroi; some inscribed *ostraka*. See Grant (1980, 57); Gras (1976); De Simone (1996); Haynes (2000, 1–2).

[42] Barker & Rasmussen (1998, 94–6, *cf.* 86).

important differences, for example in terms of alphabet. Furthermore, while both Lemnian and Etruscan seem to have a single 'rounded' vowel, Lemnian renders this with *omicron* while Etruscan uniformly uses *upsilon*. Again, the 'La Tita' text, which seemed to promise an Etruscan female name, is in fact to be read left to right, rather than retrograde, as previously assumed, and now offers nothing to the argument. So while it seems very likely that both Etruscan and Lemnian derive from a common, non-Indo-European, ancestor, it is an uphill struggle to sustain the argument that Lemnian is or could be an Etruscan dialect, and the sign of a former Etruscan presence.[43] Tyrrhenian might then be, in Greek eyes, a label with many applications, ranging from genuine Etruscans from Etruria to any non-Greek, non-Semitic, foreigners practising piracy, or even generally making themselves unwelcome.

Etruscan scholarship has, for the most part, not sought to liberate the objects of its study from the Hellenic stigma. Thus a major (and outstanding) recent study is not short of references to Etruscan piracy, with maritime depictions in art used to support the viewpoint of the literary sources.[44] Alternative viewpoints have been aired, for example that of Barker and Rasmussen, who argue for a difference between state-sponsored piracy and individual or gentilician 'entrepreneurial' activity, locating 'Etruscan' activity in the latter category.[45] Clearly there were Etruscan pirates; but the blanket application of the term is a product of Greek resentment and fear of Etruscan naval power between the seventh and fifth centuries.

If not all Etruscans were pirates, equally not all pirates were Etruscans. The political and cultural clout of the Etruscans may have meant that, in central or western Mediterranean contexts, much activity that was piratical was ascribed to Tyrrhenians, but in reality referred to Italians,

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[43] Wallace (2008, 218–22) cautiously writes of a "possible linguistic relationship", but sees the historical circumstances behind it as obscure; Penney (2009, 88–9) has a clear summary.

[44] Haynes (2000, 1–2, 33) notes a possible pirate chieftain's trident on a cenotaph from Pisa; at 42 suggests that the military power of elites of Verucchio may have extended to piracy in the Adriatic; 52 discusses Etruscan thalassocracy; 63–4 the Aristonothos krater (*cf.* Plin. *HN* 7.209); 195, 197, 308 interprets Vel Keikna, depicted as a naval commander on a stele from Bologna, as piratical. Contrast 201–2 for Etruscan victims of Greek piracy; see 258, 262 for Greek bias against Etruscan 'pirates'. For earlier studies see Cristofani (1979). On Etruscan maritime contacts, see Aristotle *Pol.* 3.9, 1280 a36, mentioning a commercial treaty with Carthage. See Barker & Rasmussen (1998, 86, 90); Haynes (2000; 202, 261–2).

[45] Barker & Rasmussen (1998, 214–15, *cf.* 260); they also note that the Etruscans and Carthaginians combined to put down Phokaian 'piracy', *c.* 540 BC. See Hdt 1.166, with Barker & Rasmussen (1998, 137).

especially western Italians. And the Antiate piracy noted by Strabo fits well into the context of widespread Italian piracy in the fourth century;[46] indeed, action against Apulian pirates (if successful) by Dionysios II of Syracuse might have encouraged others to fill any resulting vacuum.

Despite the inherent plausibility given by the maritime context, the historicity of the events narrated by Strabo has been doubted. The name of Alexander (presumably the Great, although the Molossian would be possible)[47] arouses suspicion.[48] Such scepticism is similar to broader pattern of unwillingness to take seriously evidence for significant Roman contacts with the Greek East before the Illyrian Wars. Part of this derives from the continuing influence of Holleaux, and part to the way in which the discipline has constructed its periodization, which has encouraged a separation of east from west, and discouraged consideration of contacts between east and west as an important part of Roman history before 230 BC.[49] Yet there is a growing scholarly consensus that this story, and others like it, should be taken seriously.[50] It is in my view hypercritical and hypersceptical to reject the possibility of Roman contacts with Alexander III out of hand.[51] In any case, casting aside the unreasonable suspicions aroused by the mention of Alexander the Great, there is no inherent reason to doubt an approach by Demetrios to the Romans.[52] What is said about both piracy and the nature and language of the diplomacy used by Demetrios are perfectly plausible within normal Hellenistic practice.[53]

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46 De Souza (1999, 51–2).

47 Hammond (1967); Lasserre in the Budé edition of Strabo book 5, *ad loc.*

48 Tarn (1913, 48 n. 22).

49 Holleaux (1921). For identification of the problem, Dench (2003, 295–98). See fuller discussion of the methodological issues in Časule (2011).

50 E.g. Oakley (1998, 570); Harris (2007, 318); Battistoni (2009, 78–9). See Erskine (2001, 224 n. 98), where the passage is construed as genuine, or at least fully plausible.

51 Arr. *Anab.* 7.15.4 (Brettioi, Leukanoi, Turrhenoi), 5–6 (Romans = Aristos *FGrH* 142 F2 & Asklepiades *FGrH* 144 F1). Bosworth (1988, 83–93) argues fully for the historicity of the Roman presence. De Souza (1999, 50 n. 31) may be right to suggest that the name of Alexander the Great might have been used to embellish the narrative about Demetrios (by Strabo's source?). The name could also have been used by Demetrios himself to legitimate his protest to the Romans, at once bringing them into Alexander's notional thought world, and adding weight to his protests (that the name of Alexander could be expected to weigh with the Romans is in itself revealing about attempts to involve them in a Hellenistic dialogue).

52 Note that from the 270s the Romans entered a special relationship with the Ptolemies.

53 Strabo's source can hardly be Roman. Erskine (2001, ch. 8) argues that the Romans adopted cults of other peoples to forge links with them (see Di Fazio and Hermans in this volume), whereas Greeks used kinship ties (see 224 n. 98 for the place of the Dioskouroi in Roman diplomacy). In our passage Demetrios returns the captured pirates on the basis

There is simply nothing fishy about the story, and that it is uncorroborated tells us only how inadequate our sources for Roman international relations in the fourth century are. In fact, Harris has argued that not only is the Rhodian friendship with Rome which Polybius dated as going back 140 years before Pydna, genuine, but that the 'glorious deeds' in which Rome and Rhodes co-operated were in fact a joint suppression of piracy, which in Rome's case entailed an extension of her recent offensive against Etruria (310 BC onwards) by co-opting Rhodes into cracking down on 'Etruscan' piracy in the Aegean.[54] That the Romans could team up with Greek states to suppress piracy, and at the same time allow its practice by other subjects, would add a piquancy to Demetrios' complaints.

The reigns of Alexander the Great and Demetrios provide us with, respectively, the *terminus ante quem non*, and the *terminus post quem non*, at least in terms of complaints, if not of the Antiate actions themselves: 336–287 BC. What the Antiate actions were we do not know. I have stressed above that 'pirate' is relative term, highly focalised, denoting actions to which the victim and others object, but which another observer might view as legitimate reprisal. What the Macedonian royal complaints tell us is that the Antiate actions were disadvantageous to Macedonians or their allies. It is hard to imagine that they did not involve some seizure by force of goods and people, but we should not necessarily conclude that this form of 'exchange' was the only reason which the Antiates had for venturing into the Aegean (assuming this was where the contentious events took place).

This is not the crucial aspect of the present enquiry, however. Rather, we shall be concerned with attitudes at the point of departure. First, perhaps, we should ask (again) which Antiates? The first complaints from Macedonia, ostensibly from Alexander, cannot predate the foundation

of Roman-Greek *suggeneia*, but backs up the moral force of his claim with reference to shared cult. This would seem to underline the likelihood of a Greek source for Strabo, but would also suggest Macedonian awareness of Roman practice.

[54] Harris (2007, 313–18), citing Plb. 30.5.6; Liv. 45.25; Dio fr. 68. Harris upholds the position of Schmitt (1957) against the doubts of Walbank (1979, 423–6); as well as material available to Schmitt, such as *ILLRP* 245 from Lindos (300–250 BC), Harris adduces the redating by Crowther of *SEG* 1983.637 from that proposed by Kontorini (1983) to the start of the third century BC. He notes too Diod. Sic. 20.91 on the Rhodian war before 305 against pirates 'in the name of the Greeks', which may be linked to some of the texts discussed above in n. 34. He might have added Aristeides 24.53 and Ps-Aristeides 25.4: both refer to famous Rhodian conflicts with Etruscan pirate fleets, from which beaks and other spoils were taken. The historical context is unclear, but the mention of Alexander the Great in one of these passages suggests a late-fourth century context.

of the colony; and complaints from Demetrios surely postdate the death of Antigonos Monophthalmos, and probably stem from his *basileia* in Macedon itself (294–287 BC). They therefore postdate the intervention of the colonial *patroni* at Antium in 319. Now it might be a natural assumption that the colonists cannot have been identical with the Antiates who were being such a nuisance in the Aegean. After all, it has often been thought that part of the colony's role was to prevent precisely this kind of thing.[55] I have suggested above, however, that interdiction of *Antiate* piracy was not the colony's main *raison d'être*. But there is a further problem with such an interpretation: if the colony was meant to suppress Antiate piracy, it did a lousy job, as the complaints of the kings vividly demonstrate. True, the Romans took away the *naves longae* from Antium,[56] but not all their ships; smaller ones might have been not dissimilar to Illyrian *lemboi*, and thus ideal for raiding. Whatever the ships, and despite the prohibition on sailing recorded in Livy, Antiate piracy was not suppressed after 338—if anything it seems to have flourished under Roman control.

We might go further. The indigenous Volscian community, whom we know to have had ships and experience at sea, may be blamed for the continued plundering, and the colonists for turning a blind eye. And one can see how in a community which was by its own admission without magistrates and laws, there would have been much scope for individuals to undermine any monopoly on violence which the community as a whole might in better circumstances have hoped to exercise. But we know that this Volscian community, *municipium* or not, vanished. I have suggested above that it was already in terminal decline by 319, and that there is reason to suspect that it ceased to be in that year or soon after as a result of the intervention of the colonial patrons. Of whom then was Demetrios Poliorketes complaining? The answer must be the colonists.[57]

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[55] So for example De Souza (1999, 52); at 91–2 he insists that not all Roman *coloniae maritimae* should be explained in terms of the suppression of piracy. The theory of Roman colonies as anti-piratical goes back to Ormerod (1924, 161–6).

[56] Plin. *HN* 34.20.

[57] Double communities are unfashionable (for example, Oakley (1998, 566) is sceptical): those who do not accept one at Antium must, however, accept the corollary that a single community there must be the colony, and that the colony thus bears responsibility for piratical activities from the outset. I could accept such a reconstruction, although I do not prefer it. I have argued elsewhere (Bispham 2007, 263–8) that Sullan colonization sometimes produced a 'double-community' (specifically at Pompeii, but there may have been other examples). It is worth asking whether such circumstances in their own time did not lead contemporary historians, such as Claudius Quadrigarius and Valerius Antias, to retroject similar tensions to earlier colonial situations which seemed analogous to them.

That colonists first connived at, and then in all likelihood continued, raiding and plundering, drawing on existing indigenous local expertise, seems paradoxical. After all, we are programmed strongly to associate colonies with the replication of Roman values. Aggression was, of course, one of these, but it is presented to us as aggression in pursuit of reparation, or the protection of the weak. We do not automatically think of Romans and Roman colonists, as themselves raiders or plunderers. Gabrielsen, discussing the Roman problem with Teuta's failure to restrain piracy in Illyria, places the two as diametrically opposed across the dichotomy described above, between states which suppress and punish private raiding (like Rome) and those which condone it (like Illyria).[58] This seems the natural side of the line for Rome to be, and to realise that one of her colonies was on the other side is perhaps disturbing.

There are two ways of responding to the apparent paradox. One is to wonder whether, in the eyes of others, the Romans did not in fact look very like raiders and plunderers. One thinks of the vast numbers of slaves and the wealth reportedly brought back from the Samnite Wars; the placing of Rhegion in the hands of an unscrupulous Campanian garrison; the sale of Sicilian Greek prisoners in the First Punic War;[59] the outrageous behaviour of the First Macedonian War; Pontius Telesinus in 82 BC referring to the Roman wolves as the *raptores* of Italian freedom;[60] the characterisation of Roman acquisitiveness which Sallust puts into Mithridates' letter to Tigranes. One is perhaps less surprised than one might otherwise be then to find a Roman as *proxenos* of the Aitolian *koinon* in 268 BC[61]—perhaps both states were similarly relaxed at that point about letting their citizens and subordinates go on plundering jollies.

The other response is to think again about the ties between Rome and her colonies. I have written before about the Gellian model of colonial replication.[62] Antium encourages us to think that, even if the Romans were less tolerant of piracy than the rather over-drawn sketch in the previous paragraph suggests, we need not expect colonies to be like little Romes in such matters. The colony first connived at, and then, if I am right, took over Antiate activities in the Aegean which included plundering. In this, surely, we see not the 'Romanisation' of the natives, but

58 Gabrielsen (2003, 402–4).
59 Gabrielsen (2003, 393).
60 Vell. 2.27.1–3.
61 *IG* 9^2, 1. 7a, l. 51.
62 Bispham (2000; 2006) for a critique of this model.

the 'Volscianisation' of the colonists. Far from being small and vestigially administered, staffed by a few hundred peasants farming tiny allotments and waiting out their dreary lives on the off-chance of a Greek or Punic incursion, the colonists of Antium had wide horizons, and across which they sailed, traded, plundered, sold, and returned.[63] Perhaps, despite the colony's *patroni*, the Senate lived in blissful ignorance of this until royal complaints started to come in from Macedon. But this seems unlikely. For one thing, these complaints, if Strabo is right, had come in over a number of years, but, as in the case of Roman responses to Illyrian piracy on Italian shipping, were evidently ignored, until Demetrios put his foot down. When he did so, Strabo's text suggests very clearly that he thought the Romans were responsible for the raids, and therefore aware of them. Nor did the Romans deny it when confronted with the complaint. We are left, then, with a new and interestingly nuanced picture of Roman relations with indigenes; with colonial social practices which diverge markedly from those we might expect to find; and with a sense of a vibrant and dynamic polity, where colonial identity was predicated in part on types of connectivity which standard accounts of colonization, looking always to Rome alone, could never have predicted.

4. *Conclusion: Entella, Antium, and* (*Not*) *Rome*

That Antiate colonial identity was not crushingly Roman, and that the colonists were left to develop their own identity in synergy with the social and economic practices of the indigenous inhabitants, may be borne out by another piece of evidence. This comes from the dossier of inscriptions on bronze from the Sicilian town of Entella.[64]

The section which concerns us comes from the fourth tablet, probably to be dated to the First Punic War:[65]

[63] As an example of wide horizons, note perhaps the unique Black Gloss over-painted *guttus* (a narrow-necked flask) in the form of an elephant ridden by his *mahout*, dating to the late fourth of early third century, found in Via Roma. The reference could be either to the Pyrrhic Wars or to campaigns involving elephants fought by Alexander the Great or another Hellenistic monarch. The piece was probably made in Campania, but the depiction reflects a thought-world occupied by exotic concerns and distant contacts; see Ambrosini (2006); Jaia (2010).

[64] The collection is currently being studied by Ampolo.

[65] Corsaro (1982). I am grateful to Jonathan Prag for discussing this text with me.

Τεβέριος Κλαύδιος Γαίου υἱὸς᾽Αν
τιάτας ἐπιμελητὰς ταχθεὶς εἰς τὰμ πόλιν

The name Tiberios Klaudios, son of Gaius, Antias, clearly, is not Sicilian. It is Latin, or rather, Roman. What *epimelētes* (a common term in Hellenistic public texts) denoted does not matter too much for our purposes, but the supposition that he was in Roman terms a *praefectus*, put in charge of Entella at some point during the First Punic War, seems not unreasonable. It is the onomastics which concern us here. While a Ti. Claudius might seem to be one of the patrician Claudii, we know that there were other Claudian lines in Italy;[66] and if Antias is a *cognomen*, it is not one elsewhere used by the patrician Claudii. The *cognomen* Antias itself need not imply any association with Antium—the historian Valerius Antias may be a case in point—[67] but by the same token *cognomina* which are clearly derived from colonial ethnics are known.[68] At this period, when *cognomina* are by no means common, it seems, on balance, least difficult to see Antias as an ethnic. As such, it recalls other local ethnics used in Italy in the Hellensitic period, which privilege the polity of origin over any over-arching ethnic or legal identifier. Thus we find Samnites from Saepinum self-identifying as Saipins or Saipinaz, not as Samnites.[69] Lomas has argued, with reference to the appearance of the Bruttian ethnic as a part of the personal names of a group of individuals on Rhodes in the second and first century, that this particular onomastic practice was determined both by specific historical circumstances and by the nature of the group as composed of long-term settlers rather than visiting businessmen.[70] Of course the situation here is rather different—although Claudius may have been a long-term resident at Entella—but the Bruttian case does show that ethnics might be used

[66] Bispham (2007, 265 n. 99) for some Pompeian examples.

[67] It is of course possible that he was in fact an Antiate, although there is no proof of this; thus it is possible that he was Livy's source for the nuggets of Antiate history considered above.

[68] For colonial ethnic *cognomina* see M. Postumius Pyrgensis (and perhaps T. Pomponius Veientanus) in Liv. 25.8.3ff.; M. Antistius Pyrgensis in Cic. *De Or*. 2.287.

[69] Vetter (1953: nos. 5c, 190) mentions local ethnics of Samnites; see Tagliamonte (1995, 135). Lomas (1995, 483) notes, however, that such ethnics are rare in Oscan epigraphy. A possible counter-example, the earliest mention of Samnites (*CIL* I^2 3201; see La Regina 1970–1) is problematic, because it comes from the Latin colony of Aesernia, where the Samnites are *inquolae* or indigenous co-habitants, and thus may not represent a single well-defined ethnicity, but a group of Samnites from different polities. Note too that *Antias* takes a normal Latin form of ethnic for a specific community (-as, -ates), and is cognate with the Italic examples such as **saipinaz**.

[70] Lomas (1995).

by Italians overseas as part of an onomastic formula (in this case though name + ethnic rather than *praenomen* + *nomen* + ethnic). Furthermore, the Bruttians were making an attempt to operate within Greek onomastic practice (some even adopting Greek names), since Greeks themselves often used name + patronymic + ethnic when outside their native communities.[71] One might then argue that, in using Antias, Claudius is not only being given his 'predominant' identity, but consciously conforming to Greek onomastic practise in doing so.

What I would like to argue here, if the interpretation of this disputed document which I have advanced is correct, is that Ti. Claudius Antias, who must be a Roman citizen (and this is surely true even if he is not from Antium), chooses not to identify himself, or is not identified by the Entellans, as a Roman. That is, unlike Italian *negotiatores* on Delos in the next century, who were called *Rhōmaioi* by the Greeks with whom they interacted, despite their lack of legal membership of the master-race, the Entellans find that Claudius' Antiate identity is stronger than his Roman one, more important to them, and we must presume to him.

That there could be a strong colonial identity which existed independent of the Roman, and indeed overrode it in the eyes of non-Romans, is interesting, and not what we should expect on the orthodox understanding of what these mid-Republican colonies were like. Antium has left its mark in unexpectedly far-flung places, from Entella to Pella, and in so doing has proved to have a much more strongly articulated, more interesting, and more independent identity than we could have suspected.[72]

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71 Lomas (1995, 483).

72 I am grateful to Saskia Roselaar for organising the conference which produced this volume; Saskia has been most understanding in waiting for my chapter. I am also happy to thank participants for comments and suggestions, especially Philip De Souza, Guy Bradley, Jordi Principal, and Jonathan Prag; at other points Andrew Erskine, John Penney, and Lisa Bligh all offered assistance and advice. My thanks are also due to Nikola Čašule for stimulating discussion, and to Marleen Termeer for sharing with me some of her current illuminating work on Antium. I am responsible for the views expressed and the remaining errors.

A LOCALIZED APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTEGRATION AND IDENTITY IN SOUTHERN ITALY

Elizabeth C. Robinson*

1. *Introduction*

Studies of the adoption of southern Italy into the Roman state have taken several different forms, but the most recent research methods that have been employed have been regional in scope.[1] And yet, in central and northern Italy, the use of individual case studies has shown that through such investigations, new and different data can emerge that provide additional insight into the changes and continuities that took place at the local level, both in terms of the communities themselves, and in terms of individual family histories.[2] The purpose of my current work is to apply a local-level study to a site in southern Italy, in order to add to the knowledge of the processes of integration that took place in the Republican period.

Early accounts of the integration of southern Italy into the Roman state, particularly those found in Roman literary sources, have tended to focus on the disruptive aspects of the process. Stories of Roman military campaigns against the Samnites and other native Italians, and of Sulla's persecutions and proscriptions, present a picture of destruction on the part of the Romans, and eventual submission on the part of the Italians.[3] Yet these accounts may be drastically exaggerated, and certainly did not apply everywhere in the region.

The site of Larinum, in fact, offers an example of successful non-disruptive integration, but only when examined in light of local evidence that does not rely on broader, regional assumptions as interpretive criteria. This paper begins by discussing the benefits of conducting local-level analyses when studying integration. Then, after a brief introduction to Larinum, the site chosen for this case study, and a discussion of the previous work conducted in this area, it will explain the types of evidence under consideration and will present some preliminary results. This study takes

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1 Dench (1995); Isayev (2007a); Volpe (1990).
2 Terrenato (1998b).
3 For a typical example see Strabo 5.4.11.

into account all of the available evidence, both historical and archaeological, thereby creating as complete a picture as possible of the political, economic and social conditions at the time of Larinum's integration into the Roman state. Such a study, in turn, should help to further our understanding of the complex processes of cultural change that were happening throughout the Italian peninsula at this time. The methodological framework of this study is one that can also be applied elsewhere in the Italian peninsula, and one that has the potential to provide substantially more detailed information than previous studies about the transformations and continuities that occurred in the latter part of the first millennium BC.

2. *Why a Southern Italian Case Study?*

As mentioned in the introduction, the most recent research on the adoption of southern Italy into the Roman state has been regional in scope.[4] These regional studies have been critical in helping to change the ways that native Italian groups are perceived by modern scholars: Roman historical sources are no longer seen as the final word on the peoples of southern Italy, and scholars have moved toward the integration of various types of evidence in order to create a more accurate picture of the past, rather than privileging one type of evidence over another, or, for example, pitting archaeological evidence against the historical sources. The contributions of the studies by Dench, Isayev, and Volpe are undeniable; yet these works, in my opinion, underestimate local diversity and local power networks. As Terrenato has noted, "local work in various parts of Italy now strongly suggests the need to consider each area, almost each *civitas*, individually".[5] In other words, many of the processes of integration that took place in the first millennium BC were so intricate that they cannot be fully understood by regional-level studies alone.

The Romans often dealt with the incorporation of communities into the Roman state on a case-by-case basis, and so it is logical that a study of individual sites can provide new insight into the choices that were made by both Romans and non-Romans at the local level. To emphasize this point, one need only think of the differences in tactics and results seen in examples such as the Roman conquest of Veii, as compared with the case

[4] Dench (1995); Isayev (2007a); Volpe (1990).
[5] Terrenato (1998b, 94).

of Rome's alliance with, and later control of Capua. Likewise, in Northern Italy at the sites of Pisa, Luni, and Volterra the use of individual case studies has shown that through such investigations new data can emerge that provide additional information about the processes that took place at the local level, both in terms of the communities themselves, and in terms of individual family histories.[6]

In order to understand better these small-scale networks and local circumstances, a local-level study must consider the same diverse types of materials and sources that the earlier, larger-scale studies have consulted. Materials and sources as diverse as historical accounts, field survey records, excavation reports, epigraphic sources, and urban topographical studies must all be considered. It is only by combining all of these various types of evidence that a more accurate, articulate picture of the local-level processes at work in this period can be achieved, and that the biases that can arise from favouring certain types of evidence can be counteracted. As a result, the conclusions drawn by previous studies that focused on more limited sets of materials can be revisited in light of new data, and the narratives that have been constructed can be revised to depict the histories of individual sites more accurately. It is with these goals in mind that the current study is being undertaken.

It should be noted, however, that the micro-histories of individual sites such as Larinum should be viewed as an addition to, and not a replacement for, the broader regional approaches.[7] The relationship between a city and its territory was extremely important in antiquity, and thus a case study of an individual site could not and should not be performed in complete isolation from studies of its territory and its region.[8] Regional analyses are particularly useful for studies of economic history, for example, as such summaries are best carried out using regional approaches.[9] And new ways of approaching regional studies, such as that suggested by Roth in this volume, offer yet another valuable tool to combine with earlier regional studies and local case studies in order to create as complete a picture as possible. Just as the Roman world cannot be split up into individual case

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[6] Terrenato (1998b).

[7] See Hoyer for the importance of economic contacts between different regions and Patterson for other types of interaction that pervaded the whole of Italy.

[8] An illustration of the importance of the countryside in central Italy in the fifth to third centuries BC can be found in Hoyer in this volume.

[9] But for warnings against seeing the boundaries between regions as fixed, see Roth in this volume.

studies without ever considering the regional picture, the regional picture, without the case studies, can never be fully complete.

3. *Larinum*

This study focuses on the ancient town of Larinum, located on the site of modern Larino in Molise. This site lies on the eastern side of the Italian peninsula at an altitude of about 400 m above sea level, and it sits about 25 km from the Adriatic coast (fig. 1).

The modern city of Larino consists of two parts: the lower part, corresponding to the medieval *centro storico*, and the upper part, the modern city whose construction began in the mid-twentieth century. The upper city lies atop parts of the Roman site.

The ancient site of Larinum had a long history of settlement. There are some indications of activity in the prehistoric periods, yet it is in the Archaic period, the sixth and early fifth centuries BC, that the evidence really begins to take shape.[10] There was at least one major cemetery located at Larinum in this period, but little is known about the structure and layout of the site at this time, as the tombs provide the majority of the evidence.[11] The artefacts and types of burials in the cemetery are relatively homogeneous and show connections between Larinum and other neighbouring areas of Italy, including Samnium, Campania and Daunia, as well as links to trans-Adriatic populations. The next major phase in the town's growth seems to have occurred in the late fourth or early third century BC, when the site gained a fortification wall, some stretches of which were built in polygonal masonry, and other significant structures, including a possible temple in *opus quadratum*, as well as walls made of large limestone flakes that reportedly pertain to domestic architecture.[12] The settlement at Larinum began to play a more significant role in the region in the third and second centuries BC, and in this period it seems to have been the only settlement in this area with a regular street grid and other features reminiscent of an urban centre.

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[10] De Felice (1994, 25–6).

[11] Stelluti (1997, 41); Barker, Hodges & Clark (1995, 172); Di Niro (1981, 5, 64, 66, 98–9); De Felice (1994, 48–9); Tagliamonte (1996, 105); D'Agostino (1978, 566).

[12] De Felice (1994, 27–8, 40–1, 89); Stelluti (1997, 42).

Figure 1. Map of ancient Italy.
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The site remained an independent community until the Social War, after which time it became a Roman *municipium*.[13] The integration of Larinum into the Roman state seems to have been a peaceful one, and the transition does not seem to have disrupted the status quo of the site as much as literary sources and earlier scholarship on this area have suggested. Literary sources that describe Sulla's proscriptions against the Samnites suggest that there was significant destruction and death in this area in the early first century BC; and previous research, in particular the accounts from the Biferno Valley Survey, has tended to see the introduction of Roman colonists as a further disruptive influence here in this period.[14] And yet, from a fairly early period, Larinum seems to have differed from neighbouring communities in that it had an orderly and planned architectural layout, as well as a relatively sophisticated pre-Roman social structure. It is perhaps because of these particular characteristics that its adoption into the Roman state differed from what ancient authors and modern regional studies tend to suggest happened on a broader scale.[15] The Romans would have been able to build on the pre-existing social structure and architectural layout of the town as they made the necessary modifications that accompanied Larinum's transition into the Roman state.

4. *Previous Research on Larinum*

Previous research on the site of Larinum has been conducted by several scholars who have each tended to focus on evidence of a particular type, without attempting to create any kind of synthesis of the different classes of materials. The landscape around the site was studied by the Biferno Valley Survey in the 1970s and 1980s. This research provides an analysis of the settlement patterns and land use of the region from the prehistoric period to modern times.[16] The monuments and other materials from the site itself were catalogued in the 1994 volume of the *Forma Italiae* series, which provides additional information about clusters of artefacts located in the landscape around the site, information about different areas of activity within the town itself, and reports on some of the various excavations

13 Cic. *Clu.* 11. See De Felice (1994, 42); Stelluti (1997, 44).
14 Strabo 5.4.11; Cic. *Clu.* 25. See Barker, Hodges & Clark (1995, 221, 224, 250–1).
15 De Felice (1994, 34, 40–2).
16 Barker, Hodges & Clark (1995); Barker (ed.) (1995).

that took place in the town from the 1970s to the 1990s.[17] Finally, the inscriptions from the site, including ones previously identified and published, have all been collected in an epigraphic catalogue that was published in 1997.[18] New excavations have also been taking place since 2007 in the upper part of the city in an area that the excavators believe was the forum of the town.[19] This wide variety of information about the site makes Larinum ideal for a comprehensive study of the changes that took place during the time of Roman expansion and Roman conquest.

The dissertation of which the current work is only a small part is a holistic study of several different types of evidence pertaining to this one site, brought together in order to gain a more accurate picture of the processes at work during the centuries before, during, and after Larinum's incorporation into the Roman state. Studies of this type have been successfully undertaken elsewhere in Italy, for example at Volterra, Luni, and Pisa, and have yielded results that have significantly changed the interpretations of the history of those areas.[20]

As mentioned above, the use of various types of materials helps to counteract the biases that can come from privileging certain types of evidence; for example, public art and architecture may look culturally Roman because they display Roman iconography and Roman construction techniques, while prosopography and local cults suggest native continuity because they show the continuation of local names and the worship of local deities through the use of local rituals. By combining different types of evidence, a more consistent and context-sensitive interpretation of cultural interaction emerges. The categories of evidence that have so far proved to be most relevant are: the historical sources, including Cicero's *Pro Cluentio*; the settlement patterns of the surrounding territory; the inscriptions from the site; and the standing architecture, tomb artefacts and votive objects from the city of Larinum itself. By combining these elements, the finished work will create a broad-spectrum, multi-source narrative.

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17 De Felice (1994).

18 Stelluti (1997).

19 De Felice (1994, 44 and note 201); Caliò, Lepone and Lippolis (2011). The excavations are being conducted by Professor Enzo Lippolis of the Università di Roma 'La Sapienza'.

20 Terrenato (2001b).

5. *Preliminary Results*

The study of Larinum is still in progress, but preliminary results show promise for furthering our understanding of the complex issues at work in this area from the fourth century BC to the first century AD.

a) *The Site*

The first set of preliminary results comes from the study of the archaeological remains from the site of Larinum itself. A lot of work remains to be done on this part of the investigation, but early research shows the presence of a substantial pre-Roman settlement. This settlement was surrounded by an earthen fortification made of dirt and stones, parts of which still survive on the North-Western part of the site (fig. 2, fig. 3).[21]

Within the wall there are traces of at least one sanctuary from the pre-Roman period (fig. 2, fig. 4).[22] The earliest levels of this sanctuary were built in blocks of *opus quadratum*, and the adjacent area has yielded artefacts dating between the fourth and first centuries BC that are decisively votive in nature, including ceramics, clay and bronze statuettes and coins.

In the late Republican period and the early Empire, the types of trends that seem to be appearing in the material record of the site are those that can be seen more generally throughout the rest of Italy. These include the adoption of Latin epigraphy, the erection of large cylindrical funerary monuments reminiscent of the mausoleum of Caecilia Metella, the use of Hellenistic motifs in mosaics, and the use and production of common Italian forms of black gloss pottery. The adoption of Latin epigraphy can easily be seen in the numerous inscriptions coming from the area that use the Latin alphabet and other typical Roman epigraphic conventions.[23] The remains of at least one, and perhaps two, large cylindrical funerary monuments

[21] De Felice (1994, 108–11, numbers 1.139–1.142, 115–16 number 1.154, 116 number 1.158). Remains of the wall noted by De Felice could still be seen in 2010 in the row of trees that encircles the northwestern part of the ancient site.

[22] De Felice (1994, 40–1, 64–7 numbers 1.70–1.72); D'Agostino (1978, 566); Di Niro (1980, 289–90); Capini (1981, 87–8).

[23] Stelluti (1997).

Figure 2. Map of the city of Larino, showing the upper (eastern) and lower (western) parts of the city, as well as the locations of several archaeological monuments. The fortification walls are shown in the northwestern part of the map by the wide black arc labelled with numbers 139–142. The sanctuary on the Via Jovine is located northeast of the ampitheatre and is shown by numbers 70–72.
Taken from De Felice 1994, map 1.

Figure 3. Stones visible in the remains of the fortification wall at the base of the earthen fortifications. The larger stones measure approximately 75 cm by 120 cm. Photo by author.

that probably date to the late Republic or early Empire have been built into some of the edifices of the medieval city (fig. 5).[24]

These funerary monuments are reminiscent of the mausoleum of Caecilia Metella at Rome and the mausoleum of C. Ennius Marsus at Saepinum, which date to the late first century BC and the Augustan period, respectively.[25] At least one mosaic dating to the late Republican or early Imperial period has been found at the site of Larinum. This mosaic has been found in the *impluvium* of a house whose architecture is dated in part based on building techniques and in part based on stratigraphic excavations to the first century BC or the first century AD.[26] The mosaic has a

[24] Stelluti (1997, 105–6 number 24); *CIL* 9.751; De Felice (1994, 118–20 number 1.174). De Felice (1994, 120 number 1.175) mentions some additional blocks that may have belonged to a third funerary monument, or perhaps an altar.

[25] For the mausoleum of Caecilia Metella see Claridge (1998, 341). For the mausoleum of C. Ennius Marsus see De Benedittis et al. (1984, 131–4).

[26] Stelluti (1988, 137–57); De Felice (1994, 101–5 numbers 1.121–1.123). It is unclear whether or not Stelluti (1988, 157) provides a date for the mosaic; it seems that he wants to place it within the late second or early third century AD. This seems too late both for its decorative motifs and for its archaeological location. The date of De Felice (1994, 101–5) seems more reasonable.



Figure 4. Plan and photo of the remains found near the so-called pre-Roman sanctuary on the Via F. Jovine. Taken from De Felice 1994, figures 49 and 50.

Figure 5. Remains of cylindrical funerary monuments that have been built into the bell tower of the medieval city of Larino.
Photo by author.

vegetal motif in its border, a fish in each of its four corners, and an octopus in its centre, and it shows a decorative scheme that is consistent with other Italian mosaics from the same period.[27] The site of Larinum and its surrounding territory have yielded several examples of pottery types from the Classical and Hellenistic periods, including south Italian wares such as Gnathian and Campana A-C wares. Most of the black gloss pottery from this area seems to be of local manufacture, however, although it imitates the shapes coming from elsewhere in Italy, showing that the manufacturers were aware of broader trends and styles.[28]

The use of these types of material culture and the adoption of general stylistic trends shows that Larinum was a part of what has been called the broader Hellenistic *koine*, that is, the use and spread of Greek culture and Greek motifs that occurred throughout the Mediterranean region in the latter part of the first millennium BC. For the case of Larinum, it remains to be seen whether the influences for these trends can be traced to Greece or the Greek colonies, as opposed to Rome itself, since Larinum is located so close to Southern Italy and the Adriatic coast, and seems to have been

[27] For comparisons see De Felice (1994, 105 n. 417–18). For Stelluti's comparison with mosaics of later periods, see Stelluti (1988, 152–7). For other comparanda, see Dunbabin (1999, 55, 61).

[28] Barker, Hodges & Clark (1995, 104).

participating in exchanges with the Adriatic sphere as well as with the rest of Italy.[29] As has been noted elsewhere, a Hellenization process seems to accompany the early stages of the process of Romanization, but whether this Hellenization was mediated by Rome remains to be seen certainly for Larinum, and possibly for other sites in southern Italy, as well.[30] In any case, the monuments and artefacts from Larinum in the late Republic and early Empire seem to reflect broader Italian trends, as opposed to particularly strong Roman influences.

b) *Inscriptions*

The next major class of evidence under consideration is the body of inscriptions from the site. A group of about 80 inscriptions that pertain to the late Republic and early Empire form the core of this part of the analysis.[31] When using this material, it should be remembered that the onomastic evidence cannot be taken as an accurate indication of the population, because it is clearly not a representative sample of the population of the town. It represents only those people who were able to commission the inscriptions, and it is also a factor of the way that the epigraphic record has been preserved. Additionally, there is evidence elsewhere of people changing their names to more Latin or Roman-sounding names after the incorporation of certain areas into the Roman state, and therefore Roman names in the epigraphic record cannot necessarily be taken as a reflection of a Roman population.[32]

And yet, preliminary investigations of the inscriptions from Larinum show the presence in the late Republic and early Empire of a significant group of typically Oscan or Samnite family names, such as Mevius and Papius.[33] If there had been significant disturbances in this area caused by Larinum becoming a *municipium* after the Social War, one would expect that these families would have disappeared by the end of the Republic. Instead, the continuation of these names in the late Republic and into the early Empire suggests that important local families continued to remain in place for extended periods of time, and were successfully assimilated

[29] De Felice (1994, 27–8); Di Niro (1980, 286–7); Capini (1981, 93–4); Cantilena (1991, 141, 143–4); Barker, Hodges & Clark (1995, 185).
[30] Curti, Dench & Patterson (1996, 181–5, 188).
[31] Most of these inscriptions can be found in Stelluti (1997).
[32] Häussler (2002, 61–73).
[33] Stelluti (1997, 132–3 number 57, 137–8 number 63, 146–7 number 76); *CIL* 9.6249; *AE* 1994.494; *AE* 1997.333.

into the Roman state while retaining some of their prestige and importance in the local community.[34] These Oscan names of course do not reflect an accurate cross-section of the society in these periods, but their survival speaks against the idea that the incorporation of Larinum into the Roman state was a significantly disruptive process. Some of the members of important local families even went on to hold political offices in Rome in the early Empire.[35] Examples include Gaius Vibius Postumus, a suffect consul in 5 AD, and Aulus Vibius Habitus, suffect consul in 8 AD.[36] The fact that some of these families not only survive locally, but also go on to have political success in Rome, suggests that their social rank has not diminished, and that they have weathered the transition into the Roman state with minimal disruption to their status. Further support for the hypothesis that the politically active citizens of Larinum were affiliating themselves with the higher social circles of the city of Rome is provided by the evidence of Aulus Cluentius Habitus, a citizen of Larinum, who was defended at his trial by none other than Marcus Tullius Cicero.

Other inscriptions from the site contain potentially Greek names such as Amomus and Epaphra.[37] These names most likely belong to Greek slaves, but it is also possible that they may indicate the presence of non-servile Greeks in this area of Italy.[38] If some of these individuals were the descendants of non-servile Greeks, this would lend further support to the suggestion that Larinum was involved in interactions with the Adriatic Sea and the areas of southern Italy that had particularly strong Greek roots.

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[34] Camodeca (1997, 15–16); Torelli (1973, 344–347, 353–4).

[35] Torelli (1973, 344, 353–4); Stelluti (1997, 88–9 number 6, 150–152 number 79, 155–6 number 83); *CIL* 9.730; *AE* 1913.40; *AE* 1966.74; Camodeca (1997, 15–16).

[36] Pauly-Wissowa 16.1971–1972, *sv.* A. Vibius C. f. C. n. Habitus; Pauly-Wissowa 16.1978–1979, *sv.* C. Vibius Postumus.

[37] Stelluti (1997, 101–2 number 20, 148–9 number 77); *CIL* 9.745; *AE* 1997.334.

[38] Stelluti (1997, 101–2) mentions that the name Amomus is of Greek origin, but does not specify further whether this person might have been a freedman. There are no parallels for the name Amomus in volume IIIA of the Lexicon of Greek personal names (Fraser and Matthews 1997). Stelluti (1997, 148–9) mentions that Epaphra is a Greek name, and that this perhaps indicates that the personage was of servile origin. The name Ἐπαφρᾶς shows up in imperial period inscriptions from Greece, and the Latinized version Epaphra finds several parallels throughout southern Italy, including attestations of individuals or their origins in: Apulia (Aceruntia, Gnathia-Egnatia, Venusia), Bruttium (Hipponion-Vibo Valentia, Brentesion-Brundisium), Campania (Dikaiarchia-Puteoli, Herculaneum, Pompeii) and Sicily (Lipara). In all of the Italian examples, except for the inscription from Sicily, the name is written in Latin. Several of these examples pertain to freed slaves, but others do not have an explicitly freedman character. When they can be dated, most of these examples date to the imperial period, see Fraser and Matthews (1997, 144).

The epigraphic evidence from Larinum does not show a significant replacement of local names with Roman names in the late Republic and early Empire.[39] This suggests that in this period Larinum was a mixed society consisting of people with traditionally local names, people who may have moved to Larinum from elsewhere in Italy, and slaves and *liberti*, some of whom may have come from Greece. Whether or not this group of diverse people felt a sense of shared identity, or identified themselves willingly as 'Larinates' is, of course, a question that is difficult to answer. Certainly they would have had different experiences of integration into the Roman state vis-à-vis their social status and their place within the society of Larinum itself. While the inscriptions can provide information about the political careers of certain individuals, and the persistence of certain familial lines, they leave us in the dark about other aspects of the integration and identity of these individuals. Yet they do at least provide information about the survival of important local families with Oscan family names well beyond the period of Roman conquest in this area, and about the success of some of these families in the political arena in Larinum, as well as in Rome.

c) *Settlement Patterns*

Another major class of evidence whose analysis has yielded interesting results is that of the settlement patterns from the territory surrounding Larinum. Previous work on settlement patterns was conducted in the 1970s and 1980s by the Biferno Valley Survey, and from the 1970s through the 1990s by De Felice in his preparations for the *Forma Italiae* volume on Larinum.[40] In their publication of the Biferno Valley Survey, Barker and Lloyd saw a pattern of small farms that led them to assume that in the late Republic and early Empire the area was populated by Roman colonists.[41] This is perhaps not surprising, as this was the prevailing interpretation of such farms at the time when the survey was conducted, and because, sadly, Lloyd did not have a chance to return to the material and revise it in light of more recent theories and discoveries. A review of the materials found at these farm sites, however, reveals no strong evidence of inhabitation by Roman colonists, as there are no significant materials or remains that indicate the presence of a new Roman element in the material record.

[39] Camodeca (1997, 16); Stelluti (1997).
[40] Barker, Hodges & Clark (1995); Barker (ed.) (1995); De Felice (1994).
[41] Barker, Hodges & Clark (1995, 201, 208, 210–11, 221, 224, 242, 250–1).

Instead, these farms seem to be part of the Italy-wide phenomenon of the appearance of small-scale farmsteads throughout the peninsula in the fourth and third centuries BC, regardless of the presence of Roman conquest or Roman contact.[42] A reanalysis of the survey data from the Biferno Valley Survey and the *Forma Italiae* shows that these farms are ubiquitous in this area, and that several of them existed long before the supposed Gracchan-period land distributions here, and continued to exist after the period of Roman conquest (fig. 6).

In fact, out of the 162 possible farms in this area, at least 44 can be classified as surely pre-Roman, thanks to the presence of ceramics from the fourth and third centuries BC (fig. 7).[43] This dating is based on the ceramics and other materials found by the two surveys, and relies on the Biferno Valley Survey's dating of the impasto pottery and the black gloss pottery, although these two pottery classes have recently begun to be re-examined and may be redated in the near future.[44] At this time and for this area the Biferno Valley Survey and their associated excavations are still one of the most comprehensive sources, although it could be worthwhile to revise some of their chronologies in light of more recent discoveries.[45]

Several of the remaining farms in the territory surrounding Larinum without definite fourth- or third-century BC ceramics could date to the pre-Roman period, and the survival of all but four of the pre-Roman farms into later periods suggests territorial stability in addition to the influx of new settlements in the area.[46] The survival of Hellenistic-period farms into later periods is a pattern that fits well with evidence from field surveys

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[42] Terrenato (2007, 142–4). These farms have sometimes been referred to as "Hellenistic farms". This term is not particularly popular, but could be defended in that it refers not to cultural phenomenon, but rather to a time period. It is simply a more convenient way to say "small farms of the Hellenistic period". See on this issue Terrenato (2001a).

[43] Barker, Hodges & Clark (1995); De Felice (1994). A few may even date from the Archaic period, including Biferno Valley site number A240 (Barker, Hodges & Clark 1995, 11).

[44] The Biferno Valley Survey dates the impasto to the Iron Age (c. 1000–500 BC) and the Samnite (c. 500–80 BC) periods (Barker, Hodges & Clark (1995, 4)), and uses Morel (1981) to date most of the black gloss (Barker (ed.) (1995, 104)).

[45] Guy Bradley discussed with me his recent work redating impasto as late as the second century BC, and Tesse Stek warned me that in his recent work he has found that the Daunian ware can be dated up to at least the late Republic. I am grateful for these observations, and I intend to explore further the chronology of the impasto ceramics, the Daunian-type wares, and the black gloss wares in the near future.

[46] Eighty of the remaining 118 farms have black gloss wares that suggest a date between the third and first centuries BC.



Figure 6. Map of the farmsteads that have been detected by the field surveys conducted in the area of Larino. Larino is shown as the white circle, and the farms as gray dots. The line indicates the approximate course of the Biferno River. Map by author, built on ASTER GDEM. ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA.



Figure 7. Map of the pre-Roman farmsteads that have been detected by the field surveys conducted in the area of Larino. Larino is shown as the white circle, and the farms as gray dots. The line indicates the approximate course of the Biferno River.

Map by author, built on ASTER GDEM.

conducted elsewhere in Italy.[47] These other surveys have shown that Roman conquest and colonization of other areas of Italy did not have a wholly disruptive effect on previously existing rural settlement patterns. As a result of a re-examination of the evidence, then, it seems that the Biferno Valley area is no longer as much of an anomaly as it once appeared to be: it had previously been considered practically the only area in Italy with a massive influx of Roman colonial farms. If, instead, these sites are part of the larger phenomenon of the emergence of Hellenistic-period farms, the situation in this area is not nearly as unique. Also, the survival of many of these farms from the pre-Roman period to the post-conquest period refutes the Biferno Valley Survey's narrative of radical change brought about by the Roman presence in this area.

The same seems to hold true if one considers the evidence for villas around the site of Larinum. The Biferno Valley Survey found only nine villas in this area, a remarkably small number, and a re-examination of the archaeological evidence from these sites, combined with a resurvey of many of the sites themselves, has further reduced the number of possible villas here to five (fig. 8).[48] The *Forma Italiae* survey identified substantially more potential villas, an additional 24, but a re-examination of this evidence combined with a resurvey of the sites has again shrunk this number significantly to two, for a total of only seven likely villas in this area (fig. 9, fig. 10).[49]

The noticeably small number of villas found in this area speaks against the *latifundia* model that has been renounced for other regions as well, namely that Roman colonial farms would have given way to investment agriculture, and that villas and *latifundia* would have ruled the landscape in the Roman period.[50] This model had not been explicitly proposed for

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[47] Potter (1979, 120–37); Arthur (1991, 63–6); Coccia and Mattingly (1992, 272–3); Terrenato and Saggin (1994, 477–8); Terrenato (1998b, 96, 99, 101, 109; 2007, 144–5).

[48] Barker (ed.) (1995). The resurvey of the sites was carried out in October 2010 and May 2011, using coordinates obtained from Dr. Rob Witcher and Dr. Tesse Stek, as well as coordinates from the author's georeferenced versions of the Biferno Valley Survey and *Forma Italiae* maps. The sites were relocated using a GPS device, and observations were recorded about the artifacts, landscape, land use, and visibility.

[49] De Felice (1994). This fits well with other recent research that shows a reduced number of villas, at least for regions outside of the main area around Rome or along the arteries of the major Roman roads (Terrenato 2007, 147).

[50] The model is supported in Patterson (1987, 141–4) and Carandini (1988, 121–9), and discussed in Barker, Hodges & Clark (1995, 215–3, especially 250). Against the linking of villas with *latifundia*, see Terrenato (1998b, 95–6, 99, 99 note 12, 101) and Terrenato (2007, 145–8). Arthur (1991, 65) says that he prefers the idea of several smaller landholdings that were not necessarily adjacent, to the idea of large contiguous *latifundia* for Northern



Figure 8. Map of the villas that were detected by the Biferno Valley Survey in the area of Larino. Larino is shown as the white circle, and the villas as gray dots. The line indicates the approximate course of the Biferno River.
Map by author, built on ASTER GDEM.



Figure 9. Map of the villas that were detected by the Forma Italiae survey in the area of Larino. Larino is shown as the white circle, and the villas as gray dots. The line indicates the approximate course of the Biferno River.
Map by author, built on ASTER GDEM.



Figure 10. Map of the seven likely villas that have been detected by the field surveys conducted in the area of Larino. Larino is shown as the white circle, and the villas as gray dots. The line indicates the approximate course of the Biferno River.
Map by author, built on ASTER GDEM.

this region, and it is reasonable to say that it would be an inadequate model here. Furthermore, the very small number of villas in this area, as compared to the numbers proposed by previous studies, deals yet another blow to the suggestion that the Roman conquest here was accompanied by revolutionary changes in the landscape.

This work is clearly still in progress, yet preliminary examinations of the evidence from the settlement patterns around Larinum suggest that the previous narrative of disruptive Roman colonial farms proposed by Barker and Lloyd is no longer tenable, and that further explorations and evaluations will likely lead to the creation of a completely different history for this valley. Although these conclusions are still tentative, they clearly point to the need to rethink the original models of the effects of the Roman conquest on Larinum and its territory.

6. *Conclusion*

In conclusion, although this project is still in its early stages, the findings suggest preliminary results that are significantly different from those that have been published previously. Ideas of a strongly disruptive process that accompanied the adoption of Larinum into the Roman state, specifically those based on literary accounts of the Roman conquest in this region, can no longer can be seen as tenable. Instead, it seems that there was significant stability of at least the local elites in the period of Roman conquest. The patterns in the landscape that can be seen reflect those noted elsewhere in Italy: there is an emergence of small farms in the fourth and third centuries BC, and many of these farms continue to exist after the Roman conquest; in later periods, there are only a few villas that probably reflect the continued presence of local elites, rather than the arrival of Romans who are confiscating the territory in order to set up a new type of agricultural or fiscal regime.[51]

The stability of local names in the epigraphic record seems to be consistent with the results from the territorial analysis; it shows that local families continued to thrive in the town, and that the adoption of Larinum

Campania in the late Republican period. Potter (1979, 125) states that there is little in the archaeological record to support the existence of *latifundia* in Southern Etruria in the Republican period.

[51] Compare the changes that occurred in Roccagloriosa before and after the Roman conquest: Gualtieri & Fracchia (2001).

into the Roman state did not significantly disrupt previously existing social networks. The city itself seems to have been willingly participating in the material culture choices of the broader Hellenistic *koine*; whether the influence for this was coming from Greece or Italy is still unclear, but at this point there are no definite indications that it has to have been mediated via Rome.

The general picture that emerges for the period from the fourth century BC to the first century AD is one of stability, and of the successful integration of the town of Larinum into the Roman state. The Romans had no need to use as heavy a hand, as some of the classical literary sources would have us believe.[52] Of course, this in no way denies that the residents of Larinum in the period after the Social War still had to adapt to being part of the Roman state and to adjust to all that this entailed. Yet the citizens seem to have weathered this transition successfully, allowing not only for their own continued prosperity, but also for that of their town.

The current study of Larinum provides more information about the integration of an individual site into the Roman state, and about the types of processes that were occurring at the local level during this important transition. The conclusions that are valid for Larinum will not necessarily hold true for another site or another region, but they do provide insight into the types of negotiations that occurred there as the individual citizens made choices about their future and the future of their community. If enough sites come to be examined as case studies, we will be able to understand better some of the broader phenomena, and the motivations behind these phenomena, that have already been noted in the works that have focused on wider regions. By combining the results of a study such as this one with the conclusions of the broader regional studies, our knowledge of the processes involved in the integration of communities into the Roman state in the Republican period will be deepened. Such a combination of studies will also help to elucidate the relationships between

[52] See, for example, Strabo 5.4.11, where he discusses Sulla's proscriptions in the Samnite areas. Although this discussion pertains to the area to the west of Larinum and never specifically mentions Larinum, itself, it is still relevant, especially when added to the information from Cic. *Clu.* 25 about Oppianicus claiming that, on Sulla's authority, he and three others were to replace the quattuorvirs of Larinum and to carry out proscriptions. This evidence is further corroborated by the inscription from Larinum dedicated to Sulla as dictator and *patronus* of the city (Stelluti 1997, 178–9 number 101; Torelli 1973, 342; *AE* 1975.219). App. *BC* 1.96 also discusses the punishment of the Italians who had been anti-Sullan in the course of the fighting. Larinum may not have been one of the towns specifically targeted, but it certainly seems to have been embroiled in the politics of that period.

individual communities and their regions. By taking into account as many types of evidence as possible, and by looking at the processes at work on both the macroscopic and microscopic levels, we will be able to answer in a more accurate way some of the many questions that are being asked about this complex period of history.[53]

[53] This paper is based on work that is currently being conducted for my dissertation, written under the direction of Nicola Terrenato and preliminarily entitled "Cultural Processes in Larinum from the fourth century BC to the first century AD amid Roman Expansion and the Spread of Hellenistic Culture". I am grateful to Saskia Roselaar for organizing the conference and for giving me the opportunity to share the preliminary results of my research. I am also grateful to the many conference participants whose helpful feedback has made this a stronger paper. I would like to thank the Fulbright Program and the Archaeological Institute of America, whose generous support helped to fund the research presented in this paper, and the American Academy in Rome, whose generous support continues to fund my research. Finally, I am grateful to the Soprintendenza per i Beni Archeologici per il Molise, especially Dr. Angela Di Niro, and to the people of Larino for their support and aid during my work, to Dr. Graeme Barker for allowing me to use the Biferno Valley Survey data, to Dr. Rob Witcher for his willingness to share his GIS database, to Dr. Tesse Stek and Rogier Kalkers for their willingness to share their field survey data, to Dr. Enzo Lippolis and Dr. Antonella Lepone for sharing information about the excavations currently being conducted in Larino, and to Paolo Maranzana for his help with the resurvey of several of the Biferno Valley Survey and *Forma Italiae* sites.

SETTLEMENT STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONAL 'CONTINUITY' IN CAPUA UNTIL THE *DEDUCTIO COLONIARIA* OF 59 BC

Osvaldo Sacchi*

1. *Introduction*

The problem of the recognition of a '*pagus-vicus*' structure in pre-Roman Italic settlement of Italy, and especially that of Capua, has often caused debate. This problem can profit from the excellent study by Tarpin, who, however, maybe exaggerates in entirely denying the existence of pre-Roman Italic indigenous territorial structures such as the *pagus*[1] or *vicus*.[2] In the same year Capogrossi Colognesi strongly criticized the models of eighteenth- to twentieth-century historiography, which tended to reconstruct the realities of ancient settlements before and after the Roman occupation as structured in a standardized form called 'paganico-vicana'.[3]

In my opinion, both of these positions are too radical.[4] In reconstructing the territorial settlement structures of ancient Italy, such as *pagus, vicus*, and others (*castellum*, *conciliabulum*, etc.), we should, following scholars such as Sereni,[5] regard the *pagus* and *vicus* as aggregating factors which determine, in the populations that employ them, the transformation from a tribal order to an order of a different political nature. Thus, a transformation occurs from a mainly personal-based social structure, based on the *nomen gentilicium*—a structure which may be presumed in nomadic populations such as hunters-gatherers, populations which use common pasture lands (*compascuus*), and transhumant breeders—, to a

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1 Tarpin (2002, 220): "Les pages sont des unités de territoire et à fonction censitaire tax".

2 Tarpin (2002, 86): *Vici* are "structures établies par l'autorité romaine en des lieux précis, et destinées à des catégories de population précises".

3 Capogrossi (2002, 92), adhering to the opinion of Letta (1993, 34), defines *pagus* as a "relatively large territorial unit, which is likely to cover any agglomeration of some significance as well as scattered and isolated houses". The *vicus*, however, is defined as an "inhabited compact, a real village". See Tarpin (1993, 222 n. 25); Capogrossi (2002, 182–4).

4 Exhaustive treatment of the question with full references of sources and bibliography in Capogrossi (2002, 43–5, 81–3). For the *Ager Campanus* see Guadagno (1993, 407–9).

5 Marx (1941, 192); Sereni (1955, 329–30). See now Angeli Bertinelli & Donati (2010) (*non vidi*).

polis-based structure.[6] The earliest concept of the Greek city is based on this principle.[7]

In this framework, the archaic *pagus*, whenever we find evidence of its existence (in Celtic, Ligurian, Germanic, Greek, Etruscan or Gallic populations),[8] should inevitably reflect a situation where the 'personal' basis (belonging to a *nomen*) prevailed over the 'territorial' one.[9]

We should not be surprised then by the well-known paretimology of Festus that proposes the word *pagus* as derivative of a Greek (Doric) dialect form: *Pagi dicti a fontibus, quod eadem aqua uterentur. Aquae enim lingua dorica παγαί…appellantur*.[10] The sources state that a *pagus* was a place inhabited by *pagani*, defined as 'those which pertain to the same spring', although intending it in a broader, Greek sense of 'bond' (= *dema*). This is clear from another fragment by Festus: *Demoe apud Atticos sunt, ut apud nos pagi*.[11] Similarly, but in different sense, Dionysius defined the term *pagus* as a Greek derivative.[12]

Only in the *Lex Rubria de Gallia Cisalpina*, dated to 49 BC, we can see a clear distinction from the legal standpoint between *oppidum*, *municipium*, *colonia*, *praefectura*, *forum*, *vicus*, *conciliabulum*, *castellum*, and *territorium*.[13] Sereni explains the absence of *pagus* in this *lex*, as well as in

[6] We need to overcome the ancient preconception dating back to Mommsen (1887, 3): "*Populus* ist der Staat, insofern er auf der nationalen Zusammengehörigkeit der Personen ruht, wärendt er als örtlich unter einer Staatsgewalt begriffen das imperium, das Reich ist". See on this point also Catalano (1978, 549).

[7] See Ampolo (1996, 296–8). According to Alcaeus "fighting men are the city's fortress". Thucydides, addressing the Athenians, makes Nicias say that "Men are the city—not walls". We know cities with no walls, e.g. Sparta and some towns in Asia Minor, but the macroscopic example is Knossos, which for over seven centuries (2200–1450 BC) did not have perimeter walls, until they were necessary for the menacing presence of the Mycenaeans. See also Herod. 1.141.4 (Ionus); 1.163.3 (Tartessus). See Ducrey (1995, 245–7); Carandini (2006, 118). On Knossos and the question of identifying of the ancient city see now Sacchi (2004, 69 n. 90).

[8] For Spain see Curchin (1985, 343).

[9] Rome maintained its dignity as an *urbs* during the defeat against the Gauls due to Lucius Albinius' heroism; he, according to tradition, evacuated the Vestals and the *sacra* of the *urbs* to Caere. The continuity of the city's cults saved Rome even which the city was in fact in the invaders' hands. See Liv. 5.40.9; Plut. *Cam.* 21.1; Val. Max. 1.1.10; Flor. 1.7; see Sordi (1960, 51 and *passim*).

[10] Fest. sv. *pagi* (L 247.6). This testimony must be read with Serv. *Georg.* 2.382 (see below).

[11] Fest. sv. *Demoe* (L 63.17).

[12] Dion. 4.15.2.

[13] FIRA 1^2.140.

the *lex agraria* dated to 111 BC and others,[14] as an effect of the identification in the Ligurian region, as possibly elsewhere, of *pagus* with *castellum* or *territorium* for areas where there were no settlements; a *conciliabulum* is considered a complex of several *pagi*.[15]

2. *The Functional Nature of Archaic* Pagus

Tarpin insists on the *census* function of *pagi* for the historical age, and even rejects the existence of *pagus* as a territorial district at any time, but this position does not take into account the fact that Servius Tullius' reform and the military service conscription in ancient times were based on the census classes and not on the tribes.[16] Maybe Mommsen's interpretation describing Rome's territory as an archaic division system of *montes at pagi* is correct. It would then serve for "l'administration, au moins pour la distribution de l'eau entre les maisons des citoyens".[17] Using a fragmentary but intelligible gloss of Festus relating to a *lex rivalicia* used by the jurisconsult Servius Sulpicius Rufus, Mommsen also supposes that the statutes of the *conlegia aquae* were still in use in the late Republican age: *is ipsis, id quod Graece* (...) [*le*]*ge rivalicia sic est* [...]*ae populum Ser. Sulpi:* "[*mon*]*tani paganive si*[*fis aquam dividunt*]*o, donec eam inter se* [*diviserint,...*]*s iudicatio esto*".[18]

Moreover, a reference from Frontinus shows that Augustus could have had the intention to maintain these statutes: *Aliquid et in domos principum civitatis dabatur concedentis reliquis*.[19] The reference to a possible Greek law of the same contents (*is ipsis, id quod Graece*) by Festus is coherent with the etymological solution proposed by the same source of *pagi* as *dicti a fontibus, quod eadem aqua uterentur*. For Greek writers, and for anyone who intends to use the term in the strict sense, the term *pagus* was an expression of an evident 'bond' between persons joined together

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14 *Lex agr.* l. 5: *agri locei publicei in terra Italia, quod eius extra urbem Romam est, quod eius in urbe oppido vico est, quod eius IIIvir dedit adsignavit, quod* [...]. See Sacchi (2006, 136–7). *Cf.* Luraschi (1970–2); Frederiksen (1976, 343–5). Other sources in Capogrossi (2002, 199 n. 11).

15 Sereni (1955, 383 n. 65).

16 See Pieri (1968, 143).

17 Mommsen (1889, 129).

18 Fest. sv. *Sifus* (L 458.5). See Mommsen (1889, 129 n. 1).

19 Front. *Aq.* 94.

by various links, not solely by the territory. In brief, it could refer to a political unit, a *koinonìa*, or an *ethnè*.[20]

3. *The Existence of Archaic* Pagi *and* Vici *in Italy*

Contrary to what some scholars think, the existence of *pagi* in Italy in the Archaic period cannot be denied.[21] In the city of Rome the *pagus Sucusanus* existed, a testimony that dates back to when the district of *Subura* was still part of the countryside.[22] We also know that the *pagus Montanus* was the object of a *senatus consultum*.[23] Livy and Cicero mention a *pagus Capitolinus*;[24] Mommsen held that the existence of this *pagus* within the walls of Rome could be attested by the following inscription: CLESIPUS GEGANIVS MAG CAPI(*tol*) MAG LVPERC VIAT TR.[25] Clesippus Geganius could be *magister* of the *collegi Capitolinorum* that, as Livy says, *in Capitolio et in arce habitarent*. Livy does not mention the name of the *pagus*, but the *collegia* were instituted *sacrorum causa* and Cicero attests that the *magistri* of the *collegia* were also *magistri pagorum et vicorum*: *habeto rationem urbis totius, collegiorum omnium, pagorum, vicinitatum*.[26]

On this basis, Mommsen says that "*Capitolinorum collegium tamquam pagi vices fecisse*" and also that this was a practice shared in Campania, as demonstrated by the comparison with the text of the *pagus Herculaneus* (see below): "*In titulis Campanis pagorum collegiorumque similis ratio est*

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[20] See *TLL* sv. *pagus*. I think is possible to apply Festus' economic/geographical notion (the distinction between *pagani* and *montani*, not *vicani*) of *pagus* to the *mesògeia* of Campania. Martini (1973, 1041–3), in fact recognizes cultural acquaintances between Greece, Magna Graecia, Etruria, and Rome as early as the sixth century. On the concept of ethnic unity see Catalano (1971, 809): "L'unità etnica non è il presupposto dei vincoli giuridici (anche se dà luogo a posizioni "privilegiate"), bensì i vincoli giuridici (variamente adeguati alle realtà di fatto, etniche e politiche) danno vita ad unità etniche aperte a sempre nuove estensioni ed assimilazioni." Thus also Ampolo (1988, 170); Giardina (1994, 69).

[21] *Contra* Tarpin (2002, 37 and *passim*).

[22] Varro *L* 5.48; Fest. sv. *Suburam* (L 402.5). The name *Sucusanus* had been preserved for the feast of the *Agonalia* on 11 December, a feast of the calendar of Numa, connected with the celebration of the *Septimontium* (Varro *L* 6.24: *Septimontium... feriae non populi, sed montanorum modo, ut paganalibus, qui sunt alicuius pagi*; Plut. *Q. Rom.* 69), celebrated by the primitive inhabitants of the six *montes* and the surrounding *pagus* of the rural district of *Subura* to the *dii montes*. See Lact. *Mort. pers.* 11 and CIL III.1601: *Sul*(*eviae*) *mont*(*enses*). See Capogrossi (2002, 182–4).

[23] CIL VI.3823. The text has been reconstructed according to the text of *lex Lucerina* (CIL IX.782).

[24] Liv. 5.50.4; Cic. *QF* 2.5.2.

[25] CIL I.805.

[26] *Pet. cons.* 8.30.

vidimusque ibi pago Herculaneo sub magistro pagi constituto comprehendi conlegium magistrove Iovii compagi duodenos".[27]

Other testimonials are those of the *pagus Ianiculensis* and that of the *duo pagi*.[28] For a period certainly preceding the Augustan reform, we hear of a *vicus Cuprius*, where Dionysius attests the existence of *Tigillum Sororium* connected to the dramatic story of *Horatii* and *Curiatii*,[29] the *vicus Iugaris*,[30] the *vicus Tuscus*,[31] and the *vicus Insteianus*, of which Varro found a mention in the sacrificial book of the Argei, the place where the augurs made auspices.[32] In the countryside of Rome we have the territory of the *septem pagi*; which Romulus gave to the Etruscans.[33] In historical times we find the festival of the *Paganalia*, the mention of *magistri pagorum*, and decrees (*scita*) and games (*ludi*) organized by *pagi*.[34]

For ancient Italy we find the *vicus* in the country of the Sabines[35] and references in the territory of the Marsi, Paeligni, Samnites,[36] Liguri,[37] and Enotri.[38] Tacitus uses the term *pagus* in the description of the lands of Germany, mentioning the *pagi* of Sequani and Aedui, Africa, and Hispania Citerior.[39] Finally, there is the famous statement of Caesar: *omnis civitas*

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[27] Mommsen, CIL I, p. 206.

[28] *Pagus Ianiculensis:* CIL I^2.1000; *duo pagi*: CIL I^2.1002: *T*(*itus*) *Quinctius Q*(*uincti*) *f*(*ilius*) *L*(*ucius*) *Tulli*[*us—f*(*ilius*)—] *Caltili*(*us*) *Calt*(*iliae?*) *l*(*ibertus*)/*mag*(*istri*) *de duobus pageis et vicei Sulpicei.*

[29] Dion. 3.22.8.

[30] Liv. 24.47.15–16.

[31] Varro *L* 5.46.

[32] Varro *L* 5.52.

[33] Dion. 2.55.5; Dion. 5.31.4; Fest. sv. *Romilia tribus* (L 331); Varro *L.* 5.56; Liv. 1.14–15.

[34] See Mommsen (1889 [repr. 1985], 125–7).

[35] Liv. 2.62.4: *Non villarum modo sed etiam vicorum quibus frequenter habitabatur Sabini.*

[36] Fest. sv. *vici* (L 502): *<Vici>…cipiunt ex agris, qui ibi villas non habent, ut Marsi aut Peligni. Sed ex vic*[*t*]*is partim habent rempublicam et ius dicitur, partim nihil eorum et tamen ibi nundinae aguntur negoti gerendi causa, et magistri vici, item magistri pagi quotannis fiun. Altero, cum id genus aedificio<rum defi>nitur, quae continentia sunt his oppidis, quae… itineribus regionibusque distributa inter se distant, nominibusque dissimilibus discriminis causa sunt dispartita. Tertio, cum id genus aedificiorum definitur, quae in oppido privi in suo quisque loco proprio ita aedifica<n>t, ut in eo aedificio pervium sit, quo itinere habitatores ad suam quisque habitationem habeant accessum. Qui non dicuntur vicani, sicut hi, qui aut in oppidi vicis, aut hi, qui in agris sunt, vicani appellantur*. See Liv. 9.13.7: *Nam Samnites, ea tempestate in montibus vicatim habitantes.*

[37] Strabo 4.2.1.

[38] Dion. 1.12.1.

[39] Tac. *Ann.* 2.61.4; 3.45.1 for Aedui and Sequani; 3.74.2 for the *Cirtensium pagi*; 4.45.2 for Spain.

Helvetia in quattuor pagos divisa, from which we can deduce that Caesar conceived of the *pagus* as a unit of territorial division.[40]

For Capua Vetus, finally, there is the famous inscription on the decree of *pagus Herculaneus* from Recale near Capua, close to Calatia: *Pagus Herculaneus scivit a(nte) <d>(iem) X termina[lia] conlegium seive megistrei Iouvei Compagei [sunt] / utei in porticum paganam reficiendam / pequniam consumerent ex lege pagana / arbitratu Cn(eii) Laetori Cn(eii) f(ilii) magistrei / pageiei uteique ei conlegio seive magistri / sunt Iouvei Compagei locus in teatro / esset tam qua sei sei lu<d>os fecissent*.[41]

In conclusion, for ancient Italy and Capua Vetus, we cannot deny, in principle, the existence of *pagi* and *vici* as forms of settlement, before the conquest of Rome, because *pagus* and *vicus*, as units of archaic territorial division, are, as we have seen, widely attested by the sources for Italic (also Gallic, Hellenic, Germanic, and other) populations.[42]

4. *The 'paganico-vicano' System*

In my opinion, it is impossible to deny *tout court* the existence of a 'paganico-vicano' system.[43] Apart from a famous inscription, already mentioned, reading *mag(stri) de duobus pageis et vicei Sulpicei* where the strict relationship is explicit,[44] Tacitus uses the formula *per pagi et vici* in a well-known fragment on Germany: *Iura per pagos vicosque reddunt*.[45] The same thing can be said for Vergil: *Praemiaque ingeniis pagos et compita*

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[40] Caes. *BG* 1.12.4: *omnis civitas Helvetia in quattuor pagos divisa*; *BG* 1.13.5: *quod improviso unum pagum adortus esset*; *BG* 1.27.4: *circiter hominum milia sex eius pagi qui Verbigenus appellatur*. But see also Caes. *BG*. 4.22.5: *in eos pagos Morinorum*; *BG* 7.64: *altera ex parte Gabalos proximosque pagos Arvernorum in Helvios, item Rutenos Cadurcosque ad fines Volcarum Arecomicorum depopulandos mittit*.

[41] CIL X.3772. At the end follows the list of names of the *magistrei iouvei compagei*.

[42] For Italic *pagi* see Nissen (1902, 8–10). On forms of settlement in Liguria see Sereni (1955, 307–30 and *passim*). On the Celtic *pagus* see Jullian (1920, 174–6, 361–3); Grenier (1945, 165–7). For Etruria see Solari (1931, 19–20).

[43] Schulten (1894, 631); De Francisci (1959, 135 n. 164). Capogrossi (2002, 276) speaks of the primitive phase of a 'paganico' system; see La Regina (1970, 193); Laffi (1974, 336–9); Richard (1978, 143); Frederiksen (1984, 266); Ampolo (1988, 168); D'Henry (1991, 15); Gaggiotti (1991, 35); Buonocore (1993, 51). *Contra* Tarpin (2002, 53–5, 183). Now doubtful, however, is Capogrossi (2002, 192).

[44] CIL VI.2221. This inscription is one of the *tituli reliqui* that Mommsen defines *aetatis minus certa* (CIL 1^{2} 577), but was published in the collection of the *tituli ad Caesaris mortem*.

[45] Tac. *Germ.* 12.3.

circum/Thesidae posuere.[46] The *compita* were units made of several *vici: Pagos et compita c. per quadrivia—quae compita appellantur ab eo, quod multae viae in unam confluant—et villas, quae pagi . . . appellantur, id est a fontibus, circa quos villae consueverant condi: unde et pagani dicti sunt, quasi ex uno fonte potantes. 'Compita' unde ludi compitalici*.[47] Here Servius clearly used Festus' dictionary.

In Festus' lemma on *vici*, which has been examined recently by Todisco, we find the same interpretation of the territory with reference to the first 'category' (where there were no *res publica*, nor *ius dicitur*) of the three 'categories' listed by the glossographer.[48] In the territories without *res publica*, to which Capua may have belonged after the Second Punic War, and where the magistrates had no *imperium* (i.e. the faculty of *dicere ius*), we hear of an institutional activity, namely nundinal markets, managed by *magistri vicorum* and *magistri pagorum*.

There is more to say about relations between these settlement structures. Livy is even clearer than in his statement about Italy in describing the territorial settlement forms in Attica, where he uses the term *pagatim: delubra sibi fuisse quae quondam pagatim habitantes in parvis illis castellis vicisque consecrata ne in unam urbem quidem contributi maiores sui deserta reliquerint*.[49] According to Livy, to live *pagatim* had the same meaning as to live *per castella et vicos*. Such a form of settlement was also typical for Ligurian and Celtic populations, as Livy himself attests with regard to the Hannibal's transit through the Alps: *Castellum quod caput eius regionis erat, viculosque circumiectos*.[50] The famous *castellum* of the Allobroges is even defined by Polybius as a *polis*.[51] The same is said about the Apuani, who, during their raid in the Pisan countryside, sent the escorted plunder *in castella eorum vicosque*.[52] Q. Mucius laid waste *castella vicosque* of the Ligurian populations living in the hinterland of Pisa.[53] Thus, as Sereni states, in the settlement system of the Ligurian populations "where there was a tribe, a *pagus* is structured in *vici*, which are connected by *castella*, and the connection consists of the *castellum* itself".[54]

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46 Verg. *Georg*. 2.382–3.
47 Serv. *Georg*. 2.382.
48 Todisco (2006, 605–7).
49 Liv. 31.30.6.
50 Liv. 21.33.
51 Polyb. 3.50.7; 3.51.10. See Sereni (1955, 397).
52 Liv. 35.3.
53 Liv. 35.21.
54 Sereni (1955, 397).

When later sources describe the Italic territory, they clearly put on the same level *castellum*, *pagus*, and *vicus* on the one hand, and the typically Roman settlement units *coloniae* and *municipia* on the other. In the *Sententia Minuciorum*, dated 117 BC, 'lands of the *castellum*' and 'lands of the *pagus*' appear as interchangeable expressions. Frontinus and Agennius Urbicus put on the same level *ager colonicus*, *ager municipalis*, the territories of *castella*, of *conciliabula*, and of private *saltus*: *Per Italiam nullus ager est tributarius, sed aut colonicus, aut municipalis, aut alicuius castelli aut conciliabuli aut saltus privati.*[55] In this context, the definition of Isidore of Seville, where *pagi, vici,* and *castella* do not seem to have substantial differences, assumes a different shade of meaning.[56] These settlements were, according to Isidore, territorial units for the inhabitants which, in themselves, were not *civitates*, because they were mainly meeting places, but to which, nevertheless, such a quality was attributed *propter parvitatem sui* by the ancients (*maioribus*). Thus, the concept of *civitas* appears in a much broader semantic dimension than is often thought, and we note immediately the writer's difficulty in explaining a fact which is probably not very clear to him.

Pseudo-Placidus Grammaticus, in a gloss, compares *vicatim* with *castellatim*. Sereni, correctly, sees here a general indication that where urban settlements were not dominant, i.e. where the population was settled by *vici*, the latter were united around a *castellum*.[57] It is clear that the level of 'Romanization' determined, at least in Liguria, a superimposition and adding of Italic pre-Roman structures to Roman ones, but without the complete disappearence of the former.

Moreover, in the late perspective of Isidore, the definition of *civitas* seems to refer to any form of territorial settlement which corresponds to a community representing a significant and autonomous union of persons. Below, we will see that the sources are precise in describing such a union as a cultural, economic, and, therefore, religious and institutional organization. Therefore, in this regard, it is preferable to follow the prevailing theory, which tends to recognize for pre-Roman Italy a settlement system

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55 *De controv. agror.* 20.1–3 (ed. Campbell, 2000, p. 20).

56 Isid. *Orig.* 15.2.11: *Vici et castella et pagi hi sunt, qui nulla dignitate civitatis ornantur, sed vulgari hominum conventu incoluntur, et propter parvitatem sui maioribus civitatibus adtribuuntur.*

57 Ps.-Plac. Gramm. *glossae* [Pirie-Lindsay p. 50]: *Vicatim: castellatim; sunt enim loca quae ab ingenuis habitantur et quia nec villae nec civitates possunt appellari vicus dicuntur; nam Latinitas recepit ut dicamus vicatim et oppidatim, quasi vicus et civitas, quod est oppidum.* See Sereni (1955, 382 n. 65).

divided into *pagi, vici*, and *castella*. Thus, it is clear, in my view, that the 'paganico-vicano' model is not a modern terminological invention, given that Livy and Tacitus expressly use the term, but a historical reality.[58]

5. *The Notion of* Civitas

The above may help us to understand the Latin meaning of the term *civitas*. The true meaning of *civitas* was, perhaps until the end of Roman Republic, a 'community of citizens politically organized', and not '*urbs* enclosed by walls'.[59] As evidence for its use to indicate a city district, we have, for example: *Hoc apud nos quoque videmus accidere, quotiens incendio laborat pars civitatis*.[60]

For the meaning of *urbs* as 'territory enclosed by walls' we have only later sources, e.g. Suetonius: *Plurimas per totum orbem civitates terrae motu aut incendio afflictas restituit in melius*.[61] We must recall, in this context, Strabo, for whom Elis in the Peloponnese was equally a name of a city and a region. This situation is very similar to the Samnium of Scipio Barbatus (see below). My opinion is that the large tribal unit, called *touto* in the Oscan language, could correspond to the Latin Republican term *civitas,* instead of to *populus*. In this sense we might read the well-known example of Isidore: *Civitates autem aut coloniae aut municipia aut vici aut castella aut pagi appellantur*.[62]

A *civitas* may be called a *colonia, municipium, vicus*, or *castellum*. *Civitas* in the meaning of *urbs* is secondary, deriving from the fact that a specific place consisted of the community of people living at that place.[63] In the ancient sense of the word, *urbs* was a city with *pomerium*. Therefore,

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58 See for this question Capogrossi (2002, 170–2 and n. 28).

59 See e.g. Plaut. *Merc.* 645: *sed quam capiam civitatem, cogito, potissimum: Megares, Eretriam, Corinthum, Chalcidem, Cretam, Cyprum, Sicyonem, Cnidum, Zacynthum, Lesbiam, Boeotiam*; Cic. *Fin.* 3.63: *natura apti sumus ad coetus, concilia, civitates*; Caes. *BG*. 2.34: *quem cum legione una miserat ad Venetos, Unellos, Osismos, Coriosolitas, Essuvios, Aulercos, Redones, quae sunt maritimae civitates Oceanumque attingunt, certior factus est omnes eas civitates in dicionem potestatemque populi Romani redactas esse*; Caes. *BG* 7.4.1: *Simili ratione ibi Vercingetorix Celtilli filius, Arvernus, summae potentiae adulescens, cuius pater principatum totius Galliae obtinuerat et ob eam causam, quod regnum adpetebat, a civitate erat interfectus, convocatis suis clientibus facile incendit*.

60 Sen. *Nat. Quaest*. 6.9.3.

61 Suet. *Vesp*. 17. See Vulg. *Gen.* 4.17.2: *Et aedificavit civitatem vocavitque nomen eius ex nomine filii sui Enoch*.

62 Isid. *Orig*. 15.2.7.

63 Isid. *Orig*. 15.2.8.

the Greek equivalent of *polis* may be only *civitas*, as in Isidore: *Civitas est hominum multitudo societatis vinculo adunata, dicta a civibus, id est ab ipsis incolis urbis* [*pro eo quod plurimorum consciscat et contineat vitas*]. *Nam urbs ipsa moenia sunt, civitas autem non saxa, sed habitatores vocantur*.[64]

This clarifies the relation between *civitas* and other settlement units of ancient Italy. Isidore describes *vici*, *castella*, and *pagi* as lower units of the *civitas: Vici et castella et pagi hi sunt, qui nulla dignitate civitatis ornantur, sed vulgari hominum conventu incoluntur, et propter parvitatem sui maioribus civitatibus adtribuuntur*.[65] From the definition of *pagus* (clearly inspired by the lemma *vicus* of Festus), we know that they were also called *conciliabulum* based on the fact that it was *conventus societatis multorum in unum*, or "a meeting place of the inhabitants of the territory".[66]

Formentini underlines the functional relation between the *pagus* and the *conciliabulum* as a meeting place inside the territorial unit of the *pagus* for the inhabitants of the *vici*.[67] According to Capogrossi, *conciliabulum* and *castellum* are "both associated with the meeting places of rural populations, which are more complex than the mere existence of a *vicus* and certainly have strong pre-Roman roots".[68] On this basis I suggest that *pagus* could be, for Samnium and the *Ager Campanus*, a possible division of the *civitas* in the most ancient sense of the word, as used by Scipio Barbatus in the famous inscription: *Taurasia Cisaunia / Samnio cepit* (Fig. 1).[69] In my opinion, *Samnio* stands for an entire region, because it seems that the Romans, in the third century BC, and even up to the first century BC, did not differentiate the name of an area and/or its most significant settlement.[70]



Figure 1. The funerary elogium of Scipio Barbatus.

64 Isid. *Orig*. 15.2.1.

65 Isid. *Orig*. 15.2.11.

66 See Isid. *Orig*. 15.2.14: *Pagi sunt apta aedificiis loca inter agros habitantibus. Haec et conciliabula dicta, a conventu et societate multorum in unum*.

67 Kornemann (1905, 72–4); Formentini (1925, 37–9).

68 Capogrossi (2002, 76 and n. 85). Strabo 5.2.1–4 uses *komedòn*.

69 CIL 1^2.7.

70 Cf. Fay (1920, 163ff); Frank (1920, 169ff); La Regina (1968, 187ff); Zevi (1969–70, 65ff); Saladino (1970); Patterson (1985, 185ff); Cornell (1995, 359); Valente (1995); Coarelli (1996, 178ff); Sacchi (2002, 29). See also Cambria (2002, 1ff).

6. *The System of* Pagi *and* Vici *in the* Ager Campanus

Let us now investigate claims from sources about the presence of *pagi* and *vici* in the territory of Capua Vetus in a time-span ranging from the foundation of Volturnum (ninth or eighth century BC) to the foundation of Caesar's *colonia* in 59 BC.

Speaking about Elis in the Peloponnese, Strabo describes a set of inhabited villages as *komedòn*, and uses the same term for Samnium.[71] For the same area, Livy uses the words *in montibus vicatim habitantes*.[72] In Greek, a set of villages was also called *systemata demon*; therefore, it may be possible to establish an analogy between this pattern of village settlement (*komedòn*) and the pattern of *systemata demon*. This was probably an effect of the phenomenon of synoecism, which, as has been argued, caused the birth of the some *poleis* in Greece. Mantinea, a city on the Peloponnese, originated from five villages, Tegea and Erea from nine, Patras from seven, and Dime from eight. This makes it clear that the system of settlement of a 'set of villages', called *komedòn* or *katà komas*, was considered in Greece to be *systemata demon*, and that it gave rise to some *poleis*. Ampolo provides an analogy with Rome, and I see no reason to exclude this type of settlement for Campania and Capua.[73]

Unmistakable traces of the ancient sources in fact establish a direct connection between Etruscan Capua and the internal world of the Etruscan Tiber.[74] Festus establishes a correspondence between the Attic territorial *demos* and Latin *pagus*;[75] furthermore, Volturnum (the ancient name of Capua) was founded near a watercourse, as was Rome. Thus, the ancient inhabitants of Volturnum/Capua *eadem aqua uterentur* before the 'second foundation' of Capua in 59, when this *civitas* became an *urbs* with perimeter walls.[76] Therefore, it is possible to think of the oldest phase of Capua as an homogeneous settlement characterized by *pagi* and *gentes*, over which the Samnites could overlap the system of the *touto*, without

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71 Strabo 8.3.2, 5.4.12,9.

72 Liv. 9.13.7.

73 Ampolo (1988, 169).

74 Sources and bibliography in Sacchi (2004, 46ff, 51–2).

75 Fest. sv. *Demoe* (L 63.17). See Hom. *Il.* 5.710 (*demos* close to Boiotia); 6.158 (to Argos); 16.437 (the country of Lici); *Od.* 1.103 (Ithaka); 1.237 (Teukri); 6.3 (where is the distinction between *demos* (territory) and *polis* of the Phaiaci); 24.12 (the land of dreams); 2,291 (broadly as land); 4.167 (in the earth as the kingdom of Ulysses).

76 Sacchi (2004, 80–2).

affecting the existing territorial structures, as is shown by epigraphical and archeological evidence.[77]

Capua Vetus elected its magistrates with full economic, legal-religious, and, if necessary, military powers. The territorial unit that the city referred to in the historical age seems, in fact, to include also fortified villages on the plain (*vici*?), but extended also to the mountainous area and perhaps included fortified fortresses (*oppida* or *castella*).[78] The sources attest, for the period from the late third or early second century BC, the existence of a mixed settlement system, from which it is not necessary to exclude *pagi*,[79] as scattered habitations, and *vici*, as compact habitations having a legal qualification. This seems to have been the result of the Roman conquest (as may be hypothesized for the *vicani* of Rufrae and the *viasi vicanei* of the *lex agraria* of 111 BC), and is not in contradiction to the Festus gloss.

On this basis, it may be possible to confirm the hypothesis of the existence of settlement structures preceding the Roman conquest as *pagi* and *vici*. The idea of Frederiksen that the ancient *pagi Tifatinus* and *Herculaneus* returned in 211 BC as an effect of the Roman institutional decapitation of Capua, is a clear adherence to the hypothesis that the territory of Capua was divided from the earliest times into *pagi*.[80] Guadagno has shown that, after the defeat of 211 BC, the *pagi*, integrated into a structured system of *vici*, were territorial units in full existence in the *Ager Campanus*.[81] The sources attest a *pagus Agrifanus, Capricolanus, Lanita, Myttianus*, and

[77] For a certain cultural homogeneity during the 'villanovian' and 'postvillanovian' period of the *Ager Campanus* see Poccetti (1981, 75–7); D'Isanto (1993, 47–9); Cerchiai (1995, 95). For Greece cf. Ziolkowski (2000, 22). See Franciosi (1993, 59): "Queste popolazioni si trovavano in una fase preurbana in cui la comunità tribale formava la base del sistema. Fino al tempo della guerra sociale non sembrano esistere vere e proprie città-stato nell'ambiente sannita, se si eccettui l'etrusca Capua. L'unità amministrativa al di sotto della tribù era l'antichissima istituzione italica del villaggio, il *pagus*, che sopravvive fino ai tempi della dominazione romana. Il *pagus* a sua volta poteva comprendere più insediamenti minori, come i *vici* o, nelle zone montagnose, *oppida* e *castella*. Un paragone con l'area ligure ci dà elementi di riscontro molto significativi." But see Capogrossi (2002, 172 n. 28). See now the description in Santangelo (2006, 618).

[78] See Dion. 4.15.2–4; Fest. sv. *paginae* (L 247–8).

[79] See Liv. 25.5.6–7 (212 BC).

[80] Schulten (1898, 300–2); Heurgon (1942); Frederiksen (1976, 341–3); Salmon (1985, 185 n. 65); Franciosi (1993, 58–60); Cornell (1995, 353–5). In particular Beloch ([1989], 364): "Fin dai tempi più remoti il territorio di Capua era frazionato in pagi, così come i territori di Nola, di Roma, di Benevento e probabilmente quelli di tutte le città italiche; distretti dalla cui unione sono poi probabilmente venute fuori le comunità cittadine. A questi pagi ora venivano trasferite le funzioni amministrative che fino a questo momento erano state esercitate dai magistrati della comunità di Capua."

[81] Guadagno (1987, 1–3; 1993, 407–9). But see Camodeca (2001, 413 n. 3).

Apollinaris, and a *vicus Sarclanus, Esquilinus, Herculaneus, Novanensis*, and *Palatius*, as well as some inscriptions that only mention the term, without the name: *pagus* (*Iunonis Gaurae*?), *vicus* (*Dianae Tifatinae*) *Rufrae* (?). Finally, there are locations for which we can discover the name and/or legal classification: *Laurum, pagus Cererus* (?), *vicus Caedicius, Casilinum*.

Equally interesting is the distribution along the territory of Campania. Belonging to the district of Nola, we have the *pagi Agrifanus, Capricolanus, Lanita, Myttianus, Apollinaris*, and *Laurum*. In Suessula we find the *vicus Novanensis*. At Calatia the *pagi Calatia, Herculaneus*, and *Cererus* are attested; in Cales we find the *vici Palatius* and *Esquilinus* and in Teanum, possibly, the *pagus Rufranus*. In Sinuessa we have the *pagus Sarclanus* and *vicus Caedicius*. These data justify the idea of a coexistence of *pagi* and *vici* in the *Ager Campanus* after the Roman *debellatio* of 211 BC. All inscriptions date, in fact, to a period between the Gracchi and the second century AD. The oldest is from Cales, attesting the *veqo Esqelino*, and may be dated to around 200 BC.[82]

7. *The* Magistri Campani *and Capua’s* Iuvila: *The Problem of ‘Continuity’*

What about the problem of ‘continuity’? Is it possible to say that this model of settlement was also in force before the *debellatio* of 211 BC? Or should we follow Frederiksen, who thinks that this returned in force only after this measure? Very important for this question are 28 inscriptions known as the register of the *magistri Campani*, dated between 112 and 71 BC, which represent the activities of *curatores fanorum*.

It could be that these magistrates, representatives of small territorial communities, retained independence after the measures of 211 BC. They played an important role in the construction of the theater at Capua (108–94 BC) and for the reconstruction and enlargement of the temple of Diana Tifatina. It seems that they ceased to hold office only with the establishment of Caesar’s *colonia* in 59 BC.[83] Camodeca, in his study of Nola, showed that the *magistri pagi* were still subject to the authority and control of city magistrates and the *ordo decurionum*.[84] It is clear that these

[82] CIL I^2.416.
[83] D’Isanto (1993, 19).
[84] Camodeca (2001, 415). According to the *Lex Rubria*, African *pagi* were managed by *decuriones*: CIL VIII, p. 1100.



Figure 2. A fourth- or third-century *iuvila* inscription.

magistrates existed after the *debellatio* of 211 BC. What can we say about their existence before 211 BC?

Here the so-called *iuvila* inscriptions can offer significant evidence, since they point to the existence in Capua of *meddices* in the fourth and third centuries BC. These show considerable continuity between the period before 211 and after. While accepting a date subsequent to 211 BC for most *iuvila* inscriptions, some show graphics *í* and *ú*, pointing to the third century BC.[85] Others are dated between the late fourth century BC and the beginning of the third century BC, for example *iuvila* no. 15 (Fig. 2).[86]

Numbers 20 and 21, found in S. Maria Capua Vetere, are dated before the first half of the third century BC, so after 318 and before 211 BC.[87] Here we read: [*úpil*(*eís*) *vi*(*bieís*) *pak*(*vieís*) *tantrnnaiúm iuvilas sakrannas eídúís mamerttiais pún meddís kapv*(*ans*) *adfust iúviaís nessimais staieffud sakriss*

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[85] See on the chronology of the *iuvila* Franchi De Bellis (1981, 25–31). Some examples of other lexical forms: (17A. 10.11): *medikd* [...] *túvtik kapv*, (17B.3–4; 9): *medikid túvtik kapv* [...] *Medik*; (18,5–7): *de virrieís medika*; 19.2–4: *I annieí medikkiaí tuv*; (20.5–6): *meddis kapv*; 21.6–8: *Medda pis*; 22.8–10: *l pettíeís meddikkiaí*; (23.7–10): *l pettíeís meddikkiaí*.

[86] It is an inscription on a stele, published in Mazzocchi (1741). See Franchi De Bellis (1981, 13–15, 130):]*ekas*(*s*) *tris*|||(= *iúvilas*) *med*(*ikid*) *kapva*(*nud*) *sakra*(*sias*)[-]( ) *ekas* [||||] [-] *miia*( ) *n*[*e*]*ssimas*. "[Of...] these three |||(= *iuvilas*). At the presence of Capuano's *meddix* the bloody sacrifices during the feasts (?)... These [||||] (= iuvilas) close... (?)."

[87] The first edition is by Sogliano (1889, 22–4).

Figure 3. A third-century *iuvila* inscription.

sakrafír avt últiumam kerssnaís;[88] and *úpil*(*eís*) *vi*(*bieís*) *pak*(*vieís*) *tantrn-naiúm iúvil*(*ú*) *sakrann*(*ú*) *púmperias súllemnaís pún medd*(*ikias*) *pis iním verehias sakrid sakrafír*.[89] In these two panels we find that, during the feast of *pomperie*, a member of the family group of Tanternei participated with a *meddix* of Capua in a ritual celebration.

No. 24, dated to the third century, states *tr*(*ebieís*) *virriieís kenssu-rineís ekas iúvilas trís ehpeílatasset vesulliaís fertalis staflatasset mi*(*nieís*) *blússii*(*eís*) *m*(*eddikiaí*) *t*(*úvtikaí*) *nessimas staíet veruís lúvkeí* (fig. 3).[90]

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[88] No. 20: Franchi De Bellis (1981, 170): "*Iuvila* of Opilio, Vibio, Pacio Tanternei to make sacred at the Ides of 'Mamertio', when will be present the *meddix* during the next *giovie* (= Ides). It was established that (the *iuvilas*) were consecrated with pigs, but the last with cereals."

[89] No. 21: Franchi De Bellis (1981, 171): "*Iuvila* of Opilio, Vibio, Pacio Tanternei to make sacred during the solemn *pomperie*, when will be present a representative of the *meddicia* and *vereia*. (It was established that the *iuvilas*) was consecrated with a pig."

[90] No. 24: Franchi De Bellis (1981, 185): "These three *iuvilas* of Trebius Virrius Censorinus have been erected during the *vesullie fertalie*. There are 'guaranteed' in the *meddicia tutica* of Minius Blossius son of Minius [i.e. in the presence of the *meddix tuticus* Minius Blossius son of Minius]. There are near the ports of *luco*." This inscription engraved on terracotta was edited for the first time by Von Planta (1894, 258–64). Bibliography in Franchi De Bellis (1981, 179–81).

As we can see, three *iuvilas* of Trebius Virrius Censorinus, erected during the feast of *vesullie fertalie*, are 'guaranteed' during the *meddix*-ship of Minius Blossius, in the presence of the *meddix tuticus* Minius Blossius, and are placed near the *luco*. Bearing in mind that until the Augustan age Oscan remained in use at Capua, these testimonies give us a glimpse of the social-institutional makeup of the town.[91] These small elements show that what Roman sources, such as Livy and Festus, indicate as *praefecturae*, but also as magistrates of *pagi* and *vici*, in Capua were probably equivalent to the figure of *meddix* and to the institution of the *meddicia tutica*.

Widening the perspective, we may recognize in the *magistri* of the *iuvila* the magistrates whom Festus mentions,[92] who were *sine imperio* and may correspond to the *magistri pagorum et vicorum et collegiorum* postulated by Mommsen. He noticed a strict analogy between the powers of these magistrates and that of the Roman *collegia*. The *magister pagi*, equivalent to the *meddix tuticus*, was in charge of the observance of the *sacra*, was elected yearly by the meeting of the inhabitants of the *pagus*, and could appoint patrons to ask protection.[93]

8. *Conclusion*

These *magistri pagi*, then, could be the *magistri* of Capua's *iuvila* who remained in office, at least from 318 until 59 BC, when Caesar gave back to Capua the right to be a city again.[94] In this way, Capua's institutional status appears to have been that of a *civitas sine imperio* administrated by *praefecti iuri dicundo*, assisted by *magistri*, equivalent to the *meddices* of the old pre-Roman settlement structures. It is likely, therefore, that a *meddix Campanus* was in office before and after 211 BC. The *magistri campani* continued to perform their work until the settlement of Caesar's *colonia*, which, for Capua and the *Ager Campanus antiquus*, was the real point of change in administration.

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[91] *Cf.* Franchi De Bellis (1981, 35).

[92] Fest. sv. *magisterare* (L. 113): *Magisterare moderari. Unde magistri non solum doctores artium, sed etiam pagorum, societatum, vicorum, collegiorum, equitum dicuntur, quia magis ceteris possun.*

[93] Fest. sv. *vici* (L. 502): *magistri pagi quotannis fiunt.* On Rome see Cic. *Dom.* 28; CIL IX, p. 788. On Capua see Mommsen (1889, 133, n. 4; [1963], 319).

[94] *Contra* Heurgon (1942), who thinks that in 211 BC the *meddicia* was abolished.

INTEGRATION, IDENTITY, AND LANGUAGE SHIFT: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE 'LINGUISTIC' EVIDENCE

David Langslow*

1. *Introduction*

I offer in this paper some general theoretical considerations with reference to relatively well-known texts, nearly all epigraphic.[1] Figure 1 offers, by way of preface, a swift overview of some of the languages in contact with Latin in Italy in the Republican period.[2] The non-Indo-European language Etruscan appears in one or two of the cases considered in this paper, but the large majority of my examples concern contact between Latin and Oscan or Umbrian, both closely related to Latin, both members of the Sabellic group of the Italic branch of the Indo-European family.

Various papers at this conference have suggestively highlighted several specific topics in which linguistic considerations play an important role, including the army, the relevance of urbanisation and the pull of Rome, regional varieties of Latin, and contact among Italians, rather than between Italians and Romans. For better or for worse, only the last of these is touched on in the present paper,[3] which is organised rather under the following more general topics or headings:

- Romanisation as opposed to Latinisation:
  - linguistic-*cultural* as opposed to *lexical and grammatical* items
- Cultural/political identity and language-use:
  - the importance of choice in inferring meaning from linguistic behaviour
- Language-use and language-status in different contexts and domains:
  - elite ~ sub-elite; public ~ private; politics, religion, . . .

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[1] Inscriptions are cited after Pellegrini & Prosdocimi (1967) for Venetic, Rix (2002) for the Sabellic languages, and Rix (1991) for Etruscan.

[2] The best overview is still Penney (1988); of more recent work note Wallace (2007) on Sabellic, Wallace (2004) on Venetic, and on all the languages of ancient Italy the elegant and authoritative survey by Weiss (2009, 13–17) and his further references. For documentation and bibliography on all Sabellic words, see Untermann (2000).

[3] See the discussion of Fig. 14 below.

The Italic branch of Indo-European comprises:
?Venetic
Sabellic
Latin-Faliscan
?Sicel

The Sabellic group comprises:
Umbrian
South Picene
'the little dialects', Sabine to Volscian
Pre-Samnite, and Oscan

(map by Nij Tontisirin from Weiss 2009, xvii, courtesy of Beech Stale Press).

Figure 1. Some of the languages in contact with Latin in Italy.

- Anecdote, typology and theory:
  - the plausibility of inferring historical states of affairs from patterns of language-use?

I begin with some reflections on the last, in order to frame the whole with the questions and theoretical considerations at issue.

The ancient languages of Italy known from inscriptions dating from the seventh to the first centuries BC and from literary testimonia have in common the fact that they all die, with the sole exceptions of Latin and Greek. From language death, we may unhesitatingly infer that language contact led to bilingualism and thence to language shift. May we infer from the details of our (in these respects, largely naive) evidence anything about the timing and pattern of the shift, or the type of contact and the type of the resultant bilingualism? In concrete terms, are we able to respond to questions such as: Which languages were spoken? When and where? In which domains of use and for what purposes? With what

level of prestige? By which sectors of the population? How 'well' or 'badly'?

What of course we need and must aspire to is a principled way of using for historical reconstruction the anecdotal and circumstantial evidence that we have for language contact in the ancient world in general, and pre-Roman Italy in particular. In broad terms, language contact will yield: *either* (1) a mixed language of some sort, *or* (2) language maintenance, *or* (3) language shift, ultimately language death. Both (2) and (3) can entail changes in a speaker's or a community's first language (L1) and an acquired language (L2) alike, regardless of the relative prestige, unequal or equal, of the languages in contact.

In a given language-contact situation, it is hard to predict whether maintenance or shift will result. Yet, we do well to remind ourselves that in historical sociolinguistics we are without, at least in the same degree, the bedrock of uniformitarianism on which we base our reconstructions of prehistoric sounds, grammar and vocabulary.[4] Nevertheless, certain correlations and patterns recur, and it is surely vital for us as historians to identify them, to be aware of them and to be alive to their possible significance as evidence of states of affairs and historical change.

In linguistics, the term 'typological reconstruction' is used of historical reconstruction based on recurring patterns and correlations in different parts of the grammar of a language. Such reconstruction may be applied in a weaker or a stronger form. In its weaker form, it is essentially a check against parallels for acceptability. A reconstruction is judged more or less acceptable against the number and quality of uncontroversial parallels available. In the absence of parallels, one must decide whether to allow a unique reconstructed configuration, or to defer to typological reconstruction in the stronger sense, and admit the reconstruction only of typologically acceptable (i.e. well-paralleled) scenarios.

Such reconstruction is in principle available to—and in some recent work is being applied by—linguists and ancient historians interested in situations involving language-contact. Alex Mullen's recent thesis and forthcoming book (on Gaulish, Greek and Latin in contact in southern Gaul from 600 BC to the Roman period) is important in this regard, especially because of its combination of sociolinguistic theory with reconstructions based on the material historical evidence (epigraphic, literary,

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[4] Note e.g. Myers-Scotton (2006, 69–70): "Certain factors recur, but their relative importance is variable" (*cf.* 89–106).

Bi- / tri- version bi- / tri- lingual texts	*Texts displaying bilingual phenomena*	*Mixed-language texts*	*Transliterated texts*
Include: *idiomatic texts* (versions have been rendered idiomatically rather than word-by-word) *non-idiomatic texts* (*verbum pro verbo* translation of primary text) *complementary texts* (the versions contain different information) *non-complementary texts* (versions semantically the same).	Composed in language A, but showing interference / code-switching / borrowing from language B.	Written in genetically mixed languages *or* codes that are so mixed that it is impossible to identify the dominant language.	Composed in language A, but the script is that of language B. Can involve *Texts displaying bilingual phenomena* or *bi-version bilingual texts*.

Figure 2. Typology of bilingual texts (taken from Mullen 2009, 72, revised).

archaeological). An important strand of her work is typological, involving the partitioning of socio-cultural as well as linguistic phenomena, and at the heart of her thesis is a persuasive case for assembling, testing, and using patterns of correlation between linguistic phenomena and other parts of the historical record. Figure 2 reproduces her typology of bilingual texts in order to set the texts that I shall consider against the totality of the types of epigraphic evidence available to us.[5] I do this in order to highlight the fact that evidence of language contact / bilingualism comes often not in two (or more) versions of a text each in a different language (see the first column), but rather (see the second column) in a single text in a single language which shows the effects of mixing of some form (especially borrowing, code-switching, or interference). It is this kind of text that dominates our evidence for language contact, identity, and language shift in early Italy. Nearly all the instances considered in what follows are of this kind.

[5] Mullen's typology is explicitly presented as a revised version of that which emerges from Adams (2003).

2. *Latinisation, Romanisation and the Relation between the Two*

I begin with two, at first sight conflicting, views on the extent to which Italy was Latinised or Romanised in the period before the Social War. In the first place, Mouritsen plays down very decidedly both Latinisation and Romanisation.

> [W]e have every reason to believe that Latin would have been widely understood and perhaps even spoken in some quarters; still, the implications should not be exaggerated.... The picture emerging is one of considerable variety between different areas and, occasionally, even within the same region.... *No generalised Latinisation* can therefore be demonstrated in allied Italy.... [O]nly in some areas, geographically close to Rome, are there any signs of Latin actually having been used internally within the allied communities.... The obvious Romanisation encountered in [the Augustan] period contrasts sharply with the *barely traceable Roman influence prior to the Social War*. More than anything else the painstaking search for traces of Roman influence, conducted by generations of scholars, has underlined how far from real Romanisation Italy still was by the end of the second century BC.[6]

Five years later, on the strength of a thorough review of the epigraphic and literary evidence, Adams confronts Mouritsen's summary head-on, concluding as follows:

> Mouritsen cites little of the specific evidence relating to the use of Latin (alongside Oscan, Umbrian and Venetic) in making the claim (81) that "no generalised Latinisation can ... be demonstrated in allied Italy".... I would *not* wish to argue *that Oscan and Umbrian were ousted by Latin before the Social War, but rather that Latin was in vigorous rivalry with the local languages and that bilingualism was well entrenched*.[7]

Adams adduces numerous examples of language-mixing between Latin and a Sabellic language,[8] and makes an overwhelming case for, in his words, a 'vigorous rivalry' and 'well entrenched' bilingualism between Latin and neighbouring, Sabellic languages. Adams here expressly responds to and seems to wish to refute Mouritsen's denial of a "genera-

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6 Mouritsen (1998, 80–2); emphasis added.
7 Adams (2003, 152); emphasis added.
8 There follow, to conclude this 48-page chapter, a three-page review of broad types of use of Latin alongside a Sabellic language, two lists, one of instances of Latin influence on Italic (10 items) and one of Italic influence on Latin (13 items), and two pages of further general comments.

lised Latinisation . . . in allied Italy". I wonder, however, whether Adams' conclusion is irreconcilably at odds with this part of Mouritsen's summing-up. Where it seems to me they really differ is not over Latinisation, but over Romanisation. Although he does not quote this phrase of Mouritsen, Adams, in the same chapter and on the basis of the same set of epigraphic and literary evidence, has effectively highlighted some telling counterexamples to Mouritsen's claim of a "barely traceable Roman influence prior to the Social War".

The distinction I mean to stress here is that a number of language-related phenomena are more cultural objects than linguistic features proper (e.g. lexical or grammatical items), arguably Roman rather than Latin, and associated in the first instance with Romanisation, and not necessarily with Latinisation! I offer brief illustration of such linguistic-cultural objects under the following five headings: script; writing habits; dating formulae; institutions and institutional formulae; and naming conventions. In each case, I suggest, a degree of bilingualism is presupposed by these cultural borrowings.

2.1. *Script*

In principle, any language may be written in any script. Equally, the script in which a language is written may change without any visible effects in the vocabulary or grammar of the 'borrowing' language. In the background of the borrowing of and/or shift in script was surely some degree of bilingualism, though admittedly this may have been very slight. Sabellic and Venetic speech-communities had their own distinctive writing traditions, each showing local modifications of an Etruscan model, and yet most gave up using their own script in favour of the Roman alphabet suitably adapted for writing the language of the borrowing community. So, for example, in Venetic, inscriptions begin from *c.* 175–150 BC to appear in Roman letters, and with word-dividers in place of the traditional Venetic syllabic punctuation.[9] Figure 3 illustrates how very different the two scripts (and punctuation-systems) look. It shows two of the lead missiles used by slingers from Oderzo (fighting for the Romans at the siege of Asculum Picenum in the Social War), inscribed with their ethnic (stem *Opitergin-* in the gen. pl.), some in Venetic script, some in Roman.

[9] On the Venetic syllabic punctuation, see Wachter (1986).

Figure 3a. Venetic in Venetic letters, from right to left, with the initial *o* of *.o.tergin*... clearly marked off with syllabic punctuation.

Figure 3b. Venetic in Roman letters, from left to right, no syllabic punctuation.

At least one (presumably Venetic speaking) user of the Venetic alphabet or one (presumably Latin speaking) user of the Roman alphabet must have had some proficiency in the other language (Latin or Venetic) for the borrowing to take place, but the borrowing/imitation is in the first instance (linguistic-)cultural and not linguistic-grammatical.

2.2. *Writing Habits*

Similarly, writing habits have to do with script rather than language, and, if borrowed, are again strictly cultural rather than linguistic loans.[10] Again, Venetic furnishes wonderful illustration of this point. Among the bronze votive writing tablets from the sanctuary of Reitia, the goddess of writing, in Venetic Este, is a fragmentary bi-version bilingual tablet containing complementary texts in Venetic and Latin.[11] Figure 4 shows a drawing of the bilingual tablet (Es 27) beneath an example of a near-complete tablet, purely Venetic and perfectly executed (Es 25). The bilingual, famously interpreted by Prosdocimi (1983), appears to show, on the one hand, a purely formulaic use of the Latin language,[12] alongside more spontaneous

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[10] I might have included here, under writing habits, rather than in 2.1, under script, direction of writing and type of punctuation. For more detail on script, writing habits and the texts presented in 2.2, see Langslow (2007).

[11] See Mullen's terminology in Fig. 2 above.

[12] The Latin tag *donom dedit libens merito* tells us little if anything about the writer's command of the Latin language.

Figure 4a. Venetic votive writing tablet, Es 25 (Pellegrini & Prosdocimi).



Figure 4b. The Venetic-Latin bilingual, Es 27; drawing courtesy of Kathryn Lomas.

use of Venetic.[13] On the other hand, the order of the Roman letters along the top edge of Es 27 as presented in Fig. 4b is probably (if Prosdocimi's restoration is correct) a deliberate display of accurate command of an advanced method of learning and practising the Roman alphabet, while

[13] The dedication (lines 1–2 in the transcription in Fig. 5) appears to be in perfect Venetic, to the extent that our poor knowledge of the language allows such an assessment: "(This) writing tablet Voltionmnos gave and ?dedicated? to Śainas Reitia ?for (her) goodwill?."

→ [vda.]n[.] vo.l.t[iio.n.]mno.s. [do]na.s.to ke la.g.[s. ↓ to śa.i.]nate.i. re.i.tiia.i. o.p [vo].l.tiio len[o] [D]O[NOM] DEDIT LIBENS MERITO [----] kn mn ml sr sl bl gr g[-] [---] n r n pr br śl śn tr [----------------] R F Q G P H O I N K M [-	Prosdocimi's restoration of the Roman alphabet in line 6 of the transcription opposite, taking the letters in the order first, last, second, second last, third, third last, etc. (see on the teaching of writing in Rome, Quint. *Inst.* 1. 1. 25: "Teachers reverse the order of the letters or rearrange them in every kind of combination"): [A X B V C T D S E] R F Q G P H O I N K M [L

Figure 5. Transcription of Es 27, lines 1–6 (inverted from Fig. 4b).

the consonant-clusters in Venetic letters in the two lines between the Roman alphabet and the Latin dedication (see the transcription in Fig. 5) bespeak a half-remembered, inaccurate deployment of a key element of the native Venetic teaching of literacy.[14] Again, one wonders about the language of instruction, or at any rate about the degree of ambient Venetic-Latin bilingualism.

2.3. *Dating Formulae*

Even when we move from script to the use of grammatical forms and items of vocabulary, we may distinguish Roman from Latin. In formulae, it is possible to distinguish nicely between structures and words. For example, in a dating formula in Marrucinian (one of the 'little' Sabellic dialects, Fig. 1 above), transcribed, expanded and translated in Figure 6, we seem to have purely native *forms* set in the standard Roman *structure*. As far as we know, the use of the ablative (absolute) in dating formulae was peculiar to Latin among the Italic languages—or should I say, "peculiar to Rome among Italian communities"? The script, terminology, morphology and filiation pattern are all native Oscan: the only Roman/Latin feature of this inscription is the apparent setting of the phrase in the ablative (signalled by the Sabellic ending **-úd**). Can such a thing be borrowed or imitated in isolation? How much more knowledge of Latin is presupposed by this single case ending?

[14] These are the 'permitted' syllable-initial clusters which do not require punctuation. They *should* run (as they do in Es 25, Fig. 4a) . . . *C*r *C*n *C*l . . . where *C* is each consonant in turn in alphabetical order (from digamma to khi).

m t ni dekitiúd mi
m(edíkúd) t(úvtíkúd) ni(umsiúd) dekitiúd mi(ínieís)
"In the *meddix tuticus*-ship of Numsis Decitis son of Minis."

Figure 6. Sa 2 (Rix (2002); Chieti [Marrucini], 150–80 BC), line 1.

2.4. *Institutions and Institutional Formulae*

In some Sabellic-speaking communities, magistrates are designated with terms clearly borrowed from Latin. A particularly clear and striking example is Latin *quaestor*, which is attested both in Oscan **kvaísstur** in several towns,[15] and in Umbrian **kvestur** at Iguvium and Bevagna.[16] In Umbrian in particular, this term is of interest in showing the fullest possible integration into the borrowing language: in its phonology (monophthongisation of *ae* to *e*), in its inflection (nom. pl. in **-tur**, Um 9 Rix), in the form of the derivative used to denote the office of the quaestor (in *-etia*: contrast Latin *quaestura*), and in the syntactic use of the derivative in a dating formula (**kvestretie** (loc. sg.) + gen. "in the quaestorship of…" + gen. of the individual's name: contrast the Latin ablative absolute construction). Again, however, I would ask what such a public, institutional borrowing of the designation of a key official presupposes in the way of presumably elite, private bilingualism.

2.5. *Naming Conventions*

My final example of a linguistic-cultural object that presupposes a degree of bilingualism in the context of its borrowing concerns the structure of naming formulae in Latin and Sabellic. The distinctive conventional patterns of Latin, Umbrian and Oscan are summarily illustrated in a rough and ready fashion in Figure 7, in the invented example "Marcus Tullius son of Marcus".[17]

In a famous instance in our Umbrian record, we are fortunate to see a clear shift of naming formula over three generations of a single family, in

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15 Including Pompeii, Bantia and Abella. Note that in Abella's neighbour Nola the corresponding official has an Oscan designation, **meddíss deketasis**.

16 In the Oscan law on the *tabula Bantina*, it is even abbreviated in the Roman fashion (*q.*), together with other designations of magistrates, *pr.* and *tr. pl.*. On a boundary-marker from Abella (Cm 8 Rix), on the other hand, it is abbreviated **kv**.

17 The Venetic pattern, in brackets at the bottom of the list, comprising just given name and patronymic (without gentilicial), is more archaic and more remote from the others, and is not discussed further.

Latin MARCUS TULLIUS MARCI FILIUS	
	praenomen + *nomen* + genitive of father's name + *f*(*ilius*)
Umbrian MARCS MARCIS TULLIS	
	praenomen + adjective derived from father's name + *nomen*
Oscan MARCS TULLIS MARCEIS	
	praenomen + *nomen* + genitive of father's name
[[Venetic MARCOS MARCIOS]]	
	given name + adjective derived from father's name

Figure 7. Filiation patterns in Latin, Oscan, Umbrian [and Venetic], in a schematic, invented example.

Um 27 Rix	**la: ma tvplei**	(*ego*)
	La(rs) son of Ma(rcus) Duplei(us)	
Um 30 Rix	*tupleia pu|plece*	(*daughter*)
	Dupleia (wife) of Publicius	
Um 28 Rix	*ma puplece*	(*son-in-law*)
	Ma(rcus) Publicius	
Um 29 Rix	*ca puple|ce ma fel*	(*grandson*)
	Ca(ius) Publicius son of Ma(rcus)	

Figure 8. Naming patterns over three Umbrian generations.

a series of grave tiles from Tuder.[18] These are transcribed and interpreted in Figure 8 (where the '*ego*' against the grandfather is to be understood as the genealogist's point of reference).

The grandfather, Lars Dupleius son of Marcus, is commemorated with the Umbrian formula (and in the native Umbrian alphabet). Lars's daughter Dupleia marries a Marcus Publicius, and is recorded on her grave-tile as his wife. Both she and her husband, Lars's son-in-law, are commemorated with inscriptions in Roman letters, but so briefly that no distinctive naming formula is visible, although the spelling and the ending of *puplece* are still clearly Umbrian. Their son (Lars's grandson), however, Gaius Publicius son of (Dupleia's husband) Marcus, is commemorated according to the Roman pattern, although again the language being spelled seems to be Umbrian rather than Latin.[19]

[18] On these, see Bradley (2000, 205).

[19] Even assuming that *fel* means 'son', we cannot be sure whether it is a loanword from Latin (for *filius*) or an inherited Umbrian word. The Roman naming formula speaks for

R. Vedo[| *V. Autrodiu C.* | *S. Racectiu S.* | *S. Teditiu S.* | *statuendos* | *locauerunt* "THESE FOUR NAMED INDIVIDUALS contracted for the setting up (of *termini*)."

Figure 9. *CIL* I^{2}. 400 (Ager Falernus, not later than 150 BC).

Very occasionally, this 'cultural' borrowing of naming patterns is found in the other direction, from Sabellic in Latin. A nice early example is in an official inscription from Campania (Fig. 9), not later than 150 BC, recording a contract for the marking of boundaries by four individuals whose patronymics are given in the Oscan fashion (i.e. with the father's name after the family name but without a word for 'son'), although the inscription is in Latin.[20] We return to this inscription briefly below.

3. *Identity and the Importance of Choice*

The 'linguistic-cultural' objects that we have just considered are all, potentially at least, in different ways and to different degrees related to identity, a central notion in studies of language contact and language shift,[21] and a principal concern in this volume. However, while, as I have suggested, the inscriptions we have glanced at in section 2 above have hidden strengths as indirect evidence of bilingualism, they suffer from an important weakness as indices of identity. Taking my cue not for the first time from an important dictum of Kenneth Dover,[22] I suggest that before we assign an 'identity' value to the use of, say, this dating formula or that naming convention, we ask ourselves what choices were available to the respective authors of the inscriptions.

In some cases, it is clear that choices were available. This is the case almost by definition in biversion bilingual texts produced by a single person, but, as noted above, such texts are the exception rather than the rule in Republican Italy. To give an example, the promised case of an Etruscan-

the former, but the spelling and again *puplece* look Umbrian. For details and further references, see Untermann (2000), s.v. '*fel*'.

[20] On this, see Vine (1993, 292–5).

[21] Identity is given pride of place by Adams (2003, 751–2) at the start of the conclusion to his monumental study of bilingualism and the Latin language: "This book is overwhelmingly about identity, and that is because bilinguals of different types are often particularly aware of the conflicts of | identity determined by their belonging to more than one speech community."

[22] Dover (1997, 115): "[I]t is essential that before we label any phenomenon ['X'] we ask ourselves how else could it be expressed." (In Dover's context, 'X' is 'technical'.)

Cn. Laberius A. f. | Pom.
praen. nomen father f. | tribe
a. haprni. a | aχratinalisa
praen. nomen father (gen.) | mother

Figure 10. Ar 1.3 (Rix (1991); second half of the first century BC).

Latin bilingual: it is clear that the survivor of the Etruscan commemorand of the Arezzo funerary urn (Fig. 10) had a series of clear choices (of script and of naming conventions and associated formulae) in recording one individual in Latin and Etruscan.

On the other hand, with regard to the makers of monoversion bilingual texts, we cannot be so sure. Did the commemorators of the grandson of Lars Dupleius (Fig. 8 above) know and deliberately avoid the Umbrian filiation formula (or at least favour the Latin over it)? Did the recorder of the Campanian contractors for boundary-markers (Fig. 9 above) know and deliberately avoid the Latin filiation formula (or at least prefer the Oscan)? In these cases, usually indeed, we cannot know, but the consideration of the existence of choice is important to bear in mind when any inference of identity from cultural or linguistic form is at issue.

4. *Contexts of Language-Contact, Language-Status and Language-Choice*

Another question posed to contributors concerns the contexts of language-contact and the relative status of Latin and the 'Italian' language in different contexts. In cases of contact in elite contexts, Latin is generally—except in the special circumstances of the build-up to the Social War—considered to enjoy higher status. Language-shift in favour of Latin may even be explicitly sought, as it was according to Livy by the Cumaeans in 180 BC—probably with an ulterior motive: "In this year, to the Cumaeans' request permission was granted that they might transact public business in Latin and that public auctioneers might conduct sales in Latin."[23]

[23] Liv. 40.43.1: *Cumanis eo anno petentibus permissum ut publice Latine loquerentur et praeconibus uendendi Latine ius esset*. See Briscoe (2008, *ad loc.*): "The present request, an assertion by an Oscan-speaking community of the extent of its Romanization, was doubtless a precursor to one for full citizenship." Andreas Willi has ingeniously suggested to me that Cumaean *Greeks* may have been behind the application as a way of gaining an advantage over Oscan speakers. Ed Bispham no less ingeniously has suggested a context of economic rivalry with other Oscan towns.

h(eíre)n(neís).sattiieís.detfri | seganatted.plavtad
Oscan (language and script):
"The *detfri* of/Detfri (the slave) of Hn. Sattis made (this) sign with her foot/shoe."

herenneis. amica | signauit. qando | ponebamus tegila(s)
Latin (with Oscan genitive of PN):
"The/a friend of/Amica (the slave) of Heirens made (this) sign when we were laying out tiles."

Figure 11. Sa 35 Rix (Pietrabbondante, tile-factory(?)).

In sub-elite contexts, on the other hand, the relative status of Latin and a Sabellic language may even be reversed. Take the famous and difficult case of the tile from Pietrabbondante (Fig. 11).[24]

The tile taken as a piece might be held to be a bilingual text and to represent the type characterised by Mullen (*cf.* Fig. 2 above) as biversion unequal idiomatic. However, the usual assumption here is that the tile records two utterances, one from each of two 'speakers', both slaves of an Oscan master, Heirens Sattis, both writing in their dominant language (L1). If both slaves were bilingual, there is no trace of Latin in the Oscan inscription. What is striking is that it is only the Latin speaker who betrays code-switching or interference by inflecting the master's name with the Oscan second declension genitive singular ending *-eis*. Adams is surely right that this is an instance of deferential retention in connection with a social superior.[25] The fact that the switch comes in a personal name makes the foreign morphology much less significant for the question of the writer's command of Latin than if she had written e.g. **signatted* for *signauit* (contrast the cases in Figs. 17 and 18 below). What would one not give to hear the conversation between the two authors of the Pietrabbondante tile, especially as their writing gives so little away about their bilingual context!

Another important aspect or parameter of context in which language choice may vary is that of domain. A fairly basic distinction is made between public and private. Generally, one would say that language-shift in favour of Latin occurred first, as in the Cumaeans' request above, in public, especially institutional contexts, the vernacular being retained

24 There is a good photograph of the tile at http://www.sanniti.info/smliny.html.
25 Adams (2003, 124–7).



v(iíbis). aadirans. v(iíbieís).
eítiuvam. paam | vereiiaí.
púmpaiianaí. trístaa|mentud.
deded. eísak. eítiuvad | v(iíbis).
viínikiís. m(a)r(aheís). kvaísstur.
pump|aiians. triíbúm. ekak.
kúmben|nieís. tanginud.
úpsannam | deded. ísídum.
prúfatted

Figure 12. Po 3 Rix (drawing from R. Garrucci, *Questioni pompeiane*, Naples 1853).

for private and perhaps religious purposes. It may seem paradoxical to illustrate this generalisation with the public commemoration of a public benefactor in Oscan script and language presented in Fig. 12. The fact is, however, that this inscription, although it looks so very Oscan, betrays thoroughgoing Romanisation in the borrowing not only of the official designation *quaestor* (see 2.4 above) but also of several Latin formulae and syntactic constructions (underlined in Fig. 12).[26] These are the most valuable features of this inscription, which probably tells us nothing about the knowledge or use of Latin on the part of V. Adiranus or V. Vinicius, but implies a good command of Latin political and legal language in the elite echelons of their community.

It is generally held that in private contexts, including on religious matters, the 'Italian' languages were more resistant to the spread of Latin. It is suggested even that in the language of magic including curses some ancient stylistic features of Oscan may persist in Latin garb. The best example of this is illustrated in Fig. 13, where the Latin tautological curse formula 'neither to speak nor to converse' is set beside the very similar but much earlier attested Oscan phrase. The borrowing (if that is what it is) of this phrase from Oscan into Latin presupposes again a degree of Oscan-Latin bilingualism, and offers a counterpart at a lower sociolinguistic level to the translation into Oscan of Latin legal and political phraseology seen in Fig. 12.

[26] With the words and phrases underlined compare (in text order) Latin *pecuniam quam . . ., ea pecunia . . .* 'which money . . ., with this money'; *testamento dare* 'to give by testament, bequeath'; *quaestor* 'quaestor'; *de senatus sententia* (cf. *Lex Osca Tab. Bant.*, vv. 6–7 *dat sena*[*teis*] *tanginud*) 'by the senate's decision'; *aliquid faciendum dare* 'give something to be done'; *idem probauit* 'the same (man) approved (the work)'. See on this type of borrowing Porzio Gernia (1970).

> …*seic* | *Rhodine apud M. Licinium* | *Faustum mortua sit nec* | *loqui nec sermonare possit*.
>
> “Let Rhodine in the household of M. L. F. be as dead as this (dead body) and able neither to speak nor to converse.”
>
> *Cf.* Oscan: **nep fatíum. nep. deíkum. pútíans**… **nep deíkum. nep. fatíum. pútíad**…
>
> “…Let them be able neither to ?speak? nor to ?talk?…let him *ditto*…”

Figure 13. *CIL* I^{2}. 1012 (Rome), lines 3–6, with Cp 36 Rix, lines 6 and 8.

From Umbrian Assisi at the end of the second century BC, we have a happy accident in the survival of two inscriptions (Fig. 14) recording the same individual, Nerius Babrius son of Titus, in two different languages and formulae:

Post. Mimesius C(ai) f(ilius) T(itus) Mimesius Sert. f(ilius) Ner. Capida C(ai) f(ilius) Ruf. | ***Ner. Babrius T(iti) f(ilius)*** *C(aius) Capidas T(iti) f(ilius) C(ai) n(epos) V. Voisienus T(iti) f(ilius) marones* | *murum ab fornice ad circum et fornicem cisternamq(ue) d(e) s(enatus) s(ententia) faciundum coirauere*	*ager. emps. et* | *termnas. oht(retie)* | *c. u. uistinie.* ***ner. t. babr(ie)*** | *maronatei* | *uois. ner. propartie* | *t. u. uoisiener* | *sacre. stahu*
“THESE 3 PAIRS OF MARONES took charge of the building of the wall, etc., in accordance with the decree of the Senate.”	“Land bought and marked out in the *uhtur*ship of C. Vestinius son of V. & Ner. Babrius son of T. (in community X), in the *maron*ship of Vols. Propertius son of Ner. & T. Volsinius son of V. (in community Y). I (the stone) stand as sacred (marker?).”

Figure 14. *CIL* I^{2}. 2112 (Asisium, *c.* 110–90 BC) and Rix Um 10 (Asisium, *c.* 100–80 BC?).

on the one hand, with the Roman-style filiation formula, in a monumental building inscription in Latin in the city centre; on the other hand, in an Umbrian inscription (though in the Roman alphabet), and with the Umbrian filiation formula, on a stone boundary-marker. Both inscriptions perform a public function, and between them they demonstrate the existence of appropriate competence in Latin and Umbrian among the officials of the town, but it is not so clear what factor determines the choice of language in each. It may well be, as Bradley suggests, that it is essentially

a question of domain:[27] the public or civic nature of the former calls for Latin formulation, while the religious aspect of the latter prompts the use of the vernacular (if that is an appropriate word for the status of Umbrian at this date). Certainly, the boundary-marker is expressly sacred (*sacre stahu*); it is also, however, the record of an agreement with a neighbouring Umbrian community, hence the reference to two sets of eponymous magistrates, and is thus a rare example of communication among Italians rather than between Italians and Rome.

Be that as it may, in some Oscan-speaking communities there are apparent counterexamples to the generalisation that the old native language consistently prevails in religious contexts (including curses). First, from late second-century, Oscan-speaking Pompeii, we have the relatively straightforward case of a monolingual curse in sub-elite Latin (Fig. 15),[28] a salutary reminder of the encroaching of Latin speakers in all places and domains of use. Secondly, and more remarkably, a generation later from Cumae, the town that had vaunted its Latinisation to the Roman Senate a century before, a curse in an extraordinary mixture of Latin (underlined in Fig. 16) and Oscan (in bold in Fig. 16) involving both names, including filiation patterns, and languages. Is now (or in this instance) the *mixing* itself

prim(um) | P<i>lematio Hostili (serua) facia(m) | capilu(m) cerebru(m) ***flatus*** *ren(es) |* ***ut*** *ilai non* ***suce(n?)das***

"First (for?) Philematium (slave) of Hostilius, face, hair, brain, breath (and) kidney(s), that you may not go near? (be enflamed for?) her."

Figure 15. *ILLRP* 1147 (Pompeii, late second century BC?), lines 1–4.

l. harines. her*. maturi(s) | c. eburis | pomponius | m. caedicius m. f. | n. andripius n. f. |* ***pus. olu solu fancua | recta*** *sint.* ***pus.*** *flatu | sicu.* ***olu.*** *sit*

"FIVE (OR FOUR?) NAMED INDIVIDUALS: that all their tongues should be stiff, that their breath should be dry."

Figure 16. Cm 15 Rix (Cumae, *c.* 80 BC).

[27] Bradley (2000, 210).
[28] The translation offered is tentative.

*t. uet**io*** | *dun**o*** | *didet* | *he**rclo*** | *ioui**o*** | *brat*(*es*) | *data*(*s*)
"T. Vettius gives (this) as a gift to Hercules son of Jupiter: for favour given."

Figure 17. MV 5 Rix (Navelli [Vestini], third or second century BC).

bia(*m*) *opse*(*n*)*t* [| *maron**e***(*s*) | *t. foltoni**o***(*s*) | *se. p*(*e*)*tr*(*o*)*ni**o***(*s*)
"Fountain built by marones T. Foltonius & Sex. Petronius."

Figure 18. Um 6 Rix (Fulginiae, 250–150 BC?).

the essential element of the choice made by the composer of the curse? Does the mere appearance of some Oscan here confirm the hypothesis above that religion is a domain conservative of the less prestigious vernacular? Is by now Latin emphatically the composer's L1, and Oscan half-remembered? Here, once again, it is surely safer to reserve judgement.[29]

In other domains, however, we can be more confident that Latin has established itself as L1 in the speech of individuals in (at least formerly) Sabellic-speaking communities, individuals who still aspire to write in Sabellic. I offer two examples, before concluding. The first (Fig. 17) is a private dedication, which clearly sets out to be in Sabellic (in this case, Vestinian)—note in particular *didet* (for Lat. *dat*),[30] *brat*(*es*) *data*(*s*) (*cf.* Lat. *libens merito*), and the inflection of the name of Hercules in the second declension, but which, although only seven or eight words in length, betrays repeated and significant interference from Latin morphology, in four endings and in the stem-form of the name of Hercules (all bold underlined). The formulaic tag in the last two words may be, as often, merely emblematic, and probably says more about aspiration than competence in the Sabellic dialect which we must surely regard as Titus Vettius' L2.

The second example, from Umbrian (Fig. 18) is more striking in showing similar morphological interference from Latin amid Umbrian vocabulary in a public inscription from a surprisingly early date. The vocabulary is Umbrian, but the endings (bold underlined) are Latin,[31]

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29 Adams (2003, 130) comments as follows: "It is likely that the writer of the curse (*i.e.* Cm 15 Rix) deliberately mixed the languages to make the interpretation of the curse more confusing. That he was able to do so is a reflection either of the coexistence of the two languages in the community in which he was writing, or at least of the limited survival of Oscan, perhaps as a traditional language now restricted to certain domains, alongside a dominant Latin."

30 Unless this is a miswriting of Latin *dedit*.

31 The Umbrian forms would be: opsens, marons, foltonir, petronir.

and this is surely telling of the extent of bilingualism and the relative competence in Latin and Umbrian among the local magistrates, or, better, the people responsible for the form of the inscription.

5. *Conclusion*

In the foregoing, three important and recurring (if obvious) points are at first sight somewhat paradoxical:

1. Some cultural borrowings close to or involving linguistic behaviour provide better-than-expected linguistic evidence. Even if they stop short of lexical or grammatical borrowing, they presuppose some type and degree of bilingualism—given this, the question is what type and what degree.
2. Texts ostensibly in a single language may show effects of bilingualism and carry clear implications concerning language choice, relative prestige, relative competence, etc.
3. On the other hand, some prima facie straightforward and promising linguistic examples leave key questions open—we should systematically rehearse the alternatives.

Two further points that I would wish to reiterate with emphasis are:

4. Inferences from cultural/linguistic form about cultural/linguistic 'identity' depend on the (synchronic) availability of a choice—we should show this choice where we can, and acknowledge when we cannot.
5. In general, there is no getting away from the fact that our evidence is anecdotal in the extreme and in need of a principled augmentation if it is to be used for reconstruction or as the basis for more general historical inferences.

In modern situations of language contact, it is relatively straightforward to generalise about the effects on different aspects of the languages in contact (e.g. vocabulary, accent, grammar) of different types of influence (e.g. borrowing, interference), according to the relative prestige of the respective languages in the community and their status (L1 vs. L2) in the competence of the individual. Here (Fig. 19) is a simple illustration, drawn from Weiss's recent historical grammar of Latin,[32] concerning the

[32] Weiss (2009, 477).

L2 English [superstr.]—L1 Yiddish [substr.] bilinguals in USA	ENGLISH → YIDDISH	YIDDISH → ENGLISH
	(BORROWING)	(INTERFERENCE)
Lexicon (vocabulary)	very strong	moderate
Phonology (accent)	weak	strong
Morphosyntax (grammar)	moderate	strong

Figure 19. Effects of bilingualism on the Yiddish and the English of bilinguals in the USA.

Type of mixing	Choice / control	Implies in the community	Implies in the individual
Borrowing (*essentially diachronic*)	+/–	some degree of bilingualism in the past	[?*poss. some degree of accommodation or reaction*?]
Code-switching	+	??	some degree of bilingualism now
Interference	–	??	a dominant language now

Figure 20. Some tentative illustrative historical inferences from types of language-mixing in monoversion bilingual texts.

effects of bilingualism on the Yiddish and the English of bilinguals in the USA who command the more prestigious (superstrate) English as L2 and the less prestigious (substrate) Yiddish as L1. Both of their languages are affected, but in different respects and to different degrees.

Some of these effects we can with some justifiable confidence read back onto our ancient material. Others remain far from certain. I hesitate, for example, to infer from the Latin interference in the Umbrian example in Fig. 18 above (Um 6 Rix) that Latin is the dominant language now in the *community*, rather than merely in the competence of the individuals responsible for the inscription. In order to fill in the gaps, for say a blank version of Fig. 19 concerning Oscan and Latin in Pompeii in the second century BC, or more generally for a set of inferences such as that schematised in Fig. 20, we need to use hints from every available quarter:

that is to say in addition to epigraphic and literary evidence relating to languages and their use, we need to use especially archaeological and literary evidence reflecting 'ethnolinguistic vitality', with a view to relating our 'linguistic' evidence to its historical social context in its community dynamics—local, regional, and supraregional.[33, 34]

[33] With regard to the aspirations expressed in this final sentence (and the terminology, some of which goes back to Giles, Bourhis & Taylor (1977), I would again draw attention to Mullen's promising work (2009) on southern Gaul as a possible way forward for Italy, especially in the present context, calling as it does for close and sympathetic cooperation between historians, archaeologists, and linguists.

[34] I am very grateful for comments and suggestions on successive versions of this paper to participants in the discussion at the conference organized by Saskia Roselaar, Manchester, July 2010; at the Manchester classics & ancient history research seminar, 17 November 2011; and at the Oxford ancient history seminar 'Language and history', 31 January 2012.

PROBLEMS AND AUDIENCE IN CATO'S *ORIGINES*

Eleanor Jefferson*

1. *Introduction*

The development of Latin literature in the Middle Republic is one of the most enigmatic aspects of a period already remarkable for its fast pace of cultural change. The first steps of Latin literature came in the poetry of Livius Andronicus, Naevius, Ennius, and Plautus, but Latin prose soon arrived with the works of Cato the Elder. His first work, the *De Agricultura*, is interesting in its own right, but in this paper I will address the cultural associations and implications of his later work, the *Origines*. The *Origines* is unique not only as the first work of Latin historiography, but also in its inclusion of two books on Italian foundation stories. Furthermore, there is a remarkable lack of personal names in the historical portion of the work.[1] Whereas Cato's use of Latin to write history was widely emulated by later historians, the two aspects mentioned above did not find followers.

Both of these aspects, as well as the revolutionary use of Latin for a prose, historical work, represent conscious choices on Cato's part. What these choices actually mean, however, has been debated at length. In this chapter, I will argue for a new understanding of Cato's potential audience, and I will trace the effects of that understanding on our assessment of Cato's methods and motives. While in previous studies the audience of the *Origines* has nearly always been treated as being made up entirely of Romans, I hope to show instead how we may reevaluate the work by supposing an audience made up of Italians and potentially Italic Greeks as well.

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[1] The source for the lack of names is Nepos, *Cato* 3.4: *horum bellorum duces non nominavit, sed sine nominibus res notavit*, "he did not name the leaders of these wars, but noted their deeds without names". From what fragments we have, this assertion appears to be true for the historical portion, though names are used for mythological figures in the first three books. *Cf.* Plin. *NH* 8.11.

2. *The Audience of Cato's* Origines

The *Origines* consisted of seven books, now unfortunately reduced to fewer than 150 fragments. Cato wrote it in the later years of his life, from perhaps the 160s on, and continued adding material until he died in 149.[2] The first book dealt with Rome's own mythological foundation stories, while the second and third related the origins of Italian cities; these books appear to be the source of the work's title. The fourth and fifth books covered the First and Second Punic Wars respectively, and the sixth and seventh books narrated Rome's history from the Second Punic War to the year 149. The legacy of the *Origines* is limited to its use as a source for later historians and its use of the Latin language.

Needless to say, the many interpretations of the *Origines* frequently conflict with one another. Many different explanations and interpretations have been offered for each of Cato's three notable choices: the choice to write in Latin, to include Italian origins, and to omit proper names. The choice to write in Latin has been understood generally as a part of Cato's larger anti-Hellenistic mode,[3] or, much less emphatically, as part of a desire to experiment with the Latin language.[4] The inclusion of Italian origins is most frequently read as an attempt to build a picture of Rome and Italy as a collective state, but this reading has varied greatly in its subtleties: Cato's 'Italy' has been read variously as a geographical, political, moral, or historical collective.[5] As for the names, their omission has been read mostly as anti-elite, and thus also as contributing to a sense of collectivity, but occasionally also as pro-elite.[6]

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[2] Astin (1978, 212) dates the *Origines* to 'after 168' due to a fragment referring to the Third Macedonian War: fr. 2.16 *FRH* (= Plin. *NH* 3.114). Beck and Walter (2001, 150) agree, placing the beginning of its composition 'around 170'.

[3] Gotter (2009) especially reads the *Origines* as primarily anti-Greek and anti-elite, and views the inclusion of Italian origins as an act of appropriation from Greek sources (see esp. 115), and as a method for Italianizing Roman history. See also Beck (2007).

[4] Astin (1978, 220–1).

[5] For some scholars, the collectivity has been pro-Italian in nature, e.g. Letta (1984, esp. 416–18) reads Cato's Italy as *two* Italies, one geographic and strategic, and one moral. Villa (1955) considers it a moral unit. Gotter (2009) reads the inclusion of Italian origins as creating both ethnic unity and as an elaboration of the theatre in which Rome rose to greatness. Williams (2001, esp. 48–58) reads it similarly as an exploration of an evolving concept of *Italia* and its component parts and neighbors. *Contra*: Astin (1978) sees no purpose at all. Chassignet (1987) views it as a catalogue of imperial resources, and emphatically not pro-Italian. Forsythe (2000) suggests a similarly practical, resource-motivated understanding of the Italian section.

[6] Anti-elite: Gotter (2009), with emphasis on collectivity. Pro-elite: Sciarrino (2004).

I believe that the key to forming a cohesive model for interpreting the work lies in understanding its external context, both in terms of Cato's own complex politics and in terms of the makeup of his audience. This audience has generally been treated as unquestionably Roman.[7] However, to restrict the audience for the work to a small part of the Roman nobility is to lose essential perspective on the cultural and political situation of the Middle Republic. Instead, the work should be read with the assumption that its audience was as wide as reasonable in the period. More emphatically, the *Origines* must be read as a work written not only for Roman senators, but also for their colleagues in allied Italian and Italo-Greek city states. I use the term 'colleagues' advisedly; I intend only to shift the line from Roman senators to those in other cities who would be likely to have frequent dealings with them. The *domi nobiles* of Italy, who were most socially analogous to Roman senatorial families, and who were most likely to be active in the governance of their own communities, would be those with the most directly at stake in dealings with Rome. This interest, along with the need to communicate with Rome (presumably at times by written communication, or at least in terms of decrees and treaties), would make them the most likely to have reading knowledge of Latin.[8] By the same reasoning, these would be the group most necessary for Rome to maintain its alliances and supreme status.

In order to argue for this audience, it is necessary to explore first the degree to which upper class Italians would have been able to read Latin at the time when Cato was writing, and how likely they would have been to come in contact with Latin literature outside the city of Rome itself. The evidence for Latin literacy outside of Rome (and indeed inside of Rome) leaves much to be desired, but it is certainly present. It is sometimes indirect and must be based on deductions from passing remarks or descriptions in written works. For example, Harris suggests that when Mercury warns against *ambitus per scriptas litteras*, "canvassing through written letters" (among many other ways) in the prologue to Plautus' *Amphitruo*, it is an allusion to or parody of the recent *Lex Baebia de ambitu*.[9] If the particular injunctions Plautus uses were taken from the law, then it was

[7] Feeney (2005, 237) and Marincola (2009, 12) in passing are notable exceptions, but neither focuses on the *Origines*.

[8] For the purposes of this paper, I am taking it as read that spoken knowledge of Latin was by no means rare among the upper classes of Italy. For some arguments, see Adams (2003, esp. 151–4).

[9] Plaut. *Amph.* 70. See Harris (1989, 161).

apparently a practice to communicate with potential voters *per scriptas litteras*. This particular case may only apply to Roman citizens, of course, but it may suggest the use of letters for general political and economic purposes, too, which could include communication to clients or colleagues in non-Roman communities.

There is also some indirect evidence of literacy in Polybius. He describes a system of watches in the army camps in which cavalrymen are required to go around and check that each watch shift is where it needs to be, and in which the cavalrymen specifically receive their orders for the night's duty in writing.[10] Harris is careful to point out that this does not mean that *all* soldiers need to have been able to read, or even that all cavalrymen needed to; nevertheless, *some* level of literacy among cavalry and certainly among officers is attested.[11] Perhaps half the Roman cavalry at this time was made up of allies, and often more than half.[12] Assuming that the allied troops were not mixed in among the Roman legions, their own cavalrymen must also have had some need of literacy for the same purpose. The men that were eligible for cavalry service in this period would have been relatively wealthy and thus have had more access to education than the infantry. There must have been at least a baseline of literacy necessary for military service—whether learned in the camp or beforehand—for at least some of the Italians who were wealthy enough to belong to the cavalry class.

Two more examples, both from the governmental sphere, are particularly relevant in terms of the political classes of Italy in question. First, Livy tells us that in 180 BC the Cumaeans sent an embassy to Rome asking permission to do their public business in Latin, and particularly to have their *praecones* use Latin.[13] Although this permission was not legally necessary, it shows that Latin was both well enough known and important enough to be considered a suitable and practical medium for this purpose, superseding Greek and Oscan. If Cumae was doing its public business in Latin around 180, the leading citizens and merchants must have had a fairly strong knowledge of Latin as a spoken language, and perhaps also a

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10 Plb. 6.34–5.

11 Harris (1989, 167). He is in fact arguing against using Polybius' account as evidence for literacy among the infantry. Importantly, he points out that in this period "the cavalry still remained to some extent a social elite".

12 Brunt (1971, 683). Roman cavalry in the second century BC was generally given at 300 per legion, whereas allied tended to range from 250–400, and only very rarely 500. It may have been more before the Second Punic War. See also Rosenstein in this volume.

13 Liv. 40.42.13.

reasonable knowledge of written Latin. Adams takes this as firm evidence of upper class bilingualism (if not multilingualism), and suggests that the prestige of Latin may have been an important impetus for their decision to do this.[14] This event does not definitively prove Latin literacy at Cumae, but it testifies to the growing importance of Latin in both practical and symbolic terms.

Secondly, there is the so called 'Bacchanalian Affair' of 186 BC, specifically the inscription recording the associated *senatus consultum* found in Tiriolo in modern Calabria.[15] Judging from the language of the inscription, and to some extent from Livy's description of the event, it seems reasonable to assume that the decree applied to all of Rome's connections in Italy.[16] The instructions in the inscription are specifically addressed to *quei foideratei esent*, "those who are allied", and later orders: "No Roman citizen or man of Latin rights or anyone of the allies shall associate with the Bacchae."[17] That the *senatus consultum* applied both to Romans and allies is clear from these two stipulations. The more important problem for my purposes is the degree to which being able to read the inscription was necessary for those to whom it applied; its posting may have been more

[14] Adams (2003, 113–14; on prestige, 657–8). D'Arms (2003, 17) suggests economic motives were the main purpose for this switch from Oscan to Latin, particularly given the foundation of three new Latin colonies in Campania in 194 and the need for Campanian markets to do business with the settlers. A possibly analogous piece of evidence is the presence on Delos of several Latin-language inscriptions by merchants who call themselves *Italici*. Unfortunately for my purposes, these seem to have been made after 150 BC and thus after Cato's time. See Adams (2003, 114, 153, and especially 642–69) for a fuller discussion.

[15] *CIL* I^2.581.

[16] Consensus on the scope of the *SC de Bacchanalibus* has been elusive. Some support the view that decree applied to all allies, e.g. Gruen (1990, 43 n. 37), who acknowledges the problem of whether the decree was found in an area clearly under Roman jurisdiction, but rejects the idea that the *SC* would be enforced only here and there in Italy. Toynbee (1965, 2, 397 n. 2) comes down on the side that, whether or not the land had been formally annexed, the fact that the affair had been declared by the senate as a 'conspiracy', and thus had instituted a state of emergency, would have been enough to allow Roman magistrates to take action against those who violated the terms of the decree, or at the very least that Rome "made to the allied governments suggestions that were equivalent to commands". McDonald (1944, 15) argues that the decree applied to all Italy, but was to be carried out by allied authorities in their own territories (such as the area in which the inscription was found), not by Roman magistrates. Mouritsen (1998, 52–4), on the other hand, holds that the inscription must have been intended for Romans in the area only, due to treaties limiting Rome's right to interfere in religious matters. Regardless of the specific mode of enforcement, the decree's apparent publication outside of Roman territory may stand as an example of the use of Latin in the context of official communication between Rome and its non-Latin allies.

[17] *Bacas vir nequis adiese velet ceivis Romanus neve nominus Latini neve socium quisquam*. This and all following translations are my own.

for show than necessarily for information, while the major importance was that its text be read out (*edicendum* in line 3). Harris is reluctant to use the *SC de Bacchanalibus* as evidence for literacy or even the importance of writing, but does mention it as a possibility.[18]

The use of Latin in an official decree specifically addressed to both Romans and allies indicates an expectation that Latin was intelligible, at least for those who would be in charge of cooperating with the senate's order and investigations, if not to the general population.[19] Therefore, in the twenty years preceding the writing of the *Origines*, Latin had almost certainly already become sufficiently well known to the governing bodies and officials of non-Roman towns to allow them to deal with Rome. We may reasonably assume, then, that it would be possible for these non-Romans to read works of literature in Latin.

The next question to address is how literature was circulating in Italy in this early period. Again, evidence is scanty. We must rely on what we know of Cato's predecessors and contemporaries in literature: how did the works of Livius Andronicus, Naevius, Plautus, and Ennius travel? For the dramatic works, it is reasonable to assume that their main form of travel would be through public, large-scale performances, but the epics and Ennius' other non-dramatic works must have gone a different way. Based on what we know of later literary circulation in Rome, it seems likely that their dissemination would be haphazard and dependent on chance; for example, a (presumably high status) reader would suggest or make mention of a work to another, who would then ask for a copy if interested.[20] This mode of circulation seems likely to have existed at Rome during Cato's time; after all, he brought Ennius to Rome, who later became more attached to Fulvius Nobilior and especially the Scipios. If a poet could circulate in this way, presumably his works would be even more mobile. There is also the possibility that readings were given to groups of friends, as they were in later years.

Use in school contexts might be another channel for the circulation of texts. Greek educational practices were well established by the Roman

[18] Harris (1989, 161).

[19] Inevitably, there is much more to be said on the subject of Latin bilingualism and literacy. See Harris (1987); Adams (2003); Wallace-Hadrill (2008).

[20] See Starr (1987, esp. 213–19) for a model of Roman literary circulation, based on comments from Cicero, Pliny the Younger, Martial, etc. By Cicero's time at least, it was possible for Atticus and Cicero to exchange books between Rome and Athens. In view of this, is it not likely that books could be exchanged within Italy, though several generations earlier?

period, and at least had set a model in Italy for education that was beginning to become widespread by Cato's time. Most children of aristocrats were probably educated in the home, but according to Plutarch, the first 'public' (in the sense of taking place outside the home) school in Rome was opened in 234 by a freedman named Carvilius.[21] Ennius and Livius Andronicus, too, were said to be schoolteachers, and whether or not they remained so for long, the assertion implies it was believable that there were schoolteachers in Rome at the time.[22] We know of one schoolboy who read the *Origines* or at the very least a sort of proto-*Origines*, as it happens; Plutarch tells us that Cato managed his own son's education, and indeed wrote out 'the histories' in large letters for his son's edification.[23] One may suppose that Cato hoped for his work to be an influence upon the next generations, as well as for it to be read among adults. Further, Cato's slave Chilo taught other young boys.[24] Most of these educational examples only bear on Rome itself, but it would be surprising if other urbanized parts of Italy, in equal contact with the Hellenistic world, were not doing likewise to some extent. At any rate, education, wherever it took place, could disseminate works in both Latin and Greek to wider audiences and new generations.

It is difficult to say how far a work could travel by such means, but certainly there were connections between Rome and the rest of Italy that could serve as channels for literary circulation. Relationships both familial and political linked individuals across Italy. Roman and Latin colonies in the Italian landscape were in some sense satellites to Rome; the ties of patronage, politics, and commercial activities must have led to interaction between these communities and the mother city. *Municipia* and allied cities probably interacted with Rome in similar ways, although possibly to a lesser degree.

Ennius' career and afterlife may serve as an example. The *Annales*, arguably the most direct predecessor for Cato's Latin history, were famous enough by the time the Scipio tomb was remodelled that his statue was

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[21] Plu. *QR* 59. Harris (1989, 158) believes the anecdote is credible.

[22] Harris (1989, 158), citing Suet. *Gramm.* 1.

[23] Plu. *Cat. Mai.* 20.5. Cornell (1972, 34–7), discusses the question of whether this history should be considered to be the *Origines* or not. He prefers to see this 'history' as a sort of reader for the child, rather than an early portion of the *Origines*, since if it were the *Origines*, they would have to be back-dated to the 180s BC.

[24] Plu. *Cat. Mai.* 20.

set beside those of Scipio Africanus and Scipio Asiaticus.[25] Admittedly, this testifies only that he was a known figure at Rome itself, where the tomb was. Nevertheless, the placement of a statue of Ennius next to citizens of such monumental stature indicates his prominence. Further, there is the fragment attributed to Ennius that reads more or less as follows: *latos <per> populos res atque poemata nostra . . . <clara> cluebunt*, "my content and compositions will win fame throughout widespread nations".[26] A poet's claim to great influence is hardly uncommon, but Lucretius' echo of this line in his own work adds credence to Ennius' boast:

> As our Ennius sang, who first brought from
> lovely Helicon the crown in perpetual bloom,
> which would win fame throughout the Italian peoples.[27]

In exchanging *latos populos* for *gentis Italas*, Lucretius is not narrowing the scope of Ennius' influence; rather, he is defining the same *latos populos* in terms of their status in his own time. What were for Ennius separate communities and cultures, though allied, became after the Social War and the census of 70 BC part of a new construction of Italy as an extension of Rome.[28] While Ennius' and Lucretius' testimony for the former's fame is not exactly concrete evidence of broad circulation, we can infer from it that Ennius at least imagined his works being read *per latos populos*, a much more diverse audience than the immediate Roman one alone would constitute.

A bit later than Cato, the poet Lucilius made a similar statement about his works, if more cheekily. Cicero tells us, *Lucilius noster . . . Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere*: "Our Lucilius says that he writes for the Tarentines, the Consentines, and the Sicilians".[29] While again, a poet's own testimony to his large readership is not to be taken as evidence in itself of a specific range, this statement does indicate that writing for people outside of Rome, even as far away as Sicily, was not incredible.[30]

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[25] Cic. *Arch.* 22.1; Liv. 38.56.4. See Coarelli (1972) for a full discussion of the tomb and its decoration. It is important to note that the identification of the statues was not considered certain even in Cicero's time, and Livy is still more cautious.

[26] See Skutsch (1984) on fragments 12–13 for a discussion of the variations suggested for this line. This is his reconstruction of what in our sources reads as *nam latos populos res atque poemata nostra cluebant.* See Feeney (2005, 236).

[27] Luc. *RN* 1.117–19: *Ennius ut noster cecinit, qui primus amoeno / detulit ex Helicone perenni fronde coronam / per gentis Italas hominum quae clara clueret.*

[28] Feeney (2005, 236).

[29] Cic. *Fin.* 1.7.

[30] Feeney (2005, 235–6) puts it nicely: "It was a sayable thing to claim that his readership extended to the Greek city of Tarentum, the Bruttian town of Consentina, and the

Another fascinating indication of literary circulation in this period is archaeological, a fragmentary summary of Fabius Pictor's history, painted on a piece of wall plaster found in Taormina.[31] It has been dated to the second century BC, perhaps around 130.[32] Although rather later than Cato's work, its existence does indicate the ability for literary works to travel long distances, and furthermore indicates interest in Roman history among the learned at Taormina. The fact that Taormina was a Greek city, and Fabius' work was written in Greek, need not make this fragment ineligible as evidence for literary circulation in general. Cato's Latin history naturally had fewer potential readers than a Greek work, but it could have served the same purpose as Fabius' in instructing the youth of Italian cities in the history of their hegemon. This proof of Fabius' work being used in a school context, especially so far outside of Rome, is telling for our understanding of how Roman histories could serve as a means of communication between Rome and her allies. Especially given the Italian material in the *Origines*, it would not be surprising to find Italian interest in the work.

With these pieces of evidence in mind, I believe it is not only reasonable but probable that the audience for literature in Latin in the second century BC extended beyond the upper classes of Roman citizen communities. At the very least, the political classes of the allied communities, the socioeconomic status equals of Roman senators, should be counted as part of the potential audience for Latin written works. If we understand the *Origines* as written with the assumption of such a multicultural audience, the most troubling characteristics of the work become more intelligible.

3. *The* Origines *as a Medium for Integration*

First there is Cato's use of Latin, which must be viewed as a conscious and deliberate departure from his predecessors in historiography. Fabius Pictor and his immediate successors chose to write in Greek.[33] This decision may be attributed partly to the norms of the genre in which they were working. While Roman history was new, its practitioners worked

overseas province of Sicily. These are imperial claims, however ironically expressed, and evidence of a reception far beyond the aristocracy of the metropolis."

31 *SEG* 26.1123.

32 Manganaro (1974, 398).

33 Dillery (2009, 90–5) has a useful discussion of Cato's use of Latin in the context of his Greek-writing predecessors in Roman historiography.

within the established framework of historiography as written by Greeks. Until Cato, there was no prose in Latin, apart from perhaps published speeches. Consequently, Cato's choice to write in Latin was not obvious or the default in any sense. Nor, however, need it be read as a momentous step if we consider models outside the realm of historiography. Following the examples of innovators like Livius Andronicus, Naevius, Ennius, and Fabius Pictor, Cato himself became an innovator. The use of Latin in a literary context was certainly not new eighty years after Livius' translated play at the *Ludi Romani*, and need not be read as a polemic action. Cato's use of Latin instead of Greek was an *indication of* and an *action based upon* Latin's new status as the language of power, rather than a revolution in itself.

It is easy to read the choice of Latin as part of Cato's larger anti-Hellenistic agenda. Cato's anti-Hellenism is well attested in many anecdotes, including stories where he scorns the use of the Greek language specifically.[34] Cato's attitude towards the Greek world has often been read too simply, as a sort of end in itself. Accordingly, his choice to write history in Latin has sometimes been read as an antagonistic impulse against the rise of Hellenism at Rome. This is, however, to misconstrue Cato: rather than being anti-Greek, he is pro-Roman, and hand in hand with that, he is pro-Latin.[35] Latin, as the ancient language of the Romans and their closest neighbours, was the language most fitting to relate the deeds of the Roman people, especially for a man like Cato who built a reputation of simple, rustic virtue for himself. The Latin historical dramas and epics of Naevius and Ennius undoubtedly proved to Cato that Latin historical works had potential audiences, just as Fabius' work had done for the material of Roman history. Cato's Latin prose history combined and affirmed the innovations of Latin epic and Roman historiography into a new genre. Although Cato certainly used this new genre to display and emphasize his own ideals, what is at stake in the work is much more innovative than the question of Hellenism versus anti-Hellenism.

By writing his histories in Latin, Cato emphasized Italy's transition from the domination of Greek culture, to a new, Roman-centred world. Again, it is important to stress the 'pro-Roman' character of this goal, rather than focusing on Cato's reputation for anti-Hellenism. The Latin

[34] See esp. Plu. *Cat. Mai.* 12.22–3.

[35] It is important to note at this point the many indications of Greek material in the *Origines*, especially in the sections on Italian foundations. For a thorough and nuanced discussion of Cato's relationship with Greece and Hellenism in general, see Gruen (1992).

in which the work was written served as a meaningful background for the deeds described within the work: native Italian virtue is expressed in a native Italian tongue. Such an increase in the scope of Latin would be pertinent especially to a multilingual Italian audience, whose experience of Latin would be mainly tied to dealings with Romans, and whose literary world would have been predominantly Greek prior to the works of the dramatists. The use of Latin to describe the history of Oscan or Etruscan or Greek speakers would bring the deeds of these cultures under the same umbrella as Roman deeds. The innovative nature of this goal is not only literary or linguistic, but has a social and historical import as well.[36]

The other idiosyncrasies of the work also gain clarity under the assumption of an Italian audience. Cato's inclusion of Italian cities and his suppression of military leaders' names have long been understood as a means of portraying the history of Rome and Italy as a collective product. Indeed, Cicero ascribed such a view to Cato:

> [Cato] used to say that for this reason the rank of our state excelled other states . . . [because others were built by single men] . . . but our republic was built not from the genius of one man but of many, nor by the lifetime of one man, but through so many ages and generations.[37]

If Cato's personal view of the Roman Republic was that it was the product of collective action rather than of individual personalities, his suppression of proper names makes perfect sense.[38] Gotter has argued that when the name of the perpetrator of a great deed is removed, the focus of the *exemplum* becomes the deed itself, rather than the man or the family who performed it.[39] By *exemplum* here I mean the function of historical accounts as persuasive models for behaviour, which urge readers to imitate the positive qualities of the protagonists. When deeds are focused on, rather than the people who performed them, the message of each

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[36] Dillery (2009, esp. 94–5) reads the *Origines* as a reorientation; while earlier Roman historians from Fabius Pictor on had set Roman history within the Greek *oikoumene*, with Rome as essentially one city-state among many, Cato made Rome and more broadly Italy the center of a new conception of *oikoumene*. The use of Latin is 'naturalized' within this context.

[37] Cic. *Rep*. 2.2, considered fr. 5 of the *Origines* by Cugusi & Sblendorio-Cugusi (2001): *Is dicere solebat ob hanc causam praestare nostrae civitatis statum ceteris civitatibus, . . . nostra autem res publica non unius esset ingenio sed multorum, nec una hominis vita sed aliquot constituta saeculis et aetatibus.*

[38] See however Sciarrino (2004), who argues that the omission of names is a *pro*-elite move in that it creates a division between those who already know the stories (and consequently the names) and those who are outsiders.

[39] Gotter (2009, 116).

exemplum becomes purely moral. Rather than suggesting the reader ought to imitate a particular aristocrat (and thus glorifying and immortalizing that aristocrat), the nameless heroes of the *Origines* urge readers particularly towards selfless virtue.

One of the longer fragments of the *Origines*, quoted in Gellius, illustrates this effect. During the First Punic War, a tribune and his 400 troops held off the Carthaginians so that the rest of the Romans can get away. The tribune miraculously survived, though all his men died, and Cato (at this point quoted verbatim by Gellius) compares him to Leonidas at Thermopylae:

> The immortal gods granted good fortune to the military tribune because of his virtue. For thus it happened: although he was wounded in many places there, nevertheless no wound affected his head, and they became aware of him among the dead because his blood flowed out, though he was worn out with wounds. They took him up, and he recovered, and often afterward he accomplished brave and vigorous deeds for the state; and by that deed, when he led off those troops, he saved the rest of the army. But the same good deed is very different depending on in which place you set it. All Greece has celebrated the Spartan Leonidas, who did a similar deed at Thermopylae, on account of his virtues, glory and especial esteem, with monuments of the most famous renown. But a small quantity of praise was given to the military tribune for these deeds, even though he did the same deed and saved the day.[40]

Although the tribune gains little recognition, he is neither dissatisfied, nor does he withdraw from the public world; rather, he continues to behave as a virtuous Roman (*saepeque postilla operam reipublicae fortem atque strenuam perhibuit*), remaining anonymous in Cato's version of the tale. Gotter reads this, and the omission of names in general, as an anti-elite

[40] Fr. 4.7a *FRH*; Gell. *NA* 3.7.19: *Dii inmortales tribuno militum fortunam ex virtute eius dedere. Nam ita evenit: cum saucius multifariam ibi factus esset, tamen volnus capiti nullum evenit, eumque inter mortuos defetigatum volneribus atque, quod sanguen eius defluxerat, cognovere. Eum sustulere, isque convaluit, saepeque postilla operam reipublicae fortem atque strenuam perhibuit illoque facto, quod illos milites subduxit, exercitum ceterum servavit. Sed idem benefactum quo in loco ponas, nimium interest. Leonides Laco, qui simile apud Thermopylas fecit, propter eius virtutes omnis Graecia gloriam atque gratiam praecipuam claritudinis inclitissimae decoravere monumentis: signis, statuis, elogiis, historiis aliisque rebus gratissimum id eius factum habuere; at tribuno militum parva laus pro factis relicta, qui idem fecerat atque rem servaverat.* McDonnell (2006, esp. 50–3 on the *Origines*) argues for a reading of *virtus* in general as referring specifically to deeds of martial valor. That meaning is probably primary for this passage, but the larger meaning of *virtus* must always lurk in the shadows. For a man so vociferous on the subject of moral uprightness as Cato, *virtus* cannot have been a concept for the battlefield alone.

impulse, particularly against the *Fasti* of Fulvius Nobilior, and against Ennius' *Annales*.[41] This reading, much like the anti-Hellenism problem discussed above, is too narrow. The omission of names could certainly be a reaction against encomiastic history, as some of Ennius' works may have been, and against aristocratic display in general. For such an extraordinary and unique choice, however, this seems a small purpose. To go beyond Gotter, the lack of aristocratic Roman names not only makes the work more collective in tone, but also de-Romanizes it, making it a less problematic source of *exempla* for any non-Romans who read the work. If we assume the possibility of a partially Italian audience, we can read this *exemplum* with particular relevance for Italian allies; Cato argues that despite their lack of direct praise and a smaller share in Rome's profits, they should continue to act for the good of the whole.

A similar vein of interpretation accounts for Cato's apparent omission of the period of Italian conquest, according to both Nepos' description of the work and the remaining fragments. After the mythological foundation stories or ethnographies of Rome and Italy in the first three books, the fourth book skips to the First Punic War, followed by the Second Punic War in the fifth book. In this scheme of Roman history, the heroic cultures of Rome and its allies progress from the mythological period directly to the period in which their alliance had its greatest successes. The problematic period in which Rome expanded across Italy is passed by in silence, so that a more positive, cohesive view of Italo-Roman history prevails.[42]

The bond between Rome and its allies is most clearly expressed in the *Origines* by the inclusion of the two books on Italian foundation stories. Gotter argues that the inclusion of these legends is an attempt to reclaim the history of Italy from the Greeks. According to him, by including the origins of the peoples of Italy, Cato took over their history just as Rome had taken their cities. Equally, any virtues or successes described in the origins of the Italian cities became part of Rome's history.[43]

Again, though I agree with Gotter's overall point that the *Origines* is an attempt to integrate Italian roots into Rome's history, I believe he is misguided in framing this integration as a movement against Greek culture. First, Greek elements appear regularly in the *Origines*. Cato seems to have

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[41] Gotter (2009, 118–19).

[42] Gotter (2009, 115). Cornell (1972, 61–6) reads Cato's omission of this period in a more anti-elite vein, ascribing it to the inherently aristocratic nature of the only sources that were probably available for the period, i.e. lists of office holders and family records.

[43] Gotter (2009, 115).

used these elements in an attempt to situate the histories of Rome and its allies within the broader mythical/historical tradition. Many figures from Greek legend appear as founders, and Rome's own Trojan origins are part of the same larger mythical context.[44] There are more examples, but the most notable is perhaps the story that the Sabines came from a Lacedaemonian named Sabus.[45] It is difficult to argue that Cato was a through-and-through anti-Hellenist with so many positive inclusions of Greek foundation legends.[46] Further, these mythological origins themselves would have served to heroize and in some sense legitimize and civilize the roots of Italian peoples. We know that the stories of the epic cycle and the tragedians were no less familiar to the Italian allies than they were to Romans.[47] By placing all parties concerned within the same elevated mythical tradition, Cato not only makes Italians more palatable to Romans, but makes his image of Italian and Roman history overall more flattering and acceptable to his potential Italian readership.

Under this interpretation, the *Origines*' oddities may be explained as advancing an understanding of Roman history as the building of a 'whole' by the collective virtue of many. The 'whole' is not a cultural, political, or even linguistic unit, but a unit of shared interest. Using evidence from Cato's orations, Villa argues that Cato is sympathetic to the allies, and that for him the tie that binds the allies to the Romans is that they are all *boni viri*, or 'good men'. Villa ties the necessity of keeping the Italians as allies together with Cato's position toward them as expressed in his speeches.[48] He cites one particularly notable speech fragment, in which Cato rails against the abuse of a Ligurian town's *decemviri* by the consul Q. Minucius Thermus (cos. 193 BC):

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[44] Some examples of Greek founders: Catillus, son of Amphiaraios as founder of Tibur (fr. 2.26 *FRH*); Tarchon, a descendant of Tyrrhenus, secondary founder of Pisa (fr. 2.15 *FRH*); Polites, a son of Priam, founder of Politorium (fr. 2.24 *FRH*); and the Veneti are also said to be from Trojan stock (fr. 2.12 *FRH*). For Cato's sources for these stories, see Cornell (1972, 156–8).

[45] Fr. 2.22 *FRH*. See Dench (1995, esp. 80–94) and Farney (2007, 97–111, esp. 108–10) on the ideological role of the Sabines from the second century BC on, including Cato's responsibility for the invention of that role.

[46] Letta (1984), however, argues against the inclusion of Greek roots in the Italian stories.

[47] The Etruscan François tomb is a good example: here, scenes from Etruscan history are paralleled with scenes from the *Iliad*. This juxtaposition shows an interest in integrating local traditions with the broader cultural *koine*, in a way similar to what I am suggesting for Cato's use of Greek material in the *Origines*.

[48] See Villa (1955) for a thorough treatment of Cato's position in regard to Italian allies.

> Who is able to bear this abuse, this rule, this slavery? This, not even a king would dare to do: should such things be done to good men, born from good stock, of good counsel? Where is the fellowship, the faith of our ancestors?[49]

The use of the words *societas* and *fides* underscore the real outrage of the situation: these men were protected under the ties of alliance, and they were betrayed. Beyond the political, official reason for outrage, they are also *boni*. A moral dimension is thus tied to the political one.

Cato's method in the *Origines* is similar: he ties the very real military interest shared between Romans and Italians into a higher, more eternal bond of virtue and morality. Two remarks of Servius on Cato's work show that such a moral element was noticeable in the *Origines*, both in general and with specific reference to Italy. First, very simply, Servius notes: "The discipline and way of life of Italy is praised, which both Cato in his *Origines* and Varro in his work on the race of the Roman people relate."[50] The lines commented on are spoken by Turnus' younger brother, who boasts of the Italians' difficult way of life and upbringing. Servius' note is not only a reminder of the content of Cato's work, but also an indication that similar notions about Italian life may be found in it. Secondly, he states:

> Indeed Cato says that the Roman people also follow the ways of the Sabines, who are born of harsh parents, and whose discipline the victorious Romans have followed in many affairs.[51]

The attribution of Roman success to Italian *mores* is remarkable. In this fragment, Cato seems to imply that much of Roman victory is due to the cultural legacy of their earliest Italian ally.

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49 Gellius *NA* 10.3.17 (*ORF*[3] fr. 58): *Quis hanc contumeliam, quis hoc imperium, quis hanc servitutem ferre potest? Nemo hoc rex ausus est facere; eane fieri bonis, bono genere gnatis, boni consultis? ubi societas? ubi fides maiorum?* The speech in question was titled *De falsis pugnis* and was delivered probably in 190 BC around the discussion of Minucius' triumph for his campaign in Liguria, which was refused (Liv. 37.46.1). While Cato's position in this instance seems fairly clear, it is worth noting that elsewhere he was not always friendly to Ligurians (fr. 2.1–2 *FRH*).

50 Fr. 3.9 *FRH*, Serv. *Aen.* 9.603: *Italiae disciplina et vita laudatur: quam et Cato in Originibus et Varro in Gente populi Romani commemorat.*

51 Fr. 2.22 *FRH*, Serv. *Aen.* 8.638: *Sabinorum etiam mores populum Romanum secutum idem Cato dicit: merito ergo 'severis', qui et a duris parentibus orti sunt, et quorum disciplinam victores Romani in multis secuti sunt.* It is worth noting that the idea that the Sabines descended from a Lacedaemonian is found in the same fragment, closely connecting Rome's virtues with a Greek origin.

4. *Conclusion*

The strong note of collectivity in the *Origines* almost paradoxically indicates an awareness of the diversity of Italy in Cato's time. By writing Italian origins into his history of Rome, along with more prosaic content such as the size of lakes and the numbers of tribes, Cato built a picture of an Italy which boasted many proud peoples and cities, not simply a single dominant state. Rome's place at the top of the hierarchy is not diminished by the greatness of its allies, and the inclusion of allied origins gives them at least a literary share in empire, if not necessarily an economic or political one.

If I am right to consider the *Origines* as a work written with a multicultural readership in mind, there are exciting implications for the role of literature in building cultural connections. If both Romans and Italians were envisioned as the audience for this work, Cato may have hoped to encourage both to conceive of a shared identity—not a suppression or replacement of existing cultural affiliations, but rather a new layer beyond the geographic, linguistic, political, or ethnic. Such a dual identity may be called 'nested'.[52] The *Origines* itself, then, may be considered a 'nested' history of Rome, spurring readers to develop their own 'nested' conception of an Italo-Roman identity based on a shared history of virtuous deeds, and following in its footsteps, a shared future in which *boni viri* of all backgrounds continue to exercise their virtue for the good of the whole.[53]

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[52] For the idea of 'nested' identities, see Farney (2007), esp. the introduction.

[53] This paper was written first for a seminar in Fall 2008 with Harriet Flower at Princeton University, and I gained useful input from Professor Flower. In Fall 2009 I had the privilege of delivering a revised version at McMaster University's graduate conference on 'Cross-cultural Influence in the Roman World'. Finally, I received a great deal of benefit from this paper's final airing at the conference organized at the University of Manchester. Without the input of the organizers and attendees at the conferences, my professors and classmates at Rutgers University and Princeton University, and the anonymous reviewer, this paper would not have been possible. Needless to say, any omissions or mistakes lay on my shoulders alone.

JUNO SOSPITA: A FOREIGN GODDESS THROUGH ROMAN EYES

Rianne Hermans*

> If we care to compare our national characteristics with those of foreign peoples, we shall find that, while in all other respects we are only the equals or even the inferiors of others, yet in the sense of religion, that is, in reverence of the gods, we are far superior.[1]

1. *Introduction*

From the fourth century BC onwards, Rome developed from its modest origins as a small city-state on the banks of the Tiber into an empire that encompassed a large part of the known world. For modern historians the complete lack of contemporary historical writings makes this period of conquest difficult to interpret. We are largely dependent on later ancient writers that describe, explain and justify the wars of expansion long after they were fought. On the other hand, the dependence on non-contemporary sources may, at the same time, be intriguing, since the writings reveal a sort of self-definition: Romans reflect upon their own history, their position in the world and the origins and nature of their society.[2] As the fragment from Cicero exemplifies, a major part of this reflection was religious in nature.[3] Like foreign communities that transformed from enemies into allies, the Romans also encountered foreign gods and were often quite willing to give them a place in their pantheon. Rome's success was the gods' success.[4]

One particularly striking set of foreign—and perhaps previously hostile—set of deities is those who are recognized as manifestations of Juno in ancient literature. These *Junones* have received little attention in modern literature. In this article, I want to shed light on the incorporation

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[1] Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.8: *Et si conferre volumus nostra cum externis, ceteris rebus aut pares aut etiam inferiores reperiemur, religione id est cultu deorum multo superiores.*

[2] Cornell (1991); Dench (1995; 2005).

[3] Bergemann (1992, 3–81); Levene (1993, 16–30); Miles (1995, 4–7); Bleich-Schade (1996, 3–85); Davies (2004, 21–89).

[4] Beard, North & Price (1998, 74).

and 'exotic' status of one of them, Juno Sospita of Lanuvium. According to ancient writers, Livy in particular, the little village in the Alban hills was famous because of the goddess. When the Romans took control over the area, they also became involved in the organisation of her cult. The sources, however, also inform us about a sanctuary for Juno Sospita in the city of Rome itself, perhaps even two. In my analysis I wish to examine the position of Juno Sospita in the Roman pantheon and study the relation between the cult centres in Lanuvium and in Rome. Did the focus of the cult shift after the goddess received a temple in Rome? Was she perceived as a Roman or perhaps as a local or foreign deity? What does the case of Juno Sospita tell us about religious self-perception in Roman society?

In search of an answer to these questions I will relate the literary discourse on Juno Sospita's nature and arrival in Rome to her place in the religious landscape, the material remains of her cult and her iconographic representation. The comparison does not intend to prove the historical writings right or wrong: rather, I consider both the literary and material sources as expressions of the same desire of the Romans to categorize and define the complex religious reality that surrounded them.[5] My argument, therefore, is not so much a reconstruction of the actual moment of incorporation, but instead aims at exposing and understanding the multi-layered perception of foreign elements and 'foreignness' in the cult of Juno Sospita.

2. Iunonia sedes

In 338 BC, after the Latin War, the fate of the small city of Lanuvium was in the hands of the Roman Senate. Lanuvium had been a part of the rebellious Latin League, but, unlike some of the other participating cities, it received a rather mild punishment.[6] The inhabitants obtained the *civitas cum suffragio* (citizenship with the right to vote) and no land was taken for the establishment of a colony. Perhaps this was the result of earlier friendly relations between the two cities; elsewhere Livy describes Lanuvium as a *fidelissima urbs* ("most loyal city").[7] There was, however, one important stipulation: the senate decreed that "the temple and grove of Juno Sospita should be held in common by the citizens of Lanuvium

[5] Ando (2008). See also Cornell (1995, 26–30).
[6] Cornell (1995, 247–352); Forsythe (2005, 189–91); Chiarucci (1983, 29–30).
[7] Liv. 6.21.2.

and the Roman people".[8] The fact that this is explicitly mentioned in the agreement indicates the significance of the site, which had a long history of worship with which Rome sought to associate itself. It must be noted, however, that Livy's words may reflect a contemporary rather than a historical reality.

Several generations of archaeologists have located Juno's sanctuary on the highest hill of present-day Lanuvio, the so-called Colle San Lorenzo.[9] Three phases in the temple building have been identified and the oldest remains—including parts of the roof construction, a decorated ridge piece and several terracotta antefixes—are from the sixth century BC. The rich decoration suggests that the sanctuary was frequently visited in this early stage and the influx of Romans did not change this.[10] On the contrary, in the late fourth century, when Roman magistrates are assumed to have taken part in the organization of the cult, the complex was restored and enlarged.[11] The third and final renovation took place around 50 BC.[12] At that time a large *porticus* with commercial and administrative spaces was added, so that the complex now occupied the entire Colle San Lorenzo.

Juno had a special relationship with Lanuvium: Ovid has the goddess talking about the city as "my own" and Silius Italicus labels it *Iunonia sedes*.[13] The epigraphic record shows a complex and hierarchical cult organization, in which Roman magistrates played an important role.[14] The consuls sacrificed in Lanuvium each year and the most important magistrate (in Lanuvium known by the ancient name of *dictator*) was a Roman senator as well.[15] Titus Annius Milo was one of these *dictatores*; and, in fact, he was on his way home from the inauguration of a priest of Juno Sospita when he got involved in the fatal fight with Clodius Pulcher, on the Via Appia.[16] Dedicatory inscriptions found as far afield as Africa show that the title of *sacerdos Lanuvianus* was also used in a purely honorific way.[17]

8 Liv. 8.14.2.
9 Lumley-Savile (1886, 67; 1893, 147) Pullan (1884, 327); Chiarucci (1983, 166–8); Coarelli (1987, 62–4); Attenni (2009; 2010, 26–32); Santi (2010, 33–7); Zevi (2010, 38–41).
10 Chiarucci (1983, 19–29).
11 Coarelli (1987, 69–73); Attenni (2009, 3–16).
12 Coarelli (1987, 76–80).
13 Ov. *Fast.* 6.60; Sil. It. *Pun.* 8.360.
14 CIL X.3913; CIL XIV.2097–8; 2100–1; 2104; 2113–17; 2120; 2122–4; 2160.
15 Cic. *Mur.* 90.2–4; Cic. *Mil.* 45; CIL X.3913; CIL XIV.2097; 2110; 2121.
16 Cic. *Mil.* 45.
17 CIL V.6992; 7814; CIL VIII.26583; CIL IX.4206–7; CIL X.4590.

3. *Cult Place(s) in Rome*

The renowned and esteemed sanctuary was less than 20 miles from Rome; however, eventually, Juno Sospita received a cult in the city as well. Livy informs us that the consul Gaius Cornelius Cethegus vowed a temple to the goddess in 197 BC, which was inaugurated in 193 BC on the Forum Holitorium.[18] Remains of the temple have been identified under the church of San Nicola in Carcere and on the Forma Urbis. Some confusion arises, however, when we examine Juno Sospita's position in the Roman calendar. There is an entry in the *Fasti Antiates Maiores*, to be reconstructed as *Iunon*(*i*) *S*[*osp*(*itae*)] *Matr*(*i*) *Re*[*g*(*inae*)] on the first of February, in correspondence with several other Juno cults that were celebrated on the *calendae* (first day) of the month.[19] Ovid, in his poem on the Fasti, mentions a festival for the goddess on the same day, but states that the temple was "the neighbour of the Phrygian Mother Goddess" [Magna Mater, on the Palatine] and that it had "tumbled down".[20]

Was Ovid mistaking Magna Mater for Mater Matuta (who did have a temple on the Forum Holitorium), as is recurrently assumed?[21] Then why does he claim that the temple had disappeared by his time? Coarelli comes up with a complex but plausible solution.[22] He links two references in the *Fasti Antiates Maiores* and the *Fasti Vallenses* on the first of July and reconstructs the complete entry [*Iun*]*on*(*i*) [*Sospitae ad theatrum Ma*] *rcell*(*i*).[23] If this was the festival of Juno Sospita on the Forum Holitorium, the other *dies natalis* (1 February) indicates another cult place that probably was much older and might well have been the temple on the Palatine that is mentioned by Ovid.

Clearly, Juno Sospita was firmly established in Rome, possibly even from a very early date. Did this mean that her worship in Lanuvium gradually became overshadowed? A possible answer to the question lies in an analysis of the cult practice and the iconographic appearance of the goddess. With regard to celebrations and sacrifices, very little is actually known about the way Juno Sospita was worshipped. In contrast to other

[18] Liv. 32.30.10.
[19] CIL I^2.248–9, Degrassi, *In. It.* XIII.1, tab. I–III.
[20] Ov. *Fast.* 2.55–9.
[21] Ziolkowski (1992, 77–9); Richardson (1992, 217–18); Schultz (2006, 210).
[22] Coarelli (1996b, 128–9; 1996c, 129–30).
[23] *Fasti Antiates Maiores*: CIL I^2.248–249; *In. It.* XIII.1, tab. I–III. *Fasti Vallenses*: CIL 1^2.320; *In. It.* XIII.18.

Juno cults, there are no accounts of participating *matronae*, jubilant processions or the donation of *signa*. There is, however, a long list of *prodigia*: extraordinary omens and portents that were considered as signs of divine wrath, after which placation of the gods (*procuratio*) was needed.[24] Most of these incidents—including the ones where Juno Sospita was involved—were reported at times in which the Roman state was in grave danger, especially during the Punic and Macedonian wars. Remarkably, Livy does not mention a single portent in the city of Rome (nor does Julius Obsequens, who replicated his descriptions of omens in the fourth century AD), whereas Juno's temple in Lanuvium was the constant scene of lightning strikes, rains of stones, nesting ravens and other trouble.

Lanuvium appears also in one of the *Elegiae* of Propertius, in which he describes the town as the scene of a peculiar fertility rite that involved young girls entering the cave of a giant snake to ensure prosperous crops for the following year—provided that the girls were virgins and their offerings were accepted.[25] The story is reproduced by Claudius Aelianus and by the fifth-century writer Quodvultdeus, who presents a bizarre version in which a monk destroys the now mechanical snake, thereby proving the fictitious nature of the pagan gods.[26] It is of course very difficult to say anything about the historicity of the narrative and neither is it clear whether Juno Sospita had a part in the rites. The discovery of a long, man-made corridor under the Colle San Lorenzo, in the vicinity of Juno's temple, has caused many archaeologists and historians to make the link between goddess and ritual, but the site itself has, so far, not provided further evidence to support this theory.[27]

Juno Sospita was often depicted with a snake closely following her feet. Her warrior-like appearance is quite distinctive: she wears a goatskin with ears and horns, curled shoes, a round shield in one hand and an elevated spear in the other. The modern identification of this image as Juno Sospita is, above all, the result of an observation made by Cicero:

> . . . precisely as much as you believe Juno Sospita of your native place to be a goddess. You never see her, even in your dreams, unless equipped with goat-skin, spear, buckler and slippers turned up at the toe. Yet that is not

[24] Liv. 21.62.4; 23.31.15; 24.10.6; 29.14.3; 31.12.6; 32.9.2; 35.9.4; 41.21.13; 42.2.4; 45.19.2; 45.16.5; Jul. Obs. *Prod. Lib.* 6, 9, 11, 12, 20, 46. See MacBain (1982); Kragelund (2001, 65–6).

[25] Prop. *Eleg.* 4.8.3–14.

[26] Claud. *De Nat. An.* 11.16; Quodvult. *Lib. Prom.* 3.43.

[27] Dumézil (1966, 294–7); Palmer (1974, 26); Scullard (1981, 71); Hänninen (1999, 35–6); Boëls-Janssen (1993, 472–3); Attenni (2009, 20–2).

> the aspect of the Argive Juno, nor of the Roman. It follows that Juno has one form for the Argives, another for the people of Lanuvium, and another for us.[28]

The different attributes can be recognized in a range of iconographic sources, amongst which a giant statue now kept in the Sala Rotonda of the Vatican Museums.[29] Especially informative are the coin series, appearing from the late second century BC onwards, that show a full figure or a bust of Juno Sospita.[30] Her appearance changes little over time: on the coins of Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius (with his son Commodus on the obverse) the goddess looks the same as on the coins of the Republican *monetarii*.

There is a strong connection with Lanuvium here, for four out of five Republican *monetarii* that put Juno Sospita on their coins a Lanuvian origin can be determined and both Antoninus Pius and Commodus were born there.[31] With the depiction of Juno Sospita, accompanied by a reference to the snake ritual, the moneyers seem to refer explicitly to that Lanuvian descent.[32] While Juno Sospita had a temple in Rome during the time of all the coin-issues, her appearance was not that of a Roman Juno, as Cicero makes very clear. The image of the goddess represented—at least for a large part of the audience that saw it—the archaic and respectable cult in Lanuvium.

4. *A Problematic Continuity*

But was this cult, in fact, so ancient? As we have seen, the oldest remains on the Colle San Lorenzo have been dated to the sixth century BC. But how do we know if the deity that was worshipped there—if it actually was

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[28] Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.82: *Tam hercle quam tibi illam vestram Sospitam. Quam tu numquam ne in somnis quidem vides nisi cum pelle caprina, cum hasta, cum scutulo, cum calceolis repandis: at non est talis Argia nec Romana Iuno. Ergo alia species Iunonis Argivis, alia Lanuvinis, alia nobis.*

[29] La Rocca (1990, 819–22); Chiarucci (1983, 56ff); Martin (1987, 112).

[30] Republic: RRC 316/1 (=BMC 1615–1641); RRC 384/1 (= BMC 2977–3095); RRC 412/1 (= BMC 3394–3510); RRC 472/1 (= BMC 4018–4022); RRC 379/1 (= BMC 3147–3149); RRC 379/2 (= BMC 3394–3510); RRC 509/1–5 (= BMC II.26–28). Empire: RIC III 608; RIC III 1583. For Celtic imitations of the RRC 412/1 issue, see Forrer (1968, 123, figs. 230 and 231.

[31] Cic. *Fin.* 2.63–65; Cic. *Div.* 1.79; Cic. *Mil.* 53.13–16; Hist. Aug. *An. Pius* 1.2; Hist. Aug. *Com.* 1.2. *Cf.* Farney (2007, 68–74, 260, 267, 270); Chiarucci (1983, 44–6).

[32] Farney (2007, 68–74).

the same deity as in later times—was known as Juno Sospita at any point *before* the Roman conquest? The archaic past of the Juno Sospita cult, as presented by Livy and others, is often confirmed in modern literature on the basis of iconographical sources.[33] Indeed, we have a number of archaic representations of a goddess that resemble the later Juno Sospita: a female figure with goatskin, horns, curled shoes and armour appears on a vase from the fourth century BC, a tripod from the sixth century BC, a small bronze statue from the fifth century BC and several other objects.[34] There is also a significant number of late sixth and early fifth-century BC terracotta antefixes, found all over Latium Vetus, which show the head of a helmed figure with goat horns.[35]

The portraits seem to reflect an important continuity, but, in fact, only the goat horns are similar; the other attributes are not visible and the later goddess wears no helmet. There is another problem: none of the archaic sources originate from Lanuvium itself. The figurative antefix that was found on the Colle San Lorenzo actually bears no resemblance to the other antefixes.[36] Furthermore, it has been stressed that a portrayal of Juno Sospita as lateral rooftop decoration would certainly be an exception: the roofs of other Etrusco-Italic temples from the sixth, fifth and fourth centuries BC display no antefixes of gods or goddesses, but only of minor mythological figures like maenads, gorgons or satyrs.[37] It therefore remains uncertain whether there is a connection between the antefixes and the deity that is later recognized as Juno Sospita. There are two female heads with large holes, interpreted as being used for fastening the goat's skin, from the late first century BC, but the lack of other evidence from Lanuvium may call into question the identification of the early sanctuary.[38] Or, as Damgaard Andersen states: "It is thus uncertain whether a so-called Juno Sospita antefix identifies a temple as a temple of Juno Sospita".[39]

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33 Douglas (1913, 66–72); La Rocca (1990, 819); Martin (1987, 112–19); Chiarucci (1983, 56ff).

34 Vase: Ducati (1932, 14). Tripod: Höckmann (1981. 64). Bronze: Richardson (1983, 361); Cristofani (1985, 281). Other objects: Douglas (1913, 66–72); La Rocca (1990, 819–22).

35 Andrén (1940, 52, 99, 112, 387, 398, 469, 502); Riis (1981, 33, 45); Lulof & Knoop (1998, 24).

36 Andrén (1940, 420–1).

37 Damgaard Andersen (1998, 164–5).

38 Haffner (1966, 186–205); Martin (1987, 112–14).

39 Damgaard Andersen (1998, 164).

5. *Caecilia's Dream*

Finally, one episode in Roman history that involved Juno Sospita has to be discussed, precisely because it touches on the heart of the issues that are discussed in this paper. In 90 BC the senate gave the order to restore the temple of Juno Sospita, as a result of a dream of Caecilia Metella, the daughter of an ex-consul. Cicero writes about it almost contemporaneously in *De Divinatione*; however, it is Obsequens' more suggestive version—in which he mentions that restoration was needed because the sanctuary was "befouled by ladies' attention to dirty and vile physical needs"—that has received most of the scholarly attention.[40] This has resulted in a debate on the exact nature of the "dirty and vile physical needs". However, a more essential question is sometimes overlooked: which was the sanctuary in need of restoration?[41] Many scholars have easily interpreted the absence of an indication of place as an implicit reference to the cult on the Forum Holitorium in Rome, which they see as the obvious frame of reference for the Roman public.[42] But is this indeed so self-evident?

One problem in the interpretation of the story is the presumed decrepit state of the sanctuary, something which seems hard to imagine in the centre of Rome; on the busy Forum Holitorium or on the Palatine. But it also seems unlikely in the case of the well-known temple of Lanuvium, which delivered, for example, enough gold to support Octavian's men in 42 BC and to make a 209 pound-heavy statue during the rule of Hadrian.[43] However, if we shift our attention from Obsequens to Cicero, the perspective changes. Cicero uses the word *restitutum* [*restituere*], without giving any further details; this rather ambivalent expression can be used in the sense of 'reviving' or 'renewing' an existing structure.[44] Furthermore, an ideological factor can be of importance here: on the basis of a comparison between building inscriptions and actual archaeological remains, scholars have suggested that restoration was more appreciated in Roman society than the construction or enlargement of a building.[45] Consequently, a simple adaptation could have been recorded and remembered as a restoration, perhaps because the Metelli family took pride in the incident.

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[40] Cic. *Div*. 1.4, 1.99; Jul. Obs. *Prod. Lib*. 55.

[41] Dumézil (1974, 295); Balsdon (1962, 249); Scullard (1981, 71); Schultz (2006, 208; 2006, 26–7).

[42] Gordon (1938, 25); Chiarucci (1983, 73); Palmer (1974, 31); La Rocca (1990, 819); Richardson (1992, 217); Coarelli (1996b, 128); Claridge (1998, 249).

[43] Octavian's men: App. *BC* 5.24. Statue: CIL XIV.2088 = ILS 316.

[44] Thomas & Witschel (1992, 140–1).

[45] Thomas & Witschel (1992, 135–77); Schultz (2006, 211).

Even so, the question remains: where did the presumed restoration take place? Caecilia had her dream during the Social War, and Cicero describes it just lines before he mentions another portent: mice that gnawed the "shields of Lanuvium".[46] A coincidence? We already saw that Cicero associated the appearance of Juno Sospita exclusively with Lanuvium; in the passage in the *De Natura Deorum* he uses the significant phrase "even in your dreams".[47] Maybe Cicero fails to mention a place, because, for his audience, it was obvious that Juno Sospita showed her concern for Roman affairs via her sanctuary in Lanuvium, as she had done before in times of great distress. For the Roman senate, or the Metelli family, the dream could have been a welcome occasion to strengthen the bonds with the ancient cult in Lanuvium. The restoration served as a forceful reminder of the Roman victory in the Latin War that had made Lanuvians into Romans, and Juno Sospita into a Roman goddess.

6. *Conclusion: Foreign in a Roman Way*

Obviously, it is not possible to reconstruct one general view of Juno Sospita: while she was recognized as a local or foreign deity by some groups in Roman society, she could have been seen as a Roman goddess by others. Still, the analysis of the literary discourse, the collection of *prodigia* and the study of her images in this article demonstrate that Juno Sospita was regularly—and often very explicitly—linked to her cult site in Lanuvium. Apart from its existence, we know nothing of Juno Sospita's cult in the city of Rome and this silence is perhaps significant. The coin series, in particular, show that a reference to the goddess could function as a reference to the origin of the *monetarii*; in that way, she could be seen as an expression of local identity in an urban context.[48] Lanuvium was known for its cult of Juno Sospita; Juno Sospita was known for her archaic roots in Lanuvium.

At the same time, reasonable doubts have been expressed here about the archaic status and continuity of the cult, which are often presumed in ancient *and* modern literature. Although there certainly is not enough reason to reject the tradition completely, due consideration has to be given to the guiding influence of late, often anachronistic, accounts. In

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46 Cic. *Div*. 1.99.
47 Cic. *Nat. D*. 1.82. See Kragelund (2001, 66–7).
48 Farney (2007, 49–53).

fact, we only know of the foreign character of Juno Sospita because Roman sources specifically wish to emphasize it: we recognize a foreign deity, but always through Roman eyes.

As we have seen, Juno Sospita's exotic origin was not a static relic of a long forgotten past. On the contrary, it was constantly reinvented, remembered and reinterpreted. This reflection upon the pluralistic nature of the Roman pantheon suited a society that was well aware of its multi-ethnic composition and roots, and one that displayed that diversity with a certain pride.[49] The reverence for the gods, described by Cicero in the first lines of this article as the only real talent of Rome, involved not only traditional Roman gods, but could also integrate newcomers like Juno Sospita.

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49 Dench (2005, 11–25).

FERONIA. THE ROLE OF AN ITALIC GODDESS IN THE PROCESS OF CULTURAL INTEGRATION IN REPUBLICAN ITALY

Massimiliano Di Fazio*

1. *Introduction*

Religion was, in ancient Italy, as it is nowadays, one of the crucial elements in the dynamics of cultural integration.[1] In this article I will present therefore a part of a wider research project about Feronia, an ancient goddess about whom we have a considerable amount of information from literary sources, as well as some epigraphical and archaeological evidence. Nonetheless, there is still much uncertainty about the nature of this goddess in Antiquity. It is often stated that she was particularly linked to nature, sacred woods, and springs; it is also thought that she had a special connection with the lower classes.[2] However, in painting this picture, the heterogeneity of the available data has perhaps not been sufficiently taken into account. In fact, inquiries about the religions of the peoples of ancient Italy often underestimate variations through time and space. However, the religious profile of Feronia is not the main concern of this paper; I would like to focus here on the spread of her cult throughout Italy. This can be a useful example of the complex, and seldom linear, processes through which the peninsula found a kind of cultural unification in the Republican period.

2. *The Sabine Origin of Feronia's Cult*

Looking at the map of all the testimonies to her cult (Fig. 1), whether literary, epigraphical, or archaeological, it is evident that traces of her worship are scattered throughout ancient Italy, with a significant density in the central area.

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[1] For recent overviews of the role of religion in the process of 'Romanization' of Italy see De Cazanove (2007); Stek (2009, 1–34).

[2] General works on Feronia: Wissowa (1912, 285–7); Latte (1960, 189–90); Dumézil (1974, 416–24); Radke (1965, 124–7); Nash (1988); Prosdocimi (1989, 534); Coarelli (1997, 197–9); Frateantonio (1998); Malavolta & Staffa (1998); Iorio (2009).



Figure 1. Distribution of attestations of the cult of Feronia (adapted from Iorio 2009).

One of the aims of my research has been to distinguish between 'primary' and 'secondary' cult places: that is to say, places in which the cult of Feronia was original, and others in which it could have been introduced later, for reasons that we will deal with below. Obviously, to find a clear indicator of this distinction is not easy. The best way to proceed is to examine some example cases, in order to underline the main characteristics and differences.

How to choose a starting point? From the map, it is clear enough that central Italy played an important role. This is confirmed by new discoveries, such as the important temple in Loreto Aprutino, where a bronze bowl carrying an inscription with the name of the goddess has been discovered.[3] We can refine the area if we follow the testimony of Varro that Feronia was one of the divinities that came to Rome from the Sabine area.[4] This passage has sometimes been regarded with suspicion, as the tendency of Varro to emphasize the Sabine contribution to Rome is well known.[5] Nevertheless, in this case, he can be considered reliable, because it seems to match at least other two points. The first one is that, as a matter of fact, in the Sabine area we find several cult places of Feronia, the importance of which emerges clearly from the literary and epigraphical sources.[6] Among these, we might mention Trebula Mutuesca;[7] Amiternum[8]—a town that was central for the Sabines according to Cato[9]—and of course Lucus Feroniae, as we will see in detail. Thus, on the whole, it appears clearly that the Sabine area played a primary role in the cult of Feronia. Furthermore, the presence of the goddess on the coins of Petronius Turpilianus, dating to the late Republic, is remarkable (Fig. 2).[10] The Turpiliani were a family of Sabine origins; the choice of Feronia on their coins has been seen as a way to recall these origins.[11] For all these reasons, a Sabine origin of Feronia seems most likely. In this area we will begin our survey.

Reading the sources, there is one place that emerges clearly as one of the main cult places of Feronia: Lucus Feroniae, near modern Fiano

3 Sanzi Di Mino & Staffa (1996); Staffa (1998).
4 Var. *L.* 5.74: *Feronia, Minerva, Novensides a Sabinis*. See Terrosi Zanco (1961).
5 Radke (1987, 96–8); Lehmann (1997, 38–40).
6 Evans (1939, 156–8).
7 Vallarino (2009), with previous references.
8 Buonocore (2009, n. 303, 336–7).
9 Cato *Orig*. 2.21 Chassignet.
10 Chiodini (1975, 198–201); Farney (2007, 286–7).
11 Farney (2007, 82, 96, 286–7), but see already Bartolomeo Borghesi in the nineteenth century.

Figure 2. Coin with Feronia (from Nash 1988).

Romano.[12] In ancient times, the area is supposed to have been part of the territory of Capena,[13] which was conquered by the Romans at the beginning of the fourth century BC.[14] We have a good supply of archaeological, epigraphical, and literary data. From the sources we know that Lucus Feroniae was not only an important cult place, but also one of the main market places of central Italy.[15] Its wealth, as well as its relevance for the surrounding peoples, was apparently behind the decision of Hannibal to turn off his route in order to plunder the sanctuary.[16] Excavations in the 1950s have led to a secure identification of the ancient cult place, which is not far from the later colony, which was founded in the first century BC.[17] Recent excavations have widened our knowledge: the discovery of bronze votives and other interesting materials confirms that the place was frequented at least from the archaic age.[18] But there is still room for further investigations. Interesting information can be taken from epigraphical data. Several inscriptions, all from Roman times, record offerings to Feronia; some of them have been devoted by people of non-free origins

[12] For a recent overview of Lucus Feroniae, see Moretti (2006); Stopponi & Puppo (2010).

[13] Liv. 27.4.14; 33.26.8.

[14] Jones (1962); Mazzi (1997).

[15] Cato *Orig*. 1.31, 2.19 Chassignet; Strab. 5.2.9; Dion. Hal. 3.32.1; Liv. 1.30. See Gabba (1975); Coarelli (1995).

[16] Liv. 26.11. See Brizzi (1984).

[17] Bloch & Foti (1953); Bartoccini (1961).

[18] Moretti (2006).

(Fig. 3).[19] This seems to match literary sources, which speak of Feronia as a goddess worshipped especially by lower classes.[20]

Some key points can be identified. First of all, evidence from recent excavations clearly shows that the area was already frequented before Roman times, at least from the archaic age down until Imperial times. Furthermore, the notion of a cult place at Lucus Feroniae was very old in Rome. For example, on some occasions the Romans made expiatory sacrifices in the Lucus Capenatis.[21] This means that the sanctuary was perceived as one of special relevance. Considering all this, it is quite clear that

Figure 3. Inscription from *Lucus Feroniae* (from Bloch & Foti 1953).

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[19] *CIL* I^2.2867 = *AE* 1983, 404 = *ILLRP* 93a; *CIL* I^2.2869a = *AE* 1983, 407; *CIL* I^2.2869c = *AE* 1983, 405.

[20] Serv. *Aen.* 8.564: *In huius templo Tarracinae sedile lapideum fuit, in quo hic versus incisus erat 'bene meriti servi sedeant, surgant liberi'. Quam Varro Libertatem deam dicit, Feroniam quasi Fidoniam* (= Varro fr. 222 Cardauns). See Torelli (1981, 77–8); Coarelli (1987, 113–15).

[21] Liv. 27.4.14–15 (210 BC).

Lucus Feroniae was one of the, if not the, 'primary' cult-place of Feronia's cult, as the name itself seems to suggest. This could have been assumed as self-evident, of course; but I think it is important to make clear how deep and strong is the presence of Feronia here, in order to compare it with other situations we will see later.

A further point that comes out from the documentation of Lucus Feroniae is the association between Feronia and Soranus. From a small but significant dossier of sources, Soranus emerges as a chthonic god, later assimilated with Apollo.[22] His domain was Monte Soratte near Capena, which absolutely dominates the surrounding landscape (Fig. 4). It is interesting to underline the relationship between Soranus, on the top of Soratte, and Feronia, in her sacred grove not far from the mountain. This seems to constitute a pattern which is to be found in other areas of central Italy, as I will try to show elsewhere.

Figure 4. Monte Soratte (photo author).

22 Di Stefano Manzella (1992); Colonna (2009).

3. *Other Cult Places in Central Italy*

The next step brings us to the southern extremity of the distribution of the cult: Terracina, in the southern Latium.[23] Terracina was established as colony in the year 329 BC, in a crucial position for the control of the routes towards Campania and southern Italy. It is not by chance that this colony played an important role on several occasions, especially during the fourth century, when it represented a key point in the context of the Samnite wars.[24] This importance seems to find confirmation in the mention of Terracina in the text of the first treaty between Romans and Carthaginians.[25] There is still some controversy surrounding the chronology of this; most scholars agree upon a dating at the end of the sixth century. We still do not have a clear picture of the pre-Roman phase of this area. It is likely that the territory was in the domain of the Volscians, to whose language the other name of Tarracina seems to belong: Anxur.[26] The presence of Feronia in Terracina is well documented thanks to several literary sources; the best known is, of course, Vergil's *Aeneid*.[27] Some of these sources make it possible to identify the cult place. During his travel on the Via Appia, Horace washed his hands in the sacred spring of Feronia, which was three miles north of the town.[28] The place was visible to voyagers during the eighteenth century (Fig. 5), and it is still there along the Via Appia. Here, at the end of the nineteenth century, a marble head, strongly resembling the iconography of Feronia, was discovered.[29]

Into this picture we have to insert our question: was Terracina a primary or secondary cult place? It is clearly far from the Sabine area, but it is also clear that the cult was of a considerable age. We are possibly dealing with an intermediate situation: the cult may have been brought here by the Volscians around the sixth or fifth century. About the Volscians there is much debate, concerning mainly their origins and ethnic identity. The traditional view sees them as a people originally from central Italy, that is the Sabine area, who moved towards southern Latium around the

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[23] For a recent overview see Ceccarelli & Marroni (2011, 473–503).

[24] Di Fazio (2008).

[25] Plb. 3.22.11. See Scardigli (1991).

[26] Plin. *NH* 3.59: *Tarracina oppidum, lingua Volscorum Anxur dictum*.

[27] Verg. *Aen*. 7.799–800: *Circaeumque iugum, quis Iuppiter Anxurus arvis / praesidet et viridi gaudens Feronia luco*.

[28] Hor. *Sat*. 1.5.24. See Radke (1989, 59–60); Rosso (2010).

[29] Lugli (1926, coll. 59–61); Coppola (1989, 43–4); Rosso (2010).



Figure 5. The shrine of Feronia near Terracina, drawing by C. Labruzzi (from *La Via Appia a Terracina*, Casamari 1988).

sixth and fifth centuries.[30] Thus, they could have been responsible for the introduction of the cult of the goddess in this area.

We must stress that in Terracina Feronia is linked to a young male god, Juppiter Anxur.[31] We know his image from coins (Fig. 6), and possibly even from a marble head from Terracina,[32] and from a sculpture recently discovered in the same centre.[33]

His cult place is traditionally considered to be the scenic sanctuary on Monte Sant'Angelo, on a hill overlooking the settlement of Terracina.[34] The epiclesis *Anxur* or *Anxurus* recalls a pre-Roman root, which should be linked to the Volscian language;[35] this would be a further testimony that the cults of this Juppiter and of Feronia were introduced, at an early

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30 Coarelli (1990); Colonna (1995). The recent proposal by Gatti & Cifarelli (2006) against the traditional view seems to underestimate the linguistic aspect: as far as we know, the Volscian language seems to belong to the Umbro-Sabellian rather than to the Oscan group (see Colonna 1995).

31 Coarelli (1987, 127); Canciani (1997, 422, 460).

32 Celani, in Coarelli (2009, 168).

33 Cassieri & Innico (2009, 378–9).

34 This view has been criticized by Coarelli (1987), according to whom the sanctuary of Monte Sant'Angelo should be attributed to Feronia, who would thus have had two cult places in the same territory; I do not find his proposal persuasive. See the objections in De Cazanove (1993, 123 n. 59). *Cf.* Ceccarelli & Marroni (2011, 491–502).

35 Coarelli (1990, 149).

Figure 6. Coin with Juppiter Anxur (from Canciani 1997).

stage, by the Volscians. We must underline that this pairing between Feronia and a male god implies that the cult was embedded into a wider religious system. There are several interesting analogies between Juppiter Anxur and Soranus, who was linked to Feronia in the territory of Capena. These analogies constitute one of the main points of my research, but will be developed elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is worth stressing this aspect, because it seems to represent another marker of penetration of the cult; it is not by chance that we will not find the same aspect in other situations we will consider.

The next place requires no introduction: Rome. The presence of the cult of Feronia in Rome is confirmed by some facts. Firstly, the Calendar of the Arval Brethren mentions *Feronia in Campo* on the 13th of November (Fig. 7).[36] Livy says that when Hannibal was *ad portas* in 217 the Roman *matronae* were obliged to contribute for a gift to Juno Regina; on the same occasion, the *libertae* carried money for an offering to Feronia.[37] Furthermore, an inscription from Rome records offerings to Feronia by an *ancilla* (although its provenance is uncertain), suggesting again a connection with the lower

[36] *CIL* VI.2295 = *CIL* VI.32482 = *CIL* I^2 p. 214 = *AE* 1953, 264; see Mommsen *CIL* I^2, p. 335. See also Dumézil (1974, 416); Donati & Stefanetti (2006, 143–5).

[37] Liv. 22.1.18.



Figure 7. Calendar of the Arval Brethren (*CIL* VI.2295).

classes.[38] Several scholars have also identified what was probably her cult place: the so-called temple C in the Largo Argentina.[39] In any case, the main question is the date of arrival of the cult of Feronia to Rome.[40] According to Coarelli, it should be placed in the third century, in the years after the

[38] *CIL* VI.147 (p. 3004, 3755) = *CIL* VI.30702 = *ILS* 3477: *urbana esse videtur* (*CIL* VI.147, *ad loc.*). It is a bronze *tabula ansata*, firstly seen in Tuscany around Firenze, Cortona, and Castiglion Fiorentino, then somehow moved to the British Museum (*CIL* VI.30702, *ad loc.*).

[39] Castagnoli (1948, 170–5); Coarelli (1997, 197–9); Pergola (2009). Unfortunately, this identification still lacks definitive proof.

[40] To establish when Feronia made her entrance in Rome would be useful in order to clarify the case of Terracina. A similar problem involves the obscure *Pheronia polis* in Sardinia, known only from Ptol. 3.3.4; this reference has been connected by Torelli with an unsuccessful Roman attempt to establish a colony on the east coast of Sardinia during the fourth century. Torelli connects the information of Diod. Sic. 15.27.4, according to whom the Romans had sent to Sardinia 500 colonists, to the findings in the area of Rio Posada on the eastern coast of the island, among which there is a bronze Hercules of Oscan production: Torelli (1981); *cf.* Mastino (2005); Zucca (2005). The whole hypothesis sounds interesting; but obviously, if Feronia was not yet in Rome at that moment, this proposal should be reviewed.

conquest of Sabinum at the hands of M' Curius Dentatus.[41] He underlines that Livy would have recorded the dedication of a temple to this goddess, so this must have happened in the period for which Livy's books have not survived. Less convincingly, Ziolkowski connects the arrival of Feronia to the battle of Telamon in 225 BC.[42] According to Torelli, it could have been introduced in Rome after the conquest of Capena, in the beginning of the fourth century.[43] Torelli argues that Feronia came to Rome through a ritual of *evocatio*.[44] This possibility, already put forward by Wissowa,[45] was firmly rejected by Basanoff,[46] and the idea is viewed skeptically in more recent works.[47] It is worth noting that at the moment of the conquest, Capena was far less important than in previous centuries, so an *evocatio* seems rather unlikely.

4. *Feronia's Cult along the Via Flaminia*

The next step leads us along the Adriatic side of Italy, to Pisaurum. We have no good information about this site before the Romans, but the area was inhabited by the Picentes and later occupied by the Galli Senones.[48] A Roman colony was founded here in 184 BC.[49] In the middle of the eighteenth century several inscribed *cippi* were discovered with dedications to a good number of divinities.[50] Among these there are some well known to Roman religion, such as Juno, Mater Matuta, and Diana, as well as others mainly connected with Italic religions, for example Marica, and, of course, Feronia (Fig. 8).

The place in which the *cippi* were discovered has been recognised as a sacred grove, of whose history we know very little.[51] The main question is related to the dating of these dedications. The inscriptions are in Latin;

41 Coarelli (1997, 197–8).
42 Ziolkowski (1986; 1992, 25–7).
43 Torelli (1981).
44 Torelli (1982, 128 n. 53).
45 Wissowa (1912, 49).
46 Basanoff (1947, 4).
47 Both Gustafsson (2000) and Ferri (2006) make no reference to this possibility. *Cf.* Stek (2009, 31 n. 102).
48 Peruzzi (1990); Harvey (2006).
49 Liv. 39.44.10; Vell. 1.15.2.
50 *CIL* I^2.368–381 = *ILS* 2970–2983 = *ILLRP* 13–26. *Editio princeps*: Cresci Marrone & Mennella (1984, 89–150).
51 Di Luca (2004).

Figure 8. Cippus from Pisaurum with dedication to Feronia (from Mennella & Cresci Marrone 1984).

this led some scholars to date them after the foundation of the colony.[52] But the kind of Latin of the inscriptions, rough and far from classical, seems rather to suggest an earlier date. Already Mommsen, and in recent times Prosdocimi and Coarelli, suggested that the *cippi* could have been dedicated by Roman and Latin individuals settled before the colony, perhaps in a *conciliabulum* to be linked with the conquest of the *Ager Gallicus* by the Romans in the early third century. They might also have been connected to the allotments of land by Gaius Flaminius in 232. Coarelli describes the cults attested as a kind of 'plebeian pantheon', to be linked with the specific historical situation of Rome in the third century.[53]

In any case, what is important is that the dedications seem to indicate the presence of foreigners settled in this area. As has been underlined,[54] several of the names of worshippers are indeed of Italic origin, and some of them may have been of Sabine origin, for example the *Statios Tetios* who signed the dedication to Feronia. The name *Plaria* is uncommon, but at Pisaurum we find a *flaminica Arria Plaria*; at Lucus Feroniae a *Salvia Plaria liberta* signs a dedication to Feronia. It is therefore likely that the *conciliabulum*, or the colony, had been constituted with the participation of people from outside Rome. In the early second century Rome founded several colonies (Bononia, Potentia, Mutina, Parma); it would have been impossible to send thousands of Roman citizens to each of these places. Therefore, the settlement of colonies had seen the contribution of other Italic peoples,[55] among whom might have been Sabines or Capenates, who would have brought with them their ancestral cults, such as Feronia. As Peruzzi puts it, 'Pesaro è l'area coloniale di un'area coloniale',[56] that is to say a colonial area in which the settlers arrived from a colonial area, Sabinum. But not only Sabines came here: the presence of people from southern Latium would explain the presence at Pisaurum of Marica, a goddess whose cult place was at the mouth of Garigliano river, near Minturnae, a town which was established as colonia in 296 BC.[57]

In this movement of peoples with their cults, Roman roads played an important role. We know how important roads were for the integration

52 Wachter (1987, 432–7); Peruzzi (1990).
53 Coarelli (2000). See Harvey (2006) with *status quaestionis*.
54 Peruzzi (1990, 56–8); Coarelli (2000, 203–5).
55 Panciera (1981, 107). See Roselaar (2011) for the presence of non-Romans in colonies.
56 Peruzzi (1990, 31).
57 For recent research about Marica see Cristofani (1996).

(and also in the exclusion) of communities in Roman Italy.[58] The Via Flaminia was a fundamental route for Roman penetration into north-eastern Italy.[59] It seems no coincidence that along the Flaminia we can see some testimonies of Feronia (Fig. 9): the road passed through the territory of Capena, then to Narnia, where a waterwork seems to have been placed under the protection of Feronia,[60] and through the territory south of Pisaurum to Septempeda, where there are other traces of the goddess,[61] and finally to Ariminum, a colony of the year 268, about 30 kilometres northwest from Pisaurum, where Feronia has been recognized in a marble head.[62]

And from Ariminum, through Ravenna and Adria, the Viae Popilia and Annia, built during the second half of the second century BC, led to Aquileia. It is there that our short overview finishes. Aquileia was settled as a Latin colony in 181 BC, as a sort of frontier bulwark at the northeast corner of Transpadane Italy.[63] Here we find a small dossier of inscriptions recording the cult of Feronia and her worshippers, or rather, her worshipper, as three epigraphs report the same name, Titus Kanius Ianuarius.[64] All inscriptions seem to pertain to the early Imperial period; some of them show links between this goddess and the water element, as for the *collegium* of *aquatores Feronienses* (Fig. 10).[65]

Even in this case, it seems possible to connect this cult with the presence of colonists from Sabinum or central Italy; for instance, they may have been among the 3,000 *pedites* who were sent there at the moment of the foundation of the colony, or maybe among the 1,500 Latin colonists sent in 169 BC as a reinforcement.[66] Several studies on the onomastics of Aquileia have shown a considerable presence of people from central

[58] Bispham (2007, 68–72).

[59] Ashby & Fell (1921); Bradley (2000).

[60] Monacchi (1985); Giontella (2006, 122–4).

[61] *CIL* XI.5711–12. See Marengo (1996, 200).

[62] Rebecchi (1991, 146–8). In the surroundings of Ariminum another cult place is attested in which we find traces (among other gods) of Feronia: the healing sanctuary of Faventia (Bagnacavallo, RA), see Susini (1960). Even in this case, the presence of the goddess has been related to the presence of colonists from Central Italy, see Susini (1976).

[63] Bandelli (2003), with previous bibliography.

[64] *CIL* V.776 (p. 1024) = *CIL* V *429,179 = *ILS* 3483 = *InscrAqu* 1, 200; *CIL* V.992 (p. 1025) = *CIL* V.8307 = *InscrAqu* 1, 201; *CIL* V.8308 = *InscrAqu* 1, 202 = *ILS* 8321; *CIL* V.8218 = *InscrAqu* 1, 199. See (Fontana 1997, 224–6; 2004, 402–3); D'Incà (2005, 357).

[65] *CIL* V.8307–8; Fontana (2004, 403); D'Incà (2005, 357).

[66] Liv. 43.17. See Bandelli (2003).

Figure 9. Map of Roman roads (from W. R. Sheperd, *Historical Atlas* (New York, 1911)).

Figure 10. Inscription from Aquileia (from D'Incà 2005).

Italy.[67] Among these, there were *gentes* from Praeneste,[68] which is precisely one of the sites in which the cult of Feronia can be traced back to early times, as we know from the *Aeneid.*[69] Broadly speaking, it has been underlined several times that the conquest of northern Italy saw a primary role for some Roman leaders, among whom M' Curius Dentatus, M. Claudius Marcellus, and C. Flaminius.[70] Settlers were probably chosen from among their *clientelae*, to which we should add some voluntary immigrants from central Italic areas, willing to exploit the new and empty spaces of Northern Italy.[71] I would not exclude soldiers, though their contribution to the Romanization of Italy has been recently questioned.[72] All this could explain the presence of the cult of Feronia in such a remote place as Aquileia, where she settled side by side with Roman cults, and also with local cults, like Belenus and Timavus.[73] But here, differently from the case of Pisaurum, the cult of Feronia looks more integrated into the religious life of the town, since the signs of her presence are much greater

67 Panciera (1981); Bandelli (1988, 124–6); Chiabà (2003). On the 'Romanization' of the whole area see now Cuscito (2009).

68 Strazzulla (1982); Chiabà (2003, 86–7).

69 Verg. *Aen.* 8.558–60; for the presence of the cult of Feronia in Praeneste see Colonna (1994).

70 Bandelli (2003, 50), with previous references.

71 Gabba (1994, 37–8).

72 Pfeilschifter (2007).

73 Fontana (1997, 136–65).

in number and chronological spread. The reasons for this difference are not clear, and will have to be investigated further.[74]

5. *Conclusion*

It is now time to conclude. I have tried to show the differences between primary and secondary cult places, and to underline how different the depth of a cult can be. This is possible only if we do not lose sight of the aspects of time and space. This distinction brings out some interesting conclusions. A cult that was not originally Roman was introduced in the Urbs in the fourth or third century. The goddess was then carried throughout Italy, following the routes of Roman expansion. To explain this situation we have two possibilities. The first one is that Feronia had so deeply penetrated the Roman religious system that she was perceived to be a Roman goddess, and thus exported in colonies as a means of imposing Roman religion. This possibility is of course rather unlikely: the Roman sources, such as Varro, always felt Feronia to be foreign goddess. The other solution is that she was especially important for people like the Sabines and Capenates. They were not Romans, but had been Romanized at an early stage; they were then involved in the process of the Romanization of the peninsula. This solution seems more likely.

From the long debate on the Romanization of Italy, we know that this was a long and articulated process, with several different phases and different modalities. From the example of Feronia we learn once more that religious Romanization was not only a matter of 'matching' between Roman and local cultures; sometimes it was a matter of three levels: Romans, 'Romanized', and local. What we use to call 'Roman religion', at least during the phase provokingly described as the 'Romanization of Rome',[75] was, in effect, something 'in progress', not simply a product of a 'cultural negotiation', as has been maintained,[76] but perhaps rather of a

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[74] For instance, one of the perspectives to take into account could be the different status, as Pisaurum was a *colonia civium Romanorum* while Aquileia was a *colonia Latina*; but a clear distinction between these categories has been recently questioned, with good arguments (Bispham 2006). Otherwise, the different situation of the two areas before the establishment of the colony could be revealing. Among these reasons, it is worth also considering the huge amount of epigraphical evidence from Aquileia, as Ed Bispham has kindly suggested to me.

[75] Curti (2000, 90–1).

[76] Green (2007, 82–4).

'market-place', a metaphor recently used by Bendlin.[77] On this basis we could review some statements about religious Romanization of Italy.

As a further step, it would be interesting to investigate whether the contribution of peoples like Sabines, Capenates, and others could have been influential on some other fields of Romanness, such as the political and social. The academic debate on the formation of Roman culture during the mid and late Republic has been understandably overwhelmed by analysis of the contribution of the Greek element.[78] Perhaps there has been an underestimation of the contribution of indigenous cultures, which went on providing food to the growing dominant culture; a fact of which men like Cato and Varro, among others, were well aware.[79] A more balanced evaluation would help us to a better understanding of that 'imagined community',[80] and perhaps to contribute to the discussion about the concept of identity, following the perplexities recently expressed by Hölscher.[81] The title of a work by Giardina, who refers to Roman Italy as an 'unaccomplished identity' is illuminating.[82] Of course, our knowledge of the social and political structures of these Italic peoples is so small that, at the moment, a real evaluation of their contribution to the 'imagined community' seems to be a question without answers. Nevertheless, to find the answers is important, but to ask the right questions can be even more important.

[77] Bendlin (2000, 134).

[78] The 2010 exhibition in at the Musei Capitolini in Rome, 'I giorni di Roma. L'età della conquista', is an example.

[79] Rawson (1985). On indigenous presence in Roman colonies see also Bradley (2006).

[80] Laurence (1998, 109); Bispham (2007, 68).

[81] Hölscher (2008, 52–4). For a recent interesting contribution on the subject of Roman cultural identity see Wallace-Hadrill (2008).

[82] Giardina (1997).

TIBURNUS, ALBUNEA, HERCULES VICTOR: THE CULTS OF TIBUR BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND ASSERTION OF LOCAL IDENTITY

Elisabeth Buchet*

1. *Introduction*

I would like to examine here the notions of integration and identity through the prism of religion, more specifically the cults of one Latin city, Tibur. I will try to show, through three examples, that these cults played an essential role in the integration of Tibur into the Roman state, as well as in the resistance to it. I will begin with a brief overview of the relations between Rome and Tibur until the end of the second century BC, before examining the renovations which took place in the city at that time. I will then take a closer look at the three deities we will encounter while studying these renovations.

2. *Tibur's Position in Latium*

Tibur has a rather singular position in Latium. It is located on the lower slopes of the Apennines, at a crossroads of the Latin and Sabellic cultures. It is the gateway to Latium, and a necessary stop for transhumant flocks. Those features partly explain the importance of the city, as well as the particular cultural traits which can be found there, for example the seventh-century circle burials, which seem odd in a Latin city. Ever since Antiquity, doubts have been cast on the Latinity of Tibur, often thought of as a Sabine rather than a Latin city.[1] The cults of Tibur reflect this original situation of a Latin city deeply rooted in Sabellic culture.

Tibur's conquest by Rome proves to be just as atypical. According to Beloch's estimations, Tibur was the largest city in Latium after Rome in the sixth century. Therefore, it must have played a major role in Latium, although we do not know much about this. We know, thanks to Cato, that

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[1] For example Cat. 44.1–5. Tibur was not in the same region as the rest of Latium in the Augustan classification.

the city was part of the Nemi coalition.[2] The fourth century is when the city starts appearing regularly in Livy's account. Even then, it does not seem to play a part in any conflict against Rome until 361, when the Tiburtes, for unknown reasons, forbid entry to the city to the Roman consuls coming back from a campaign. Tibur then takes numerous actions against Rome, even allying itself with Gauls, thus scandalizing Livy. It is finally vanquished in 338, at the end of the Latin war, in which Tibur proved itself a worthy, if unsuccessful, adversary of Rome. Tibur's fate then differs from that of the other cities that fought Rome in this war. It remained a Latin city, with all the rights associated to that status; along with Praeneste, it lived on as an allied state, submitted to the different requirements of that position, but still theoretically independent. Livy writes that the reason for this is the scandalous alliance Tibur and Praeneste struck with the Gauls, 'a barbarian people'. However, this explanation implies that Roman citizenship was a favour granted to conquered cities. A possible explanation of those exceptions would be that Tibur and Praeneste were too big, too far away, and maybe, as Salmon thought, too attached to their own identities, to be digested, so to speak, by the Roman state at that time.[3]

At the end of the second century BC, Tibur was still an allied state. The Tiburtes seem to have enriched themselves considerably through trading on Delos and in the East. In the course of the second century, Tibur started to become a favoured summer resort for the Roman elites, who could escape the heat of the City without being too far away from it. This situation implies numerous contacts between Roman and Tiburtine elites. Around this time, we know of two Tiburtes who gained citizenship through a trial against Roman citizens. Doing so allowed them to acquire a certain level of recognition in Rome; their descendants, if we are to believe Cicero, were highly respected citizens.[4] However, the relationship between Rome and Tibur was not entirely without trouble. Thanks to a *senatus consultum*, dating back to 159, we learn of a mysterious affair involving Tibur.[5] We can only speculate as to the nature of this affair, but the Tiburtes had apparently been accused of something they denied

[2] Cato *Orig.* 2.28 C = fr. 58 P.

[3] Salmon (1982, 53–4).

[4] Cic. *Balb.* 53: *Quo modo igitur L. Cossinius Tiburs, pater huius equitis Romani, optimi atque ornatissimi uiri, damnato T. Caelio, quo modo ex eadem ciuitate T. Coponius, ciuis item summa uirtute et dignitate* (*nepotes T. et C. Coponios nostis*), *damnato C. Masone ciuis Romanus est factus?*

[5] CIL I^2.201.

having ever committed. The *senatus consultum*, although it clears the Tiburtes of all blame, sounds rather threatening; moreover, the Tiburtes were relieved enough to have the letter bearing the news engraved and exposed on their forum, which seems to imply that the outcome could have been rather dire for the city.[6] The strong links between the Tiburtine and Roman elites, and the fact that Tibur apparently did not take part in the Social War, do not mean there were no festering tensions between the two cities.

3. *Tibur's Restructuring and Its Religious Aspects*

It is precisely at the end of the second century that the senate of Tibur began a series of renovations that gave Tibur the look of the great Hellenistic cities, which the Tiburtine traders could admire in Greece and the East. Those important works must have been at least partly paid for by the wealth those same traders had recently acquired. The fact that one of them is an Octavius Graechinus could be seen as proof of this; it is possible he acquired this *cognomen* by trading in Greece. The renovations began at the end of the second century with the restoration of the city walls and of the rectangular temple on the acropolis, and continued well into the first century with the construction of the round temple on the acropolis, the restructuration of the city forum, and, last but not least, the building of the sanctuary of Hercules Victor, a gigantic work, towering above the Anio, which included in its structure part of the Via Tiburtina. It is interesting to note that, although the work seems to have been interrupted during the conflict of the Social War, it continued afterwards, maybe not exactly as planned, but still under the authority of the senate of Tibur, now a municipal senate.[7]

The extent of those works and their sheer magnificence raises the question of why Tibur chose to embellish itself so lavishly. A possible explanation could be that its elites wanted to show they were worthy of Roman citizenship. Another would be that, on the contrary, they showed pride in their city and did not care one bit about Rome. The fact that there are

6 See Bispham (2007, 132): "The Roman Senate here arrogates to itself the right to forgive the Tiburtes—and by implication the right not to forgive in other cases. (…) We must read this text, as far as its implications are guessable, as a reflection of power-relations in which Rome recognized the nominal independence of the Tiburtes while in some spheres she overrode it."

7 See Coarelli (1984, 83–112).

a number of architectural innovations which were not found in Rome at this time could be an indication of the latter:[8] when it came to finding an architectural model, the Tiburtes did not look for it in Rome.

The religious elements certainly point in that direction, if we examine the three temples we know were built or rebuilt at that time. F. Coarelli has very convincingly demonstrated that the temples of the acropolis were dedicated to Albunea and Tiburnus: the round temple to Albunea and the rectangular one to Tiburnus.[9] Tiburnus was the founding hero of Tibur, according to one branch of the legend, which states that Tibur was founded by three Argive brothers, Tiburnus, Catillus, and Coras, Amphiaraos' grandsons. According to another story, Tibur was founded by the Arcadian Catillus, a prefect in Evander's fleet. Albunea was a nymph of the river Anio, which flows through the city and has impressive waterfalls right below the acropolis. She brought *sortes* from the water, as well as a cult statue.[10] Clearly, owning those *sortes* granted the city a certain amount of power. Lastly, there is the monumental sanctuary of Hercules Victor.

4. *Rome's Attempt at Integration and Tibur's Resistance*

I will now take a closer look at these three deities, and examine how the history of their cults reflects that of the relationship between Tibur and Rome.

a) *Tiburnus*

As mentioned earlier, Tiburnus was the founding hero of Tibur in the Argive version of the foundation legend.[11] There are indeed other stories about the foundation of Tibur. The earliest version we know can be found in Cato's *Origines*,[12] which states that it was Catillus, prefect of Evander's fleet, who founded the city. However, I believe the Argive

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[8] Among those innovations we can mention the cryptoporticus used near the forum, the stone theatre included in the structure of Hercules Victor's sanctuary, and the massive substructures used to build this sanctuary, which may have been an inspiration for the architects of the Tabularium in Rome.

[9] Coarelli (1984).

[10] Lact. *Inst.* 1.6.12; *Tib.* 2.5.67.

[11] See in particular Verg. *Aen.* 7.670–1; Serv. *Aen.* 7.670; Hor. *Carm.* 1.7.13; 2.6.5; Mart. 4.57; Ov. *Fast.* 4.71–2; *Amores* 3.6.45–6.

[12] Cato 2.26 Chassignet = 28 P.

version to be local and rather ancient, because the Argive version seems to be the more widespread. This is not a very good reason in itself, but seen with the rest of the evidence it is worth mentioning. There is tangible proof that Tiburnus was worshipped in Tibur, and associated with various areas of the city. For example, we know of the existence of a *Tiburni lucus* on Tibur's acropolis.[13] Tiburnus is mentioned by Pliny the Elder, who writes that in Tibur stood three very ancient holm oaks, even older than the founders of the city, which was itself founded before Rome, and that Tiburnus' inauguration took place under those three oaks.[14] In Pliny's narrative, Tiburnus is Amphiaraos' son; there is no mention of Catillus and Coras. But it means that in Pliny's time there was standing proof that Tiburnus was honoured in Tibur and associated with the number three and with Amphiaraos; the name Tiburnus is never associated with the Arcadian branch of the foundation legend. We could therefore say that it is the Argive legend that prevails in the topography of the city.

One of the most important arguments in favour of the Arcadian origins of Tibur as the original story is that we find this in Cato's *Origines*, and that it is the oldest allusion we have to Tibur's origins. But we might have evidence that as early as the fourth century the Tiburtes were boasting Argive origins. I am referring to Coarelli's analysis of the paintings in the François Tomb.[15] According to him, the paintings in the tomb are organised in such a way as to place some characters in front of their ancestors. According to this theory, the Marce Camitlnas depicted in the act of killing Cneve Tarchunies Rumach could be from Tibur, since his name sounds more Latin than Etruscan, and we find Amphiaraos, Tibur's mythical ancestor, painted in front of him; we must also remember that in some cases Servius Tullius has been said to be from Tibur. In that case, Sisyphus, who is standing near Amphiaraos, would be Tarchunies' ancestor, which fits Coarelli's theory, since Livy assigns Corinthian origins to Tarquinus Priscus. The depiction of a man from Tibur in a fourth-century Etruscan tomb would be perfectly logical, especially since Marce Camitlnas is slaughtering a Roman. In the fourth century, in fact, Tibur played a very important part in the fight against Rome. At the same time, Rome was fighting a coalition of Etruscan cities led by Tarquinia. The Argive origins of Tibur could have been used as 'propaganda' against Rome during

13 Hor. *Carm.* 1.7.13: *Et praeceps Anio ac Tiburni lucus*; Suet. *Vit. Hor.* p. 47 R.
14 Plin. *NH* 16.237.
15 Coarelli (1996, 167–72 = 1983, 62–3).

the fourth-century wars, in the same way as the Vulcians in the François Tomb clearly seem to identify themselves with the Greek warriors fighting Troy, i.e. Rome. If one follows Coarelli's interpretation, the evidence would point further to the Argive story being the local one, as opposed to the Arcadian story.

So why does the Arcadian story exist? It is, to my mind, an attempt, initiated by Rome or Tibur, or, as is more likely, both cities, to create some sort of *syngeneia* between the two cities; the two foundation legends of Lanuvium, by Diomedes or by Lanoios, a friend of Aeneas, form an interesting parallel.[16] We should keep in mind that the incident referred to by the *senatus consultum* mentioned earlier seems to have taken place in 159. And the story of Catillus, Evander's prefect, is told in Cato's *Origines*, which were written somewhere between 180 and 149. So, hypothetically, the story of Tibur's Arcadian origins could have emerged around that time, as an attempt from the Tiburtes and/or the Romans to reinforce the ties between the two cities. It is also possible that this version of the foundation story was born during the Second Punic War, in order to create a stronger bond on the battlefields between Rome's and Tibur's contingents. In that regard, it is interesting to note that Tiburnus' story is the one that seems to have endured, and remained the most widespread version. At the end of the second century, the Tiburtes did not only choose to dismiss any common origin they might have had with Rome; they chose to honour a hero who, being Argive, was essentially anti-Roman.

b) *Albunea*

We find more or less the same process in Albunea's cult. Albunea is an interesting case: she is probably rather ancient, although not much is known about her; however, we know that she had a grove in Tibur.[17] The first evidence we have of her worship might be an Etruscan mirror from Chiusi: the Casuccini mirror, dating back to the fourth century.[18] The date itself, as we have seen before, is interesting. If it is indeed Albunea who is represented here, we might have a very early example of the way the nymph and her oracular power were used against Rome. Once again, building a temple to her where there may well have been none before must be significant.

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[16] See Briquel (2001).
[17] Ps.-Acr. *Ad Hor. Carm.* 1.7.10.
[18] Maggiani (1986).

In the period we are studying several elements must be noted. Firstly, Albunea seems to have been to some extent Romanized in the same way as Tiburnus. Some evidence in Servius points to an identification with Carmenta.[19] I believe that this identification, which links Albunea to Rome's Arcadian past, recalls the story of the foundation of Tibur by Catillus, Evander's prefect; this is why I think it can be dated to the same period, the mid-second century, precisely when the relations between Rome and Tibur seem to have been rather tense.

This attempt at integrating Albunea into Roman myth was rather limited. There is, furthermore, another transformation of Albunea's character which is of special interest to us here: Albunea's *sortes* did not stay in Tibur. They were taken to Rome and joined the Sibylline corpus. I believe that it is because of this transfer that Albunea became, in the minds of the Romans, the tenth Sibyl, as is illustrated in Varro. The way it happened, and why, are of particular interest to us. We know that Albunea's *sortes* were among the prophetic books Augustus had transferred from the Capitol to the Palatine Hill, because they are quoted in Tibullus' poem in honour of Messalinus' installation as *quindecemvir sacris faciundis*, and there is no mention of the fact that Augustus replenished the Sibylline books before taking them to Apollo's temple;[20] on the contrary, Augustus severely amended the existing Sibylline corpus. So, we must assume that Albunea's *sortes* were already in the Sibylline corpus by the time of this transfer. Although Tibur does not appear in the story of the three legates commissioned in 76 BC by the Senate to bring back the oracles of the Sibylla Erythrea after the temple of Iuppiter Capitolinus burnt down in 83, it is safe to think that Tibur was one of the Italian cities mentioned by Dionysius, quoting Varro.[21]

According to F. Coarelli, there is an inscription on Albunea's temple in Tibur which might help explain what triggered the transfer of the *sortes* to Rome. We can read [...] E.L. GELLIO L. F. The inscription is badly damaged and its interpretation is difficult. I should add that this inscription seems to be written over another one. Coarelli identifies this Gellius with L. Gellius L. f. Poplicola, praetor in 94 and consul in 72, a rather lacklustre career. Thanks to Lactantius, we know that one of the legates commissioned to retrieve the Sibylline oracles was named M. Otacilius. And we

19 Serv. *Aen.* 8.336.
20 Tib. 2.5.67–8.
21 Dion. Hal. 4.62.5–6. See Coarelli (1987, 106–10) for this reconstruction.

have a M'. Otacilius in Pompeius Strabo's *consilium*, along with a L. Gellius, who was, therefore, close to the matter. F. Coarelli argues that the prophecy used by Lentulus in the Catiline conspiracy, which stated that three Cornelii, namely Sulla, Cinna, and himself, were destined to rule Rome, was not invented by Lentulus, but had been used before, probably by Cinna. We know that after he was expelled from Rome in 87 he went for help specifically to Tibur and Praeneste, well known oracular, as well as Marianist, cities.[22] According to F. Coarelli, it was the help Albunea brought to the Marianists that resulted in the transfer of Albunea's *sortes* to Rome, probably under Gellius' authority, whose name was then engraved on Albunea's temple over that of a Marianist magistrate. This may be what boosted Gellius' otherwise undistinguished career, since he finally held the consulate a few years later. Whatever happened, taking the *sortes* away from Tibur was akin to denying the city control over its own fate.

Albunea's case reflects perfectly the history of the relations between Rome and Tibur from the fourth century onwards. The oracular capacity of the goddess granted the Tiburtes power over fate, and therefore was an effective weapon against Rome, and also, possibly, against Sulla in Cinna's case. It became increasingly necessary for the Roman state to take possession of that power, so that it might harness it to its own needs, explaining why the Tiburtes were deprived of their *sortes*. We might see a confirmation of this in the fact that there is some evidence that the Tiburtes later tried to regain part of the influence they lost with Albunea's *sortes*. Evidence for this can be seen in the way they handled the *sortes* of Hercules.

c) *Hercules Victor and His* Sortes

It would take much too long to study here Hercules' cult in Tibur in its entirety. However, there is an element of this cult which, I believe, is particularly relevant to the notions of integration and identity, namely the oracular capacity of Hercules in Tibur. The city is not unique in that regard. Ostia, for example, also had an oracle of Hercules. However, it is the fact that this oracle seems to be rather recent, which is of interest to us here. We know Hercules had a cleromantic oracle in Tibur thanks to two elements. The first is an allusion in Statius describing the beauty of Tibur: *Quod ni templa darent alias Tirynthia sortes, / et Praenestinae*

22 App. *BC* 1.65. However, Tibur's allegiance remains unclear.

poterant migrare sorores.[23] The comparison with Fortuna's sanctuary at Praeneste does not allow much doubt: Hercules' oracle in Tibur is cleromantic. The second is a late-republican inscription discovered in the sanctuary which bears the words: *DELANEI H.V. SORTIAR*.[24] Those words are inscribed on a small piece of marble. *Sortiar* has baffled scholars over time. It has sometimes been understood as an abbreviation of *sortiarium*, meaning *sortum*. More convincingly, however, is the possibility that it should be interpreted as an abbreviation of *sortiarius*, which would be the local word for the Roman *sortilegus*.[25] The evidence is rather thin, and, above all, rather late.

This lack of evidence has led J. Champeaux to believe that this oracle of Hercules was a later addition to the cult, probably in the course of the first century BC, in order to compete with Fortuna's sanctuary in Praeneste;[26] Statius' verses could be an illustration of the competition between the two sanctuaries. J. Champeaux therefore believes Hercules' sanctuary might have taken back Albunea's oracle. I would like to follow this idea further: the name of the priest in charge of the *sortes*, the *sortiarius*, an ancient, typically Tiburtine, word, appears to be at odds with the fact that this oracle probably did not exist before the first century BC, which coincides with the transfer to Rome of Albunea's *sortes*. An inscription presumably bearing the name of a priestess of Albunea was also found in Hercules' sanctuary.[27] It is very likely that the cleromantic oracle in Hercules' sanctuary was created as a means to fill the void left by Albunea's *sortes*, and thus regain some of the power and the influence these *sortes* had granted Tibur all those years, even though it might not have been Albunea's *sortes* that were transferred to Hercules' sanctuary. The fact that they were made part of the Sibylline corpus seems to indicate that they were not cleromantic in nature, whereas Hercules' *sortes* seem to have been in the same category as Fortuna's. Whatever their nature, I believe that Hercules' *sortes*, giving back some oracular power to the city, even as it became a *municipium*, is a strong indication that, at least regarding their religious identity, the Tiburtes were reluctant to surrender matters into the hands of Rome.

It may be symptomatic that after Tibur became a *municipium*, Hercules' sanctuary became an object of rivalry between Octavius and Antony,

23 Stat. *Silv*. 1.3.79–80.
24 CIL I^2.1484.
25 Klingshirn (2006).
26 Champeaux (1994, 21–5).
27 CIL 14.4262.

and no longer between Rome and Tibur; the devotion of Antony to his ancestor Hercules is well known, and he used Tibur as his headquarters for some time. This may explained why Augustus spent quite a lot of time in the sanctuary,[28] perhaps trying to appropriate the deity his rival had worshipped. As Tibur became fully integrated in the Roman city, its cults retained some of their political significance, but in was in Roman politics they henceforth played a part.

5. *Conclusion*

In conclusion, I hope to have illustrated, through these few examples, how important local cults are to the study of integration and identity in Latium, especially in a city like Tibur, where the evidence is otherwise rather scarce. Albunea and Hercules Victor show us how the cults of a Latin city gradually start playing a part in Roman politics, rather than in Tibur's 'international' policy. However strong the links between Tiburtine and Roman elites, it seems that at the end of the second century the Tiburtes were still strongly asserting their own religious identity. Moreover, once the city became a *municipium*, they were not ready to let go of that identity, as can be seen through the example of Albunea's and Hercules' *sortes*. This general attitude towards their cults shows, in my opinion, that the Tiburtes still thought of themselves as a separate entity, which was maybe in keeping with Tibur's reputation for pride.

[28] Suet. *Aug.* 2.72.2.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Saskia T. Roselaar*

1. *General Conclusions*

It is clear from the articles in this volume that the integration of Italy under Roman rule was a complex process, which showed many local and regional variations. Only in the late first century had the Italian languages mostly disappeared and the cultural expression of Italian towns become more uniform, both on a large scale, such as in the layout of towns, public buildings, administration, and on a small scale, such as material artefacts, burial rituals etc. Nevertheless, local identity remained important; towns now employed the Latin language and *koine* culture to express their own identity. Larinum, discussed by Robinson, is a good example of how the identity of Italian towns transformed during the last centuries of the Roman Republic, and the new ways in which local pride could be expressed; similar processes are visible in Perusia, as discussed by Neil.

On the other hand, the influence of Roman conquest cannot be denied. Rome itself was undeniably changed during the last centuries BC. Its conquest of a Mediterranean empire brought with it many changes in Roman material culture, mentality, and eventually politics, as the Republican constitution was unable to deal with the increase in territory. The culture of the Romans, especially the upper classes, became more Hellenized—although there were limits to this Hellenization, since to show too much devotion to Greek culture in public was not acceptable—but this was not only the case in Rome itself. Most of the Italian peoples had already been in contact with Greeks for many centuries, either with the Greek colonies in southern Italy or with Greece directly. However, before the Roman conquest these contacts had not yet led to such a level of cultural uniformity as appeared afterwards. Therefore, the cultural changes in Italy, and especially the appearance of a cultural *koine* and the use of Latin throughout the peninsula, must be considered the result of the Roman conquest.

This indicated that profound cultural and linguistic changes would be most likely to appear only in a situation of continuous, intensive contact

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between Italian peoples and Romans, or after a long time of belonging to the Roman state. The articles in this volume have tried to highlight some of the aspects of this process, by investigating in which contexts such intensive contacts could have occurred.

A few of these 'points of contact' are discussed in this volume, such as settlement patterns. As Bispham discusses, colonization which included both Romans and Italians would lead to cultural influence from both sides; it is clear that in Antium the 'Italian' aspects of identity were, for a long time, just as important as the 'Roman'. Colonization did not occur everywhere in Italy, so that many Italians had no Roman colonies nearby; nevertheless, many interactions still took place between Romans and Italians in areas which were not colonized. Patterson and Lomas explore some of these networks, such as bonds of intermarriage and patronage. Such contacts are not always easy to trace, as in the case of Perusia; no colonies were located nearby, and no examples of individual contacts are known. Nevertheless, even in such cases, 'Rome' and its culture became increasingly important for the Etruscans in this town, at first as an 'Other' against which Etruscan culture could be reinforced, then as something to be associated with. The process of cultural change in this town was slower than that of areas with more intensive contacts with Rome, but change occurred all the same.

The army is another location of interaction on a daily basis. As Rosenstein explains, army life offered plenty of opportunities for interaction between Roman and Italian soldiers, even if in actual battle they fought in separate units. However, not all Italian peoples served equally often in the Roman army; some were more often called up, and, within each people, only some men were actually sent to serve. This type of interaction would, therefore, only have been important for some Italian groups. Not only contacts between Rome and the Italians were maintained through military service; Kent argues that the conclusion of mutual defence treaties and mercenary service was a general phenomenon throughout Italy. Thus, military service was also an important mechanism for integration between different Italian peoples.

A third area of interaction was the administration of Rome's growing Italian territory. Even if some Italians received full or partial citizenship, it remains to be seen how much influence this would have had on their daily lives. Most of those who had citizenship would not have exercised their right to vote; indeed it might have been only the elites who took part in politics at Rome. Local politics would not have been much influenced by contact with Rome; as Sacchi shows, even in Campania, a relatively 'Romanized' area of Italy, with many informal contacts with Rome

and Roman *praefecti* as administrators, some parts of pre-existing local administration remained in place and local identity remained strong until the first century BC.

Economic relations were another obvious point of communication. Hoyer investigates the consequences of Roman conquest for the region of Samnium; he argues that this area already had long-standing economic relationships with various areas in and outside of Italy, and Roman presence only stimulated these contacts, rather than causing fundamental changes in the Samnite economy. Roselaar's paper yields similar results: Italians were already active in overseas trade before the Roman conquest, and these economic relations continued when Italy became subject to Roman hegemony. In fact, Rome even encouraged Italian economic welfare by protecting Italian traders. Ñayo del Hoyo and Principal investigate the role of economic relations with Rome for an area in Spain with a less developed pre-Roman trade network. It is clear that trade with the Romans, resulting from the presence of the Roman army, led to cultural change among the local population.

Contacts with Rome naturally did not always immediately result in a desire to associate with Roman culture. As Roth suggests, the first contacts between Romans and Italians in the fourth and third centuries BC led, in fact, to a clearer delineation of the identity of several Italian groups, in an attempt to demarcate themselves more clearly from the 'Other': namely Rome. A similar process may have occurred in Etruscan Perusia in this period.

Such firmly delineated groups were used by the Romans for their own purposes. Cato, for example, in his *Origines* illustrates the importance of several Italian peoples for Roman history; this would have both reinforced the claim that Italy belonged to Rome, as well as strengthened the feeling of belonging to the Roman state among Italians, as Jefferson shows. Such a process of appropriation of Italian cultural elements is also visible in religion. The cult of Feronia is a good example of this; according to Di Fazio, this goddess, originally of Italian origin, was adopted by the Romans and appears in many colonies. The non-Roman origin of this deity was not explicitly acknowledged, in contrast to that of Juno Sospita; her association with Lanuvium was constantly emphasized, as Hermans explains. In this case, the Italian contribution to Roman religion was clearly considered important.

It must be made very clear that the 'Italians' were not a uniform group in this period. As indicated by Patterson, there were tensions between various Italian peoples, and even within each individual people. It was only in the late second century that the Italians were able to formulate

a coherent Italian identity and policy, in opposition to the Roman state. They used claims of blood relations with the Romans to back up their claims for Roman citizenship.

It must also be emphasized that the individual Italian would not experience a unilinear development from Italian to Roman. According to the situation an Italian could exploit various aspects of his cultural and linguistic heritage, sometimes expressing himself as a member of an Italian community, sometimes as a Roman. Langslow explores this process for the linguistic changes taking place in Italy; various languages could be used at various times. In most Italian regions it was not until the late first century BC, or even first century AD, that Latin was used exclusively.

The complex dialogue of identities is especially clear for the late second century BC, when Italians actively began to strive for Roman citizenship. Although Cato had already acknowledged the importance of the Italian contribution to Roman history, the Romans were very reluctant to share Roman citizenship with Italians. After various attempts to expel Italians from Rome, discussed by Tweedie, they were even ready to wage a costly war to prevent Italians gaining this right, as Kendall explores. In hindsight, it seems difficult to explain the reluctance of the Romans to share the citizenship, because a cultural *koine* and shared language appeared relatively quickly after the Social War.

This, however, does not sufficiently acknowledge the large differences that still existed in Italy in the late second century. It was the grant of Roman citizenship itself that may have been an important stimulant for further cultural and linguistic integration. Furthermore, the cultural unity of Italy was particularly emphasized by the emperor Augustus, who wished to acknowledge the contributions of all Italy to his regime. For example, Buchet explores how, even after the Social War, the local pride of the town of Tibur remained very important. Only in the late first century BC did cultural unity emerge quickly, but this makes it more difficult to distinguish the wide cultural differences that still existed in the late second century BC. If we take this into account, the Roman reluctance to share citizenship is more easily understood.

2. *Further Research*

Despite the amount of recent work on integration and identity formation in Republican Italy, there are still many issues that remain unexplained. Firstly, the correlation between various types of integration, such as

economic, geographical, political, and cultural, is not clearly understood. It is possible that Italians who had received Roman citizenship were quicker to adopt Roman culture than allies, or that those who lived near to a Roman colony or maintained frequent contacts of trade or intermarriage, experienced more influence from Rome. However, it is clear that there was not always a direct correlation between different types of integration. Even today different cultural groups living close together do not always adopt each other's culture; in fact, they may emphasize their own cultural distinctiveness in order to differentiate themselves from their neighbours.

It may be possible to investigate the relative importance of each of these aspects by looking at the economic and cultural developments of various regions in Italy. Increased contact with Romans and growing integration of Italians into the Roman state will have caused changes in the local economy of the Italian communities. In this volume Hoyer, Neil, and Robinson have argued that there is no evidence for depopulation of conquered areas; rather than postulating economic decline,[1] they have instead argued that there is overwhelming evidence for increasing economic prosperity. With this economic prosperity came cultural transformation, as many Italian cities and sanctuaries were remodelled in a monumental Hellenistic style. This development seems to have been widespread throughout Italy, even in areas which previous scholarship described as being in decline. By investigating a number of Italian regions, we may be able to explain in more detail the role of various types of contact and integration. Did areas which had full Roman citizenship experience different economic and cultural developments than allied communities? Or was economic development dependent on the amount of participation in the Roman army or social contacts between Italian and Roman elite families? Or was economic prosperity achieved independently from Rome, through trade outside of Italy, which had been going on before the Roman conquest?

A further issue that needs more study is the exact way in which day-to-day contacts led to cultural change on a larger scale. The simple fact that an area became part of the Roman state is insufficient to explain transformations on such as scale as in Italy. Who exactly were the instigators of such changes? Local Italian elites would be the obvious choice,

[1] E.g. Toynbee (1965).

since they were well positioned to experience both life in Rome itself, and to maintain contact with overseas areas, such as Greece. Furthermore, it was they who stood to benefit most from a close association with Rome, since this would bring them political influence within the new regime, as well as the possibility of economic benefits in the new Mediterranean empire. However, not all areas in Italy experienced the same level of cultural change, even if their elites were closely connected to Rome or to Greece. Indeed, too close an association with Rome may have had negative effects for their standing in their home towns, as they were seen to abandon their local communities. Italian elites therefore had to walk a fine line between pro- and anti-Roman behaviour. However, the cultural change that is visible in Italy is unlikely to have been so great if only the Italian male upper classes had been involved.

A more detailed investigation of personal relations is therefore in order. In the case of intermarriage, for example, the role of the women involved has not yet been studied at all. Did Roman women marry Italian men? If so, how much of an influence did they have on their husbands? And, if Roman men married Italian women, what consequences would this have had? Similarly, in the case of the army, the lines of communication between Roman commanders and soldiers, Italian leaders and their subjects, and their Italian hometowns, should be explored further—who communicated his experience in the army to the home front, and how? Were the Italian army commanders who fought for Rome the same people who held leading positions in their own communities?

Other locations of day-to-day contact have not received any attention. For example, it may be supposed that trade took place between Romans and Italians on a fairly local level, for example at markets in colonies, at Italian sanctuaries, weekly village *nundinae*, in the wake of Roman armies active in the peninsula, and during seasonal transhumance through the territories of various peoples. If we can get a clearer picture of who attended such markets, then we may be able to shed light on the type of contacts that took place, and, very importantly, the role of non-elite Italians and Romans in cultural transformation.

Furthermore, the continuing variations within Italy in the first century BC and throughout the imperial period should be studied in more detail. It is often thought that all Italy shared the same language and culture after the Augustan cultural reform, but this is not the case. Italians were aware of their local history, and were proud to broadcast their local identity in public. For example, an inscription from Interamna Nahars dating to AD 32 commemorates the foundation of the town 704 years before (i.e. in

673 BC); clearly, the town was proud of its history, and it was not the only place erecting such monuments.[2]

It is clear that for some of these questions the source material may not be sufficient to answer all the questions I have just presented. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of the number of issues that are still unanswered for this period, and to try to find possible explanations for the fundamental transformations that took place in Italy in the last centuries of the Republic. It is to be hoped that further research into processes of integration and identity formation in the Roman Republic will be able to answer at least some of these questions.

[2] Bradley (2000, 13–14).

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